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The academic recognition of human geography as a 
discipline of knowledge is determined by the 
definitional rigours of scientific criteria. The 
development of human geography has been largely 
orchestrated by the philosophical underpinnings of 
`normal' science. Logical positivism has prescribed the 
epistemological and methodological dictums of its terms of 
reference as well as for the meaning of rationality and 
social reality. The scientific paradigm otherwise 
validates and affirms the credibility of human geography 
as a social science. Many of its presumptions have been 
adopted from those employed in the physical and biological 
sciences. Empiricism and nominalism are the fundamental 
axioms for the investigation of socio-spatial phenomena by 
the 'scientific method'. 
Recent developments in geographic thought challenge this 
view. The emergence of alternative themes in human 
geography - namely those of structuralism and 
reflexivity - have appealed either to a Marxist critique 
of political economy or to phenomenology and 
existentialism in an attempt to uncover the dynamics of 
interaction between man and his spatial environment. 
The pluralistic face of human geography has not only 
raised a hermeneutic dilemma but also questions the 
acceptability of 'normal' science and the parameters which 
it seeks to impose. 
The ethos of this study is grounded in the presupposition 
that all the major philosophical positions which currently 
influence geographical research and education must 
initially tackle the question and purpose of human 
existence. Its contention is that the individual social 
actor cannot be objectified as an impersonal particular 
within the corpus of geographic inquiry. Nor can he be 
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made subordinate to technico-scientific, ideological or 
philosophical contingencies. 
Moreover, the ontological clarification of socio-spatial 
relations is a necessary precondition for the formulation 
of an epistemological standpoint and of methodological 
procedure. Failing this, human geography cannot adequately 
explain present-day spatial problems and must either 
resort to some emancipatory futuristic view of 'optimistic 
humanism' quo, utopian idealism, or concede that pessimism 
and nihilism constitute the actual epistemological 
backcloth of its premises. 
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PREAMBLE 
The central thesis of this study is based on the 
contention that there is a pressing need to reappraise 
the epistemological status of human geography in 
education. This charge, in turn, demands a 
clarification of the philosophical terms of reference 
which underpin the theory and practice in human 
geography. Equally, it is a necessary precondition 
towards the formulation of an epistemological backcloth 
and a methodological procedure whose orientation is 
geared to a reconstitution of socio - spatial reality. 
This issue is fundamental to the educational context of 
human geography as an applied discipline of knowledge in 
the social sciences insofar that it is an expression of 
the authenticity and credibility of its content. 
Epistemology and methodology in human geography must, 
however, be preceded by the ontological imperative. Put 
otherwise, in order to tackle the question of 'how do we 
know' - that is, the reality of the categories which 
support either the promulgation of a truth, or the 
exposure of an untruth - it is first necessary to verify 
the postulate of what 'there-is' that needs to be known -
that is, to establish the origins and nature of existence 
of which geographical phenomena are a part. 
The contemporary development of human geography has 
largely appealed to the scientific method for its 
validation and academic respectability. In so doing, 
geography has primarily allied itself to the tenets 
expounded by logical positivism. More recently, the 
areas of syllabus development, curriculum innovation and 
the structure of teaching-learning relations have been 
increasingly orchestrated by the vested interests of 
governmental and corporative agencies. These have 
tended to impose debilitating financial and ideological 
constraints on the social sciences in general so that 
any notion of 'progress' and 'development' broadly 
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corresponds to their institutionalization within the 
technocratic scientific state. A moribund and uncaring 
human geography, stripped of any measure of critical 
reflexivity, and which is increasingly compelled to pay 
lip-service to a stereotyped educational policy grounded 
in state ideology, is a reflection of its entrenchment in 
a positivist-inductive mould of enquiry. The potentially 
totalizing impact of the technocratic orthodoxy, together 
with a naturalistic and impersonal science, renders the 
impending fossilisation of geography in education as a 
condition of its survival. 
Moreover, the inherent danger of the steady erosion and 
ultimate surrender of affective values (particularly the 
role of social ethics and the exercising of independent 
judgement and freewill) in geographical decision-making 
invites a complete dehumanisation of human geography. A 
human geography that is compelled by legislation or 
which elects through ideological persuasion, to collude 
in a political process of the anaesthetization of 
knowledge in education will soon discover that its 
function is reduced to a position akin to a socio- 
spatial rigormortis. This view of a cumulative shift 
towards the 'epistemological blinkering' of human 
geography echoes some of the anxieties expressed by Graves 
(1981) as well as reinforcing the ground for Johnston's 
(1986) pessimistic outlook. Current educational policy 
strongly suggests that geographers increasingly risk 
becoming inebriated within the confines of a limited and 
monotonous philosophical discourse, whose methodological 
expression is marked by the non-explanation of external 
phenomena and events. 
The intensification of developmental constraints, 
distributional imbalances and the apparent mismanagement 
of environmental resources have increasingly focused 
attention of the social organisation of space from the 
local level to the international domain. In response to 
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these problems, human geography has, to some extent, 
gradually begun to widen its philosophical and 
methodological horizons, thereby challenging the 
legitimacy of the scientific qua positivistic status quo 
which predominates in the social sciences per se. These 
trends have precipitated a plurality of paradigms within 
geographic thought whose thematic content attempts to 
cover a wide range of considerations from social justice 
and mutual self-understanding to the meaning of 
emancipation and realism. All are fundamentally 
preoccupied with the complexity of intersubjective 
relations and man's existential interaction with and 
understanding of space and place. This would seem 
positively invigorating for the dynamics and well-being 
of geographic inquiry but is, at the same time, fraught 
with problems. 	 Competing paradigms do not generally 
enjoy a peaceful coexistence. Rather, the fragile 
concept of parallelism will readily collapse as soon as 
a paradigm seeks to impose itself with view to 
invalidating the propositional truth-claims of any 
juxtaposed standpoints. The tenets which are propounded 
by any one particular school of thought do not easily 
lend themselves towards an accommodation with the 
categories exposed by another. The tension generated by 
the irreconcilabilities of philosophical disagreement is 
unlikely to lead to a genuine consensus in human 
geography until certain preconditions are met. Failing 
this, the contribution of human geography to the wider 
spectrum of the unity (totality) of knowledge will 
remain fragmentary and problematic as long as its own 
espistemological position is obscure. Essentially, this 
study undertakes a broad philosophical critique of the 
limitations and deficiencies of the scientific method. It 
attempts to achieve this by uncovering the inconsistencies 
which are grounded in the pre-suppositions that underpin 
the terms of reference of the main paradigmatic approaches 
in scientific thought. Its ramifications on the nature 
and constitution of empirical reality can be used to 
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identify the ways in which ideological contradictions and 
self-deception have been superimposed on and integrated in 
the areas of human rationality and scientific reason. For 
geographers in education, this has a significant bearing 
on the interpretation and meaning of socio-spatial 
reality, that is, towards a sufficient explanation of 
social process and spatial structure. 
Normal science - with geography as an integral part of 
its corpus - is geared to providing an atomistic and 
exclusively causal explanation of the phenomenal world. 
In geographical terms, this implies the scientific and 
technical domination of the natural environment as well 
as the manipulation of individual social factors located 
in specific spatial contexts. Research findings in 
theoretical physics have compelled the scientific 
community at large to recognise that much of the phenomena 
which underpin the symptomatic manifestation of empirical 
reality are grounded in an indeterminate acausality. The 
interplay of meta-inferences has also been acknowledged by 
other disciplines of science - biology and psychology in 
particular - and would appear to have an equally important 
leaning on the epistemological foundations and development 
of the social sciences, albeit problematic. Mysticism and 
spirituality are endemic to the question of existence and 
cosmological understanding as well as the problems 
inherent in the human condition with which geography is 
concerned in a spatio-environmental context. Geographical 
inquiry increasingly demands an holistic approach to the 
interpretation of man-space-place relations, rather than 
one which attempts to isolate particular aspects of the 
socio-spatial mosaic. 
The ambiguities and inconsistencies which pervade the 
existential dilemma of human geography largely arise 
from the confusion and uncertainty associated with the 
mechanics and tempo of external events. The global 
dysfunctions prevalent in the organisation of society 
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and space suggest that the categories which underpin 
rationality, reason and reality have become distorted 
and mis-represented. In the last resort, the apparent 
opacity of these problems and the ineffectiveness of human 
action to resolve them points to the inability and/or 
unwillingness of the individual actor to internalize the 
feedback which he receives in his social relations with 
the 'outside' world. The redressing of the balance is 
contingent upon a re-evaluation of the motives, intentions 
and values which constitute the basis of decision-making 
(knowing) and action (doing). Failing this, human 
geography risks participating in the tendency towards a 
condition of 'collective psychosis' (see Koestler 1978). 
Nor does an instrumentalist philosophy of geography geared 
to the terms of the 'survival value' qua materialist 
imperative provide a solution on account of its impersonal 
terms of reference. By this token, the contribution of 
neo-Darwinian theory to the applied social sciences has 
done little to enhance geographical awareness in 
education. 
The preoccupation with understanding and explanation - and 
particularly when related to the antimonies of human 
behaviour in socio-spatial practise - is otherwise a 
search for meaning and order in geographical phenomena. 
This is marked by an impending need for the affirmation of 
the personal and unique within the totality of human 
social relations. 
	 That there should be any order at all 
clearly points to the fact that it is inherent in the 
cosmos. Progress in human geography is restricted by 
concepts such as 'randomness' and 'chance' since this 
would suggest that man is the author of his own existence 
and that all things can be known exhaustively. Rather, the 
ecosystem tends to exhibit a purposefulness by design 
whose unity-within-diversity constitutes the basis for 
man's participatory interaction in the natural world. By 
this measure, man exercises a quasi-autonomous function 
within the given order of things. Exhaustive knowledge of 
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a cosmological 'organising principle' always seems to 
`point beyond itself' (see Munitz 1987). Atomistic 
knowledge thus collapses into the domain of metaphysical 
speculation. 
This study attempts to make a case for an 'eco-spiritual' 
approach to the social organization of spatial structures 
in human geography in education. Its central thesis urges 
a respect for the developmental limitations and uses of 
environmental resources through the mutual reciprocation 
of human responsibility, dignity and accountability in the 
distribution of goods and services. It rejects the 
technico-scientific view of growth which admits to the 
proliferation of geographical imbalances and disparities 
within and between regions on the basis of an enforced 
commercial pressurizing of both society and the 
environment (see Lindfield 1986). The promulgation of o, 
`materialist ethic' based on the accumulation of goods ad 
infinitum clearly precipitates the structural 
disintegration of the social and spatial fabric of human 
relations. The relative strength of the 'technocratic 
rationality' in human geography is partly a reflection of 
the spiritual (inner) impoverishment of Western socity. 
Much of the enterprise of human geography is sapped in 
`energy-draining' activities rather than those which are 
`life-enhancing' and which correspond to the fulfillment 
of both material and spiritual need (see Bord and Bord 
1983). 
In order to tackle these problems, human geography must 
explore those avenues which promote the activation of 
unconscious awareness (intuition and perception) in 
cognitive reception and understanding. This permits 
those perspectives which are of concern to geographic 
inquiry to be reconsidered from the standpoint of an 
`alternative' reality. Whilst human geography in 
education tends to be culture - specific in terms of the 
backcloth upon which its structures of knowledge are 
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constituted, the tenets of its epistemological claims are 
ultimately grounded in philosophy and belief systems. 
The case made here is thus: that the validation of any 
propositional truth-claims expounded through the 
epistemological context of geographical science in 
education rests unequivocably on the clarification of an 
ontology of socio-spatial relations. This, in turn, 
confirms the measure of adequacy attached to the meaning 
of empirical reality in humo,n geography. The 
explication of these issues is both necessary and 
inescapable to the field of applied social science for 
which geographers in education surely bear a heavy 
responsiblity. 
INTRODUCTION: THE DEHUMANISATION OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 
Contemporary human geography - alongside all other 
disciplines in the social sciences - is locked in an 
identity crisis. By definition, it is concerned with the 
process and structure of human socio-spatial 
relationships, but as a part of the grand ensemble of 
science, it is seemingly compelled to adopt the procedural 
methods and the connotative terms of reference acceptable 
to this body of thought. Yet, the very ethos of scientific 
theory and practice, and the consensus which supports its 
current paradigmatic status, is one of contingency. 
Moreover, science - with human geography as a part of its 
corpus - is fast eclipsing the subject of its enquiry, 
man. Scientific knowledge reflects man's philosophical 
nominalism and his idealism. It not only has an uncertain 
and wavering epistemological basis, but equally lacks any 
sound ontological foundations. Any claim of certitude in 
the areas of reason and reality on the basis of human 
material and physiological existence is proving to be 
shallow. 
The efforts of 'normal' science and instrumentalism to 
provide an adequate explanation and understanding about 
the socio-spatial organisation of society fein 
rationalism. Their assertions are speculative because they 
are unable to confirm man's purpose or place in the world 
in the context of his existential finitude. Save, at the 
last resort, an appeal to the scientifically unacceptable 
sphere of metaphysics, 'normal' science preoccupies itself 
in the circularity of empiricism and must ultimately 
concede that the intrinsic nature of man as a socio-
spatial actor is either obscure and discursively 'silent', 
or that it is non-existent. 
The historical development of geographic thought and 
geography in education has been comprehensively reviewed 
since 1945 (see Graves 1980. 1980a; Stoddart 1981a, 
1981b), but it is only since the late 1960s that Western 
geography has begun to critically examine the 
16 
philosophical premises which underpin its theoretical 
presuppositions, and those which might possibly be 
explored. Huckle (1983) shows that the new geography' of 
the 1960s has remained influential in terms of its ongoing 
impact on curriculum structure. The educational 
curriculum, of which geography is a part, is largely 
defined by the prevailing political and corporative 
interests. 	 The insistence on a positivist scientific 
method and a technocratic instrumentalism to pursue 
spatial problems has not however, gained unequivocal 
support in human geography. The limitations and 
shortcomings of the positivist epistemology have imposed 
an increasingly conservative and authoritarian grip on 
education in general. All disciplines of knowledge are 
subsumed into the social process and spatial structure; 
positivism and instrumentalism fail to diagnose the causes 
of socio-spatial disparities and imbalances. Their 
methodological and philosophical rigidity are both 
stifling and insensitive towards any expression of the 
aesthetic, ethical and spiritual needs of people. 
Human geography as a positivist social science has largely 
been preoccupied with de-ontologising the apparent 
restrictive and paralysing theistic basis of knowledge. 
Darwin's evolutionary theory provided science with an 
emancipatory premise for a new naturalistic and 
experimental status from which it might construct fresh 
epistemological perspectives. Bowler (1983), however, 
notes that the fortunes of Darwinian ideas were only 
revived when the modern 'synthetic theory' of evolution 
was advanced in the 1930s. Further, Julian Huxley's 
campaign for a revival of Darwinism did much to re-
establish the theory as a central feature of scientific 
thinking. Although a good deal of Huxley's platform was 
based on the naturalistic 'necessity' to purge any element 
of divine control from scientific thought once and for 
all, he ultimately sought some form of evolutionary 
humanism with a quasi-religious content, but one 
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essentially free from all connotations of external 
supernatural beings: "Religion today is imprisoned in a 
theistic frame of ideas, compelled to operate in the 
unrealities of the dualistic world... with the aid of our 
new vision it has the opportunity of escaping from the 
theistic impasse and of playing its proper role in the 
real world of unitary existence" (Huxley 1961, 46). 
De Chardin's (1979) evolutionary monism had outlined 
similar objectives and was subsequently supported by 
Huxley. These efforts were shortlived and soon collapsed 
into a hard, deterministic scientific behaviourism which 
fully embraced positivist philosophy and its empirical 
methodology (Lorenz, Pavlov, Skinner and Desmond Morris). 
All social behaviour could then be explained in bio-
genetic jargon devoid of any ethical commitment. 
Behaviourism did not escape the attention of human 
geography which saw it as an opportunity to gain 
intellectual credibility and scientific respect and 
recognition. Wilson (1985) has more recently argued that 
sociobiology can explain religious beliefs and practices 
by reducing them to the terms of the individual biological 
organism. Wilson - as with his predecessors - concedes 
the necessity for a quasi-religious evolutionary humanism 
in order to 'rationalise' the meta-constituents of the 
human condition. Such a model cannot, however, discuss 
questions about the validity or falsehood of belief 
systems, nor about the values which may provide the basis 
for a code of social ethics. Notwithstanding, the 
attractiveness of sociobiology and behaviourism to the 
social sciences is indisputable: their methods and 
techniques have been adopted and applied by both the 
capitalist and Marxist systems and used respectively 
towards their own ends. 
A naturalist science has largely substituted the 
ontological dilemma by an epistemological primacy grounded 
in anthropocentricism upon which it is hoped that science 
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will say something about human rationality and reason, and 
social reality: If positivists can provide only limited 
and biased explanations of natural phenomena, their 
ability to explain our social world is even more 
restricted" (Huckle 1983a, 144). 
The optimism of scientific instrumentalism during the 
1960s is proving to be illusory and deceptive insofar that 
social class barriers have widened while the equality of 
opportunity has correspondingly diminished. Its 
prejudicial presuppositions and the inflexibility of its 
methodological inquiry are both dependent on the 
separation of knowledge from values. From this 
perspective, social process and spatial structure must 
necessarily be kept divided: spatial problems should not 
be related to their socio-economic, political or moral 
contexts, but rather described and accepted in a 
scientific vacuum. In 'A Framework for the School 
Curriculum' (DES 1980), the affective attributes of 
education - social and ethical consciousness - were 
confined to the context of religious education. Geography 
was not even mentioned. Moreover, the social sciences and 
humanities were to be retained in a technocratic vein, 
broadly in line with the political status quo. Geography 
students have rarely been encouraged to fully integrate 
the unity of knowledge into a socio-spatial context. With 
some justification, Storm (1983) draws attention to an 
already overcrowded syllabus acting as a deterrent towards 
curriculum modification/innovation. 
Consequently, much human geography is contained in a 
`man-land-resource' ecosystem approach which is generally 
unconcerned with ontological and epistemological criteria. 
Ethnocentricism is the general rule while many intrinsic 
human values are swept aside as non-rational scientific 
irrevelances. Problems related to human dignity and 
social justice in geography are often treated passively 
and partially or are otherwise 'normalised' as an 
19 
unavoidable product of the systematic mechanics of the 
scientific method. Contradictions and ambiguities are 
frequently seen as an embarassment and one undeserving of 
a thorough critical reappraisal. 
A dogmatic educational policy which is increasingly 
regimented by those with governmental and corporative 
interests not only encourage social extremism, intolerance 
and even nihilism, but equally attempts to restrict human 
geography's horizons by fostering a climate of myopia and 
naivety. Meaning and purpose in human geography risk 
becoming more elusive and ill-defined. Little can be said 
about socio-spatial relations unless the whole area of man 
is disclosed. This not only requires closer harmony and 
exchange between geography and other social science 
disciplines (Cook 1983), but may also demand some 
appreciation of the recent advances of scientific 
theorizing in the physicalistic domain. These suggestions 
may raise some uncomfortable ramifications concerning the 
status of the components of the social sciences as 
independent disciplines of knowledge: is perhaps a multi-
disciplinary integrated social science syllabus a more 
realistic and wholesome unit of study at the 16-19 and 
degree levels? If so, then the case for the primacy of 
man as the 'subject' of inquiry may become emphatically 
reinstated. As 'normal' science would presently have it, 
man is the 'object' of study, while in a geographic 
context, space retains overall primacy. 
The application of phenomenological and existential 
philosophical ideas to geographic thought has attempted 
to switch the emphasis to the 'subjective' attributes of 
man. This has drawn upon a variety of standpoints from 
Husserl's (1970) claim for a 'pure' consciousness and 
Schutz's (1962) attempts to combine transcendentalism with 
empiricism, to Merleau - Ponty's (1962) and Sartre's 
(1943) rejection of an 'inner man'. Humanistic geography 
has clearly made an important contribution towards a 
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deeper understanding of human thought, culture and beliefs 
in a spatial context, but has largely failed to gain wide 
scientific recognition on account of its epistemological 
shortcomings and its methodological ambiguity: it is "a 
form of criticism rather than an alternative scientific 
approach" (Entrikin 1977, 629). Otherwise, phenomenology 
has been criticised for its individualistic stance and its 
failure to recapture 'lived experience' by the 
transposition of the transcendent to the real world. 
Existentialism even further exposes itself to the rigours 
of scientific accreditation: it terminates in absurdity 
and meaninglessness about existence, while knowledge is 
about 'nothing'. Although Husserl was concerned with 
ontological issues (essence and truth) of social 
phenomena, most humanistic geographers have been 
preoccupied with epistemological questions. Tuan (1976, 
266-267), however, has unconditionally reverted to 
(positivistic) biological evolution to explain man's 
ontological dilemma. 
In its search for 'relevance' in the social sciences, 
human geography has explored the domain of political 
economy in an attempt to sharpen its socio-spatial 
perspectives. The impetus for a Marxist interpretation of 
social process and spatial structure was initially 
provided by Harvey (1973) and Peet (1977). This radical 
orientation has also been supported by Habermas (1976) and 
Kolakowski (1978) who have directed geography's attention 
towards a possible impending crisis in advanced capitalist 
nations, thereby making a case for the collapse of its 
political and economic structures. The unravelling of 
power relations and conflict remains a complex area for 
human geography (Foucault 1982; Giddens 1984). The track-
record of advanced capitalist economies and their 
governmental structures manifests a history of 
disreputability in both the developed and developing 
worlds. The critiques provided by radical geographers 
(Castells 1975, 1977; Lee 1979; Peet and Lyons 1981) do 
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not generate simplistic practical alternatives but rather 
retain a primacy for theoretical considerations. 
Smith (1978), in his liberalistic 'welfare' approach to 
human geography, argues that political and military power 
- implicit of the territorial and economic control over 
resources and manpower - is in reality the overriding 
priority of socio-spatial analysis. There is little room 
for concepts of 'welfare', 'justice' or the 
ispiritualisation' of society. 
Geography as a 'critical social science' (Gregory 1978; 
Sayer 1984) has opened new vistas for exposing the 
shortcomings and misconceptions of diverse philosilhical 
and ideological positions. Yet - with few exceptions - it 
curtails the objective reality of its own position by an 
ongoing insistence of an autonomous-man/science basis for 
its epistemological backcloth. Much of critical theory is 
geared to a futuristic emancipatory idealism which 
embraces the fields of political theory, hermeneutics and 
linguistics (see Ricoeur 1981). There is no apparent 
methodological consensus so that the emphasis tends to 
oscillate between the standpoints of an optimistic 
(utopian) humanism to one of pessimism and hopelessness. 
There is, however, a general agreement amongst critical 
theorists for the condemnation of positivist epistemology 
and the technocratic nation state, but they have deviated 
widely from an orthodox Marxist (materialist) theory 
insofar that its contributers have largely treated social 
interaction in isolation from the deterministic 
infrastructural inferences (see Keat and Urry 1975; 
Bottomore 1984). 
That the mastery of language is a precondition for 
understanding (Gadamer 1975) underlines a fundamental 
facet of critical theorizing. For Habermas (1976, 1979, 
1984), the 'purification of discourse' is imperative for 
the realisation of an 'ideal speech situation', but this 
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should be read against Heidegger (1962) and Wittgenstein 
(1961) who have both asserted that in the absence of some 
point of reference, language soon collapses into either 
meaninglessness (nothing) or metaphysics and mysticism. 
When 'ideal speech' is combined with some neo-Marxist 
ideal, it will hopefully provide a new basis on which 
socio-spatial problems may in the future be reviewed 
(Gregory 1978). 
Critical theory must, however, seek to accommodate the 
`double hermeneutic problematic in the social sciences. 
This means that social scientists should develop not only 
an 'objectivised' knowledge about externalities, but 
equally a critical self-awareness of people as subjects. 
For some critical theorists (Hudson 1982; Sayer 1984), the 
recognition of a metaphysical interaction which structures 
causal phenomena in a social context is a most forceful 
point. The cause-effect relationship is not a fixed 
mechanism, but contingent. Probability and prediction 
therefore have little relevance in social causal 
mechanics. Marxism too is possibly a metaphysics of a 
`not-yet-conscious' futurism which cannot precisely say 
what people want, because they do not yet know. This 
again raises the issues of not only 'how' causal powers 
work (episteme) but equally 'what' their origins are 
(ontology). 
Scientific knowledge can be acquired in a spirit of 
humility or power. Much contemporarty science seeks to 
demystify the natural world with ambition, 
competitiveness and vanity (Johnston 1979, 1-17; 
Koestler 1978, 134) and is increasingly becoming an 
adversary of man. Moreover, it assumes a position above 
society from which it asserts its autonomy. Human 
existence does not, as Gregory (1978, 21) fears, 
necessarily need to collapse into "abstract and mystifying 
proportions which offer no prospect of a critical 
understanding of the relations between man and his 
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material universe". Social reality, however, is not 
merely a phenomenal or materialist term. Man does not 
conveniently fit into exclusive empirical categories any 
more than those of the physical sciences do themselves in 
the quantum field of inquiry: "Science can never make any 
statements about the ultimate orderliness and unity of the 
universe without slipping into metaphysics" (Hill 1981, 
58). For Adorno (see Held 1980; Jay 1984), a world 
potentially based on disorder in the absence of any 
metaphysical or theistic precepts invites a pessimistic 
epitaph of chaos and destruction. 
A scientific human geography which is value-free must 
rely on pragmatism as a matter of practical adequacy. 
The disequilibrium between innovations in scientific 
technology and finite environmental resources, and the 
unclear notions of an unlimited progress and the socio-
spatial and economic imbalances which this unleashes, 
makes it impossible for moral philosophy to be 
dissociated from social policy (Jonas 1984). 
Government, moreover, employs an 'ethics of concealment' 
which frequently degenerates into one of corruption and 
evil intentions (Bok 1984). Nor do self-interest and 
morality constitute a basis for reason in geographical 
decision-making when they are obscured by governmental and 
corporative interests (Parfit 1984). 
The fundamental issue of socio-spatial problems relates to 
the impact of cultural stupefaction through the acceptance 
of ideological propaganda which, in itself fails to 
legitimate its methodological premises or its 
epistemological foundations. Moreover, it completely 
ignores the need for an ontological reappraisal of human 
existence. For Olsson (1978), this is indicative of the 
authoritarian enslavement of society". Conflict, 
contradiction, ambiguity and uncertainty are persistent 
features in socio-spatial phenomena. Much contemporary 
social science promotes a climate of egotism, hedonism and 
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utilitarianism against a wider social background whose 
reality is one of despair, fear and even dread. Human 
existence becomes an existential wilderness based on 
apathy, hatred and prejudices (Ley 1974). 
Science, in many ways, is transformed into: ".. a kind 
of gamesmanship .. a complicated game within a very 
limited area so that [a scientist] never has to think of 
the real problems or of meaning" (Schaeffer 1972, 105) 
If the purpose of any science is the pursuit of truth, 
then: any understanding of science which ignores it 
runs the risk of undermining the whole edifice which 
scientists have constructed" (Trigg 1985, 109). 
Conversely, if there is no truth, there can be no hope 
present or future, nor is there any basis for discussion 
in any area of knowledge. Existence is reduced to a 
spatio-temporal nonsense. The scientific treatment of 
man's metaphysical and religious content has increasingly 
been one of outright condemnation and rejection. It has 
been devalued as an irrational and unreal expression of 
man's historical development and his mythical traditions 
which are manifested in the forms of symbolism and 
totemism. Religion and mysticism, however, have always 
fulfilled an indespensable function within culture" 
(Malinowski 1954, 90). They constitute a part of man's 
knowledge and purport to say something about his existence 
- past, present and future. Equally, they provide a key 
to the recovery of the wholesomeness of man as 'subject', 
and of science as man's tool which may then reaffirm and 
reflect all that man 'is'. 
The elevation and idolisation of a naturalistic science 
to a position of supremacy is a fundamental inversion of 
the former relationship between man and natural science. 
Normal science has discarded any genuine concern for 
human social wellbeing and has largely abandoned any 
sense of spatial defence. For scientific 
instrumentalism, the 'end' increasingly justified the 
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`means' regardless of the turmoil which it may generate. 
Instrumentalism tends to explain social systems in terms 
of no change: it advocates social control rather than 
social change so that the institutional status quo is 
maintained. Kolb (1961) argues that the capitalist social 
control system_ which attributes an autonomy to the 
resulting spatial structures which it generates - is 
contrary to the assumptions of Judaic-Christian doctrines 
on which Western societies were built. Equally, a Marxist 
geography assumes that 'social consciousness' is moulded 
as a result of the productive relationship between men and 
their economic existence. It therefore presupposes that 
man is 'nothing' until he engages in the mode of 
production. Environmental relations (natural and spatial) 
are structured by their social formation. Both systems of 
thought insist that knowledge is drawn from sensory 
experience alone (see Nagel 1961), suggesting that the 
undermining of cultural, moral and religious values is 
paramount to the survival and predominance of each system 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1972). 
The dehumanisation of human geography may initially 
appear to be a hyperbolic and alarmist proposition, but 
on the basis of social reality 'as-it-is-to-be-found', the 
geographer is increasingly compelled to recognise the 
impasse into which an autonomous science drives him. 
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PART ONE: SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND MAN: 
A METHODOLOGICAL EXPOSE 
27 
THE MEANING OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 
The study of spatial phenomena - as the central 
criterion on which human geography deliberates - 
reflects man's thinking, his philosophical beliefs and 
his ideological terms of reference, his decision-making 
and his value systems, the sum of which culminate in his 
movements and actions as a social actor in geographic 
space. Space and man are both components of the 
fundamental question of existence (being). The primary 
consideration of human geography as a discipline of 
knowledge in the social sciences concerns its 
philosophical status. The use and organisation of the 
spatial environment by man immediately raises an 
epistemological question. There is no consensus of 
thinking in this respect but moreover a polarisation of 
views which are broadly contained under two discrete 
standpoints. 
First, that human geography is concerned with the study 
of empirical phenomena which can only be undertaken by 
the use of experimental methodologies. In this case, 
the guiding presupposition is that knowledge is 
initially fragmented and must be cumulatively 
reconstructed until some form, sense and meaning are 
apparent. This is achieved on the basis of 'normal' 
scientific rationality and reason. Alternatively, space 
and man may be propositionally viewed in an integrated 
holistic context. Knowledge is pre-assumed to comprise a 
unity-of-all-things, whose coherence - although forming a 
complex whole - provides a working basis for its 
conceptual universality. This case does not exclude the 
possibility for the interplay of meta-inferences in the 
study of socio-spatial behaviour. Consequently, its 
concatenations are often strongly contested by those 
opposed to its claims on account of the absence of any 
marked 'normal' scientific eloquence, and equally since it 
may also appeal to teleological forms of explanation. In 
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these respects, a holistic human geography may assume the 
characteristics of an 'extraomAinary' science. 
The search•(oc spatial order requires that decisions must 
be taken. This, by implication, necessitates the 
formulation of a value system. An appeal for a social 
ethic in human geography - or indeed, any consideration 
towards the negation of its relevance - immediately 
demands some accountability for man's moral predicament. 
On the basis of these precepts, the socio-spatial field 
of geographic inquiry - and other disciplinal areas with 
which it is inter-related - can be investigated 
according to one of two fundamental premises: either, 
there is a case in which the existence of the 
underpinning principles of human geography can be 
rationally and logically considered and which can be 
communicated and discussed on an individual and 
collective basis; or, that there is no logical or 
rational answer for the existence of any constructive 
principles which might emerge from the interaction of 
socio-spatial relations. 
The former case is hinged on an optimistic expression of 
hope, meaning and purpose and asserts an implicit 
responsibility and expectation for geographic wellbeing 
and stability. Conversely, the latter view underlines the 
belief that man and his natural environment are chaotic, 
irrational and discontiguous aspects of a meaningless 
state of being, so that the formulation of any positive 
attributes in human geography will be abortive, devoid and 
non-sensical. In this context, explanation and 
understanding are irrelevant and exclusive categories. 
As its outset, human geography is seemingly locked into 
an epistemological dilemma. Either, it may adopt a 
concern with the case for a propositional truth-claim 
holistically based on a fundamental preassumption or 
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conviction that the nature of rationality, knowledge, 
reality, truth and goodness can be ultimately 
substantiated against some permanent, ahistorical logos 
which transcends all historical space-time continuums; or 
alternatively, the epistemological claim may be atomistic 
where it is maintained that no 'a priori' matrix can be 
scientifically proven so that all values are mutually 
exclusive and no single conceptual scheme can claim to 
have a universal validity - all truth-claims, as such are 
ambiguous and pragmatic and do not represent the discovery 
of any absolute principle in human or natural existence. 
Human geography clearly has an important contribution to 
make towards an explanation of the meaning and purpose 
of man's interaction with space and the ensuing social 
relations which pervade throughout this spatial 
spectrum. In a contemporary setting, where each 
authoritative pronouncement of science is increasingly 
believed to be wholly true, or the outcome of 
incompetence, distortion or fraud such as to make it 
wholly false, human geography bears a heavy responsibility 
to uncover a unity and understanding about socio-spatial 
phenomena. 
The scientific study of human geography has tended to 
streamline itself into four broad schools of thought, each 
with its particular philosophical underpinnings and 
attendant methodologies. First, scientific 
instrumentalism, based on logical positivism and which 
frequently appeals to behaviouristic theory to explain the 
dynamics of socio-spatial configurations. Its political 
and economic expression is notably reflected in the 
technocracies of advanced capitalist nations, but similar 
claims may equally be vested with bureaucratic socialist 
states which frequently revert to behaviourism to explain 
the human condition. Secondly, where political economy is 
used to explain socio-spatial relations, and moreover, 
where materialism is adopted as an autonomous ideological 
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precept. This particularly corresponds to a Marxist 
interpretation of human geography. Thirdly, by 
establishing the primacy of 'subjectivism' from a 
humanistic standpoint. The emphasis may either tend 
towards a pherpnological appreciation of 'essences' and 
aesthetic values, or an existentialist treatment motivated 
towards an individualistic orientation of perception. 
Finally, human geography has appealed to the primacy of 
language because it is a universal experience. This 
branch is largely concerned with the problematic issues 
raised by hermeneutics and semantics and has attracted the 
attention of some critical theorists. 
The juxtaposition of conflicting standpoints in human 
geography immediately reflect epistemological 
differences of opinion, yet as a human science whose 
spatial characteristics are never devoid of social 
repercussions, it has hardly begun to tackle the problem 
of man's ontogenesis. Failing this, there can be no 
substantial discussion of science, values, the 
identification and understanding of problems and of 
decision-making, because epistemology can only provide a 
highly fragmented view of content, meaning, purpose and 
certitude. Human horizons are contained within restricted 
parameters which afford a limited perspective when it 
attempts to assess the rationality and reasonableness of 
socio-spatial activity. In any event, the fundamental 
dilemma concerns the question as to whom or to what are 
geographers addressing themselves? Modern science 
generally provides an examination of the ontogenesis of 
man and the environment using the Darwinian evolutionary 
basis of explanation. This view is the accepted credo of 
scientists in many different philosophical schools of 
thought including not only the logical positivists, but 
also Marxists, humanists and critical theorists. Human 
geographers too have largely adopted the evolutionary 
standpoint when ontological considerations are pressing -
it is an indication of scientific rationalism and 
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respectability. Philosophies - usually those with strong 
reflexive persuasion - which attempt to offset the 
evolutionary theory of origins by some alternative 
explanation generally encounter the need to make an 
irrational unscientific 'leap' into metaphysics and 
mysticism, or collapse into a nihilistic, chaotic 
`nothingness', reductio ad absurdum. 
Paradoxically, it should also be noted that a 
significant number of prominent evolutionary biologists 
continue to entertain De Chardin's evolutionary synthesis 
with Christian theology. Julian Huxley recognised the 
potential of De Chardin's evolutionary monism as a means 
of re-mythologizing science into a secular evolutionary 
humanism. This would essentially be a 'religion without 
revelation' which would provide a basis for human values 
while simultaneously giving an account of present and 
future trends in human social behaviour. Human geography 
has yet to make any profound inroads by using these 
sociobiological concepts. Social Darwinists in advanced 
capitalist nations have largely overlooked the issues of 
urban-social deprivation and economic disparities from the 
regional to the global scale. Moreover, technocracy and 
scientific progress have upheld the precedence of human 
law-making as opposed to the finite limitations imposed by 
natural and environmental processes. If Darwinian 
evolution is interpreted as man's ascent towards an 
ultimate unity with the environment - and as De Chardin 
would have it, towards the 'Omega Point' of unity with God 
- then the grounds for a 'Scientific theology', albeit 
ambiguously defined, may appear to be a challenging 
proposition in the social sciences. The only proviso 
which governs such a theory is that all questions of 
origins and the optimistic future direction of mankind can 
only be discussed in impersonal terms. 
Chappell (1981, 186) attempts to make a case for some 
reconciliation between science and religious values in 
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human geography, but clearly insists on the paramouncy 
of the former over the latter: "A new kind of objectivity 
is needed related perhaps to religiously-based humility, 
which in its own way might lead to new scientific insights 
as the dawn of modern science". 
In this context, the definitional terms of rationality, 
meaning, purpose and reality are strictly predetermined 
by scientific procedure. Human geography as a social 
science also confers itself with an autonomous 
scientific status where man proclaims himself as the sole 
source of all legislation and judgement. Kant, however, 
has shown that this standpoint could only be valid if man 
was his own first cause, which clearly he is not. As long 
as an autonomous science attempts to borrow and utilise 
metaphysical concepts (however 'irrational' these are by 
its own terms of reference) that are refashioned and 
interpreted against the background of 'normal' scientific 
parameters, so that they might be integrated in its 
theorizing, then human geography cannot but hope to 
generate partial and disjointed insight into socio-spatial 
human behaviour and its related problems. Moreover, in 
its geographical context, social science tends to become 
an increasingly restricted and elitist area which is 
consciously or unconsciously preoccupied with questions of 
dominance, power and socio-spatial manipulation. It may 
frequently attempt to disguise its overriding objectives 
and/or pacify its skeptics with a facade of quasi-mystical 
linguistic connotations or pseudo-religious symbolism, 
particularly in the areas of social ethics and futuristic 
assertions which are bound into a belief of 'optimistic 
humanism' dictated by some form of scientific technocracy. 
An important pre-requisite to an understanding of 
contemporary human geography as a social science is a 
brief review of the history of scientific development 
and thought, and the ways in which philosophical changes 
have shifted its epistemological emphases towards 
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disunity and fragmentation. These changes have not only 
influenced the area of knowledge, but also the questions 
of morals, existence and origins. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT:  
A HISTORICAL REVIEW. 
The epistemological claims of contemporary human 
geography are conditioned by the presuppositions of its 
philosophical and ideological underpinnings. The 
historical evolution of geographic thought - and indeed, 
the development of the other social science disciplines -
has been adequately documented in terms of the ways in 
which it has been influenced and has adopted to shifts in 
the philosophical climate (see Schaefer 1953; Davies 1955; 
Haggett 1965, 1977; Graves 1980, 1980a). Significantly, 
the dynamics of change and emphases within and across the 
philosophical backcloth, which otherwise provides the 
fabric and supports the bases of geographic theorizing, 
has largely been overlooked. This is particularly the case 
in the historical and developmental contexts. 
Modern philosophy and the development of the natural and 
social sciences with their attendant methodologies 
broadly stem from the epistemological foundations 
prescribed by the Greeks. Mk 
*The Greeks, with 
their variety of 'gods', failed to resolve the 
epistemological dilemma first, because the 'gods' were 
basically inadequate in terms of the content which 
mythology could provide to explain human existence and 
empirical phenomena, and secondly, insofar that a marginal 
majority or a small powerful elite exclusively carried and 
propogated the status quo of knowledge. 
Between the sixth and thirteeth centuries, knowledge and 
existence in European society were entrenched in the 
theocentricism of the Judaeo-Christian ethic. Man's 
thinking and perception were largely Byzantine with an 
overwhelming emphasis on mystical symbolism. Moreover, 
this position was unrealistic insofar that the 'higher 
sphere' of heavenly things and essences could neither be 
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related to nature, nor were they attainable in the finite 
context of human existence. The Byzantine age did little 
to enrich geographical knowledge: man and his relationship 
with the natural environment held no interest, except as 
part of the world to be lived in. 
By the thirteenth century, two important shifts took 
place which generated a movement towards humanism and 
the foundations for an autonomous structure in the area 
of knowledge. First, the old and growing humanism in 
the Roman Catholic position increasingly suggested that 
man was autonomous in the area of salvation: according 
to its promulgations, Christ died for man's salvation, but 
man had to merit the merit of Christ. Equally, the Roman 
Church at thistime can be charged with motivating people 
towards utilitarianism and hedonism in the interests of 
economic gain under the auspices of an authoritarian 
capitalist political structure, in which the church played 
a significant role (see Horkheimer and Adorno 1972, 222-
225). The growth of European capitalism in the Middle 
Ages, in advocating social and economic gratification, 
reduced individuals to economic receptacles and provided 
an early impetus towards the dehumanisation of man and his 
relationship with others, and with the natural 
environment. 
Secondly the contention held in the philosophic-theology 
of Aquinas (1952) introduced a new perspective of the 
biblical Fall insofar that although the will of man was 
fallen, the intellect - claimed Aquinas - was not. This 
not only implied that man's intellect became autonomous, 
but on the basis of the presupposition, both man and 
philosophy were now independent and emancipated from the 
propositional revelation of the Judaeo-Christian theology. 
Aquinas's standpoint initiated a schism between 'nature' 
(empiricism) and 'grace' (metaphysics), yet Aquinas did 
not accept a complete discontinuity between these two 
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spheres since the intellect represented a concept of unity 
between them. 
In some respects, the resultant birth of the humanistic 
Renaissance which superseded Aquinas's views clarified 
many aspects of reality. The natural environment, and its 
inter-relationship with man, received a more proper place 
insofar that it was not something to be despised, or held 
as contemptuous. For the geographer, this implied that 
man's management of the spatial environment demanded 
responsiblity and care in the measure of his decision-
making. Conversely, Aquinas's 'autonomous-principle' 
established both a dichotomy and a constant struggle for a 
unity of 'nature' and 'grace', 'subjective' and 
`objective', 'explanation' and 'understanding', and a hope 
that rationality would say something about the resolution 
of this dilemma. 
Aquinas's ideas soon permeated into the arts, whereby the 
`autonomous principle' of nature-as-nature was reflected 
in the work of Giotto, Dante, Boccaccio, Van Eyck and 
Lippi, amongst others. Landscape art - albeit still imbued 
with religious themes - became increasingly naturalistic, 
yet true perspective and true space emerged for the first 
time. Paradoxically, the increasing reality of nature in 
artistic representation did not provide a holistic 
understanding of knowledge and existence. Rather, the 
autonomy of 'nature' begins to consume 'grace'. While 
Aquinas had introduced Aristotelian thinking, this 
position had compounded the search for a unity-within-
diversity. Prior to the Reformation period, the 
philosophical climate switched to one of neo-platonism 
once that it was recognised that having liberated the 
particulars, some directive was required to evolve 
universals. This was otherwise an attempt to reinstate 
ideas and ideals. Leonardo da Vinci recognised that if an 
`autonomous rationality' was presupposed to be the basis 
for knowledge and existence, then mathematics is the ideal 
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yardstick because it is concerned with that which can be 
measured. 
The impact of Aquinas and the subsequent climate of neo-
platonism introduced a fundamental and lasting weakness 
into the educational process insofar that the natural 
associations between disciplines were semeek All 
disciplines have tended to be studied in unrelated 
parallel lines while failing to understand that all 
aspects of knowledge focus on man. 
By constrast to Aquinas's position, the Reformation 
repudiated both the Aristotelion and neo-platonic views. 
The Reformers rejected the incomplete Fall in Aquinas's 
work which had set loose an autonomous man. Instead, they 
claimed that there was nothing autonomous either in the 
area of final authority or in the theological concept of 
salvation. Moreover, the Reformers accepted the biblical 
explanation of a complete Fall, where only God was 
autonomous. No humanistic or autonomous, religious or 
moral effort of man could provide universals. Although 
the Judaeo-Christian scriptures might not provide 
exhaustive truth, it gave, they contended, sufficient 
knowledge to say something truly about God, man and 
nature, and the relations contained therein, in a unified 
form. Indeed, in an historical and societal context, 
there could have been no Reformation and no Reformation 
Culture in Northern Europe without the recognition that 
God had spoken to man in the scriptures, and that this 
communication needed to be based on a propositional 
revelation of truth. Under the Reformation position, 
Northern European culture understood that while man is 
normally guilty before a God who exists, man, 
notwithstanding, is not nothing. This did not imply that 
there was no freedom for art, literature or science, but 
that they too were contained in the propositional truth of 
scriptural revelation and could not, therefore, claim to 
be autonomous. 
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Prior to the age of Enlightenment, scientists and 
philosophers had accepted the possibility of a universal 
in the areas of knowledge and ethics. Absolutes imply a 
logic of thesis - antithesis and although there was 
disagreement as to what absolutes might be, there was 
nonetheless a basis for reason. Classical apologetics 
rarely analysed their presuppositions profoundly and so 
fell short of a full demonstration of Judaeo-Christian 
tenets. Early scientists such as Copernicus, Kepler and 
Newton based their work on the presupposition of the 
uniformity of natural causes in a closed system. Early 
science was natural science which accepted that the 
Biblical position gave an explanation for an objective 
reality akin to a cause - effect system operating in a 
limited time span. It was not a science contained within 
a naturalistic philosophical framework. 
Bacon, in his Novum Organum Scientiarum, understood that 
the 'fall of man' entailed a fall in both his 'state of 
innocence' as well as his dominion over nature. Bacon 
claimed that man could to some extent repair these losses; 
the former by religion and faith, the latter by the arts 
and sciences. Therefore science as science, and art as 
art were understood to be religious activities. Bacon did 
not regard science as autonomous, but man - through the 
content of scientific inquiry - could use his reason to 
rediscover universals. The ethos of original science, 
based on the Christian doctrine of creation, supported the 
expectation that the physical world should be one of 
rational order, reflecting the reason of its Creator. 
Equally, since the world was God's free creation, it was 
one of a contingent character which could be discerned by 
experimental investigation. This was made possible by the 
distancing of creation from its Creator, but because the 
world was God's creation, there could be no impiety in 
making it a fitting object for study (see Russell 1985). 
In seeking to eradicate the methodological deficiencies 
and the metaphysics of superstition of medieval thought, 
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Bacon (1960, 47) recognised a measure of irrationality 
in human thought implicit of scientific distortions and 
deformations, in which could otherwise be detected the 
ideology. 
Bacon's influence on philosophy and science in the 
seventeen}% and eighteenth centuries is decisive (see 
Larrain 1979, 22-23). Bacon had not sought to make 
scientific inquiry subservient to the roots of religious 
faith based on fear and ignorance, but rather had intended 
to show a clear demarcation between theology and 
philosophy and ethics. Notwithstading, the impact of 
early science and its insistence on the Judaeo-Christian 
explanation has not been discredited for the development 
of contemporary scientific inquiry. Marx (1975), although 
an adversary of theology, acknowledged Bacon as the father 
of modern science. Similarly, Oppenheimer (1962) concedes 
that Christianity was necessary for the beginning of 
modern science because it created a climate of thought 
which put man in a legitimate position to investigate the 
form of the physical world. 
Many Enlightenment philosophers revised Bacon's 
interpretation of irrational prejudices which pervade 
over man's judgement (the 'idols'), so that the concept of 
irrationalism followed by Condillac, Holbach and 
Helvetius, amongst others, became 'prejudices' embodied in 
traditional religious representations. Religious 
`prejudices' were identified as being ideological and an 
impediment to human wellbeing. Religion was no longer 
regarded as an integrating force, but the source of all 
false notions, preconceptions and superstitions. Moreover, 
Machiavelli (1970) and Hobbes (1975) had exposed the 
legitimating social function of religion so that it was 
made coextensive with political power and economic gain. 
Holbach (1966, 332-233) argued that human misery 
reflected man's misunderstanding of nature. Reason, he 
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claimed, must be experiential and challenge ".. the 
prejudices.. ignorance and uncertainty.. consecrated by 
religion". 
Helvetius (1959, 103-111) made a distinction between 
`true virtues' (those under the dictum of 'L'education 
peut tout') and 'virtues of prejudice' which belong to 
mystics, magicians and priests. 
The post-Newtonian age is therefore one where the sense 
of the autonomous, which had been derived from Aquinas, 
becomes fully developed, but with an increasing 
influence on the formulation of the problem. Kant's 
failure to reconcile the phenomenal world of nature with 
the noumenal world of universals finally eroded any 
concept of revelation in any area. There could no 
longer be any notion of metaphysics ('grace') on this 
interpretation of rationalism, rending the idea that the 
universe is reasonable through the creation of any absolute 
power as defunct. The problem for philosophy and science 
- which included sociology and psychology and indirectly, 
human geography - was no longer the dualism between 
`nature-and-grace', but of 'nature-and-freedom'. 
The naturalistic scientific rationalism evolved during 
the Enlightenment was so totally autonomous that 
determinism, which had almost exclusively been confined to 
of 
physics and mechanics, permeated into the areaAsocial 
science. Science, newly defined, increasingly constituted 
a threat to human freedom and individual self-expression. 
In the absence of any metaphysical constructs, 'freedom' 
too had become autonomous. Rousseau's concept of 
`autonomous freedom' necessarily refuted any notion of 
mysticism, but as absolute freedom, his ideal emancipated 
man not only from revelationary concepts but equally from 
social constructs (polis). By definition, Rousseau's 
freedom is both destructive, chaotic and nonsensical. If 
universals are non-existent, then man is hedonistically 
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free, but there can be no distinction between reality and 
illusion. Yet a freedom that is without restraint or 
limitations cannot be accommodated into a rational world, 
though Rousseau had nonetheless retained the logical 
consistency of the age in his analysis and philosophical 
standpoint. 
The Enlightenment position was ultimately bolstered by 
Compte's (1975) contribution towards the removal of the 
theological and metaphysical states of any science, which 
he dismissed as 'imagination', 'supernaturalism' and 
`personified abstractions'. Compte's positive critique of 
theological and metaphysical philosophies is in itself 
metaphysical: his main presuppositions about the 
inevitability of social domination and elitism, the need 
for the class structure and the preservation of the 
economic status quo are not scientifically verifiable 
truths. Nor did Compte have any terms of reference to make 
a critique of 'imaginary' or abstract notions, which, if 
by definition are dogma and ideology, unless it can be 
accepted that Compte's critique itself is ideological. If 
science is to assume a position of neutrality whereby it 
may arbitrate over questions of truth, reality and 
meaning, it will collapse into an ideology immediately 
that it accredits itself with an autonomous status. The 
fetishization of science and progress can only be 
discussed by appealing to the metaphysical concepts which 
have previously been repudiated. 
The Enlightenment philosophers continued to follow the 
classical ideal of unity, but increasingly realised that 
unity could only be achieved on this bases by ruling out 
`freedom'. German idealism at this point continued the 
critique of religion in the sense that philosophy must 
emancipate Christianity from its outmoded historical form. 
This required a more radical and profound criticism. Hegel 
made philosophy coextensive with theology insofar that 
both are concerned with revealing the relationship between 
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the finite spatio-temporal realm (empirical phenomena) and 
the infinite sphere (metaphysics). Certainly, any 
postulation which elucidates origins is necessarily of 
philosophical and theological interest and will raise 
questions of meanings, purposes and destinies. Philosophy 
and theology, however, deal with the same basic questions, 
but will give different answers and in different terms. 
Hegel was aware of these problems and contended that 
classical philosophic humanistic thought had robbed 
Christianity of its rationalism and therefore, of a 
unified field of knowledge. Moreover, Christianity for 
Hegel had become deformed into an authoritarian and 
dogmatic system which had alienated man from his true 
self. The Hegelian dialectic restructured the areas of 
epistemology and methodology. He argued that the synthesis 
with its relativism would somehow provide an insight to 
the rationality and reasonableness of the relationship 
between the finite and infinite categories of existence. 
Effectively, the idea of rationalism was retained, but 
(classical) rationality was discarded. Any concept of 
`truth' was radically revised and in many respects became 
an ambiguous concept. 
Feuerbach's extension of Hegelian thought was rooted in 
the presupposition of God as a projection of man's 
essences and thus a product of objectivization of the 
human being. Feuerbach otherwise attempts to reduce 
theology to anthropology and to show that talk about God 
was really talk about man. Religion, therefore, has been 
the product of a necessary state in man's process of self-
awareness. Feuerbach (1957, 184) claimed that any notion 
of the "existence of God" was external to man and the 
world. Religion, as such, is seen as a symptom of man's 
alienation from himself, inhibiting man from acting, and 
distorting man's knowledge about himself, and his 
relationship with others and with nature. Feuerbach (1957, 
33) therefore attributes the disunity of all man's 
categories to setting "God before him (self) as the 
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antithesis (alter ego) of himself". Although Feuerbach 
sought to eradicate all metaphysics and supernaturalism, 
he neither discusses the underlying causes of human 
alienation, nor succeeds in identifying the reasons for 
the dichotomy in human thinking. In sum, Feuerbach asserts 
that God corresponds to the infantile stage of man's 
development, but one which is dispelled once philosophy 
has discovered man's real nature. 
The most radical shift in contemporary philosophical 
thought can be attributed to Kierkegaard who categorically 
severed any final hope of a unified field of knowledge. 
Kierkegaard emphasised human existence before science. 
Man, he claimed, cannot be an instrument or an object of 
scientific inquiry. Accordingly, any 'objective' 
scientific inquiry will be insensitive to movements and 
changes in history. Kierkegaard's understanding of 'truth' 
is interlocked with existence, but not with a platonic 
contemplation of essences, nor with intellectual pursuits. 
The apprehension of 'truth', he claimed, requires a (self) 
commitment it' a subjective sense so that it becomes a part 
of human nature. The human dilemma is found in the 
individual's necessary engagement and participation in 
society which urges people to be objective, and where 
knowledge consists of abstract generalisations. Although 
Kierkegaard's concept of `truth is grounded in the 
Christian ethic, God is 'ever-pervasive' so that 
`rational' deductions from first premises are untenable. 
Kierkegaard thus rejected Hegelian dialectics and 
contended that no synthesis could be achieved by 'reason' 
alone. According to Kierkegaard's position, modern 
philosophical and scientific reasoning were compelled to 
accept that on the basis of their own definition, the 
`real' (empirical) world embraced all that was rational 
and logic, while conversely, the 'unreal' (metaphysical) 
world became non-rational and illogical. There was an 
absolute dichotomy between these two spheres. Furthermore, 
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on the basis of philosophic° - scientific reason, 
`rational' man is 'dead' since he has no categories or 
terms of reference with which to discuss his meaning, 
purpose or significance. All philosophical 'rationality' 
is therefore pessimism, while any appeal to 'non-rational' 
concepts(i.e. those predilections whose internal logic 
becomes at some point inconsistent with its system of 
philosophic) reasoning) is motivated by an untenable 
optimism. 
Kierkegaard asserted that on this basis, 'progress' can 
only be realised by initiating 'irrational leaps' within 
`rational' logic. The key which motivates these 'leaps' is 
man's realisation of his own inauthenticity (i.e. the 
absence of any adequate terms of reference with which to 
discuss his lack of unity). On the basis of Kierkegaard's 
`philosophy of despair', man has existentially shown that 
there are no 'rational' answers to unity. Nothing can be 
verified because there is no basis for 'reason'. Man 
responds to his innate need for 'hope' in the 'non-
rational unreal' sphere by abandoning the real world 
against his 'reason'. 
This trend has subsequently been the case in much 
contemporary philosophy, science and ideology. Kierkegaard 
- supported by the later works of both Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein - recognised that the necessary 'leap' is 
achieved through the medium of language, yet even this 
area provides no resolution to man's dilemma. In 
semantics, the focus is on undefined connotation words 
acquired from the 'unreal' sphere of (non-) reason. They 
provide an illusion of communication, but it is precisely 
in this area that science and philosophy attributes values 
and directives to their systems of thought. As long as the 
dichotomy and 'leap' are accepted, the actual content of 
the verbalisation - whether in secular or religious terms 
- is committed to find understanding in a 'more real upper 
sphere'. The transition between 'normal' and 
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`extraordinary' science (empiricism and metaphysics), or 
between philosophy and mysticism becomes the critical 
element, but the terms of reference by which it is 
accomplished and expressed are seemingly irrelevant, since 
`optimism' or humanistic 'faith' are all that matter. 
Whenever the categories of an 'optimistic humanism' are 
applied to scientific inquiry and philosophical discourse, 
they cannot be conceptually challenged because there are 
no terms of reference by which they may be analysed. 
Moreover, by removing theological explanation from the 
context of scientific inquiry and placing it in a 'non-
rational' sphere, anything can be discussed without fear 
of implicating 'truth'. Nothing can be conclusively proven 
or disproved. This becomes especially conspicuous in the 
area of social ethics. 
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PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC MYSTICISM 
Post-Kierkegaadian 'pessimism' permeated not only into 
philosophy, the arts and literature, but subsequently into 
the physical sciences, the social sciences and more 
lately, theology itself. Its dualism establishes man as a 
`zero', that is, as one particular category against an 
infinite number, but none having any meaning. The 
rationality of classical philosophical thinking embodied a 
metaphysical content which had always assumed that 
`something was there'. Contemporary scientific and 
philosophical 'mysticisms' are semantic, dealing only with 
words. They reject the notion of 'anything being there'. 
Moreover, any reference of a universal absolute or 'God' 
becomes 'Being', or as Schaeffer (1970, 78) lucidly 
suggests, a "Pan-everythingism". The more towards the 
most recent secularisation of theology may almost entirely 
be attributed to Heidegger's work. Heidegger's influence 
has been equally paramount in the area of semantic 
mysticism, whose connotation words and categories of 
thought have been applied to the social sciences at large. 
Modern naturalistic science - by contrast to the Baconian 
era of natural science - can no longer accept the idea 
that the supernatural and natural are intrinsically 
intertwined in an historic space-time continuum. This 
position is coextensive with the presupposition which 
rejects the Judaeo-Christian standpoint, based on a 
personal God who has communicated to man by a 
propositional, verbalised revelation of content. Science 
and philoarhy cannot, therefore, accept the 
`extraordinary' or supernatural as a part of reality. 
Alternatively, they are left with a nihilism and the dread 
of 'nothingness', or may resort to some form of irrational 
`optimistic humanism'. Modern science and philosophy have 
enacted an important epistemological shift in their 
reasoning: either man 'knows' exhaustively, or not at all. 
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Yet, this standpoint places man at a point of tension, 
because he can hold neither of these positions. 
According to its own definition, 'normal' science must 
`live-in-its-time': it can neither afford to try and re-
enact a past age on which to base its presuppositions, nor 
look towards some futuristic ideal. These paths, 
according to Bultmann (1961, 4) lead to "schizophrenia and 
insincerity". The 'rationalisation' of theology and 
mysticism has subsequently become a prime task in the 
physical and social sciences. As long as theology is seen 
to be under the sociological and scientific forms of 
control, and is in some way always 'evolving', it can be 
accepted as part of the 'normal' field of knowledge (see 
De Chardin 1970, 1979, 1979a; Huxley 1961). This implies 
that an 'autonomous' science must invalidate the Biblical 
claim on accound of its 'historical irrelevance' and its 
mystical content. Alternatively, if it does contain 
social truth, it must be 'demythologised'. Kee (1971, 26-
28) suggests that the problem of establishing an absolute 
or 'God-Being' is prevented insofar that man's reason 
makes no correspondence with any personal experience or 
revelation which might be interpreted as 'God', yet 
inexplicably concedes that "(men) are in fact already 
seeking something". 
The social sciences, in which human geography plays its 
part, generally seek the validation of their underpinning 
philosophical and ideological presuppositions by an 
analysis of the truth-claims of their 
experimental/experiential methodologies. This is broadly 
the case for all scientific standpoints - positivist, 
structuralist and reflexive. Many commentators have 
attempted to legitimate the contribution of theology as a 
constituent part of scientifically and socially acceptable 
rational knowledge. Using the basis of 'experience,' it 
has often been hoped that theology would enhance the 
development and clarification of theory, as well as 
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providing fresh insights for decision-making. This has 
proved to be a difficult case. 
Schleiermacher (1963) tried to establish an empirical 
basis for 'religious experience' and argued that it was 
widespread throughout all social levels of existence, and 
not confined to the exceptional or the 'extraordinary'. 
He claimed that the consciousness of 'being' (existence) 
was unconditionally dependent on relations with God. 
Schleiermacher implied, therefore, that through an 
analysis of his own experience, man would be led to the 
acknowledgement and recognition of God. Otto (1959, 24), 
in a similar vein, referred to the man-God dependence as 
"creature consciousness". Robinson (1965, 117-118), while 
attempting to construct a 'new theological atheism' 
acceptable to scientific norms, concedes that it is not 
possible to depersonalise basic theological tenets in a 
social context on account of "the inescapable and 
unconditional reality of who he [man] 'really' is". 
Robinson contended that the human experience of 
theological reality must in some way manifest itself in 
personal human existence, i.e. man's being-in-relations 
with the world. 
by 
The inevitable problem raisedAthis standpoint concerns the 
extent to which - if any - an individual's or socially 
collective 'experience' may be interpreted as a religious 
encounter, and therefore to the presupposition of God's 
relationship with man in a socio-spatial context. In this 
respect, it is possible to argue that man is conscious 
both of his finitude and of the phenomenal experience of 
the world in which he lives, but to say that he 
`experiences God' may be taken as an irrational 
deductionism on account of his finitude so that in 
reality, such an 'encounter' is not a part of that 
experience (see Hume 1968). From a more arguably 
scientifically acceptable viewpoint, James's (1982) 
pragmatic assessment of mystical experiences was more 
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inclined towards an understanding of the effects and 
change which were apparent in people's lifestyles, 
especially their socio-ethics. James was noticeably 
unconcerned with the origin and content of such 
experiences. 
The ambiguity, uncertainty and apparent irrationality of 
religious viz `extraordinary'/metaphysical encounters in 
the socio-spatial reality of phenomenal experience have 
largely initiated the ostracization or outright rejection 
of theistic overtones in the body of scientific knowledge. 
Marx (1974a, 244), following Feuerbach's critique of 
religion, claimed: "Man makes religion, religion does not 
make man". Marx's materialist critique of religious 
representations situated religion as a social product, so 
that 'reason' - emancipated from dogma and prejudices -
will ensure progress and material wellbeing. 
The scientific outlawing of theology from all aspects of 
physical and human existence in the nineteenth century was 
not only attributable to Darwin's evolutionary theory on 
origins, but philosophically and ideologically to 
Nietzsche's 'Death of God' concept. Nietzsche 
differentiated the 'non-religious man' from the 'religious 
man' not only on the basis of the 'supernatural and his 
rejection of it, but equally by the repudiation of all 
morals and every aesthetic point of reference. For 
Nietzsche, this was not only a question of logic, but one 
which necessitated the collapse of all metaphysics. 
Nietsche accepted the tenets of Darwin's theory and was 
therefore compelled to find a new naturalistic basis for 
judgement and values. Alternatively, he was confronted 
with nihilism and social amoralism. Nietzsche (1973, 57) 
understood religion as a illusion and an expression of 
man's inauthenticity: "The Christian faith is from the 
beginning sacrifice: sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, 
all self-confidence of the spirit, at the same time 
enslavement and self-mockery, self-mutilation". 
50 
There could be neither eschatology, nor teleology, nor 
could Nietzsche replace God with an historical process 
which apparently 'led somewhere' in a futuristic sense. 
Nor could there be any 'making sense' of existence: 
`being' was necessarily devoid of meaning, purpose and 
significance: The goal of humanity cannot lie in the end 
but only in its highest specimens" (Nietzsche, quoted by 
Kaufman 1956, 127). Nietzsche fails to show how some 
individuals are either different from or qualitatively 
superior to the 'average' person. To resolve this 
dilemma, he introduces the concept of 'the will to power', 
in which, he claims, some men strive to 'go beyond 
themselves'. The rejection of the will is made 
coextensive with weakness of logic and an obstacle to 
self-assertion. Religous faith and conviction are placed 
in this category. Nietzsche's (1968a) 'world-without-God' 
was both liberating and terrifying to him and once again 
reinstates the anarchic idealism found in Rousseau's 
concept of 'autonomous freedom'. 
The significance of Nietzsche's widely accepted statement 
that 'God is dead' has been reverberated throughout the 
social sciences, so that in human geography social process 
and the spatial structures it generates have become wholly 
secularised. Anthropocentricism dictates all terms of 
reference in decision-making and policy implementation, 
yet increasingly runs the risk of losing both its form and 
content. This confusion has been accelerated by the 
growing climate of relativism in the social sciences 
together with man's separation from the developmental 
stages in factual historical thought in the areas of 
epistemology and origins. 
Nietzsche's contribution towards the demystification of 
existence and the solidification of atheistic man 
precipitated a 'Death of God' doctrine within theology 
itself. In contradiction to the Baconian and Reformation 
standpoints, this school of thought relates to a complete 
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loss of any former reality of God at the deepest 
existential level. It otherwise presupposes a richness 
which has since disappeared, presumably for ever. 
Nietzsche's influence on the early work of Heidegger was 
profound and in turn, Heidegger's impact in the social 
sciences, theology and philosophy is indisputable. 
Tillich (1953, V.I; 1957, V.II; 1963) based his 
`systematic theology' on Heidegger and concludes that God 
`is not'; He is beyond essence and existence. MacQuarrie's 
(1955, 1967) 'existential - ontological theism' - also 
based on Heidegger - fails to find any 'new way' of 
talking about God, or of any notion which might 
`secularise' His existence. 
Altizer's (1967, 111) 'new technology' claims that: "God's 
death has actualised in our history a new and liberated 
humanity". This clearly implies that there is no sense in 
rejecting the 'secular autonomous-man' way for a 
primordial relationship with the sacred. For 'rational' 
scientific man, there can be no 'present' God in an 
historic space-time context. Only the word 'Jesus' has 
any apparent validity in the spheres of historicism and 
empiricism, but even this has attracted the attention of 
those who seek to 'demythologise' its content and 
therefore sterilize its meaning and significance to man 
(see Cupitt 1980; 1985). 
In contradiction to the pessimism expressed by 
contemporary European Philosophy, man cannot be shown 
through experience to be meaningless or 'dead': existence 
on an individual or collective basis does not support this 
proposition. Human geography - along with the other 
social sciences - is primarily concerned with developing a 
methodology which arrives at 'truth', but is largely 
uncommitted to the terms of reference used to express 
these ideas. The growing epistemological uncertainty and 
confusion in geography and further, its ontological 
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obscurity, have increasingly generated a trend towards 
relativism. When the concept of 'relevance' is applied to 
social geographical problems, it gives the impression that 
scientific laws are in a constant state of flux. This is 
far from being the case. In the physical sciences, the 
speed of light in a vacuum is considered to be an absolute 
standard. Relativity cannot, however, be applied to human 
existence in the same way. Social scientists do not agree 
on a unity of knowledge and therefore invalidate any 
concept of relativeness. Against his background, there is 
no way of testing experience. 
As long a modern philosophy and ideology contend that 
there is an absolute didktomy between empiricism (reason) 
and metaphysics (non-reason), a 'new mysticism' will 
become necessary to stop the gaps in the methodologies of 
the social sciences. Much of 'new mysticism' has 
attempted to enhance its status and respectability by 
adopting a form of scientific symbolism. In the physical 
sciences, a mathematical symbol ideally has a well-defined 
communication of content and accuracy. This position can 
be consistently held for atomistic phenomena and their 
determinate characteristics but which render complexity 
and inexactitude in the area of sub-atomic (quantum) 
theorizing. In the case of the social sciences, the 
position is highly ambiguous. It has no definition, but 
gives an illusion of meaning. The word-connotation 
implies the personal, endowed with meaning and a 
communication between the symbol and its reader, but such 
a relationship and understanding cannot exist where the 
symbol fails to clarify either its content or the terms of 
reference by which it might legitimate the internal 
consistency of its logic. 
Such forms of scientific symbolism and philosophical 
mysticism do not expect to find a unified field of 
knowledge but rather affirm that meaning and reason are 
irrevocably separated and that this is intrinsic to both 
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the nature of the universe and to human existence. Any 
`leap' into an 'optimistic humanism' is a faith-in-faith 
which is otherwise in contradiction to scientific 
rationality. Man cannot think and act responsibly with 
modern dichotomy between reason and meaning, no more than 
he can accept a state of meaninglessness in his being. As 
a social actor, the individual must, in practice, 
methodologically function in terms of thesis-antithesis. 
Failing this, he experiences a totalising alienation and 
will experience some form of psychological disorder (see 
Laing 1972; Jung 1983; Smith 1983). 
Human geography will only be able to make clear inroads 
into socio-spatial phenomena when a firm epistemology has 
been established. This, by implication, requires an 
ontology on which knowledge can be based. An expression 
of 'faith' in its content can only materialise from a 
belief in the knowledge which is available to man. Belief 
cannot be acclaimed until the truth (verfication) of an 
explanation is established on the basis of historic space-
time evidence. Knowledge in human geography cannot be 
based on an emotional, existential experience, nor can it 
be said that an 'impersonal + time + chance' equation has 
produced a personal man, since this presupposition is 
against all experience. If geography adopts a normative 
standpoint, claiming that man will at some future time 
resolve his problems, current issues remain untouched and 
devoid of explanation as to where or how this process will 
begin. Rather than attempting to offer some social utopia 
- where political, socio-economic, psychological and 
ethical dilemmas will be resolved - human geography must 
account for man's present sociological tensions and his 
disunity with the spatial environment. 
GEOGRAPHY AS SOCIAL SCIENCE: BACKGROUND PRACTICES.  
Human geography deals with an increasingly wide and 
complex range of socio-spatial considerations, most of 
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which are problematically defined. The field of inquiry 
is seemingly limitless. In the advanced capitalist 
nations, it covers the geographical implications of inner 
city deprivation with its social, economic, political and 
psychological ramifications; regional economic imbalances 
and distributional disparities which generate 
inconsistencies to the accessibility of goods, services, 
welfare and employment opportunities; the continuing over-
production of consumer goods and foodstuffs in Western 
trading markets. The widening schism between the relative 
wealth and affluence of the 'North' and the impoverishment 
of the 'South' is equally of growing concern to Western 
Geographers. Associated with this phenomenon are the 
problems of the economic exploitation, ideological 
subversion and political coersion of many developing 
countries, often against a backgound of a geography of 
starvation. The continuing tensions along sensitive geo-
political frontiers in the Middle East, Central and South-
East Asia, Central and Latin America and the African 
continent are not only dynamic and unpredictable, but 
generate a variety of geographical repercussions, not 
least the oppression of both indigenous nationals and 
minority groups. At a time when science has fully 
embraced technology and made it coextensive with the ethos 
of 'progress', it is both Ahconceivable and alarming that 
the contribution of human geography in this package 
exhibits a proportionately diminishing prescriptive impact 
towards the resolution of socio-spatial problems. 
Modern man is confronted with an existential dilemma - if 
not, despair - because he has failed to evolve a 
scientific or humanistic universal which might be used in 
decision-making and problem solving. Since the rise of 
scientism, epistemological inquiry has restricted its 
vision to methodological issues, rather than the underelivsrw  
traditional concern into the conditions of possible 
knowledge and the meaning of knowledge. Science 
increasingly denies man the role of the 'knower' and 
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therefore impairs his philosophical reflection. Moreover, 
science seeks to establish an infallible position for 
itself, insofar that it maintains that there can be no 
independent source of knowledge which might arbitrate over 
science and its claims. Under a scientific technocracy, 
society is largely contained by fictional (unreal) 
institutionalised world-views. These become legitimised 
and a scientific 'consensus' is claimed. At this point, 
some doctrine or ideology is formed whose duration is 
dependent upon its ability to exploit human uncertainty 
about knowledge and existence. Fear, neurosis and forms 
of schizophrenia become socially regularised aspects of 
`normal' behaviour which otherwise support an unreal 
scientific 'rationality'. No social theory can dictate 
and justify action because the element of risk and 
uncertainty are ever-present. 
The predominant paradigm of the age, under which human 
geography and the other social science disciplines are 
subsumed, is based on technological power. This has not 
ensured health and wellbeing in a socio-economic sense, 
not does it seem concerned with any notion of truth. If 
science is concerned with developing views which may be 
counted as acceptable theory, then only 'rational' 
concepts of truth can be expected, which will tend to 
collapse into a disjointed pragmatism. Hubner (1984) 
argues that there can be no ahistorical, external 
standpoint from which it might be claimed that science 
grapples with 'the truth', or conforms to some absolute 
standard of 'rationality'; nor should it explore this 
problem by purely philosophical methods. Under these 
guidelines, scientific inquiry becomes an autonomous form 
of knowledge in which it is unable to clarify 'what is 
wrong' with those people who reject many of its claims. 
All issues which focus on the meaning of truth immediately 
raise the question as to why any truth-claim should be 
believed. Definitions of truth have inspired 
philosophical controversies which can only be fully 
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discussed in terms of metaphysical and aesthetic concepts. 
Science however, insists that questions about truth and 
belief can only be pragmatic. It demands concrete 
outcomes which provide practical applications to everyday 
living which are generally expressed as improvements in 
the material quality of life alone (see Rorty 1983). 
Given the presupposition that all metaphysical and 
aesthetic considerations c*.n be overruled in 
epistemological and existential matters, science - as the 
perpetrator of 'what is good in the way of truth and 
belief' - must still find a way of legitimating a claim 
that all knowledge can be objectively constituted within 
its field of inquiry. Any attempt by science to transcend 
the dilemma of the Kantian subject - object division on 
this basis can only be satisfied under the classical 
`thesis-antithesis' position. Failing this, science is 
compelled to reconstruct Kant's claim that there are 
"universal and unavoidable presuppositions of theoretical 
and practical reason" (McCarthy 1982, 59). 
Any social science which makes claims of normalcy and 
objectivity in the positivistic sense becomes self-
deceptive and self-limiting. An 'objective' human 
geography must presuppose cultural practices and shun the 
social background which mades its objects and methodology 
possible. Yet any account of socio-cultural practices 
cannot be value-free nor context-free, but require an 
interpretation. Likewise, the 'subjective' or humanistic 
geography cannot claim to attain normalcy since it 
attributes the final explanatory power either to 'everday 
meaning' - as in Sartre's existentialism - or to 'deep' 
meaning akin to the Husserlian notion of a meaning-giving 
transcendental subject. 
Neither the scientific nor the social paradigm has any 
intrinsic validity. By determining what is a 'problem' 
and what may be a 'solution', 'normal' science - and 
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therefore, 'normal' society - become totalising fields of 
activity, providing an endless source of prediction and 
control for those who manipulate the paradigmatic order. 
Normal science is coextensive with the accumulation of 
knowledge using predictive techniques which are not truths 
about how things are themselves. Instrumentally, it is a 
powerful and insidious form of domination where, under the 
banner of an elitist ideal (i.e. the paradigm), rules or 
laws can be derived/devised to suit the purpose. Paradigms 
may therefore remain intact even in the absence of rules 
(Kuhn 1970, 42). 
Furthermore, the relationship between 'normal' science and 
the technology which it embraces in its functional 
coalition is a contradiction: ..."whereas normal science 
aims in principle at the final assimilation of all 
anomalies, disciplinary technology works to set up and 
preserve an increasingly differential set of anomalies, 
which is the very way it extends its knowledge and power 
into wider and wider domains" (Dreyfus and Rainbow 1982, 
198). 
A reassessment of human geography's epistemological status 
and scientific practice necessitates a return to the 
background practices of the human subject, because these 
provAethe key for understanding society and its 
institutions. There is, however, much contention 
concerning the choice and legitimacy of the basic 
presuppositions which structure the reasoning and 
methodology of the inquiry. This is fraught with 
pitfalls. The individual may seemingly believe what he 
wants to believe, providing that he can substantiate his 
claims within a 'logical system' within which: "he can 
explain all the physical data upon any one of any number 
of mutually exclusive and contradictory premises" (Morris 
1966, 109). 
The 'normal' or positivistic scientific method is 
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concerned with the reproducibility of empirical data in 
the study of present natural processes. It asserts that 
the pressupposition leading to the most logical and self-
consistent system of interpretation must be based on 
experimental techniques and statistical arguments. 
Moreover, a striking shortcoming of positivist methodology 
is its failure to consider the knower of what is known, 
yet he is accredited with the full knowledge of things 
without actually 'being-there'. If, as its system claims, 
the observer is impartial and neutral, there can be no 
certitude of a correlation between the subject and the 
object of the inquiry. Nor is there any reason to assume 
that anything exists, i.e. 'that data is data'. 
Positivism, far from clarifying the area of epistemology, 
generates statistical averages and approximations, with no 
certainty that anything 'was-there' nor any notion of 
continuity in the things that were-there. In sum, it can 
only make statements about that which a thing 'is- not'. 
Neither 'normal' science nor technocratic instrumentalism 
appear to have grasped any real understanding of the 
origins, purpose or meaning of man and his natural 
environment. In the environmental realm, technocracy's 
apparent mastery over nature is generally tantamount to 
the abuse of its resources. The natural environment gives 
of its best response when man's interaction with it is 
reasonable and harmonious which, in turn, is dependent on 
man's measure of responsibility and care. The environment 
seemingly resists the exploitative and coersive tendencies 
expressed by technical interests; as soon as its 
equilibrium is seriously disrupted, its productive utility 
can fast deteriorate from a lucrative asset to a financial 
and social liability. The loss of respect and moderation 
in the relationship between man and the environment 
largely reflects the obsession for greed and power on the 
part of technocracy. 
For Marx, the basic tenet of any theory of social 
relations needed to be evaluated in the context of the 
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environment and natural resources, and thus in terms of 
human interaction in the production process (see Bottomore 
1984). Marx understood the problem of proving social 
reality and reason as a practical question which would be 
achieved by an analysis of the ways in which man 
transforms the environment and his material world. His 
epistemological position could not therefore be divorced 
from historical materialism. Production otherwise 
`socializes' man's inner nature, from which moral issues 
are translated as the self-understanding of a classless 
society. This, presumably, may be made coextensive with 
the socio-economic 'ills' which are generated under a 
capitalist wage system where class differentials are 
necessary a part of its functional organisation (see Peet 
1977). 
According to Marx's analogy, the revolutionary 
transformation of society and the environment make 
`subject' and 'object' as one because social reality is 
neither to be found 'outside' of man, nor as an abstract 
form of internalised idealism (see Kolakowski 1978). 
Marx's unitary idealism about socialist societies tends to 
be an illusory concept in this light. Three important 
considerations may be immediately raised. First, social 
democracy requires an active, self-disciplined working 
class who control the means of production and participate 
fully in decision-making at all levels (see Kitching 
1984). Secondly, the realisation of Marx's socialist 
ideals is, moreover, a normative theory which bears little 
impact to the present. Thirdly, a collective social order 
does not mirror the individual will. Lukes (1982, 139) 
points out that such a standpoint cannot possibly show 
that people would reach a 'rational consensus', but 
conversely: "there is ... every reason to suppose that 
they would not ...". 
Any conception of social reality, truth and ethical norms 
which are expressed in classical philosophical terms or 
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which are connected with metaphysical values is 
categorically rejected by Marxism. Otherwise, it would be 
tantamount to a recognition that nature and the human 
condition are contingent upon certain external 
limitations. This contradicts the Marxist vision of an 
alternative future and the emphasis on social actors 
creating their own destinies (see Worsley 1984). 
Although Marxist theory overlooks the 'irrational' 
characteristics - fear, greed, pride, prejudice, and so on 
- inherent in the human condition, they are manifest in 
reality. No political ideology can eradicate individual 
`irrationality', except by imposing collective 
restrictions by force, in which case, coersion is merely a 
temporary masking of the real dilemma. Rather, it provides 
a fragmented view of who man really 'is'. Truth, social 
reality and social values in the Marxist sense correspond 
to some fundamental 'human good' which can only be defined 
and substaqt4ated from a materialist standpoint (see Lukes 
1985). 
Alternatively, others have attempted to reconstruct the 
problem of background practices by appealing to 
pscychological inferences and language. While Freud 
largely reduced all aspects of human background practices 
to the 'libido', and Jung to the pursuit of (self) 
`individuation' and the uncovering of 'archetypes', both 
methods fundamentally agreed that no meaningful 'rational 
consensus' could be achieved unless their subjects 
willingly and voluntarily accepted and recognised the 
problems inherent in their conditions. In a modern 
technocratic society, social action and communication have 
become distorted and conditioned by dominant power groups 
and repressive socio-economic policies. Man has been 
denigrated to the role of the 'object' and has thus 
surrendered much of his subjective creativity and realism. 
This, by implication, demands a definitional unveiling of 
`progress' which concerns not only an interpretation 'how' 
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socio-economic geographic inequalities are generated by a 
particular system, but equally the question 'why' these 
should arise. 
The discussion of background practices from the 
presuppositions of a psychological line of inquiry require 
that human characteristics such as conscious 
deception/unconscious self-deception, insincerity and 
inauthenticity be recognised and eradicated if any 
`rational' consensus is to be forthcoming. How are 
individuals to be made aware of these conditions? By whom 
and by what means? Do people have any real interest in 
reviewing/recognising these problem? Such a discussion is 
once again contingent on the interpretation and meaning of 
`truth'. It may be evolved, modified or reconstructed to 
suit social praxis under a political ideology, but unless 
its ontological and epistemological bases can be fully 
expounded, it is no longer 'truth'. Individuals have 
different conceptions of life, where the diversity of 
philosophical and religious beliefs, and of political and 
social doctrines tend to obscure the meaning of any 
`rational consensus'. 
LANGUAGE: THE UNIVERSAL EXPERIENCE 
An examination of background practices through the study of 
language has become a potent contemporary medium of both 
philosophical and social inquiry, to which human geography has 
also been attracted. Notwithstanding, there is no 
agreement for the application of linguistic or semantic 
theorising in the social science to that a variety of 
theoretical approaches prevail. The aim of all linguistic 
work is to discover the relational and structural 
characteristics which make meaningful communication 
possible in human existence. Rossi (1981, 63) refers to 
this as 'transformational structuralism', in which there 
is a need to penetrate beyond the surface issues that 
largely preoccupy the positivist and behaviourist 
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assumptions. The axiom of language is contained in an 
examination of the 'deep and real structure' which shape 
`observable phenomena' and 'conscious explanations' as 
well as their 'apparent contradictions'. 
Language as a branch of transformational structuralism, is thus 
based on the presupposition that human existence is 
governed by basic universal structures which provide 
uniform categories of the human mind. The analytic depends 
on the unravelling of the meanings of language found in 
the deep abstract levels of human existence. These 'deep' 
structures do not easily lend themselves to an analysis by 
an empirical scientific methodology, but rather their 
transformational mechanics must be uncovered and explained 
in social praxis and behaviour (see Leach 1981). This 
approach is not without its problems and moreover, the 
fundamental arbitrary and obscure nature of language. This 
is further compounded by the use of signs and symbols 
which shroud the content and meaning of language (see 
Harvey 1969, 32). 
Chomsky's (1965) work with structural linguistics has 
attempted to identify the fundamental characteristics of 
language systems which govern everyday speech useage. He 
considers that there must be basic, genetically imprinted 
rules which govern all forms of human communication and 
that all language systems are biologically determined. 
Chomsky's aim has been an attempt to isolate the general 
principles which permit the transformational aspects 
between the rules in language systems (langue) and 
everyday speech acts (parole). 
Piaget's work on analytical structuralism investigates the 
structures which govern the development of human intelligence. 
The methodological approach and problematic orientation 
are similar to those found in Chomsky's analytic. 
Piaget's structure is a system of transformations based on 
three concepts: wholeness (compositional laws), 
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transformation (the mechanics which structure and organise 
laws), and self-regulation (the dynamics which maintain 
stability in, and which give meaning to the structure). 
Piaget understood the human intelligence as man's ability 
to learn and assimilate new material with which he could 
experience the phenomenal world. Man must therefore 
aspire to greater levels of intelligence and action. 
Much of Piaget's reasoning appealed to the integration of 
evolutionary theory so that his transformatignal 
•,A1N 
structuralism is essentially a closed systemlis not open 
to reordering by any philosophical or psychological 
notions of 'insideness' or 'outsideness': "... man can 
transform himself by transforming the world and can 
structure himself by constructing structures; and these 
structures are his own, for they are not externally 
predestined either from within or without" (Piaget 1971, 
118-119). 
By contrast, Levi-Strauss's (1963) examination of the deep 
structures which underly human existence and social 
systems focussed on the theory and practice of 
transformational structuralism in social anthropology. 
His methodology provided scope for the integration of 
cultural, mythical and mystical inferences not uncommon to 
the psychoanalytical work of Jung and James. Levi-Strauss 
believed that all deep structures which govern human 
behaviour and speech are "... preordained by unconscious 
forces beyond human control" (Kurzweil 1980, 27). Akin to 
the views of transcendental phenomenologists - and 
particularly those of Husserl - Levi-Strauss's analytic 
must also accommodate the metaphysical phenomena which 
comprise a part of those unconscious forces which he hopes 
to identify as the transformation of deep structure. 
The methodological complexities in Levi-Strauss's work, 
together with the assimilative and interpretative 
difficulties of its metaphysical content, have largely 
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tended to isolate it beyond the parameters of normal 
scientific inquiry. 
Habermas argues that in language man can discover the 
essence of rational personality in which autonomy and 
responsibility are couched. In this concept, he suggests, 
the history of reason is contained. For Habermas, speech 
must be made the condition where man's internal nature 
(insideness) and the external world and society 
(outsideness) become fixed. Habermas contends that if 
human existence is made coextensive with debate, then the 
bases for an undistorted and prejudice-free discourse must 
be uncovered. This he terms as an 'ideal speech 
situation'. 
In contrast to Marx, Habermas substitutes a theory of 
action related to a class struggle for one of 
enlightenment based on rational argumentation. Man 
somehow has to reach a point of self-recognition which 
will provide a basis for a consensus and therefore, 
rational action and positive decision-making. According 
to Habermas (1971), Marx failed to recognise the 
distinction between work and language, and by subsuming 
the latter into the former, failed to grasp the potential 
of dialogue as the vehicle which provides "the 
inseparability of truth and virtue, of facts and values, 
of theory and practice" (Held 1980, 250). Similarly, in 
his critique of capitalism, Habermas (1974) suggests that 
the increasing authoritarianism of the capitalist state, 
maintained by class contradiction, jeopardizes the 
possiblity of some 'pure' form of dialogue. Habermas sees 
people as locked into systems of administrative 
rationality, but with no means of establishing a 
democratic consensus so that decision-making can become a 
collective activity. 
Accordingly, Habermas grounds his claim for an 'ideal 
speech situation' within the presupposed existence of an 
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`emancipatory interest' amongst those seeking liberation 
from state power, or, for that matter, from any kind of 
authority. This is an ambiguous concept because it 
implies some combination of work, language and decision-
making. Habermas requires an ideal institutional basis 
where social and political conditions foster and promote 
the free and equal access to participation in discourse 
and debate (see Bernstein 1984). The notion of a 'debate 
among equals' ∎s an exclusive concept, promulgated within 
an utopian ideology. 
Habermas's idea of communicative rationality is grounded 
in the classical notion of 'logos'. His linguistic-truth 
dialectic claims are not addressed - as Plato would have 
it - to a 'particular audience' who already have some 
prior understanding with the teller, but to a 'universal 
audience' (Habermas 1984). This corresponds to an 
Aristotelian view of some unspecified form of 
egalitarianism, where the pre-requisite for a 
participatory politics calls on the 'common sense' of the 
mature citizen rather than on any specialised scientific 
knowledge. In this case, the dangers of self-deception 
and delusion constitute an omnipresent dilemma insofar 
that the individual is given self-accountability for his 
responsibility and decision-making as a social actor. 
Furthermore, Habermas fails to acknowledge that in an 
`ideal speech situation', many people will not gain access 
to a certain circle of understanding because they continue 
to lack the necessary insight required for the relevant 
understandings. Modern political structures of all 
ideological persuasions deny the masses an undistorted and 
complete view of rationality, not least because 
technocratic instrumentalism increasingly demands that the 
nature and scope of human action in the contemporary world 
must have some degree of theoretico-technical knowledge in 
order to 'participate' (see Bell 1974). 
Habermas's theory of language as a precondition for a 
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rational consensus in the social sciences may be 
critically reviewed from various standpoints. Habermas 
(1979; 1984) rejects the view of classical philosophical 
inquiry that a complete view of knowledge can be 
uncovered. Instead, he finds contemporary philosophy is 
`post-metaphysical'. This means it can establish the 
`formal conditions of rationality' in knowing, in 
linguistic understanding and the truth claims of social 
actors. Habermas does not seek any substantive theories 
of nature, history or society. His epistemological 
standpoint differs from that of Kant insofar that Habermas 
rejects any notion of an ahistorical transcendental 
subject which might determine the preconditions for any 
experience. For Kant, reason must reflect upon itself to 
discriminate between an unprejudiced valid knowledge and 
that of mere speculation. This implies that if authentic 
social relations can be discovered, then society can 
emancipate itself from the illusions imposed by 
ideological conditioning and self-deception. It might 
then be possible to develop a profound critical faculty 
which penetrates all forms of social and political 
conditioning. In opposition to Kant's conception of an 
autonomous self, Habermas dismisses such claims as 
monodological mythico-magical world-views whose internal 
structures resist verification and which imply that man is 
`more than man'. Habermas rejects that Kantian ideal that 
man discovers 'pure reason' first at the individual level. 
`Individuation' for Habermas must be "a process of 
sociation" (McCarthy 1982, 76). Habermas's efforts to 
reconstruct Kant's thesis through emphasis or)language 
rather than an historical consciousness, fails to uncover 
any claim that man possesses any rational autonomy of a 
history of reason. Habermas has no grounds to attenuate 
the notion that man is a rational being, or that he has 
the potential to an autonomous self-revelation of 'self'. 
In a 'speech situation', where people realise their 
potential as rational social actors, Habermas must account 
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for the linguistic content of that which is 
communicatively shared. Equally, in order to claim an 
`ideal speech situation', Habermas must first establish 
the grounds for the generalisability of interests. If he 
seeks to unravel a systematically distorted communication, 
Habermas must, at the outset of his critique, presuppose 
some idea of what undistorted communication is. Habermas 
cannot, however, account for the ways in which 
communication is distorted, or how it might be removed, or 
as to how a legitimate consensus may be established. 
Habermas tends to underscore the fact that in any analysis 
of language, some consideration must be made of the 
communicative competence of each participant. 
Every speech-act contains certain validity-claims which 
make speech comprehensible and recognisable and open to 
verification. Without validity-claims, speech would have 
no intelligibility, nor could the 'truth' of its 
propositional content be tested or debated. Philosophy 
has always presumed that the language not only asserts an 
autonomy which is anticipated, but also which is real. 
Language is thus accorded the status of an 'interest of 
reason'. This itself is an 'a priori' assertion and 
cannot claim to be empirically derived. Any theoretical 
presupposition which are grounded in an analytic of pure' 
language or 'ideal' speech-content constitute a 'faith' or 
a 'belief' which has no historical validation. Habermas's 
position is therefore ideological and his notion of 
`anticipatory emancipation' through a prejudice-free 
discourse appears to be theoretically fictitious. It 
follows that the conditions of ideal speech may be 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the attainment of a 
`rational consensus'" (Thompson 1982, 130). Equally, in 
attempting to reject the classical philosphical dilemma of 
`hope' and 'despair', the utopian overtones of Habermas's 
rationalisation of discourse effectively reduce his theory 
to a form of optimistic humanism reminiscent to a 
Kierkergaardian 'leap' of faith: "... the concept of 
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communicative rationality does contain a utopian 
perspective" (Habermas 1982, 227-228). 
Habermas's insistence on an 'ideal speech situation' fails 
to take account of the origin, content and diversity of 
cultural traditions or of the geographical distribution of 
material and technical resources. It is unlikely that all 
speech is ultimately going to provide a universal 
consensus for a rational, free and just society. Moreover, 
human 'rationality' and 'understanding' are generally 
prejudicial towards their own (self-) interests. 
Habermas's theory of language is not a fulfilled 
proposition because it expresses the philosophy of 'as if' 
ideal speech 'was' the case in hand. The crucial factor 
concerns the content of knowledge contained in any (ideal) 
language, about which Habermas can say nothing. Similarly, 
his 'emancipatory' interest in 'ideal speech' is a 
normative assertion which is hardly a generalisable social 
condition. 
The real structure of society is, moreover, fraught with 
irrationality and contradiction. It is precisely these 
aspects of human existence which man tries to conceal. 
Habermas has broadly recognised this tension and refers to 
its condition as a 'quasi-transcendental' interest. 
Habermas's assessment of the human condition is deviod of 
any sensitivity - it is all too mechanical: "Habermasian 
man has ... no body, no feelings; the 'structure of 
personality' is identified with cognition, language and 
interaction" (Heller 1982, 22). The real dilemma and 
shortcoming of all Habermas's theorizing is his refusal to 
integrate any concept of moral rationality within his 
linguistic idealism. Any discussion of a substantive 
social existence and human interaction with the spatial 
environment are constrained by metaphysical limitations. 
Without such considerations, theoretical and practical 
reason are at best only partial truths insofar that the 
epistemological backcloth remains incomplete and 
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fragmentary. The real essence of 'self' in human 
existence remains preclusive. 
Foucault adopts political reality as the presupposition 
for uncovering the truth-claims of linguistic background 
practices. Language is part of a larger field of power 
and practice whose relations are articulated in different 
ways by different paradigms. Foucault wishes to eradicate 
any ethical or metaphysical content from his analytic of 
language. The legitimisation of discourse cannot, he 
claims, be realised by appealing to some idyllic, 
futuristic priniciples; nor is the reinterpretation of the 
origin of language possible in the phenomenological 
context of some past 'golden age'. Foucault (1973; 1975) 
rejects these hypotheses as the 'herneneutics of 
suspicion'. Rather, something in man's historical 
practices seems to have defined him. 
All empirical investigations into linguistic practices 
ultimately collapse into mysticism. Man, although 
seemingly divorced from his origins, is 'already there'. 
He cannot get behind his language, but uses it with some 
understanding (Foucault 1973, 332). To make mystical and 
metaphysical provisos in linguistic practice presents an 
impossible exegesis steeped in theology which, in 
Foucault's (1975, XVII) view is "ever secret, ever beyond 
itself". 
Foucault (1972, 16) attempts to make discourse autonomous 
within an "archaeological" structural holism, "purged of 
all anthropologism". Discourse, he claims, unifies all 
systems of practices - social, political, economic, 
technological and pedagogical, but nothing is 
transcendental in its workings. Speech-acts are part of a 
"rule-governed system" (Foucault 1968, 29). 
Beyond this, Foucault concedes that the source of man's 
meaning is unobtainable. He can neither justify the 
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autonomy of discourse, nor the philosophical position of 
phenomenoltNcal detachment necessary to establish the 
ahistoricism of his 'archaeaogical method'. Foucault 
(1979, 75) attempts to offset the dilemma by introducing 
the notion of "truth effects within a fictional discourse" 
where his terms of reference are contemporary society and 
its problems. There is no resort to past, historical 
conceptualisations which might be used to explain the 
cumulative development of present-day issues. Foucault's 
work indicates that although discourse is based on 
knowledge, the dilemma of the knowing and telling of 
`truth' remains as long as man's ontological origins are 
untouched. Otherwise, any attempt to make discourse 
autonomous requires the denial of any teleology of reason, 
deep meaning or 'concealed origin' in history or outside 
it, and moreover, of any logos which is before, he behind, 
or beyond history while remaining situated in history. 
In his final pronouncements on 'ordinary philosophy' 
Wittgenstein (1961) attempted to construct an 
(unambiguous) 'ideal language' based on a Russellian 
philosophy of logical atomism. The fundamental problem 
concerned the description of the structure of the atomic 
propositons. This raises an epistemological dilemma -
what is knowledge; what is the essence of knowledge? 
Wittgenstein could find no strict definition, nor did he 
think it possible or desirable. The mystery of meaning 
would only disappear when an 'unprejudiced' vision was 
adopted to the way words are used. Much philosopy, 
according to Wittgenstein, treats a word as if it has a 
name. The personalisation of the basis of language is a 
seemingly unavoidable metaphysical trap. Such analyses 
assume mysterious 'pseudo-entities' which are set up as 
the objects of reference. It tends towards a belief in 
universals. Alternatively, 'understanding' a word, or 
`learning a word's meaning' is also a way of deciphering 
epistemological complexities, yet it still creates the 
necessity for an 'idea' or 'content' which must then be 
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comtemplated by the inquirer. This runs the risk of 
collapsing into a fragmented array of possible 
interpretations. 
In the case of 'language games', meaning is only derived 
if the speaker is talking to someone who already 
understands the game. By this, Wittgenstein does not mean 
one who understands the mechanics of the internal logic of 
learning structures, but how the meaning of our (own) 
language is understood. Wittgenstein's crucial 
presupposition to linguistic practices is that every 
proposition must have a clear and definite sense. In 
Russellian terminology, most propositions contain complex 
expressions which cannot be called 'logically proper 
names'. If propositions are to have a definite sense, then 
the sense must refer to names, otherwise the 'sense' or 
`object' will remain undisclosed (silent) because it 
cannot be discussed if it has no identity. It follows that 
all the 'truths' of philosophical and scientific logic 
consist wholly of tautologies. According to Wittgenstein, 
a 'proof' is merely a mechanical expedient for recognising 
tautologies, so that all propositions of logic say one and 
the same thing - nothing. 
Wittgenstein's dilemma was to somehow dispense of the 
human mind and of knowledge responded to some 
transcendental influence or entity. In such a case, this 
would raise a host of intractable problems as to how 
spiritual essences interact with body and mind, for which 
philosophy and science have no answers. Wittgenstein 
dismissed this problem in claiming that metaphysics arises 
out of the fact that the 'logic of language' is not 
understood. In an 'ideal' or 'pure' language, logic would 
be unnecessary and metaphysics impossible - all things 
would be known and understood. Wittgenstein understood 
metaphysics as an attempt to transcend the limitations of 
language, beyond which nothing can be said. The ethos of 
human background practices is 'silence' while the 
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metaphysical content of language is unrecognised or 
refuted, yet without it, speech is ambiguous and 
meaningless because none of its propositions have any real 
sense of identity. Nor can any speech act on this premise 
either establish or justify the terms of reference through 
which is must validate its content and 'truth' claims. 
Alternatively, to presuppose that the structure and 
content of language begins (and is maintained) on an 
impersonal basis would render all communication between 
man and man, and man with himself, an impossibility and a 
nonsense. In such as case, nothing can be known about 
anything. Wittgenstein's assessment of this dilemma is 
inescapably implicit for a return to origins: if it is 
presupposed that the telos of reaching 'understanding' is 
to be found in the concept of speech with a communicative 
content, then no explanation of what it is 'to reach an 
understanding' can ever be thought or discussed unless it 
is first known what it is 'to speak'. 
Heidegger's (1958) hermeneutic study of language signified 
a methodological digression from his initial 
phenomenologico-ontological standpoint - his work, Being 
and Time - in which he hoped to uncover the source of 
reality ('Being') and the meaning of existence ('being'). 
Although Heidegger's early (non-linguistic) work is 
confusing and ambiguous, it is clearly influenced by the 
possibility of an encounter with metaphysics and 
mysticism. Simplistically, the object of Heidegger's 
analysis is man ('Dasein') as an object in a world of 
objects. Man as 'Dasein', however, enjoys a special 
position because he relates to himself in terms of his own 
`essence' (see Heidegger 1962, 105-106; Pivcevic 1970, 
114). According to Heidegger's 'concept of possibility', 
man either authenticates (voluntarily choses-to-seek) or 
inauthenticates (chooses not-to-seek) his understanding of 
his own existence. There is no certitude, however, that 
anything is-there to be discovered; the proposition of 
73 
`being' or 'Sein' (an existence-with-meaning) must be 
counterbalanced against that of 'non-being' or 'Nichtsein' 
(an existence devoid of meaning, or 'nothingness'). 
The elusiveness and vagueness of Heidegger's terminology 
is equally prevalent for his concept of 'Being' (what is-
there to cause existence to-be). For Heidegger, the source 
of 'Being' is unknown to man in which there is a dualism 
is oankiwalent 
insofar that 'Being',v(see Heidegger 1962, 24-28, Pivcevic 
1970, 121; Kee 1971, 34-35): 'Being' is not itself an 
existent, but it is not nothing; it is not one entity 
among others; it is not that of a 'class' or 'genus'. 
`Being' cannot be disclosed in normal terms - it strictly 
has no definition at all - but is something 'primordial'. 
`Being' then is both hidden and revealed; it concomitantly 
appears and withdraws from 'Dasein's' view. The relevance 
of truth and meaning which it contains can only be 
apprehended by philosophical reflection about its 
fundamental ontological essence. The history of Western 
thought has been forgotten: "... the beginning is the veil 
which conceals the origin" (Heidegger 1972, 152). 
Heidegger places the onus of this omission on man and 
refers to it as a 'failure' on his part. In this sense, 
man has abandoned the questions of his origins and 
meanings, substituting them with his own (autonomous) 
version of 'truths'. 
The 'early' Heidegger of Being and Time failed to reveal 
both the nature of 'Being' and the meaning of 'being'. At 
this point, his attentions are drawn to the possibilities 
of language as a vehicle which may provide the authentic 
access to the subjects of his inquiry. The 'later' 
Heidegger's shift in emphasis was towards the language of 
poetry in which, he claimed, all 'authentic' thinking and 
metaphysical truths were contained. Conversely, Heidegger 
shunned any reference to the language of the scientific 
and technological rationality whose logical reasoning was 
seen by him as impoverished, formalised and 
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philosophically inferior, and moreover, set in 
contradiction to his expectations. Reflexive and 
contemplative thought, according to Heidegger, encounter 
things which cannot be accommodated nor understood by 
scientific logic. 
Heidegger's 'new' position is that 'Being' communicated 
with 'Dasein' in poetic language during a 'golden age' at 
the time of the pre-socratic Greeks, prior to Aristotle 
when, he claims, man had a unity of knowledge and an 
`ideal' universal speech situation existed. There is no 
historical evidence for such a 'golden age', yet Heidegger 
insists that the 'essence' and 'message' of 'Being' could 
be found in the "oracular obscurity of the pre-Socratics" 
(Blackham 1982, 108-109). This is Heidegger's basis for a 
`mystical hermeneutics', which otherwise is another form 
of philosophical 'romanticism'. Equally, Heidegger could 
not justify his presupposition that in the Greek language 
alone is logos from which he hopes to recover the lost 
fact of authenticity and meaning which 'Being' speaks to 
US. 
Heidegger's linguistic position is thus based on the 
premise that a part of 'Being' is the existent, 'Dasein' 
(man), who verbalises. Because speech is a universal 
experience and was supposedly 'pure' in a pre-Socratic 
era, Heidegger believes that it can shed some kind of 
meaning to 'Being'. The poet becomes the prophet because 
in him there may be mystical explanation and hidden 
meanings, as yet obscure. In this way, Heidegger is 
presupposing that something ('Being') is-there, 'Being/  
does reveal itself, and that language (a communicated 
speech) is both central to, and reveals the identity of 
`Being'. Language is in itself a hermeneutic. 
Heidegger, however, cannot clarify the 'message' of this 
poetry. He concludes with the admonition 'but look at the 
poet'. This implies that somehow (an 'irrational' 
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optimism) there may be a greater 'truth' about reality and 
existence that what could rationally and logically be 
expected, merely on account that the poet and poetry both 
exist. When Heidegger says 'listen to the poet', he does 
not in fact mean that we must reflect on the content of 
what the poet says. The area of content is immaterial 
because it is a hermeneutic and therefore sets up 
contradictions. The real emphasis is poetry as-it-is, 
because for Heidegger, its mystical linguistic 
connotations provide the speculation for a 'more real 
world', yet, according to Heidegger's analysis, one 
without any content or meaning. 
The most intriguing point of tension in Heidegger's 
linguistic analysis is, by implication, the attempt to 
integrate the notion of an historic Fall into his new 
system. Aristotle, and all those who follow him are 
`fallen' because they begin to think in terms of a 
rationale alien to the pre-Socratic Greeks. Aristotle's 
philosophy somehow instigated this schism so that, for 
Heidegger, Aristotle, by implication, substitutes the 
place of Adam as 'the one that fell'. Heidegger appears to 
see himself as the one to recapture the 'saving grace' of 
`Being'. 
Heidegger, however, rejects the Judaeo-Christian 
insistence for the recognition of sin, repentance and 
deliverance. As he sees it: "Theology is seeking a more 
primordial interpretation of man's Being towards God, 
prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining 
within it ... its system of dogma ... conceals and 
distorts it (Heidegger 1962, 30). 
Unsurprisingly, Heidegger's concept of the Fall has no 
moral content, but rather emphasises an epistemological 
and methodological abnormality in man's thinking. 
Heidegger, nonetheless, ensnares his case in his own 
linguistic standpoint, metaphysics and all. Heidegger 
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otherwise shows that since Aristotle, man thinks and 
reasons 'abnormally', yet Heidegger has no historical 
basis by which he can explain this occurrence. 
Furthermore, Heidegger's analysis supports the contention 
that philosophy lacks the explanatory power to account for 
the dilemma of man's loss of meaning and understanding in 
the areas of knowledge and existence on the basis of man 
and history now being 'normal' and 'rational' thinking and 
reasoning has ever taken place, so that man now 'is' as he 
always 'has been'. Such an argument has clearly been 
insufficient to legitimate either the 'early' or the 'new' 
presuppositions of Heidegger's work. 
Heidegger's linguistic proposition - the impersonal and 
unknown point of reference 'Being', speaking through 
existence ('being') to man ('Dasein'), who verbalises - is 
equivalent to man's acquisition of meaning and 
understanding about 'nothing'. In such a case, Heidegger's 
earlier concept of 'angst' has yet to be removed. This 
corresponds not only to man's dread of 'non-being' after 
death, but equally to the purposelessness and 
meaninglessness of both 'being' and of 'Dasein'. In its 
socio-spatial context, it signifies man's total 
alienation, anonymity and depersonalisation in every 
sphere of existence, from his social relations to his 
interaction with the spatial environment. For as long as 
`Being' is denied the attributes of any intelligible and 
communicative speech content, there can be no truth-claims 
about knowledge and existence in any field of inquiry. Nor 
is it conceivable that Heidegger (1972, 105-110) - by 
appealing to Neitzsche's thinking - should encourage 
`Dasein' to 'go beyond' itself through its inherent 'will 
to power' to seek an encounter with 'Being' when, in fact, 
`nothing-is-there'. 
In sum Heidegger's 'Being' has no propositional content 
with which 'to speak'. It would appear that Heidegger 
would require something akin to the Judaeo-Christian 
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standpoint of 'Being', but without its moral content or 
the need to recognise that knowledge is an expedient of 
`being'. The possibility of the presupposition is anathema 
for Heidegger since it implies that Being' ('Someone') has 
spoken 'behind man', which is the antithesis of all 
Heidegger's thinking and philosophy. 
CRITICAL REMARKS ON BACKGROUND PRACTICES 
The universality of language, as a source of possible 
insight to human background practices, fails to uncover a 
comprehensive reconstruction of meaning and understanding 
in the areas of knowledge and existence. Both Chomsky's 
and Levi-Strauss's works have been critically received on 
account of their methodology intricacy, the difficulty of 
reconciling theory with practice, and the problem of 
isolating and identifying a 'deep' structure, whose 
conceptualisation has not generated either a wide appeal 
or much agreement against scientific reasoning. 
Nor does Piaget provide a convincing basis for his 
methodology. He underscores the aesthetic qualities of 
the human condition by outlawing any notion of 'essences'. 
His transformational arguments are almost entirely 
dependent upon the preassumptions of evolutionary theory, 
but, as in the case of Quine's behaviouristic study of 
language, there is no wide agreement that human behaviour 
can be explained solely in physiological terms. Indeed, it 
would be rash to assert that psychology, sociology and 
human geography are all ultimately reducible to physical 
and chemical equations. 
Habermas wishes to depoliticize the ground for the 
development of his 'ideal speech situation' so that his 
study of propositional truth claims in language is 
entirely theory-based. His immediate problem would be to 
find a point of access in whch he could integrate his 
theorizing in a practical social context. This in itself 
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is problematic. It is unlikely that people will develop 
new concerns about a utopian 'emancipatory' ideal whose 
concretion seeks liberation from all kinds of authority. 
Habermas gives no guarantee or assurance that the 
interests of an 'ideal speech situation' correspond to a 
criterion of responsibility and commitment. 
Foucault's analysis of language collapses at the point 
where the ontological confrontation is encountered, 
about which, he claims, nothing can be discovered. He 
then grounds all discourse within the internal logic of 
contemporary politics and power struggles. Wittenstein's 
study of the propositional 'sense' in the content of 
language led him to the conclusion that either linguistic 
practices smacked of metaphysics, or that normal science 
had not yet grasped the 'logic of language', for which he 
could provide no directive. For those like Heidegger who 
seek to locate and identify the source of the initial 
linguistic blueprint in an historic space-time context, 
any propositional revelation of speech is contingent on 
the inclusion of metaphysical and mystical inferences. 
Koestler (1982, 684-685) also drew this analogy in his 
appeal to the historic Babel to explain, as he saw it, the 
inadequacies and shortcomings of man's theories and 
beliefs. If the contention is held that social philosophy 
is now engaged, as a final resort, in the hypothesis that 
`rationality' is to be found in language, and that Athis is 
rejected or collapses, then all disciplines of knowledge 
in the social sciences will ultimately be compelled to 
seek a 'higher principle' of rationality. This would 
conform more closely with the Kantian position of 'pure 
reason' as a condition which "is not an empirical given 
but a special mode of reason which ... imposes itself 
directly and unrestrictedly on the subject's self-
understanding" (Bubner 1982, 49). 'Rationality' cannot, it 
seems, be revealed or contained within a 'normal' 
scientific paradigm. As for the potentiality of the truth 
claims in speech: "Belief in the reliability of language 
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or in perfect forms of communication ends in rhetorical 
delusion" (Bubner 1982, 51). Rather, the linguistic 
manifestation of dialogue is a secondary outcome of a 
deeper underlying conception of what is social rationality 
both in theory and in practice. 
RATIONALITY, REASON AND REALITY 
Human geography - as a social science which examines the 
behaviour and thinking of social actors in a spatial 
context - is compelled to legitimate its epistemological 
and metholok§ial underpinnings through the exposition of 
rationality, reason and reality. This at once seemingly 
raises a hermeneutical dilemma: these terms may assume 
differences of interpretation and therefore of 
definitional content according to the choice of 
philosophical departure which will dictate the given 
terms of reference. No social science discipline can 
ignore questions about the human condition, and 
therefore who the individual precisely 'is'. The 
recognition of this prerequisite sharply differentiates 
the social sciences from the physical sciences. 
Many of the basic assumptions about human rationality, 
reason and social reality have become increasingly 
circumscribed by scientific procedure and the meaning(s) 
which it subsequently attributes to these areas. 
According to Horkheimer (1974), scientific reason is 
concerned with means and ends. It possesses the 
technical procedures to achieve an end, but these do not 
necessarily generate the rationality of the end itself. 
Scientific reason is concomitant with instrumentalism. 
From this perspective, reason is no longer rational 
insofar that social scientists are influenced by 
philosophical presuppositions acceptable to their own 
views about man's role in a societal and environmental 
context. An instrumental reason is not synonymous with an 
objective rationality; that is, all beliefs which are not 
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scientifically (positivistically) verifiable constitute an 
altogether different reality which is inaccessible to 
scientific reason is said to be irrational or mythical and 
is frequently equated with ideology and dogma. Much of the 
problem concerns the search for a common rationality in 
which there will be a consensus for both reason and 
reality. This requires the assumption of a universal human 
condition, which, as MacDonald and Pettit (1981, 31) 
suggest, is founded on a "belief in the unity of human 
nature - a belief that people in different cultures are 
essentially similar". 
These notions are fraught with problems, but have 
largely been compounded by the predominance of 'normal' 
scientific inquiry as the paradigm of rationality. 
Empiricism and its logic do not always provide a wholesome 
and complete view of human socio-spatial relations. 
Inspired by Hume's (1965) work, empiricism rejects the 
existence of acausal or 'concealed' agencies in networks 
of apparent regularities. Its credence has been eroded 
from many quarters. Quine (1964, 22-29) - himself, an 
empiricist - has recognised that the very notion of a 
basic experience becomes exposed as an empiricist 
prejudice due to the inadequacies of both theory and data. 
Empiricism cannot call on experience to show how two 
events are causally related without invoking a theory 
which may explain the unobservable entities which provide 
the connectivity in the relationship. Kuhn's (1962) anti-
empiricism has also attacked the rational foundations of 
'normal' science insofar that much knowledge and belief -
claims are the products of social forces of which many 
people have little or no understanding. Feyerabend (1981 
a) is particularly critical of the paramouncy of Western 
science and its 'rationalism' over all other traditions. 
Rather, Feyerabend interprets it as one of many kinds of 
social practice and its reason as a tradition. Reality, 
for Feyerabend (1981, xiii) depends on man's ability to 
choose between competing alternatives: "We decide to 
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regard those things as real which play an important role 
in the kind of life we prefer". His basis for the 
scientific method becomes the principle of 'anything 
goes'. 
By Feyerabend's (1978) standards, reality and reason 
have no universal meaning. Holistic knowledge has 
collapsed into a fragmentary empiricism so that 
reflexivity and praxis have been abandoned. Wilson 
(1985) views this trend as a sign of pessimism: 
contemporary social science is inadequate because it 
reinforces the climate of social instrumentalism. For 
Wilson, progress is an illusion, innovation is dead and 
science is otherwise in crisis. Luckmann's (1983) 
phenomenological approach to the meaning of social reality 
attempts to treat the structures of the life - world as-
they-are-experienced by conscious actors. He suggests 
there is a dualism in life-work structures: first, in 
terms of a strict Husserlian phenoMenology where 
structures only become a part of an individual actor's 
experience insofar that he encounters them in the world; 
secondly, seen in terms of philosophical anthropology and 
biology, structures must be understood as fixed 
constituted realities which have always been a part of the 
life of a species into which the individual actor is born. 
Luckmann, however, wishes to restore the primacy of the 
human mind by undermining historical objectivism so that 
the possibilities of history are limited by structures of 
human consciousness and existence. Man, in other words, is 
responsible for the making and structuration of his 
history and his social reality is, at any given point in 
time, a reflection of his own conscious condition. 
Luckmann's position raises a moral dilemma insofar that if 
historicity is not an entity unto itself, it is a 
structure projected and assembled by man. This calls for 
an evaluation of what is 'good' or 'bad' for mankind, and 
what is just, selfish or based on greed. In sum, this 
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demands a statement of the theoretical foundations which 
seem to legitimate the validity of such a position. Berger 
and Kellner (1982, 74) do not lend much support in this 
area because social science "presents a spectrum of 
meanings and values ... but ... cannot tell people whether 
they should or should not adopt these meanings and values 
as their own". If, as they believe, it is not possible to 
discover laws about social reality, then the social 
sciences reveal the different ways in which people can 
construct social reality, but not the nature of social 
reality itself (see Mehan and Wood 1975). As Trigg (1985, 
97) has pointed out, "the basic question should be the 
truth of beliefs rather than their rationality". The 
treatment of individuals solely as agents within a social 
process which they hardly understand tends to overlook any 
rationality of their own. The beliefs of individual actors 
cannot be dismissed irrespective of the social context in 
which they are found. Nor can the identification of a 
particular belief be made coexistent to its social 
context. The explanation of the social context of a belief 
differs from the assessment of the rationality of the 
belief itself. It is dubious as to whether questions about 
individual rationality can be accommodated within the 
paradigm of 'normal' scientific explanation. If the 
scientific rationality is the cultural product of only one 
type of society (see Winch 1958), then a technocratic 
rationality is not the only criterion relevant to an 
assessment of human socio-spatial activity. This suggests 
that if instrumentalism cannot achieve a paradigmatic 
consensus, then all else is nihilism: "Once it is accepted 
that science merely forms one set of practices alongside 
others, social scientists are left without any standards 
for judging a society" (Trigg 1985, 84). 
The contemporary view of the scientific rationality as a 
form of ethnocentricism is hinged on the work of Max Weber 
and Durkheim. Weber's (1958) view of rationalisation 
processes was centred on the culturally specific 
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limitations of rationality in Western capitalist 
societies. The chief configuration, as he saw it, was an 
analysis of economic, political, legal, administrative and 
religious structures. Each sphere, he contended, was 
unique and was not reducible to any other. Weber asserted 
that no rational social order could be an expression of 
justice and equality. Moreover, increasing knowledge in 
itself creates various forms of domination, power 
struggles, economic conflict and the dehumanisation of 
social actors. The rationality of modern capitalist 
societies - as Weber saw it - was always at a point of 
tension as it attempted to resolve the perpetual conflict 
between the substantive rationalities of particular groups 
and individuals, whose ideal and material interests 
conflict one with another. Scientific rationality is thus 
equated with pragmatism insofar that there are no specific 
terms of reference to which society as a whole can appeal, 
nor by which any agreement might be possible (see Rorty 
1980, 318). Recognising this dilemma, Weber argued that 
the economic and political structures in the capitalist 
world pursue definite forms of domination in an attempt to 
contain potential disorder. Weber's view of scientific 
rationality is therefore one of unfreedom and 
meaninglessness. 
Durkheim did not accept that ontology could be based on 
nominalism and phenomenalism per se, nor that epistemology 
was uniquely derived from observation or experience. 
Moreover, he sought a holistic and trans-subjective method 
to examine problems in social science, hoping to 
circumscribe some parameters to the question of social 
reality. For Durkheim (1976, 419) the main ideas of 
scientific logic and its fundamental categories of thought 
are of religious origin, but: If religion has given birth 
to all that is essential in society, it is because the 
idea of society is the soul of religion". Durkheim 
contended that if social scientists abandon the search for 
first causes, then neither empirical associations nor 
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subjective meanings can be explained or understood. Such 
work has no value or logical consistency. Social reality -
as Durkheim conceived it - is a sphere of dominance in 
which individual actions are constrained. 
The social scientist cannot disengage himself from social 
reality because he is a part of it. Any standpoint of 
philosophical reflection which may provide insights to the 
existence, mechanisms and effects of social reality on 
individual actors will be compounded by considerations 
about the moral quality of collective social life on 
individual thought and actions. Durkheim - akin to 
Heidegger - decrees that the nature of reality is 
concealed. Its identity is not manifest by our 
participation in society, but may be exposed by 
theoretical analysis. 
Durkheim's theoretical analysis of scientific reason and 
reality does not lend itself to empirical 
verification/falsification on account of his insistence on 
a dialectic between the forces of the material world and 
those in a 'meta'-existence (social ethics). If moral 
forces are a part of social reality and cannot be 
adequately contained/explained in a material or abstract 
sense, then, Durkheim argues, their ontological status is 
ambiguous, if not illogical. In any case, there can be no 
recourse to either experience or reason to explain 
rationality. Scientific rationalism cannot uncover an 
ontology which explains the basis of individual actions 
because it is not an effective experiential taxonomy. Even 
if crude empiricism is abandoned and an ontological 'leap' 
is implemented, Durkheim recognised that an 
epistemological encounter would then be imminent. 
Simplistically, the relationship between cause and effect 
(i.e. the unobservable entities/essences) must still be 
demonstrated. Questions about rationality, reason and 
reality are, in the first place, those of the individual 
understanding himself. 
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If is frequently contested that the scientific rationality 
has been evolved to counter the claims of political 
ideologies and religious dogmatism. On the first account, 
it is increasingly clear that science equates itself as a 
working partner with political authority and its economic 
systems. On the latter, there is more evidence to suggest 
that the antimony between science and religion represents 
a power struggle on the part of the former to coerce the 
claims of the latter. If positivism is correct, then 
religion is strictly meaningless, since only science 
provides knowledge. If positivism is untenable, then 
religion, is part of social reality. In this respect, 
religious belief may stoke a claim about an objective 
reality which is not overshadowed uniquely by practices or 
rituals. Science cannot and does not explain every facet 
of knowledge, existence and meanings and it does not 
necessarily follow that to hold beliefs which are not 
scientifically verifiable is irrational. Conversely, it 
may be irrational to reject all the pontifications of 
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normal' science, but it is not thereby rational to be 
restricted by its shortcomings. By definition 'normal' 
science cannot accommodate the 'extraordinary' claims of 
religious truth'. To assume that all religious claims 
must be irrational is tantamount to a prejudice in favour 
of science, and fundamejtally, one of deep philosophical 
disagreement. Religion may serve to integrate society, and 
the decline of religion may have a disintegrating effect, 
but this still does not eradicate the existence and 
content of the religious standpoint. Jarvie (1984) 
contends that religion provides a cognitive basis about 
the world and of space, and is therefore open to rational 
assessment. He rejects the rigorous 'normal' scientific 
approach to the social sciences in general and condemns 
the inflexibilty and restricted understanding gained from 
a functionalist treatment of religion. Religion, he 
contends, should not simply be reviewed in terms of 
symbolism and metaphysics, but also in terms of its 
practical outworkings in cultural systems, and therefore, 
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its contribution to social structure and to knowledge in a 
particular cultural context. 
While religion and all metaphysics have been 
systematically eliminated from the area of 'normal' 
scientific rationality, the latter in itself is 
increasingly fraught with inconsistencies which defy the 
capacities of its categories of logic and its explanatory 
power. Kuhn, (1970, 2) claims that it is no longer 
possible to distinguish the 'scientific' component of past 
observations from 'error' and 'superstition': "If these 
out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can 
be produced by the same sort of methods and held for the 
same sort of reasons that now lead to scientific 
knowledge". Kuhn contends that historical accidents and 
arbitrary elements always form part of 'normal' science. 
The criterion of validity is not the adequacy of theory to 
an objective reality, but rather, according to Kuhn, its 
adequacy in achieving a procedural consensus which is then 
accorded a paradigmatic status. 
Positivists vehemently reject such allegations and are 
compelled to defend the scientific rationality through an 
outright condemnation of 'extraordinary' science. Carnap 
(1959, 79), for example, asserts that metaphysics 
originated from mythology "to give expression to a man's 
attitude in life, his emotional and volitional reaction to 
the environment", but that it "pretends to be something 
that it is not". Habermas (1972, 68), however, suggests 
that the fundamental difference between the positivist 
philosophy of science and other traditional epistemologies 
is that to the former, the knowing subject is no longer 
the system of reference. Under the 'normal' scientific 
rationality, personal values are subordinate to method. 
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RATIONALITY AND PSYCHOLOGY 
Because the problems of rationality, reason and reality 
are intrinsically related to the categories of the human 
mind, some recourse to social psychology is necessary. 
This may be briefly reviewed through the work of Freud and 
Jung. Freud argued that there was a dialectical tension in 
man between 'eros' (the basic sexual-erotic instinct, 
which he equated with unity/communication with others) and 
'thanatos' (the death instinct, which erases every 
expression of existential awareness, transposing 'being' 
into 'nothingness'). On a practical level, Freud 
recognised that state corruption perverted the innate 
`goodness' (reasonableness) in people. He was skeptical 
towards the eradication of the aggressive instinct in 
human relations and maintained that even if it was denied 
an outlet in the political and economic forum, it would 
resurge in other ways. Freud contended that individual 
reason and rationality were constrained by stress, 
necessity and escapism. Individuals often attempt to abate 
their anxieties and guilt by actively becoming 
participatory members of the human community. This implies 
subservience and obedience to a political consensus and 
the social norms which it prescribes (see Freud 1961). It 
quickly becomes evident that scientific knowledge and 
instrumentalism do not guarantee any incremental 
enhancement in the quality of life, nor do they sharpen 
the perspective of social and economic rationality. For 
Freud, the problem of 'guilt' feelings (self-doubt, self-
hate and self-alientaion) is repressed by social and 
political conformity until the individual internalises it. 
Rather than providing some measure of rationality, the 
state circumvents the problem towards the individual, 
leading to all manner of neuroses. 
Equally, Freud viewed religious affiliations as an 
expression of irrational dogmas, which perpetuate the 
unobtainable order and justice of the 'New Jerusalem'. 
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Moreover, it is a form of escapism from the finality of 
death and the realisation of nothingness: religion is an 
illusion which fulfills "the oldest, strongest and most 
insistent wishes of mankind" (Freud 1928, 52). 
Furthermore, Freud (1928, 24) maintained that religious 
ideas are "the most important part of the psychical 
inventory of a culture". Individuals moreover resort to 
religion not as a measure of rationality, but to 
desensitize their anxieties. Freud isolates yoga and 
mysticism as examples used to induce instinctual numbness, 
or some temporary alleviation of individual 
Religion otherwise idealises the helplessness of the human 
condition and provides a purpose for accepting suffering 
and misery. For Freud, religion therefore becomes "the 
keeper of civilised morality by rooting obedience to 
social norms in the mythical promise of an afterlife" 
(Smith 1980, 76). 
The religious concept of transcendentalising death as a 
new mode of existence and rationality is unacceptable to 
Freud, who discards it as 'wish fulfillment'. Although 
Freud is critical of the content and objective of 
religion, he does not pass judgment on its reality value. 
For Jung, all the most powerful ideas in history - and 
therefore those which correspond to rationality, reason 
and reality - are connected to 'archetypes'. These 
represent 'typical forms of behaviour'. They are not 
inborn ideas, nor are they conscious phenomena. Rather, 
they underpin consciousness, feeding it with primordial 
images and mythical notions which become manifest as ideas 
and images. Archetypes therefore exerts/organising 
influence. Jung maintains that archetypes manifest their 
existence in the individual psyche but are beyond spatio-
temporal, physical and mental laws, yet nevertheless 
constitute a part of reality. According to Jung (1983, 
18), Western culture tends to generate "an overvaluation 
of thinking which could alienate a man from his emotional 
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roots". Jung suggests that many individuals refuse to 
recognise and acknowledge the importance of unconscious 
manifestations because these frequently appear to be 
chaotic and irrational forms of behaviour and thinking. 
Conversely, Jung argues they may be compensatory 
expressions of the psyche in its efforts to assert a 
better balance in individual rationality and reason. 
Jung's concern for individual wholeness ('individuation') 
provides the key to what he understood as rational and 
reasonable categories of thought. Jung claims that 
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consciousness is evolved from the ordervunconscious 
psyche. The bridge between the historical aspect of the 
unconscious and conscious awareness is often lost and 
distorted. This is not a dysfunction within the 
unconscious, but rather an individual's or group's 
struggle to coerce it with the primacy of consciousness. 
For this reason, the unconscious imposes itself to redress 
the disequilibrium. 'Wholeness' cannot come about when the 
inter-related and co-determining facets of the unconscious 
and conscious are suppressed or attacked one by the other. 
The degree of rationality and reason achieved by the 
individual depends on the realisation of the 'self' (the 
centre of gravity situated between the unconscious and the 
conscious, but which must not be equated with the 'ego' 
which is the centre of the conscious). Jung refers to the 
`self' as an 'integrating' factor (an archetype) which 
coordinates information within the psyche. Although the 
consciousness must discriminate over the information it 
receives, some manifestations from the psychic sphere 
appear to defy physical/physiological laws in the form of 
mystical representations. These are frequently dismissed 
as irrational (meaningless) occurrences. For Jung, the 
search for rationality and reason - and therefore, the 
fusion of 'insideness' and 'outsideness' - is related not 
to the ideals and values carried by the political state, 
but to the development of the individual personality (i.e. 
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(self'). Self-knowledge cannot, claims Jung, be based on 
theoretical assumptions because the individual is both the 
subject and object of all knowledge. Scientific knowledge 
and rationality, however, claims to be the sole authority. 
The individual, albeit irrational and unpredictable from a 
scientific standpoint, is the "true and authentic carrier 
of reality" (Jung 1983, 354). When modern scientific man 
subordinates his (unconscious) psychic resources to 
empirical classification, he in effect deobjectivises 
himself and suppresses the psyche. Man increases the risk 
not only of greater inauthenticity (irrationality), but 
equally the likelihood of pathological disorder. 
Knowledge, rationality and reason are not uniquely a 
conscious, scientific question, but also a transcendental 
problem. 
Jung does not openly discredit the objective rationality 
of religious values and ideas. Moreover, Jung (1983, 238) 
claims that man naturally possesses a 'religious attitude' 
which has increasingly degenerated into "egomania and 
(spiritual) sickness" with the growth of state power and 
an instrumentalist rationality. Much of the onus falls on 
the history of Judaeo-Christian civilisation - the social 
and economic injustices it has administered; the 
attrocities committed under its banner; its political 
prejudices; its worldly over-emphasis and spiritual 
shallowness. 
Jung contends that the increasing disillusionment with the 
modern scientific rationality incenses a powerful 
reawakening of the human unconscious. Bryant (1983) 
suggests that this might assume negative or positive 
proportions. First, in a negative, destructive sense, the 
unconsious can manifest its 'rationalism' in the forms of 
hedonism, deviance, violence, fantasy, oblivion and 
nihilism. Both Jung and Freud equate these manifestations 
with occultism. Ultimately, the senselessness of 
`unlimited (anarchic) freedom' becomes absurd and 
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irrational and is often a prerequisite for authoritarian 
governments. Secondly, the unconscious may promote a 
positive, constructive search for rationalism and 
understanding. Much seemingly depends on the 'spiritual' 
state of the unconscious. 
Jung insists that once the individual has explored the 
unconscious and experienced contact and relationship with 
the 'self', the contradictions, paradoxes and ironies of 
human rationality, reason and reality become starkly 
apparent. Contemporary social, economic and political 
issues are then reducible to a struggle between 'good' and 
`evil'. 
Science is increasingly confronted with the need to 
provide an adequate explanation for the conflict between 
man's rational faculties (intellectual and technological 
achievements) and his irrational affect-bound beliefs 
(religion; ethics). This problem clearly cannot be solely 
reduced to physiological terms. The history of human 
rationality shows that man is not a reasonable being 
insofar that: "Intra-specific warfare in permanence is a 
central feature of the human condition" (Koestler 1978, 
7). This charge is equally relevant for human geography 
where it cuts across all spheres of socio-spatial 
activity, creating imbalances, disharmony, misery and 
suffering from the local to the international scale. Man 
is largely unwilling to face reality for most of the time, 
but prefers to impose fictitious and illusory categories 
of thought upon his existence. Vaihinger's (1924) 
philosophical system - 'The Philosophy of As If' -
suggests that man has cumulatively ensnared himself into 
fabricating 'meaning' in his world because he has shunned 
and rejected the fullness of his being. Scientific 
rationalism can hardly expect to subscribe unconditional 
remedies for human socio-spatial 'ills' if it continues to 
categorically reject the scope and diversity of the 
symptoms which constitute a complete diagnosis. 
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Laing (1972, 39-61) relates scientifically-defined 
irrational thinking and behaviour to a basic existential 
position of 'ontological insecurity'. If the human 
condition is reduced purely to physiological terms, there 
can be no place for his hopes, despair or fears, because 
these are irrational and unreal. A scientific explanation 
of man must be made in terms of an organic 'energy system' 
If the scientific paradigm is to hold, then man must be 
depersonalised. From the standpoint of 'normal' science or 
some political ideology, the rejection or denial of human 
autonomy implies that a person considers his existence is 
intrinsically and reciprocally bound up with 'something 
other'. This is a state of ontological dependency, where 
the attachment to the 'other' is based on genuine 
mutuality. From the standpoint of 'normal' science, this 
position transcends the possibilities within the structure 
of human relatedness: it is irrational and abnormal, and 
in psychiatric jargon may be labelled as psychosis. 
Correctly defined, however, it is a mysticism, yet one 
which is distinctly and uniquely related to the human 
condition. 
Laing (1972, 66-67) outlines two fundamental aspects of 
the human condition: first, the ordinary, everyday 
physical sensation of real, substantial awareness of one's 
bodily existence (embodied being); secondly, the awareness 
in some individuals of the distinction between bodily and 
spiritual existence (unembodied being). The latter 
phenomenon has also been recognised and discussed by 
Bultmann (1967) and Koestler (1967). Human rationality is 
once again seemingly grounded in two existential 
settings: (insideness' and 'outsideness'. 
Sartre (1950, 165-166) attempts to explain the dualism by 
reference to the 'real self' (authentic, physicalistic 
awareness) and the other 'imaginary self' (inauthentic, 
self-delusion) which is a form of existential escapism. 
The 'real' and the 'imaginary' cannot, Sartre claims, 
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coexist by their very nature. Sartre cannot, however, 
adequately account for the apparent shortcomings of 
`rational content' in the 'real' sphere. At this juncture, 
Heidegger's (1962) discussion of (in)authenticity and 
dread provides a more profound insight into the reasons 
for man's disengagement from the rationality of the 'real 
self'. 
`Normal' scientific rationalism otherwise imprisons man in 
a 'closed' system based on anthropocentricism, finitude 
and ultimately, complete self-extinction (nothingness). 
This prospect terrifies man, because it can only be 
understood as a total eclipse of his self. Because this 
threatens to undermine man's reasoning and existence, the 
self must remain undisclosed, then it is 'safe'. This may 
go some way to explaining the standpoints of deviationist 
geographers such as Kropotkin (see Breitbart 1981) and 
Reclus (see Dunbar 1981) whose 'anarcho-communism' ideals 
for the social and spatial reorganisation of society 
irreducibly seem to offer a last-resort alternative, 
however elusive. Yet even they too are caught in a 
circular discourse since their forms of idealism cannot 
rationally appeal to any ethical terms of reference which 
are otherwise required to provide an axiom for man's 
relationship with others and with nature. 
The ethos and fundamental downfall of the 'normal' 
scientific rationality is found in its anthropocentric 
underpinnings. Foucault's (1973, 315-318) 'analytic of 
finitude' recognises the irrational leap of man into 
modernity by his positing the startling notion that the 
limits of knowledge provide a positive foundation for the 
possibility of knowing. Man, therefore, in his finitude 
establishes himself as his own point of reference. 
According to this rationale, finitude becomes both the 
source of all intelligibility (empirical fact) as well as 
that which is unclear and unthought (transcendental 
conditions). Man is the source and limitation of all 
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knowledge, yet in attempting to fully confirm his 
finitude, he simultaneously wishes to completely deny it. 
Any rational discourse sets up a space in which man's 
reasoning aimlessly meanders through a series of futile 
strategies, refusing to recognise the ultimate impasse in 
which it is situated. 
By the terms of his own rationality, man is a product of a 
history he can never reach at the point of origin, yet he 
is apparently the source of that history. Man therefore 
becomes a dualism, a split personage which - in the most 
lenient terms - may be scientifically defined as quasi-
schizophrenia. Any contemporary philosophical system based 
on this analytic which attempts to combine an empirical 
content with the transcendental will be contradictory and 
ambiguous. It may question the reality and reasonableness 
of man and his existence, but will not be able to accept 
the inevitable hopelessness of such a standpoint. If, 
however, the only sources of motivation are clear 
(rational) objects of conscious reflection or obscure 
(irrational) unconscious forces, then a dilemma arises. 
Rather than attempting to grapple with the complexities 
and elusiveness of the transcendental/empirical double, 
man discovers that he is not the source ofjlis own being, 
and is severed "from the origin that would make him 
contemporaneous with his own existence ..." (Foucault 
1973, 332). The basic problem which inhibits any judgment 
of what may be rational or irrational by the definitions 
of 'normal' science is the failure to identify the 
transcendental source of human origins whose beginning 
escapes empirical enquiry. 
`Normal' science and its rationalism has failed to uncover 
any kind of unity, or any other hope of a rational 
solution to human socio-spatial problems. Its intellectual 
climate generates an impression of the immediate out-
datedness of all systems of thought without having 
transcended them with any new truth: it is an era of 
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`post-everything'. For Foucault (1966), the logical end of 
the dichotomy is the surrender of all rationality and 
reason: the reality of existence and the ultimate 
`freedom' of the human condition is madness. 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A DEHUMANISATION OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 
The emphasis of this study centres on the proposition that 
every man is in tension until he finds an adequate 
explanation and understanding for his place and inter-
relationship with the spatial environment, as well as for 
his personal identity and individual existence. Put 
otherwise, the dilemma of modern man and his dependence on 
scientific reason is that he seemingly has no way of 
understanding his loss of meaning with himself and with 
others, nor of the meaning of his relationship with 
nature. Nor is there any apparent likelihood that 'normal' 
science will provide a vehicle for a recovery towards 
unity. Equally, it challenges the notion that scientific 
systems of thought may justify the basis of their analyses 
anthropocentrically. Such pardigms lack the legitimate 
authority necessary to endorse this line of inquiry (see 
Kant 1929, 1966; Wojtyla 1982). On this basis, human 
geography cannot be shown through experience to be either 
arbitrary and ambiguous or meaningless and purposeless, 
otherwise man and his existence are nonsensical. Any human 
geography which seeks an,. agreement within the parameters 
of 'normal' science must fit into a world which is open to 
empirical observation and analysis, but cannot 
subsequently reconcile itself with the correlation between 
the categories of the human mind (subject) falling into 
the categories of the external world (object). The 
insensitivity of scientific epistemology renders any 
attempts to identify the reality and essence of human 
socio-spatial relations as largely sterile and abortive. 
Modern social science has readily accepted the dilemma 
posed by an intellectually untenable objectivism and an 
epistemologically stifling relativism, but the fear - or 
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`Cartesian anxiety' - in the circularity of this debate is 
that in the absence of an existentially unconditional 
point of reference, any notion of 'truth' will vanish. 
This problem fundamentally concerns the concepts of 
dualism and parallelism between the 'real world' 
(phenomenal) and the 'unreal sphere' (metaphysics). If any 
dualistic tenets are held, there is no reason to make any 
distinction between opposites unless they are governed by 
some higher (external) concept to which arbitration can be 
made. Otherwise, the words and arguments on both sides of 
the dualism are purely subjective and meaningless, in 
which case, there can no longer be a true dualism. Any 
dualism generates an imbalance or tension where a 'unity' 
can only be forthcoming either where one category consumes 
the other, or where there is a movement towards a monism. 
Even where a parallelism is sought, it ultimately tends to 
impose the subordination for one side to the other, or for 
one side to become an illusion or an absurdity relative to 
the other. In its contemporary setting, whenever this 
dichotomy is enforced to isolate the 'real' from the 
`unreal', an autonomous agency (science and man) will 
impose itself on the presupposed vacuum in the other. The 
resultant schism between the scientifically-defined 'real' 
and 'unreal' aspects of existence generates an illusion of 
`autonomous freedom' for man. This is potentially 
destructive, particularly in the area of socio-spatial 
decision-making. 
`Normal' scientific rationalism - based on the notion that 
in the absence of any universals at the outset, finite man 
with finite reason can sufficiently grasp knowledge with 
total objectivity and construct social absolutes - and its 
philosophcal tenets may at best contain part-truths, but 
formal logic and nominalism do not foster the development 
of unity and of epistemological concensus. Moreover, the 
rigid cause-effect determinism used to explain the 
relationship between social process and spatial structure 
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in human geography alienates man from his aesthetic and 
metaphysical attributes. The 'rational' scientific 
geographer believes he can offset conflict in his 
methodological procedures and explanations, but to achieve 
this goal must, by his own terms of reference, 
irrationally adopt some form of 'optimistic' humanism 
(i.e. a normative explanation or some futuristic utopian 
idealism) to validate his scientific propositions. The gap 
between the limitations of anthropocentric philosophies 
and scientific optimism can only be bridged by scientific 
`faith'. Otherwise, 'normal' scientific theorising is 
externally one of 'hope', but logically one of despair. 
If, however, human geographers as social scientists 
renounce their 'rationalism', then they surrender all 
their terms of reference and effectively have no basis on 
which any proposition can be discussed. Medawar (1985) 
asserts that when the meaning, purpose and origin of human 
existence are questioned, science is confronted by an 
uncomfortable ultimatum concerning the autonomous status 
by which it prescribes limitations and sets parameters in 
the field of scientific inquiry. Either these questions 
are unanswerable enigmas, or they are answerable by 
something other than science, or they are unanswerable 
because they rest on false assumptions. 
If human geography accepts the propositional basis of 
scientific rationalism, then it must also accept in all 
its presuppositions that man is the 'object' of science. 
The human agency is thus depersonalised in terms of its 
existence and is one of many impersonal categories in 
socio-spatial analysis. This provides the point of 
departure towards the dehumanisation of human geography. 
In the last resort, human geography must either be a 
'science-for-man' or alternatively, it is a study of 'men-
for-science'. 
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PART TWO: HUMAN GEOGRAPHY AS SOCIAL SCIENCE: 
GEOGRAPHY, METHODOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
The social sciences have long functioned on the basis of 
moral neutrality and detachment. This is seen to be a 
necessary part of their 'objectivity'. Geographers have 
largely studied man in a naturalistic manner, outlining 
man as a social and physical being, investigating his 
spatial environment and social habits. Brough (1983, 57) 
acknowledged that man is different from all other animals 
by his spirituality. The present standpoint of human 
geography is oversimplified and constrained because it 
ignores man's spiritual awareness. Human geography has 
tended to avoid philosophical disputations in its syllabus 
design and even more ethical and spiritual implications. 
These considerations are likely to raise intangibles, 
uncertainties and ambiguities (see Olsson 1978). 
Geographical problems inevitably lead to an ethical 
imperative. This necessitates some form of judgment and 
values. The focus is clearly on man. If man's aesthetic 
nature is oppressed, stifled, ignored or discounted, then 
his spirituality is drained and his person dehumanised. 
Relevance is therefore an important aspect of geographic 
thought and inquiry. Ideally, an assessment of 
geographical decision-making reflects the measure of man's 
`goodness' or 'badness', his responsibility to himself and 
towards others and whether or not he cares in any given 
situation. This raises the question of accountability. If 
man feels no obligation in this area, then he may well be 
motivated by egotism, hedonism and utilitarian interests. 
For those who hold power, such interests are generally the 
manifestations of insensitivity and material gain and 
greea. The social and economic outworking of such 
decision-making - deprivation, misery, hunger, poverty, 
fear, censorship, and so on - is meaningless to those who 
initiate the action. 
The preservation and intensification of sensory experience 
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is frequently attacked by the scientific community as an 
irrational transcendental idealism. This stance is equally 
a reflection of the rigidity of technocraticism and its 
tendency to dehumanise man as 'subject' and therefore to 
alienate him. The devaluation of man is seen in the work 
process which progressively leads to his alienation from 
society (i.e. unemployment; loss of material welfare) and 
within himself (i.e. loss of dignity and self-respect). To 
speak of a technological or economic crisis is imprecise: 
the real crisis concerns the nature of man (see Ley 1974). 
Scientific rationality, on which much syllabus design in 
geography continues to be based, clearly neglects human 
intuition. Its epistemology, according to Ley and Samuels 
(1978, 2), "is built around the mystical glorification of 
technique". The overriding concern for an epistemological 
framework in geography is to reassemble man in such a way 
that both his secular and transcendental feelings and 
thoughts are combined within his being. Without this 
unity, man is incomplete and desensitised. His perception 
and understanding of space and place - and his role in 
them - will become increasingly fragmented and impaired. 
The dilemma of human geography is to produce a methodology 
where the schisms between understanding and widsom, 
objectivity and subjectivity, and materialism and idealism 
might be reconciled. Human geographers have generally been 
reluctant to examine the empicical and logical grounds by 
which they have established their criteria for 
investigating geographical phenomena and man's spatial 
context. Much methodological criteria is founded on 
precarious and diverse epistemological interpretations. 
The search for 'values' and 'truth' often becomes a 
pragmatic jungle conditioned by changes in individual or 
social attitudes through historical space and time. Graves 
(1980b, 4) notes that: "A discussion on the nature of 
modern geography is likely to run into difficulties unless 
certain semantic and epistemological problems are 
recognised in the first place". The absence of any solid 
101 
epistemological foundations in geography is the root of 
man's alienation from his environment and prevents his 
understanding of himself. An idea can fast become 'fact' 
or even 'truth' given the necessary 'consensus'. The 
epistemological structure, origin and logicality of any 
methodology are the foundations on which it will stand or 
fall. 
Kant allied geography to the natural sciences because he 
believed it was subservient and accountable to physical 
and biological laws. Geographers, according to Kant, are 
concerned with the study of natural processes and the 
external (observable) aspects of human action (see May 
1970, 114-115). The innate or 'internal' characteristics 
of man which make him distinctly and uniquely human were 
overlooked. No reference is made by Kant and his 
contemporaries of intention, freewill, ideas and 
symbolism. 
Much of the epistemological structure of modern academic 
geography remains tied to the nineteenth century approach. 
The 'scientific method' has largely been demolished by 
Popper (1976) on the basis of the philosophical position 
of logical positivism. No 'scientific' knowledge, 
according to Popper, could truly be called 'objective', 
nor could any of its presuppositions be based upon its own 
unproved 'validity'. Epistemology has become 'critical'. 
Claval (1981, 228) maintains that epistemology "already 
contains universal truth", and that all that is needed to 
reveal this truth "is to let its potential be developed". 
If all knowledge is potentially 'given', this challenging 
viewpoint must next raise the question of 'where to find 
it' (i.e. to evolve the necessary methodology). Claval 
calls into question man's 'reason' and the fundamental 
basis of 'rational' thinking. The geographer must 
critically review epistemological 'gaps' and 'mysticisms' 
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and therefore recognise and explore the shortcomings of 
his methodology. 
The source of geographical thought can, according to 
Claval (ibid, 230-238), be viewed either historically or 
epistemologically. The historical case is hermeneutically 
inspired insofar that it tries to recreate the past, 
rethinking social attitudes and comparing them with the 
present position of geography. 
Epistemologically, the method requires a review into the 
development of ideas and the 'logic' behind them. The 
inspiration and motivation becomes problematic. 
`Knowledge' is examined beyond the factual particulars. It 
seeks to identify the 'authority' behind their 
crystallisation. Geography is therefore philosophically 
investigated from 'within'. If the 'core' and stimulus can 
be identified, then the logic and rationality of the 
external particulars became meaningful and can be 
understood in their proper context. 
The modern 'episteme' should dig deeper into reality 
seeking the causalities which motivate and provide an 
identity for its expression. The epistemological search 
encompasses an integration, if not collaboration, between 
all forms and disciplines of knowledge. This is not 
without its problems. Many aspects of the human condition 
and of existence tend to raise paradoxes, anomalies and 
contradictions which do not appear to easily lend 
themselves to 'logical' harmonisation or rationalisation. 
All forms of knowledge, however, display one clear 
epistemological aspect: the finite nature of man and his 
foreknowledge of death. Without this certitude, claims 
Koestler (1964), none of the great literary works would 
ever have been written, not would man have ever found it 
necessary to explain or understand his predicament. 
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GEOGRAPHY AS A DISCIPLINE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
If, as Carter (1979, 415) states: The interpretation of 
any spatial pattern leads to inferences about human 
behaviour", then the geographer is compelled to consider 
the basis upon which human frames of reference are 
founded. It then becomes apparent that the human condition 
encompasses not only those disciplines in the human or 
social sciences, but equally those contained in the 
natural sciences, literature, art, philosophy and 
theology. Any notion of geography as a singular, self-
contained discipline disintegrates: "The division of 
knowledge into disciplines is artificial and, to a certain 
degree, arbitrary." (Johnston 1983, 1). 
Knowledge cannot be evaluated in terms of unrelated, 
disjointed or isolated parts. It is holistic. Much of 
man's thinking and behaviour is ambiguous, unpredictable 
and indeterminate and does not conform to the 'rational' 
determinism demanded by the 'scientific' methodology. In 
this respect, much of rational scientific thought is 
dictated by institutional conditioning. 
According to Mulkay (1975, 510-515), academic research 
should be neutral, impartial, unprejudiced and undertaken 
with 'humility', and that a scientist's work is assessed 
against "an existing set of scientific assumptions and 
expectations . . . to established preconceptions". Most 
work seeks order, understanding and a quest for universal 
laws. 
For Guelke (1974, 202), although the geographer seeks "to 
provide a true account and explanation", this is not 
possible in practice because "different interpretations 
can often survive quite happily because of the lack of 
data". Equally, the geographer's precise intentions are 
difficult to define. It is, however, becoming clear that 
geographic enquiry has no precise definitional parameters. 
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The problem, as seen by Tuan (1978, 201) is for social 
geographers to decide what to observe". 
In its contemporary context, the development and 
perpetuation of philosophies and ideologies which separate 
the unity of knowledge into disciplines have, to a 
considerable extent, been influenced by governments and 
other power-seeking bodies (e.g. multi-national 
corporations). The relative academic inflexibility and 
rigidity of social science disciplines is mainly in 
response to their endearing conformity with those 
organisations either in the form of research sponsorship, 
or in an outright manner of hostility and threat if their 
`credibility' or 'legitimacy' are challenged. 
Alternatively, social science disciplines have wrought 
much of their own methodological sterility in search and 
recognition for 'scientific respectability'. Whatever the 
case, the human content of human geography has hardly been 
entertained, but rather conceptually by-passed as an 
intengible philosophical ideal. 
The pursuit of the ontogenesis of man and his relations 
with the spatial environment is tantamount to entering a 
labyrinth. These can be unknown frontiers which appear to 
transcend 'normal' academic boundaries passing into 
metaphysical territory for which experimental scientific 
methodology is rendered inadequate as a means of 
decodification. Paradoxically, geography's older and more 
`respectable' cousin, physics has recognised the need to 
make a quantum 'leap' into the study of subatomic 
phenomena. Human geography as yet has been reluctant to 
thoroughly examine the deeper psychological and 
metaphysical elements of the human condition. Until 
geography confronts these issues, theoretical and 
paradigmatic congestion will be inevitable. 
Philosophically, it will remain trapped in a circular 
discourse. Such lines of enquiry are often resisted since 
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the cumulative intangibilities of the non-empirical method 
are considered by some to lead to an 'unscientific' dogma. 
Social problems in geography appear in increasingly procu.se 
numbers and complexity. Decision-making is typified by its 
growing incompetence and inability to identify and 
effectively deal with the real issues confronting society. 
If the philosophical and methodological outlooks are 
unrealistic, obscure or irrelevant to the essential 
problems, then geography's contribution runs the risk of 
becoming meaningless. It is unsatisfactory to evolve 
geographical systems of thought which devalue the status 
of the human being and which reduce and depersonalise man 
to an object of nonsensical finitude. If man wishes to 
assert his own autonomy, he must be able to justify and 
substantiate it by his own terms of reference. If, by 
these criteria, man lacks meaning, intent and purpose then 
he becomes an object of some form of ideological 
domination and is therefore exposed to all manner of 
political, economic and social manipulation. Ultimately, 
his cultural and spiritual values will be undermined, 
eradicating any notion of epistemological or ontological 
certitude pertaining to his existence. 
Philosophical inertia and circularity, and methodological 
proliferation and confusion in human geography continues 
to attract much attention. There can be no real lasting 
accommodation or compromise of viewpoints between one 
philosophical standpoint and another, nor between 
conflicting methodologies. Much of academic geography is 
indebted to other disciplines for its conceptual 
development and status. The intensity of the present 
debate largely focuses on ideological precepts, with the 
pursuit of the scientific technocratic rationality at the 
forefront. The geography of political economy, whether 
capitalist or Marxist espouse their epistemologies on 
concepts of materialism, reductionism, social determinism 
and technocratic power structures. Man is 
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instrumentalised, exploited, dehumanised and 
inauthenticated. Both models conceal and coerce the 
pluralism and conflicting values in the superstructure of 
society. Geography's task is to expose the value-systems 
which govern man's intentions, decisions and movements in 
space. 
Sayer (1979, 30) reminds us that while man is more or less 
reconciled to a sense of obedience in his dealings with 
nature's laws, he acts as if there were no social 
universals. Social laws are arbitrary. For 'autonomous-
man', there can be no real code of social ethics because 
he has no terms of reference with which to ground and 
discuss them. Social determinants are moreover based on 
self-interest. Those who control the means of power and 
therefore the material well being of the masses devise 
laws to suit their own purpose. 
The geography of political economy frequently reveals the 
rigidity, inflexibility and intolerance of those who 
govern socio-spatial systems. No political camp has the 
basis to claim 'rationality' or 'reason' in its 
methodologies and ideologies. Nor can they claim to have 
explained and understood the real purpose and essence of 
human existence. Their epistemologies say little about 
`what is'. Instead, they revel in the historical past or 
adopt and 'optimistic humanism' from a normative 
standpoint, based on an untenable utopian idealism. 
Concerning the present time, their incomplete 
epistemological vision posits society at a juncture of 
uncertainty and fear. Socio-spatial relationships become 
senseless and directionless which increasingly terminate 
in pessimism. 
Ideologies appear to gain acceptance if they attempt to 
present something near to a universal or 'world-view' 
which then gains a social consensus. This is not always 
the case. Many ideologies are imposed by a dominant power 
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elite in a totalitarian sense. For the most part, 
ideologies are relativities which assert themselves 
against the deficiencies in other doctrines over the 
course of history. As one ideology is transformed into 
another, the central issues persistently remain intact. 
These themes essentially concern man's enslavement, 
domination and alienation. Many ideologies are committed 
to the removal of these problems, but lack the 
methodological means to achieve it. This indicated the 
need for a reassessment of the ontological and 
epistemological premise. Geographers tend to manifest 
conflicting views and standpoints in their analyses of 
ideology. Some are emphatically committed to one 
particular position while others attempt to 'disengage' by 
a 'taking-of-distance' from the problem. 
A positivist methodology which claims to make a realistic 
theoretical study of man through its 'scientific 
objectivity' negates the fundamental issues by its lack of 
reflexivity. Theory shifts the emphasis from the reality 
of the observable to the unreality of probabilities which 
do not strictly conform to human intentions and actions 
(see Hay 1979). This strips man of his ability to explore 
and rationalise his unconscious thoughts and emotions. A 
positivist methodology brackets the question of its 
grounding and perspective and therefore fails to examine 
its own credibility. This means it must assume a 
prohibitive position where it cannot be epistemologically 
challenged (see Habermas 1974). 
The relationship between political economy and geography 
is now a recurrent theme, but often lacks any profound 
analysis. If one broadly accepts that the economic life is 
central to all social and geographical understanding, then 
the state has the responsibility for the maintenance of 
economic wellbeing and for the administration of social 
justice and fairness. In a democratic context, the 
political body has to legitimise its intentions and 
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decision-making, thus clarifying its ideology and put it 
before public acceptance, whose interests it is supposed 
to represent. This is rarely the case in reality, either 
in the capitalist or Marxist world. 
Johnston (1983, 132) accredits a territorial definition to 
the state which makes it a geographical entity. The real 
problem concerns the need for methodology towards an 
understanding of state decision-making and the way in 
which individuals move and act under the political state. 
Much depends upon the linguistic competence of the 
perceiver and the perceived. The representation and 
interpretation of political statements and outcomes 
frequently raises contention, conflict and disunity. The 
state machinery comprises a range of arbitrators, all with 
different professional qualities and aptitudes. Any 
question of a general methodology is meaningless unless 
the state can clarify the epistemological basis of its 
ideology and the historical foundations of its society. 
The state can give no unconditironal guarantee about any 
future improvements in the quality of living standards, 
but often speaks as if this was given. The 'operative 
principle' of political action must therefore be the 
ideologization of the masses. The different patterns of 
spatial organisation which social and economic processes 
generate are also conditioned by their encounter with 
particular historical, cultural, religious and 
environmental situations. 
This immediately raises the question of social relevance, 
a theme which has attracted the attention of geographers 
since the 1970s. Distributional issues assume a new 
urgency. Political divisions become more profoundly 
determined raising the need for an allegiance to an 
ideological path. With the relevance debate, regional and 
area studies in geography became tools of Smith's (1974, 
1978) who gets what, where and how' definition. This 
could be applied to a specific territorial context under a 
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humanist banner. It is largely concerned with the material 
existence of the individual and to exposing the mechanics 
of economic disparities and imbalances and of social 
injustices. This has either taken the form of a 
liberalistic 'welfare' approach or from a radical Marxist 
standpoint. 
Social processes are seen by many geographers as the means 
for understanding and explaining spatial patterns. This 
involves the consideration of actions, rules and meanings 
in their societal contexts. The root causes of spatial 
inequalities are to be found in the structure of society. 
In its political reading, this has generally meant some 
resort to Marxist or neo-Marxist methods (see Harvey 1973; 
Pickvance 1976; Peet 1977; Gregory 1978; Held 1980). 
Eyles (1977) directs attention to the need for' 
understanding and explaining 'social ills', the 'quality 
of life' and 'equitable distributional patterns' and 
argues (Eyles 1981, 1336) that "no geography . . . can be 
complete without Marxist". He then concedes that Marxist tlum61.1t 
must somehow be integrated with humanistic methodology if 
"lived experience" is to be explained. 
Eyles and Lee (1982) are, however, resigned to the 
practical impossibility of any accommodation between 
competing philosophical and methodological standpoints 
because, as they see it, the epistemological differences 
between the various approaches do not afford any 
compromise. Such a position would be untenable due to the 
difficulties involved in the articulation and 
clarification of the meaning of concepts. Gregory (1978) 
has emerged as one of the more recent pioneers for a 'new' 
epistemology in geography, but makes no mention of an 
ontological foundation from which such an epistemology 
could evolve. 
Harvey (1973) discusses both issues, but restricts the 
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terms of epistemology to historical materialism linked to 
a Piagetan evolutionary-based ontology. The weaknesses of 
Harvey's arguments do little to clarify the motives and 
actions of either the state or the individuals in it. Both 
are exposed as impersonal entities which have little 
meaning apart from the ideological domination of the state 
over the masses. 
Ley (1980, 19) condemns both the positivist and Marxist 
methods as negative ideologies because they are both 
reductionist, dehumanising, enslaving, irrational and 
amoral, where "men . . . assume the role of the 
uncomplimentary puppets that the state's theorists model 
and its social engineers plan for . . . ethical and moral 
issues are themselves appropriated into the domain of the 
technical". 
Modern geography, according to Graves (1980b, 6-7) 
consists of a "focused curiosity" which strays in many 
directions. The investigative methodologies are a mix of 
the scientific (positivistic) and the 'non-scientific' 
(existentialist and phenomenological). 
Positivism and behaviouralism both tend to collapse into 
some generalised form of 'social Darwinism', making wide-
sweeping and unfounded claims concerning the nature of 
man. Their rationalism and logic are established on the 
basis of imperfect criteria which methodologically contain 
strong elements of elitism, coersion and domination. 
The humanistic methodologies are equally dubious in many 
of their promulgations. Ley and Samuels (1978, 13) 
maintain that the exposure of any values through an 
existentialist or phenomenologically-based methodology 
does not "necessarily provide a calculus for decision-
making, but it does assert the existential necessity for 
responsibility, choice and commitment". 
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This is not, however, the case for Sartre, where man's 
commitment to any political ideology or religious doctrine 
is a threat to his 'freedom'. Sartre's ontological 
structure is rooted in 'negation' - one objectifies 
oneself by saying what one 'is not'. The essence of any 
phenomenology, as in positivism, bases its standpoint on 
man's intentionality as a rational being and actor. The 
ultimate phenomenological and existential reduction for 
both Heidegger and Sartre is the discovery of 
`nothingness'. To assert that 'freedom' is coextensive 
with man's disengagement from 'being' into 'non-being' 
renders all meaning and understanding of the human 
condition as an absurdity. There are no apparent terms of 
reference for man to speak and act responsibly in his 
social, economic and spatio-environmental realms. 
Central to this problem is man's obsession to manipulate 
and intervene in process and design while failing to 
recognise that whatever new spatial structure he creates, 
there will always be irreconcilable differences, 
conflicting interests and a philosophical point of 
tension. There is little basis, as Kates (1962) would have 
it, to believe that men are rational when making 
decisions. When man sets up his own autonomy as the basic 
pre-assumption for his methodological designs, he can 
neither justify nor substantiate his case philosophically 
or ideologically by his own terms of reference. Decision-
making becomes partial and prejudicial and does not 
necessarily represent the totality of (best) interest in 
society. Man is entwined by his own egocentricity. He 
seems to be dealing with a mass of unrelated particulars 
but lacks any fresh terms of reference by which he can 
evaluate and interpret his dilemma. His understanding of 
meaning, intention and purpose is at best fragmented and 
obscure. 
In conscious choice, any system of knowledge must be based 
on some set of rules. If not, all decision-making becomes 
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a shambles. Decisions are hampered by the "conflict 
between groups with different attitudes and motivations" 
(Johnston 1979, 118). 
Pred (1969, 139-144) shows that a scientific methodology 
based on inductive positivist and behavioural models fails 
to make a convincing case for the improvement of 
geographical decision-making since it suggests that "any 
model is better than none . . . even if the model is 
literally untestable". The generalisations and statistical 
aggregates generated by these approaches tend to be 
culture-specific and ethnocentric as they are usually 
group value-systems which are broadly aligned under 
culture, language and ideological acceptance. 
Lowenthal (1961, 248-251) attempts to give credence to all 
views since: "We all live in personal worlds . . . rooted 
in reality", but acknowledges the fact that people ". . 
elect to see certain aspects of the world and to avoid 
others". 
Spatial patterns will continue to be disorderly where 
there is no consensus in methodology or in its 
epistemological grounding. Jones (1980, 257-258) issues an 
unconditional challenge if human geography is not to 
stagnate: "What many are not prepared to accept are the 
ideological implications which are that society - and by 
implication, spatial inequalities - cannot be modified but 
must be replaced by a different social order." 
The problem increasingly concerns the ways in which man 
has institutionally structured and ordered societies and 
to identify the transformations which, in his view must be 
undertaken to create a social utopia. Does this then 
suggest that human geography merely reflects political 
decision-making and is ultimately subordinate to political 
ideologies seeking to legitimise their own interests? If 
this is the case, then the quality and understanding of 
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human existence must largely be determined by economic 
materialism to the devolution and exclusion of any value-
systems. Normative considerations are then exposed as 
statements leading to higher degrees of abstraction, 
detached from the reality, derisory and delusive. 
Human geographers are divided on this issue. Harvey (1973) 
and Gregory (1978) contend that unless a theory or other 
standpoint can be read in a political context, then it is 
probably useless. Berry (1973), however, claims that no 
amount of 'political reshuffling', within the 
developmental structures of human geography can resolve 
man's dilemma. 
For Ley (1978) and Wallace (1978), any 'new' geography 
motivated by overriding political considerations, 
especially those which integrate Marxist theory, will 
initiate a new dialectic setting opposition within its 
every synthesis. 
Philosophically, man has in an historical spatio-temporal 
context subdued his own nature and his relationship to the 
spatial environment by using his 'reason'. He then becomes 
a prisoner of his own 'rationality', and consequently is 
the 'object' of scientific inquiry. 
The human and social sciences, of which geography is a 
part, have increasingly isolated and reinterpreted many 
characteristics which are intrinsically unique to man. 
Science attempts to provide an explanation which either 
claims to be complete, or some interpretation which is 
supposedly all-embracing. It generally utilises a purely 
empirical - theoretical standpoint or makes a 
phenomenological - existential assessment. 
Whether or not the methodology is derived from a 
philosophical concept or an ideological presupposition, 
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scientific procedure tends to analytically mutilate man 
and render it impossible to understand him in the totality 
of his being. 
Elaborate social-spatial models can be imposed on man as 
scientifically-tested types of behaviour so that man 
becomes the object of scientific manipulation. His desires 
and needs, behaviour and value-systems will to some extent 
become modified or radically altered. Each scientific 
discipline will be able, in its particular sphere, to 
grasp only a partially true;  but incomplete interpretation 
of man and his problems. Even a 'critical social science' 
will encounter deeper complexities as it attempts to 
evolve an explanatory methodology. Man's dilemma may 
become more intensified but its understanding will be more 
obscure. 
Much of contemporary social science has become 
increasingly schismatic because it has disengaged itself 
from the classical thesis - antithesis methodology. 
Hegelian dialectics have compelled social scientists to 
take sides. Tuan (1978, 204-205) notes that either they 
must pursue an 'objective' reality, where value judgments 
are discarded under a 'scientific' banner, or they follow 
`subjective' line where 'meaning' must be discerned from 
the investigation of "inner psychic phenomena". 
No human geography can be complete unless the basis for 
man's code of social ethics is exposed. As a social actor, 
man does not conceptualise his thoughts and ideas nor 
relate to others and his surroundings in an impersonal and 
valueless manner. As Abler, Adams and Gould (1971, 21) 
point out: ". . . geography and the other social sciences 
have pressing social and moral responsibilities". Unless 
the socio-spatial 'welfare' of mankind is accorded ethical 
and spiritual considerations, then human geography cannot 
become scientific yet humane, analytical yet relevant and 
responsive to real problems because it will have an 
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incomplete knowledge of man. Failing this: "Even if all 
agree to build a new society' at the service of man, it 
is still essential to know what sort of man is in 
question" (Pope Paul VI 1971, 28). This may raise many new 
obstacles yet Smith and Ogden (1977, 55) entreat human 
geographers to "look the world in the face, 'warts and 
all'." 
At this juncture, any primacy of the spatial prerogative 
will exert an artificial constraint because the immediate 
problem is one of discerning the nature of social order 
and organisation. To this effect, Herbert (1979) indicates 
that human geography becomes 'a-disciplinary'. 
GEOGRAPHY AND RELEVANCE 
The stress for 'relevance' in human geography has a long 
historical past. It attempts to reflect on the development 
of human awareness, experience and relationships between 
man and his spatial environment. Modern geography 
increasingly emphasises its involvement with social 
concern and economic wellbeing. According to Stoddart 
(1981, 1), this directive necessitates a "sharpening of 
the historical method". An analysis of geography's 
historical development and the cumulative stages through 
which its present knowledge is based is thought to provide 
a better understanding of its present predicament and an 
insight into future research. Geographical relevance is 
thus concerned with philosophical and epistemological 
considerations set against a social, economic and 
political backcloth. 
Philosophical and ideological changes in geographic 
thought have drawn their inspiration from diverse sources, 
but the dilemma of real explanation and understanding 
remains unresolved. The refinement of knowledge in the 
social sciences had seemingly been concerned with sifting 
`truth' from 'error' and 'good' from 'bad'. Much of this 
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work has provided a wealth of information but which has 
not necessarily enhanced any understanding of the 
fundamental problems and ambiguities of the human 
condition. 
There is no generally accepted social theory prescribing a 
formula for human well-being in a material context, nor 
does there seem any likelihood of evolving one under a 
political ideology. Smith (1978) makes an important 
distinction between 'needs' and 'wants'. He defines human 
`needs' as those relating to physical survival, while 
unnecessary 'wants' are symptomatically generated in 
advanced capitalist societies which are unconcerned with 
distributironal inequalities. The ethos of capitalism in 
its fiercely competitive social and economic climate 
relies on the dehumanisation of relationships and 
feelings, responsibility and care, unity, cooperation and 
solidarity, peace and harmony. Distributional inequalities 
and disparities can be found at every level on a global 
scale. These range from rapidly deteriorating urban-social 
conditions in Western inner cities manifesting segregation 
of minorities, racism, intolerance, discontent, 
deprivation, fear, psychological stress, and so on, to the 
shanty-town communities in the cities of the Developing 
world nations and the urban/rural exploitation in many of 
these countries by multi-national corporations. At a time 
when the gap between rich and poor nations is forever 
widening, rapid economic progress is not a solution to any 
call for 'social justice' in geography. 
Man cannot be scientifically rationalised on the pretext 
of any historical materialism. Many of his intrinsic 
characteristics such as greed and deceit can never be 
completely eliminated by his own terms of reference. These 
shortcomings impose constraints and limitations on man's 
ability and desire to make distributional material 
improvements in the world, even to the point of denying 
basic 'needs' to others. While capitalism reinforces codes 
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of social differentiation, emphasising the 'quality of 
goods' over the 'quality of life' and 'efficiency' over 
`equity', Marxist geographies too falsify the validity of 
their ideological preassumptions by claiming 'neutrality' 
(non-values), 'objectivity' and a denial of any 
metaphysical considerations in the historicity of man. 
Although there appears to be an extending time-lag 
between reality and the value positions held by society at 
large, Smith (1978, 361) maintains that social welfare, 
both on an individual and collective basis "is a proper 
and necessary topic for geographical analysis". It poses 
problems of a descriptive and interpretative nature. Value 
judgments are frequently seen as an attack on the 
`scientific objectivity' of positivism and its application 
to political ideologies, capitalist or Marxist. Spatial 
reforms must, as Lee (1976a, 47) points out, be allied to 
societal reform, but until human feelings towards others 
near and far becomes genuine and sincere, no change will 
come about. Culyer (1973, 87) adopts a pessimistic 
outlook, suggesting that human concern is perhaps subject 
to 'distance decay'. 
Value-teaching is essential in any teaching-learning 
situation since all forms of instruction transmit human 
views of reality. Geography is particularly value-laden. 
Spatial patterns reflect a cultural landscape in which 
economic, social, political and religious values are 
found. Geography cannot authentically be value-free, nor 
can philosophical and ideological considerations and 
controversy be excluded from its content. Existing social 
and economic conditions must be critically reviewed to 
derive any sense and meaning in a spatial context. This 
increasingly suggests the need for a multi-disciplinary 
approach to human-social sciences where geography is an 
integral component with sociology, politics, economics and 
anthropology, philosophy and theology. 
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No value can be held as a matter of scientific 
convenience. Nor can values be asserted and contained 
within the circularity of philosophical discourse unless 
it can rationally legitimate his epistemological 
standpoint. He will in this case, by necessity, need to 
clarify his terms of reference through some form of 
historical space-time reductionism to substantiate his set 
of preassumptions on which his argument is based. To 
authenticate his proposition, the geographer needs to 
establish the criteria on which values may be explored and 
evaluated in terms of their likely beneficial, adverse or 
prejudicial impact. No epistemology can be fully expounded 
unless something is known about the onto-existential basis 
of man. 
GEOGRAPHY, MAN AND AUTONOMY 
Man throughout history has largely been concerned with 
asserting his own autonomy. His desire for control and 
domination includes not only power and authority over his 
fellow man but also over his environment. These objectives 
necessitate the notion of 'rational' thinking. The Greeks 
interpreted philosophy as a means of acquiring greater 
wisdom. The later Judaic and early Christian societies 
were more concerned with deciphering man's identity in his 
finite and temporal situation. The Judaeo-Christian 
standpoint accords God the absolute sovereignty over the 
universe. Man's domination of nature relates to a 'pre-
Fall' consciousness, but man essentially remains 
accountable to God in his dealings with others and with 
nature. This suggests a form of stewardship (see Houston 
1978). It rejected anthropocentricism in the context of a 
philosophical or ideological 'autonomous-man' premise. 
The Renaissance period, with its introspective quest for 
understanding, is generally isolated as the historical 
watershed from which all contemporary forms of thought 
have subsequently developed. The Enlightenment era, 
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however, presents an intangible philosophical position. It 
cut across all forms of knowledge and initially activated 
a process of decay, eroding the unity and wholesomeness of 
epistemology into an unreal nominalism. This, in time 
became accommodated in scholasticism and academia. Its 
rationale provided the foundations for the nihilistic 
humanism of modern science. 
Philosophically, all is despair and pessimism, while 
ideologies tend towards some form of 'optimistic' humanism 
which cannot rationally be discussed. 
Descartes introduced a fundamental ontological doubt 
about existence by dehumanising the status of man's 
being. Spinoza's value-free investivation of 'scientific 
truth' contributed to the epistemological disarray and 
increasingly obscured man's onto-existential understanding 
of himself. Kant's scientific rationalism specifically 
isolated that knowledge derived from the 'objective' 
observations of empirically-measurable phenomena. This 
ultimately severed subject from object. Kantian logic 
removed any consideration of "ethics, morality and 
transcendent meanings" (Ley and Samuels, 1978, 7). 
Teleological methodology was reduced to an 'unscientific' 
metaphysics, concerning only theology and mysticism. 
Nineteenth century Comptean social science initiated 
positivist philosophy and instrumental reason based on an 
`autonomous-man' concept, where science became the new 
`god'. Instrumentalism and its insistence on the 
technocratic became immanent and ideologically assumed an 
`emancipatory' function for man's existence. Nietzsche 
(1968, 226-227) noted that scientific advancements (i.e. 
Darwinism) and technical progress appeared to have 
devastated traditional (i.e. theistic) world-views, 
especially religion and metaphysics. 
Enlightenment philosophy signified man's efforts to 
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reconstitute his pre-Fall condition, but on his own terms. 
Bacon had resisted the insistence on the scientific 
domination of nature and called for respect and obedience 
on the part of man's dealings with nature. He maintained 
that religious faith coupled with scientific and artistic 
explorations could restore in part man's loss of 
innocence and his dominion over nature. Baconian ideals 
were discarded and theistic promulgations subsequently 
evaporated. Under an 'autonomous-scientific' banner 
emerged a fully secular society with the aim of reuniting 
its own purpose and 'rediscovering' its origins. 
Man was not a product of the environment whose capacity 
for understanding was only possible at the phenomenal 
level. Any investigation or probing beyond symbolic 
(mathematical) logic was scientifically 'irrational'. 
Enlightenment philosophy is, however, based on a 
conflicting structural dualism which, according to 
Horkheimer and Adorno (1972, 83-84) is a dialectic between 
Kantian 'pure' universal/utopian reason and freedom, and a 
concept of reason as a function of domination akin to the 
ideas of Nietzsche. Horkheimer and Adorno (ibid., xi) 
emphasise the latter dimension and refer to mankind 
"sinking into a new kind of barbarism". Koestler (1978) 
too works along similar lines in his analysis of man's 
cruelty and - as he sees it - his schizophrenic condition. 
Marcuse (1970, 1-2) extends the argument, contending that 
domination is internalised and used by the individual on 
himself. The outcome is individual 'autonomy' from which 
the various philosophical forms attached to this ideal 
seek to legitimise social and economic inequalities and 
the infliction of human misery, suffering and cruelty. 
Held (1980, 151) interestingly presents the dialectic of 
enlightenment in the form that "myth is already 
enlightenment; and enlightenment reverts to mythology". 
Held also endorses the conceptual potency of domination as 
the basis for man's thinking and points out that all 
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ideologies and doctrines have the potential to become 
barbaric, uncaring and irresponsible. In this category, 
Held notes that even organised religion can become a 
lethal historical force it if abandons its initial 
precepts. 
Man's contemporary decision-making slips easily into 
utilitarian and hedonistic designs, which are 
fundamentally symptoms of mis-management. His socio-
spatial domain is consequently abused and decimated. 
`Autonomous-man' and his concept of domination can only 
become assertive if belief systems are represented as 
misplaced superstition, or if they are demythologised, 
Yet, Enlightenment philosophies and mythology (religious 
or otherwise) have similar concerns - survival, freedom, 
fear, and dread, hope - albeit in a different contextual 
framework. Man is basically fearful of the unknown and 
particularly of his own encumbent death, which signifies 
extinction and non-being. He presupposed that his 
`emancipation' from the dread will become actualised once 
human existence and knowledge are demythologised. He 
preoccupies himself with the finite business of the world 
while systematically rejecting its metaphysical 
ramifications. All must be scientifically internalised. 
`Outsideness' (see Relph 1976) is tantamount to man's 
vulnerability and is a source of fear, anonymity, 
alienation and loneliness. 
The history of man points overwhelmingly to the fact that 
the greater his measure of 'autonomy', his control and 
domination over nature, then the greater is the measure of 
oppression and injustices which he inflicts. There can be 
no talk of universal values or 'truth'. Truth is 
pragmatic, circumstantial and relative. Man modifies 
truth' according to his purposes and imposes it to 
legitimate his own ends, essentially through his capacity 
to exercise the 'will to power'. Truth has no definite 
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meaning because there are no terms of reference to discuss 
it. 
If man lacks any universal 'truth' about himself and his 
relationship with nature, than all 'value' statements are 
meaningless. It then becomes increasingly difficult to 
evaluate human geography in terms of 'goods' and 
`truths' and 'errors' or to attach any meaning to the 
concepts of 'concern', 'welfare', 'injustice' and so on. 
The philosophical terms of reference raised by scientific 
rationalism seemingly generate ambiguities which in turn 
set-up a hermeneutic dilemma. 'Value statements' in 
geography in this context are non-explanatory because they 
cannot be adequately understood. 
Enlightenment philosophy has problematised geographic 
inquiry and study. The separation of knowledge and 
experience has left man believing that he must act on 
experience to gain understanding and explanation. 
Empirical scientists pioneered the way to bring about a 
single 'objective' environment which might claim a 
universal acceptance. If normal science could strike this 
goal using a positivist philosophy, then 'science' in the 
form of technocratic instrumentalism was the answer to 
achieving sustained economic growth as this would be the 
sole criterion for 'wellbeing'. Popper (1970, 52-55), 
however, dismisses this possibility claiming that normal 
science is non-revolutionary, barely critical, 
unchallenging, supportive of the ruling dogma, and brittle 
and uncompromising to alternatives. Science, for Popper, 
must be bold and critical. 
Keller (1985) suggests that modern Western science is more 
'objectivist' than objective because it treats nature as a 
separate object to be known through domination. Her view 
is modelled on the masculine-feminine dichotomy and 
therefore asserts that 'genuine objectivity' can only be 
realised by a 'gender-free science', as distinct from 
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specifically male values. The essence of Keller's critique 
rightly points to the unreasonableness of human values in 
a scientific context. 
Human geography's problem largely concerns its limited 
concept of man and his environment. Few compromises have 
been found between deterministic-possibilistic 
environmentalism with its stress on the 'real physical 
environment' and perceptual-behaviouristic geography which 
attempts to intertwine the observer and the observed 
environment, and therefore drawing on the interaction of 
social psychology (see Gold 1980). The humanistic and 
radical schools of geographic thought advocate a 'social 
humanism', developing a perceptual-cognitive approach 
where man as subject is identified with the object of his 
study. Its overriding objective is to devise and direct a 
social course of action towards "the future potential 
environment as expressed in values" (Grano 1981, 33). 
This constitutes a philosophical and methodological clash 
of humane, analytical yet relevant and responsive to real 
problems? On the one hand, the empirical scientists 
maintain that the analysis of the 'perceived' environment 
as an inductive matrix will logically reveal (empirical) 
knowledge about the 'real' environment. A behaviouristic 
approach assumes that the environment functions with a 
logic understood by man and one which structurally 
conditions his behaviour and thinking (see Kirk 1951; 
1963). Alternatively, the 'man-centred' approach adopted 
by the humanistic schools depends upon the cultivation of 
man's affective rationality. This may include his 
perceptiveness and response to his socio-cultural and 
mythico-religious landscapes (see Tuan 1974; 1977; 1979). 
The mind becomes the instrument which synthesises 
information from the 'perceived' environment, transforming 
it into 'real' knowledge and understanding. 
Changes in geography's disciplinary structure reflect the 
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historical and cultural trends and attitudes of the 
society in which they take place: "Geographers are 
creatures of their time" (Smith and Ogden 1977, 50). The 
promotion of a positivist scientific geography has been 
accelerated in advanced capitalist nations partly in 
response to the demand of post-1945 technological changes 
and in an attempt to counter-balance the spread of the 
Marxist ideology. There is generally an abhorrence of 
value statements. The problematisation of man's emotions 
and feelings is largely seen as a metaphysical aberration, 
unde serving of any theoretical or experimental 
consideration and therefore devoid of any scientific 
credibility. Butterfield's (1977, 17-18) efforts to 
justify the utility of a positivist geography with its 
"new relevance concepts" and "problem perception" are not 
reassuring. The empirically unverifiable qualitative 
content of the human condition are an impediment to 
scientific 'progress'. 
Contemporary man strives to find meaning in his life 
through the concept of 'progress'. In Western society, 
`progress' is coextensive with the increasing consumption 
of material goods and for gaining wider knowledge in 
technological fields. 'Progress' has become the condition 
for 'freedom' from the restrictions imposed by natural and 
social phenomena. Its omnipresent ideology is 
questionable: what is the meaning of a never-ending 
pursuit for technical knowledge? Is there any time or room 
to enjoy it in peace, or does it lead only to 
dissatisfaction, hardship, misery and injustices? 
Scientific 'progress' is unconcerned with the development 
of moral consciousness, yet the neglected issue of ethics 
is of primary importance as a factor of social change in 
geography (see Berdoulay 1981, 131). Nor can 'progress' 
come to terms with the eschatological mystery of death. 
The phenomenon of social injustice - with which scientific 
geography is seemingly unconcerned - is no new problem. It 
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constantly widens its horizons, encompassing new victims 
who are discriminated against, in law or in fact, on 
account of their origin, race, colour, culture, class, sex 
or religion. Contemporary human geography has the 
increasingly difficult task of examining the nature and 
origins of social injustice while a diminishing number of 
countries are able to reflect upon the notion and meaning 
of promoting their own development. Technocratic 
instrumentalism is having a repressive impact on 
geography. Political and economic ideological domination 
constrains any concept of freedom of thought or action in 
geographic thought. It is far easier to pass on the 
responsibility for injustices and distributional 
inequalities to the shortcomings of another's planning or 
policy-making, or to environmental limitations and 
constraints. The pattern of world trade and economic 
relations between rich and poor nations alike are such 
that every individual has a share in the responsibility 
for the just distribution of goods and profits. 
The era of quantitative techniques and technological 
gymnastics has failed to assert any lasting impact in 
geographical study. The notion of 'rational and informed 
economic man' has equally been eroded. For the Marxist 
geographer, all is reduced to a deterministic economic 
base. Man is depersonalised solely in terms of his 
productive economic propensity while his aesthetic 
qualities are relegated to a subordinate social 
superstructure. Humanistic geography, grounded in 
phenomenology or existentialism, has drawn attention to 
the ways in which people subjectively perceive the world 
but has failed to provide any convincing practical 
guidelines for socio-economic and institutional change. 
Nor has it discovered a set of moral statements based on 
unreproachable values which have a universal validity and 
application. 
Neither the various political ideologies nor the 
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humanistic philosophies can present a formula for 
universal human wellbeing. Problem-solving frequently 
overlooks the immediate dilemmas of the present-time. 
Social and economic change are situated in the long-term 
and can only be 'rationally' discussed in the context of 
some future 'optimistic humanism'. Short of some idyllic 
utopia, social humanism fast collapses into nihilism. 
Despair in the social sciences arises either when it is 
recognised that society cannot be organised or function 
smoothly in a moral vacuum, or when it is realised that 
there is a need to engage in a discussion concerning the 
place of ethics in human existence, for which there are no 
apparent terms of reference. Equally, the individual is 
free to accept or reject an ethics whose content is 
metaphysical and seemingly intangible to many. The will-
to-act is one of individual choice, deliberation and 
responsibility. No ethics can be made accountable to human 
authority rendering the legal enforcement of any such 
values difficult, if not impossible. Anthropocentricism, 
moreover, degenerates into areas of power and domination. 
It is unconcerned with social wellbeing or with any 
ensuing spatial relations. The practical outworkings of 
its policy-making are likely to have a dehumanising 
influence on socio-spatial relations and patterns. 
Any index of social and economic wellbeing is manifest in 
the spatial organisation of society but it is the social 
processes of welfare which dictate and condition spatial 
form. Effective policy-making necessitates an assault on 
both external and internal forces. The geographical 
analysis of local or regional problems cannot draw 
restrictive parameters at the expense of international 
political and economic decision-making. Equally, the 
institutional organisations which initiate policy-making 
and which prescribe social values need to be internalised 
and their epistemological predilections closely examined. 
THE HISTORICITY OF GEOGRAPHIC THOUGHT 
The history of geography depends on what is currently 
defined as geography at any one stage of its development. 
The content of human geography as a body of knowledge has 
hardly had any fixed parameters throughout history. 
Although every school of research has its own 
historiography and compiled the history of geography 
according to its own criteria, the enquiry for 
geographical knowledge is grounded in basic thinking which 
is independent of both historic space-time transformations 
and the fragmentation of the field of knowledge. 'Pre-
scientific' thinking has always existed througout the 
history of geography. It is a form of natural geographical 
consciousness upon which contemporary geographical science 
is dependent. 'Pre-scientific' thinking and reflection 
does not readily conform to the 'rationalistic' 
methodology of 'normal' science. Epistemology is its chief 
concern and its insights are rather the result of 
`creative intuition' or 'sleepwalking' (see Koestler 1964, 
1979). That geography belongs to science must be taken in 
its broadest sense: that science is a part of society and 
that it constitutes as knowledge human action behaviour
and culture as well as the social structure of society. 
Science is not simply a reflection of the 'object' of 
study. Knowledge is bound to the individual who in turn 
belongs to some specific culture and social group. 
Rather than projecting an 'objective' social determinism, 
human geography's historical concern is to reinstate man 
as subject. With his perception, experience, knowledge and 
action, man forms a holistic unity with nature. The 
environment and man's place and meaning in it can only 
however, be realistically explained in terms of man. The 
emergence of the 'humanistic' movement in geography during 
the 1970s has attempted to overcome this problem by 
attributing a phenomenological or existential philosophical 
perspective to the discipline (see Buttimer 1974, 1976, 
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1981; Relph 1976, 1981; Samuels 1978, 1981; Tuan 1974, 
1977, 1979). Drawing particularly upon the work of 
Husserl, Sartre, Dilthey and to a lesser extent, 
Heidegger, they have sought to establish old pre-
disciplinary and pre-scientific traditions for 
geographical thought. They contend that no modern 
geographical science can exist without a pre-scientific 
and natural geographical consciousness. Geography, in its 
pre-scientific context, retained an inseparable unity 
between man and nature. When geography became 
institutionalised, an artificial schism between these two 
entities was created to provide a basis for logico-
empirical study. The knowledge it provided has become 
increasingly derisive, fragmented and pragmatic. Moreover, 
modern scientific geography has politics and society, by 
whose yardstick it must justify its status as a science. 
The historicity and epistemological development of human 
geography are generally discussed in terms of the changing 
emphases and cumulative body of knowledge which constitute 
its disciplinary content (see Graves 1980, 7-43). Its 
ontological backcloth is an opaque consideration. Only 
Darwin's contribution to an understanding of Man's origins 
gained a wide scientific consensus in the development of 
modern geography. Nonetheless: "Writing the history of 
geography was part of the search for identity" (Grano 
1981, 21), not only within the discipline, but also for 
man and his place in the human sciences and as an 
individual. Its significance is unquestionably concerned 
with men and ideas throughout time. Yet even the history 
of pre-scientific thinking somewhere obscures the point at 
which knowledge became fragmented and where man's 
understanding lost its unity and wholesomeness. 
The modern world is increasingly marked by political and 
moral nihilism. Modern man has abandoned divine intention, 
nature and reason. History is taken as the pre-eminent 
directive of practical life, as a means of resolving 
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social tensions and ills. It is treated as a normative 
agent, as a part of human actuality. In terms of 
historicist philosophies, however, man is at pains to 
articulate a conception of history that can consistently 
sustain human dignity. Paradoxically, the historicization 
of Western life and thought is motivated not by the 
success of history in explaining meaning in human 
existence, but by its failure to convey anything of 
substance and certitude. History is a useful instrument to 
negate the human condition and to illuminate all that man 
is-not. Rather than providing a positive prescriptive 
incentive, it plunges mankind into deeper confusion and 
despair. 
Gillespie (1985) attempts to utilise Hegel and Heidegger 
to transcend the limits of historicism to find an 
underlying reality which can provide an intelligible 
account of the meaning of man's historical existence. Both 
accounts tend to be shrouded in philosophical mysticism, 
whether it is the Hegelian dialectical reconciliation of 
the tensions in being and consciousness, or in Heidegger's 
obscurum per obscurius self-revelation of Being in an 
otherwise meaningless nothingness. Gillespie's response is 
metaphysical. He is 'irrationally' compelled to make an 
optimistic 'leap', claiming that human experience contains 
a source of insight and wonder which penetrates beyond 
history, fixing itself to an understanding of man's place 
in a somehow intelligible super-historical cosmos. 
If, however, the concept of truth is to be contained 
within the parameters of what is empirically verifiable, 
then this necessitates a return to an historically-based 
rationalism. This implies that man must somehow discover a 
point of reference which is universally acceptable to 
human existence and which is generally manifest in some 
form of speech or action. The apparent failure of 
historicist philosophies to provide man with a universal 
frame of reference for social organisation renders the 
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likelihood of an emergent, coherent politics or ethics as 
a remote possibility. Neither history nor natural sciences 
seem capable of exercising the necessary judgment to 
achieve this objective. 
The historicity of human thought and values has been 
marked by uncertainty, ambiguity and superficiality. The 
exposure of relational 'truth' between economy, society 
and space cannot be discovered or explained until the 
origins and essence of man's inhumanity are discussed. 
Social theory needs to generate propositional structures -
as in quantum mechanics, particle physics and molecular 
biology - which might account for 'social reality'. The 
rationality of methodology in the contemporary social 
sciences has lacked circumspection. The fundamental 
dichotomy is between those whose basic presuppositions 
about knowledge and existence are empiricially grounded 
and others who wish to pursue the development of a 'meta-
theoretical' level (see Sylvan and Glassner 1985). This 
opens the stage for fierce debate concerning the theory 
and praxis which may form a basis towards a clearer 
definition and understanding of rationality, reason, 
reality and truth. An important underpinning theme which 
provides a common point of reference for all social 
theorists is the relationship between cohesion and 
conflict in and between social groups. For the geographer, 
this includes the ways in which space is perceived and 
utilised by these various groups. 
While Buttimer (1978, 74) asserts that: The ultimate 
challenge . 	 . is to develop a truly personal type of 
knowledge, one that allows for emotion as well as 
thinking, passion as well as reason, and one that leads to 
an understanding of the self as well as to an 
understanding of the world", it is questionable as to 
whether this directive might be subsumed under geography 
as a discipline of knowledge, or indeed under any single 
paradigmatic banner. Much depends on whether human 
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geography can be paradigmatic, or if it is non--
paradigmatic. 
GEOGRAPHY AND THE PARADIGM DEBATE 
The definition of a philosophy is rooted in an 
individual's beliefs and convictions. Harvey (1969, 5) 
recognises that research cannot proceed without some 
philosophical foundation. Its ensuing methodology is 
concerned with the logical exposition of an exploration. 
There is much controversy over the paradigm concept in 
human geography. For Buttimer (1981, 81), the notion of a 
pardigm "offers an illusion of clarity yet remains 
sufficiently vague and analytically elusive to occupy our 
imaginations for a long time". 
Titus (1964) refers to the paradigm idea as a personal, 
speculative, and reflexive attempt to formulate a 
universal or to develop a viewpoint which must be 
critical, analytical and concerned with linguistic 
clarification. No body of knowledge can be equivalent to a 
paradigm unless the numerical support is forthcoming to 
endorse the viewpoint. This is a difficult proposition to 
maintain since scientific consensus is rarely unanimous or 
unified in any discipline. Harvey and Holly (1981, 11) 
suggest that geographic thought is a manifestation of the 
interaction between prevailing philosophical viewpoints 
and the major methodological approaches in vogue. Any 
reconstruction of the history of thought requires 
assumptions and inferences concerning its aims. Knowledge 
inevitably becomes more fragmented. Certain pieces are 
retained, others discarded, distorted or reworked to make 
it fit into a particular theory. Buttimer (1981, 87) 
observes that the mystery of how knowledge actually 
develops is still a puzzle to most philosophers of 
science" and goes on to suggest that documented knowledge 
recorded in books and articles is but a shadow of the 
thought behind the ideal. 
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Any branch of geographical study - regional, locational or 
areal analysis - may claim a paradigmatic status because 
it is supported by "widely held views" (Haggett 1965, 10-
13). All disciplines react to external influences for the 
development and interpretation of knowledge. Much is 
determined by the dominant political ideologies which hold 
power and by technological changes and trends. Graves 
(1981) challenges the notion that geography might be 
accommodated under one paradigm and suggests the 
possibility that the whole concept of the 'paradigm' is an 
attempt to impose constraints and limitations on precisely 
what constitutes 'geographical study'. 
Whatever the case, the division of knowledge into rigid 
disciplinary boundaries confuses an understanding of 
reality and man's place in it. An inter-disciplinary 
synthesis seems prospectively to be the most satisfactory 
approach to provide explanatOry wholesomeness. but an 
accommodation of various philosophies based on different 
standpoints and which generate diverse and conflicting 
methodologies is an awesome task. To deny or ignore the 
philosophical diversity which underpins geographic thought 
is to remain unreceptive to innovation and change and 
imposes limitations on man's shifting perception and 
horizons of world problems. As far as geography is 
concerned, Bird (1978) and Stoddart (1977, 1981) contend 
that the paradigm idea provides little understanding when 
methodologies and philosophical outlook change. 
Pre-renaissance paradigms were concerned with natural 
science and physical law-making. This primarily involved 
the search for universals. Many such paradigms remained 
unrivalled until it could be shown that some systems of 
thought had methodological shortcomings. Changes were 
largely manifest on account of shifts in the philosophical 
climate. The paradigm dilemma became all the more 
compounded in the case of the human or social sciences 
because of the complexities of man as a being. Kuhn (1962, 
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37) understood that the social sciences were necessarily 
"pre-scientific" because none of the individual 
disciplines in their group had ever established a general 
body of concepts, categories and relationships. Nor was 
there any firm methodology which could endorse their 
validity and acceptance as a paradigm. It is not, 
therefore, surprising that contemporary social theory - in 
which human geography has its part - has avoided any 
attempt to reconstruct complete and all-embracing 
ideologies. Knowledge tends to remain a fragmented and 
privatised field of enquiry. Theory may be seen as a form 
of conceptual scaffolding which supports the further 
elevation of individual disciplines rather than a 
totalising form of ideology that seems to make inter-
disciplinary inroads. In any case, the meaning of 'theory' 
had vague interpretations. Theory may not necessarily be 
deemed to be 'scientific' if it cannot be contained within 
the parameters of a positivist definition, yet many so-
called (positivist) scientific theories may be completely 
devoid of any practical applications or therapeutic 
utility. 
Bubner (1982, 52) transposes this problem into the terms 
of formulating an 'ideal': "Even if one concedes that an 
ideal does not always correspond to reality, the ideal 
must nevertheless be meaningful as an ideal. That is, it 
must be an appropriate criterion for testing whether a 
reality is inadequate, in so far as the reality must 
correspond to the ideal, at least in principle". 
The paradigm debate in geography had generally been 
emphasised with particular reference to Kuhn (1962; 1970). 
Kuhn saw 'normal science' carried out under a paradigm 
within the context of a positivist philosophy, but which 
justified itself through its numerical acceptance by 
scholars. This definition was largely accepted by most 
quantitative geographers in the 1960s. Chorley and Haggett 
(1967) refer to paradigms as stable patterns of scientific 
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activity and as large-scale models. 'Normal science' 
demands intellectual mastery over complexity and 
analytical activity in its conceptualisation and 
methodology. This is not, however, without problems. A 
positivist science is concerned with the technical 
manipulation of data. Its problem is relating its 
theoretical findings into practical solutions which might 
be simplistically explained in ordinary language. Harvey 
(1969) recognised that the hypothico-deductive method of 
inquiry was perhaps a more direct means of revealing 
`truths' in scientific explanation, but resigned himself 
to the probabilistic-inductive approach because of the 
limitations to knowledge and understanding. 
No paradigm can be formulated in a value-free context. In 
advanced capitalist nations, the conception of scientific 
activity has long corresponded to particular class 
interests. Government and industry controls and funds 
research in the interests of those who own the means of 
production. Science, in this sense, is concerned with 
manipulation and control and this is the driving force 
behind paradigm formation. Unavoidably, the question 
remains as to who is going to control whom. Even Marx's 
new scientific rationality can only raise part-truths 
which may be relevant at a given point in time. Marx takes 
the concern for material reality as the genesis of 
scientific inquiry, but this reality is historically 
conceived and made by men and, therefore, susceptible to 
be changed by their practice. 
Larrain's (1979, 35) evaluation of Marxist ideology as: "A 
system of thought which brings together idealism and 
materialism, philosophy and economy, science and 
revolution, is bound to present problems of 
interpretation", does little to clarify an understanding 
of a paradigm. Yet it remains that the paradigm has become 
an instrument of scientific respectability and academic 
convention and has assumed itself to be isolated from 
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ideological and political scrutiny,. The plurality of 
geographical study seemingly creates an irreconcilable 
conflict when assessed against Kuhn's requirements for 
paradigmatic status. 
Where two or more standpoints are competing with one 
another, then a dual or multiple paradigmatic state 
exists. This does not, however, imply thatansingle paradigm 
will unconditionally emerge from the ensuing debate and 
discordance. Some see this as an undesirable prospect. 
Johnston (1979, 189), for example, fears that the work of 
"iconoclasts" will direct human geography towards 
"anarchy". Merton (1976), however, suggests that a 
plurality of standpoints is academically and 
scientifically healthy insofar that it seeks to emphasise 
the merits and shortcomings in each paradigm. Graves 
(1981, 90) too favours a plurality of coexisting paradigms 
which may reduce the risk of a myopic and limited outlook 
so that geography may be left to: "wander creatively where 
it may to make it an open-ended intellectual quest rather 
than an artifically restricted study stifled by the 
unheeding blinkers of an epistemological concept". 
Bartels (1973, 24) refers to paradigmatic coexistence as: 
"situations of conflict between different statements of 
truth". This, he claims, does not necessarily inhibit a 
sharpening in the focus of the discipline. 
The question remains, however, as to whether 'truth' can 
be disjointed, dissected and contained in different 
statements. Its fragmentation cannot provide an acceptable 
practical image. No valid statement can be made to stand 
if it fails to assert some epistemological foundations. 
Man needs to know 'what is to be known' in theory and 
praxis, plus a standpoint. Otherwise, 'truth' in 
geographic thought will fail to assume any holistic 
dimensions, leaving the discipline in an existential 
wilderness charged by pragmatic incertitude. Paradigmatic 
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plurality within a discipline only examines the 
particulars, whereby "discussion on the fundamentals 
remains and long-term progress fails to occur" (Masterman 
1970, 74). 
Human geography has not escaped the dilemma of 
paradigmatic plurality. Moreover, it has increasingly 
encountered this problem with the growth and proliferation 
of competing philosophical, ideological and methodological 
standpoints. The positivist and behaviourist schools have 
been severely challenged and criticised by humanistic and 
radical thinkers, which have both subsequently claimed a 
paradigmatic status. 
Many human geographers seek understanding and explanation 
from the phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophies. 
These approaches suggest a search for 'ideal' ways of 
thinking about the world and problematise the questions of 
`being' and 'existence'. The phenomenological theme has 
attracted a diversity of methods and approaches to 
investigate human perception and relationships in space 
and with place. It has not, however, generated a 
sufficiently large consensus to warrant it a paradigmatic 
status, at least insofar that its promulgations have 
hardly made a convincing case to attract attention and 
favourable reactions from the scientific community or from 
government. This does not, however, necessarily invalidate 
the work or the value of the critical acumen of the 
humanistic approaches to human geography. 
Relph's (1976) interpretation of 'insideness' and 
`outsideness', 'placelessness' and 'alienation' provides a 
valuable insight to understanding human behaviour and 
individual decision-making. Equally, he illuminates the 
shortcomings between planner and place and the seemingly 
insurmountable problem of creating an 'ideal' and 
`acceptable' environment suited to each individual. Relph 1-No.s 
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drawn substantially on the constraining and indoctrinal 
influences of technocracy. 
Tuan (1974, 1977, 1979) discusses the inference of myth, 
history and culture on the landscape, while Buttimer 
(1974, 1978, 1981) and Rose (1981) are concerned with an 
empathetic approach to understand the 'personal message' 
of the lives of geographical pioneers through an 
autobiographical study of a scholar's life. Guelke (1971, 
1974, 1975, 1981) attempts to attribute an individualistic 
view of experience in man-land relationships by drawing on 
historical and cultural idealism. His standpoint is based 
on 'normal' human rationality. 
Ley (1974, 1978, 1980) and Wallace (1978) adopt a 
humanistic approach as a critical tool to demolish the 
mechanics of advanced capitalism and the ideological 
shortcomings in Marxist theory. Samuels (1978, 1981) 
employs an existentialist view of man's encounter with 
himself in a spatial context. Olsson (1978) too defies and 
challenges scientific rationalism by outlining the 
ambiguity of language and man's existential uncertainty. 
Olsson (ibid., 113) identifies this problem by trying to 
understand: "... how one authority gives way to 
another...how a paradigm is overthrown and superceded by 
another". 
Smith (1973, 1978) has been anxious to develop a 'human 
paradigm', for which he has proposed a 'people geography' 
and a 'welfare approach'. Smith emphasises the 
difficulties in satisfying basic needs. He points to the 
entrenched values and ideas of industry and those in 
educational institutions, and their inflexibility and fear 
of change. There is, he claims, an extending time-lag 
between scientific reality and the value positions held by 
society at large. Smith (1978, 370-373) wishes to 
accommodate "non-geographical" considerations in his 
analysis, so that the mechanisms which generate social and 
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economic inquality and distributional disparities can be 
challenged, exposed and refuted. If, Smith contends, a 
policy or paradigm is caring and responsive, then its 
value should stand. 
For Harvey (1973) and Peet (1977), the only acceptable 
`paradigm' is a critique of political economy, which for 
them is the application of a Marxist approach to human 
geography. In this case, Marxist theory attempts to 
combine a materialist base with an analytic method, where 
the dialectic of materialism works as a sifting device to 
resolve contradictions, paradoxes and opposites. 
Gregory (1978) and Sayer (1984) contend that human 
geographers as social scientists should develop an 
'objectivised' knowledge about externalities and promote a 
critical self-awareness of people as subjects of 
geographical and social inquiry. Following the work of 
other critical theorists such as Habermas and Bhaskar, 
they support the notions of the 'emancipation' of the 
social individual from all forms of political ideology by 
seeking an 'ideal communicative competence'. 
While those human geographers investigating the avenues of 
critical theory tend to seek a new realism' which 
frequently smacks of some expression of neo-Marxism, 
Giddens (1984) has integrated human geography into his 
theory of structuration. He repudiates holistic and 
evolutionary thinking in both functionalism and Marxism in 
human geography. Equally, he condemns both 'objectivist' 
theories which assert the dominance of 'structural 
constraint' over human action, and 'subjectivist' views 
based on methodological individualism which tend to 
generate extremes of idealism. Moreover, and following the 
ideas of Goffman and Foucault, Giddens is persuaded that 
the concept of 'power' is critical to the understanding of 
how society is produced and reproduced, the geographical 
context of which is inclusive. 
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In those respects, both the radical school of Marxist 
geographers and those who engage in critical encounters 
with major intellectual traditions in the development of 
geographic thought and methodology may feasibly make 
claims for a 'paradigmatic' status. 
Kuhn's work has been criticised on account of his 
idealistic interpretation of science and progress, where 
the relationship between scientific knowledge and its 
materialistic foundations are divorced. Others maintain 
that science and technology are intrinsically linked to 
the materialistic expression of their theory and 
development. Nor does Kuhn's analysis explain how 
anomalies are set up in a paradigm and how this may 
precipitate a crisis. Kuhn's model of 'normal sciences' 
does not adequately explain the dynamics of paradigmatic 
change - certainly, it is less connected with any 
demonstration of scientific error. The genesis of a new 
paradigm and its related body of theory is a complex 
matter. There is no consensus as to how it comes about or 
as to what paradigm change precisely means. Some observers 
maintain that when an established scientific orthodoxy can 
no longer sufficiently explain a set of facts, actions or 
circumstances, then their methodology becomes inadequate 
and their paradigm outdated and acceptable. 
Harvey (1973, 146) suggests that paradigm shift is only 
possible where: "... such a superior system of thought 
when judged against the realities which require 
explanation ... succeed in making all opposition ... look 
ludicrous". This position may be difficult to substantiate 
particularly where experimental methodology reaches its 
explanatory parameters and becomes compelled to recognise 
- in the terminology of 'normal science' - a sub-atomic 
(metaphysical) field of inquiry, where relationships are 
mcasual, indeterminate and which generally defies any 
measurement of probability. At such a point, 'truth' is 
likely to become a highly subjective and personalised 
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concept which does not lend itself to 'normal scientific' 
verification. 
The acceptance of a new paradigm does not necessarily 
conform to a 'logical' sequence of thought insofar that 
the emergence of new ideas and concepts is not always the 
product of a dialectic between 'normal scientific' inquiry 
and the prevailing attitudes in the socio-economic 
structure of society. According to Buttimer (1981), there 
is often a profound element of 'uniqueness' in paradigm 
revolution, where individual scholars have provided the 
dynamism and insight to extending knowledge and 
understanding. This requires critical reflective thought 
in terms of encounter and events which help to explain the 
cumulative shaping of these insights. Kuhn too recognised 
that where the parameters of 'normal science' could be 
legitimately challenged and shown to be insufficient, then 
`extraordinary science' might be considered as an 
alternative. Moreover, Kuhn (1926, 34) believed that if a 
paradigm was completely abandoned, then the science it 
defined ceased to be practised. 
Much remains unclear. Harvey (1973, 129) maintains that 
paradigm shift in geographic thought responds to the 
dynamics of changing social objectivity and conditions. 
Further, Harvey (1972, 3) claims "... a new paradigm 
should be intellectually challenging and appealing; 
contain enough substance to attack the fundamentals of 
other viewpoints; offer complexity in its structure, a new 
methodology and a basis upon which further research can 
take place." On the other hand, paradigms should not be 
problematised in such a complex theoretical framework that 
they bear little or no resemblance to social reality. No 
system can claim to be valid if it is value-free, neutral 
or uncommitted in the development of its policy. 
King (1976, 306-308) argues that a paradigm must have an 
operational utility to enhance the quality of material and 
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social wellbeing. Smith (1978) interjects that the 
transition from scientific theory to practical social 
policy requires ethical statements and normative 
assessments. Any 'normative theory', however, may arouse 
suspicion due to its apparent inability to deal with 
immediate problems. It cannot be empirically verified and 
often collapses into the metaphysical implications of 
human existence. 
Although paradigms appear to come and go according to the 
speed by which research can reveal anomalies and non-
explanation in existing paradigms, paradigm shift is more 
a 'revolutionary' process than an accretive one. 
Stoddart (1981, 74-77), using T.H. Huxley's 'Four Stages 
of Public Opinion, shows that many generalisations about 
the nature and progress of scientific change predate 
Kuhn's ideas and are independent of his formulation. 
Huxley claimed that over a one hundred year period a 'new' 
way of thinking is first ridiculed, then becomes accepted 
as an 'absolute truth'. Later, it is found to be lacking 
in explanation and finally, it becomes an historical 
mixture of 'truth' and 'error'. 
More recently, Schafer et al (1984) extended the notion of 
`finalization' as a possible explanation for the 
development of scientific thought, in which three distinct 
phases of paradigm formation are suggested: first, the 
`pre-paradigmatic' or exploratory phase, where the 
research may be strongly motivated by external social 
interests, but where the results are fragmentary and of 
little value; secondly, the 'paradigmatic' phase, where a 
theory becomes recognised and is acknowledged within a 
relatively closed technical community; thirdly, the 'post-
paradigmatic' phase, where theory assumes a practical 
application and where research is geared to technological 
uses. 
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A 'finalized' science, however, clearly threatens the 
autonomy of a discipline and its practitioners insofar 
that societal forces impinge directly on the structure and 
process of the field of inquiry. These agencies undertake 
the selection and definition of'research inquiry, specify 
and propagate the nature of explanatory ideals and dictate 
the conditions of the research environment. In this 
context, modern science excludes any critical reflection 
of its objectives and encloses itself in a 'value-free' 
vacuum. Technocratic dominance in research directives, 
when in the hands of corporal societal interests (i.e. 
governmental, industrial, commercial or military), 
suggests a move towards 'strategic epistemologies'. 
CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE PARADIGM ISSUE 
Human geography can no longer be contained under a 
positivist paradigm or any of its related offshoots, 
namely behaviourism and functionalism. Although positivism 
directed human geography toward a single-paradigm science 
in the 1960s and much of the 1970s, its credibility had 
largely been undermined by philosophers and social 
theorists alike. Its rigid and inflexible methodology and 
its refusal to explain social change exposed shortcomings 
in its philosophical content. Its preoccupation with 
socio-spatial generalisations, with economic efficiency 
and rationalisation, theorems, mathematisation and value-
free analysis stultified and stifled geographic horizons. 
If a paradigm is understood as a consensus of aims and 
methods which defines, until replaced, the pursuit of 
`normal science', then positivism threatened to accord 
science and technology predominance over man, 
subordinating the latter as a dehumanised social actor 
whose thinking, behaviour and responses could be 
technocratically conditioned and physiologically 
explained. 
Increasingly in human geography there is a need for more 
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epistemologically rigorous foundations for research and a 
more open discussion of values. Either it can conform with 
the 'scientific' (positivistic) yardstick - that is, the 
preoccupation with procedural and technical issues; 
particularity and narrowness of methodological inquiry and 
an uncritical reluctance towards its own ends - or 
redefine its understanding of value and meaning. This bi-
polarisation of standpoints inevitably generates 
discordance over the interpretation of 'relevance', 
`reason' and 'rationality' in geographical study. As the 
positivistic consensus has steadily become fragmented, 
human geography has entered a state of crisis: it has 
either become multi-paradigmatic, or it is non-
paradigmatic. 
There is no consensus for the paradigmatic status of human 
geography as a discipline of knowledge in the social 
sciences. Gould (1979, 145) considers that perhaps there 
has been no paradigm shift; instead, "We see ourselves in 
an enlarged paradigm ... We are not flip-flopping from one 
paradigm to another, but enlarging our perspective by 
reaching out. 
Graves (1981, 90) suggests that the conceptual relevance 
of the paradigm is probably more suited to the physical 
and environmental sciences than to human geography, where, 
he contends, "the issue is more problematic". By 
implication, Graves poignantly infers that perhaps not all 
that is published in human geography is social science. It 
is therefore possible to question the paradigmatic 
substance of the social sciences as a composite whole. 
Jones (1980, 259) remains unmoved in his opinion that: 
"Paradigm has replaced paradigm so rapidly that it is 
impossible to discern a concensus of opinion which will 
support one view of social processes". 
If it is asserted that disciplinary limitations and 
boundaries impose artificial constraints, then the 
fragmentation of knowledge can never be expected to reveal 
truth, reason, rationality and meaning in human existence. 
Contrastingly, disciplinary expertise, in its conventional 
sense, increasingly runs the risk of a wider 
epistemological distancing in both an academic and social 
context. 'Critical theory', for example, will also quickly 
lose its potentiality and usefulness as a means of review, 
assessment and adjustment. 
The chief downfall of modernism has been its inability to 
establish a common culture. It has failed to combine the 
world of practical experience and individual sensitivity 
into a universal social theory and practice. Abstractions 
of philosophical idealism - particularly those with a 
phenomenological basis - are frequently condemned by 
positivist and radical geographers alike on account of 
their lack of content. A reflexive methodology tends, in 
any case, to collapse into some form of utopian idealism, 
or moves towards an association with positivist 
empiricism, or into a socially aware form of materialism. 
It is hard to accreditate it with a paradigmatic status. 
Notwithstanding, it does not follow that all non-cognitive 
reference points such as custom, tradition, culture and 
religion can be eradicated from onto-existential and 
epistemological considerations in human geography. 
Positivism offers a technocratic mass consciousness with 
its supportive symbolism and stylistics. Substantive and 
affective values and ideas are discarded as 'irrational', 
`irrelevant' and 'unscientific'. Contemporary society is 
increasingly squeezed by the power of dominant elites and 
their associated policies and ideologies so that scope for 
consensus has become restricted, and its sense and meaning 
obscured. The limitations and stereotypography of a 
technocratic rationality not only confuses human reason, 
but pushes any notion of the inclusion of justice, dignity 
and moral responsibility into paradigm formulation as a 
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nonsense. It is equally difficult to apply.rigid 
materialistically-rooted paradigm to human geography, as 
many Marxist commentators would have it. This is an 
`atomic' and deterministic methodology where 'normal 
science' circumscribes its paradigmatic territory. 
The 'sub-atomic' aspects of human thought, behaviour and 
existence are necessarily excluded. They do not easily 
lend themselves to experimental methods of inquiry in the 
normal way and are difficult, if not impossible to 
quantify. This is perhaps the point where theories and 
ideologies are reduced to their underpinning philosophical 
foundation, where epistemological and ontological 
structures are ultimately called into question. 
Jones (1980, 260) makes an unprecedented appeal for 
phenomenological relevance in human geography through a 
proposed study of De Chardin's work. This suggestion 
clearly indicates an integrated study of man's historico-
theological roots and his relationship and place in 
cosmological theory. It is also a point of imminence where 
the 'natural' collapses into the 'supernatural', the 
`normal' into the 'paranormal', and philosophy into 
metaphysics and mysticism. If this analogy is 
coexistensive with Buttimer's (1974) insistence on an 
interplay of both "inside" and "outside" views of man and 
the universe, then any substantive paradigm for human 
geography and all the social sciences is contingent on an 
examination of origins and essences. 
GEOGRAPHY, MAN AND SPACE 
The notion and meaning of space is intrinsically bound in 
the philosophy of science. In much of human geography, 
spatial considerations are frequently devoid of and 
dissociated from social and moral philosophy as if these 
were not relevant constituents of the philosophy of 
science. Facts become dismembered from values, objects as 
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independent from subjects. Objectivity encompasses an 
identity divorced from human perception and action. A 
resultant system of thought based on fixed definitions and 
fixed categories and relationships are frequently seen as 
obstacles to understanding. When philosophy and 
methodology are separated, theory is evolved. Its 
verification is accomplished by scientific experimentalism 
so that theory becomes practice. 
Alternatively, a positivistic approach may be abandoned 
for a materialist or reflexive interpretation of space. 
This may be set in an historical and/or individualistic 
context which may be thought to contain the wholesomeness 
of existence, and therefore, of spatial awareness. 
Ultimately, such standpoints will provide a more solid 
directive towards problem-identification in a socio-
spatial context and for present and future decision-
making. 
Whatever the case, a universally acceptable definition of 
`space' is difficult and complex in order to satisfy the 
various forms of geographical inquiry. Many of geography's 
problems are ontological where the interpretation of the 
meaning of 'space' is paramount. For this, there is no 
consensus of opinion. Space is not absolute, nor relative 
or relational in itself. Man can manipulate the concept of 
space depending on his purpose, pre-assumptions and the 
demonstration of his method. There are no philosophical 
answers to philosophical questions when the nature of 
space is scrutinized. Its various interpretative shapes 
and forms are manifested in human action. 
The schism between fact and value which has pervaded post-
Renaissance Western philosophy has established the need to 
reconcile dualisms where dogmatic moral precepts can 
somehow or other be removed. Kant resorted to an 'a 
priori' methodology, while Marx's dialectical materialism 
attempted to abolish all philosophical and metaphysical 
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dilemmas once and for all. Marx's eternal synthesis 
58-mIn gh.. is compelled to accept the need for a man-
centred ethical code. Concepts of 'social justice' and 
`morality' in the use of space do not disappear, but 
rather Marx attempted to show that they are created within 
and from human action. Any notion of fixed truths which 
govern man's concepts, his modes of action, or which help 
to explain his successes and failures is rejected. A 
Marxist theory of space necessitates the recognition of 
concepts of 'good', 'bad', 'greed', 'envy', 'misery', 
`responsibility', 'justice', and so on. All such terms of 
reference may be seen as metaphysical abstractions which 
must somehow be translated within the context of an 
ideological economic determinism. 
As Harvey (1973, 15) points out, Marxism required: "a move 
from a predisposition to regard social justice as a matter 
of eternal justice and morality to regard it as something 
contingent upon the social processes operating in society 
as a whole." 
Values, however, have always been a part of historical 
analysis, including its socio-spatial context. Although 
agnosticism and atheism remain a negation of values, they 
cannot eradicate the need for social values in itself. 
Rather, they attempt to redefine historical values under 
an autonomous-man frame of reference. Marxist theory, for 
example, must convincingly try to legitimate the choice 
and reasons for the values which it employs in the 
materialistic theorisation of space. How are such value 
systems reshaped, integrated and contained within the 
theory? Upon what moral prerogative are social 
abstractions founded? How may social actors be encouraged 
to react accordingly in a spatial setting? 
A spatial awareness or 'spatial consciousness' is 
inseparable from social process if any real understanding 
is to be gained. According to Mills (1959, 5), the 
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"sociological imagination" enables man to understand the 
wider implications of his historical background, both in 
terms of its meaning for the "inner life" as well as for 
his "external actions". The suggestion is that the 
individual can understand his own experience. Popper 
(1970) and Polanyi (1962) amongst others, both imply no 
information-processing system can formulate an up-to-date 
representation of itself, that is, complete self-awareness 
is never achieved unless the peak of the hierarchy is 
attained. Man has largely sought to discover the social 
and historical meaning of the individual in society. This 
pursuit raises ontological and epistemological questions. 
For Harvey (1973, 24), a 'spatial consciousness' involves 
the recognition of "how transactions between individuals 
and between organisations are affected by the space which 
separates them". 
This suggests some evaluation of relevance between people 
and places over spatial boundaries. In this context, the 
inseparability of spatial structure and social process 
implies that tight disciplinary parameters are a hindrance 
to explanation and understanding. 
Space is still misunderstood, misconceived and misused 
throughout the social sciences. Contemporary 'scientific' 
methodology relays its influence through the technological 
society which it has created. Positivism, for example, 
prescribes cultural homogeneity so that theories and 
hypotheses can be modelled and tested. This approach, 
according to Blanche (1968, 6) is unacceptable since: 
"Statistical laws say nothing whatsoever about the 
behaviour of the individual elements ... moreover, any 
prediction about average behaviour is not given as a 
certainty". 
Relph's (1976) phenomenological investigation of space and 
his concept of 'placelessness' not only indites the 
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topographical landscape, but emphasises man as part of a 
depersonalisation process. The city is a place of 
anonymity, alienation and human anxiety (see Wirth 1938; 
Cox 1968; Roszak 1973). Values are removed by technocracy. 
Man is reduced to the terms of socio-economic definitions. 
Every aspect of his existence - his relations with others, 
his own thinking and with the environment - is eroded and 
is inauthenticated. Space (i.e. Land) mirrors the 
innermost emotive human expressions: need, meaning, greed, 
ambition, malevolence and fears. Much of man's endemic 
historical downfall is related to his insatiable appetite 
for unlimited material wealth and territorial gain (either 
by a 'visible' military invasion, or by 'invisible' 
economic coersion) and thus, the implementation of power. 
Societal and environmental imbalances are the inevitable 
spatial repercussions of his thinking and actions. 
Irrespective of the individual's philosophical 
convictions, life is dictated by decision-making. This 
requires judgment and therefore a belief in personal 
responsibility. This in turn is coextensive to freedom of 
choice. In reality there exists an uneasy accommodation 
between geographical, sociological and political decision-
making. They are rarely in practical agreement and 
conceptually and methodologically usually in conflict. 
Harvey (1973, 27) asserts that: "Once a spatial form is 
created it tends to institutionalise and, in some 
respects, to determine the future development of social 
process". This suggests that many socio-spatial functions 
are increasingly carried out 'automatically' or 'semi-
consciously' with a diminishing degree of awareness. 
Koestler (1978, 240) maintains that "experience is 
constantly being eroded by the formation of habits and 
mechanical routines". Much of these tendencies can be 
attributed to the impact of scientific technocracy. 
Man's spatial experiences cannot be confined to any one 
strict category. Cassirer (1944) suggests three basic 
forms of spatial experience: first, 'organic space', which 
is biologically determined and used in behavioural 
analysis by ethologists to explain migratory movements and 
instinctive territoriality; secondly, 'perceptual space', 
which is experienced by the senses and probably influenced 
by cultural conditioning; thirdly, 'symbolic space', where 
space is vicariously experienced by the interpretation of 
symbolism which has no spatial dimension. 
The geographer has tended to experiment with mathematical 
and geometrical representations of space to produce 
workable ideas, but Euclidean three-dimensional design is 
probably more applicable to physical laws for the 
organisation of objects in physical space. Social space 
incorporates personal dimensions which transcend physical 
space. The structuration of space in an urban or rural 
context may symbolically be culture-specific, reflecting 
an existing social or political order of symbolising 
needs, fears or hopes. Social space is difficult to 
generalise. It is an assortment of complex individual 
emotions and personal images which reflect responses to 
spatial symbolism. Spatial relations are personalised and 
privatised, functioning primarily at the individual level. 
Group norms may be identified where people are seen to 
behave and evaluate space in a similar way, but there may 
be no common or universal image of perception. Conversely, 
there are strong discontinuities in socially-measured 
spatial structures. Some images are highly unpredictable 
and idiosyncratic. Even where distinctive group behaviours 
are identified, sociological criteria may be inadequate to 
explain them. This reinforces the 'unscientific' and 
`irrational' aspects of man's personality. Moreover, the 
symbolic qualities contained in spatial form reflect the 
dynamics of man's conscious and unconscious 
manifestations, his belief and value systems. 
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Spatial structure mirrors man's state of being through 
time. Changing social norms and behaviour exert a 
considerable influence on spatial structure. This implies 
a strong acausal and a-deterministic relationship 
between society and space. Although space is sometimes 
accorded a mathematical meaning, it is still essentially 
an illusion because it embodies man's thinking. It 
otherwise has no real accountability or commitment. Space 
defines the limits of geographical and geo-political 
frontiers to which man relates in his 'private space'. 
Place, however, is the human transformation of space and 
contains an existential and ontological meaning. 
Contemporary man attempts to develop new forms of 
scientific, ideological or philosophical rationalism to 
represent the meaning of space. Taking anthropocentricism 
as the basis for all inquiry and discussion, man tries to 
reinterpret historical symbolism in such a way that his 
epistemological linkages become severed, fragmented and 
distorted. Equally, he often lacks the linguistic tools to 
provide an adequate explanation for his terms of 
reference. Even when man resorts to mathematical 
symbolism, mysticism abides in some shape or form. 
The shifts in man's reasoning are seen in an historical 
space-time context. In his primeval setting, man's inter-
relationship with the natural environment was based on 
fear, superstition, magic and demonology, "with no 
distinction between idea and actuality, word and thing" 
(Houston 1978, 229). Judaic and early Christian societies 
emancipated themselves from the ontological and 
epistemological dilemma by accepting the limitations of 
language and knowledge, and putting 'faith' into action. 
The 'irrationality' of scriptural mysticism and the 
problematic equations of man's relationship with nature 
and his economic transactions in their spatial context 
could then be identified and better understood. Judaic 
society was strictly governed by a sense of God's 
involvement and participation in the world. Man has been 
endowed with responsibility, accountability and a moral 
and legal code of conduct. Man acted as a 'leaseholder' or 
`steward' in his interactions with the land. The Judaeo-
Christian ethic fostered a sense of social justice backed 
by moral values. It categorically outlawed and discredited 
those whose sole concern was economic gain by emphasizing 
the eschatological imperative. 
Renaissance secularism, with its idealistic stress on 
anthropocentricism, breached the creationist position and 
any notion of the Genesis Fall. A schism was drawn between 
man and his spatial domain, so that any relationship was 
deprived of meaning or understanding. Theocentricism was 
finally abandoned. Science viewed the world and all the 
physical universe as a closed system of mechanical 
causation, devoid of any personal origins, design or 
purpose, and therefore by implication, without any value 
system. This new perception radically altered man's 
understanding of space and place. 
Many existential and phenomenological philosophers have 
emphasised the importance of place. Heidegger (1962) 
understood 'place' as a confirmation of man's existence 
(being-in-the-world), providing man with the means for 
self-reflexion. Heidegger could not, however, along with 
his contemporaries, provide an ontological interpretation 
to explain man's purpose, meaning and origins. 
Buber (1966) too recognised that scientific rationalism 
has increasingly eroded any code of ethics, displacing any 
ideal of justice by a return to philosophical naturalism, 
which Houston (1978, 223-234) refers to as: "a paganism 
and desecration of space". 
If social and economic planning are to be decisive in a 
spatial context, then a policy is needed which harmonises 
all the relevant attributes, including the political and 
ethical considerations. Few legislators are prepared to 
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clarify the position concerning ethical standards. Any 
discussion of ethical judgments overlaps into the 
normative. The pursuit of 'what ought to be' immediately 
highlights 'what is not' at the present time, and 
following this, 'why it is not what it ought to be'. Man 
is frequently loathe to recognise his shortcomings in the 
social and political arenas. Any exposure of his ethical 
shallowness threatens to demolish the foundations of all 
his other precepts. Geographers and environmental planners 
too have largely elected to avoid uncomfortable concepts, 
tending to confine themselves to regressive or static 
tendencies within the parameters of spatial determinism. 
A scientifically-orientated technocratic society must 
increasingly exercise totalitarian measures of control to 
impose and maintain its ideological structuration. By 
manipulating the spatial fabric of the environment, the 
status quo is either perpetuated, or indeed some new 
social order may be initiated and effectively controlled. 
A 'placeless' geography is increasingly likely to emerge. 
Where statistical significance is sought, then all 
unquantifiable variables must necessarily be eliminated 
and regarded as scientifically insignificant if they 
threaten to make a hypothesis unworkable. This is often 
compounded by disciplinary ridigity: sociologists may tend 
to ignore the spatial imperative from their analysis, 
while geographers omit any reference to the social 
processes in theirs. 
The existential-phenomenological insistence on 'mythical' 
or 'personal' space has reverberated throughout the 
humanistic schools of geographic inquiry. This can partly 
be attributed to the growing disenchantment for scientific 
and ideological inflexibility in socio-spatial matters and 
moreover, the dehumanising treatment of man as the subject 
of human geography. It helped to reinforce the contention 
that there is no accepted definition of statistical 
significance in spatial inference. Spatial distributions 
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have not been satisfactorily explained by hypotheses 
formulated in the human sciences. 
While humanistic geographers have sought to unravel the 
`deeper' personality characteristics which contribute to 
socio-spatial behaviour, their non-experimental research 
techniques - largely based on intersubjective criteria -
have failed to gain scientific acceptance owing to the 
intangibilities of their empirico-hypothesis verification. 
The phenomenological assessment of spatial structures is, 
at the last resort, seen as a weak analytic tool for 
cumulative inquiry. Paradoxically, the predominance of the 
`scientific' methodology as the most 'rational' technique 
for the analysis of spatial phenomena is progressively 
being challenged by work in particle physics. Its findings 
threaten to undermind the epistemological bases of 
`normal' experimental science, to whose precepts and 
methods the social sciences had appealed to gain academic 
respectability and accreditation (see Bachelard 1971). 
When a geography of space sets up a causal relationship 
where spatial form conditions social process, none of the 
human complexities are decoded. Nor can this method claim 
to explain the network of interaction between spatial and 
social constructs. Conversely, a rigid economic 
determinism as advocated by Marxist ideology may provide a 
close critique of the capitalism treatment of space, but 
does little to enhance its own case through the 
suppression of the superstructural content of human 
existence. In short, an orthodox Marxist view of space 
generates similar antagonisms and dualisms to its 
capitalist counterpart. The more man asserts himself as 
the autonomous and egocentric logos of socio-spatial 
activity, then nature and everything contained within it 
increasingly becomes a utilitarian composite, open to 
exploitation and without recourse to any code of 
substantive ethics appertaining to the interaction between 
man and his environment, and between man and man in a 
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distributional context. The outworkings of causality and 
determinism in the social sciences frequently culminate in 
an accentuation of human greed, disparate levels of wealth 
and poverty, misery and injustices and a craving for 
absolute power by dominant ruling elites. The ethos and 
wellbeing of spatial relations are directed under the 
banners of ideological and scientific progress. 
From a spatial perspective, man has tended to blinker the 
scope of his access to knowledge: "... education has 
fashioned ... minds according to the norms of classical 
geometry, and has accustomed sensibilities to submit to 
these norms" (Blanche 1968, 37). Man surrenders a certain 
level of experience on account of this shortcoming. In 
reality, space manifests itself as multidimensional, non-
homogeneous, personalised and inter-subjective in the way 
in which social activity takes place. 
At the sub-atomic level, the regular concepts of space, 
time, matter and causality are no longer valid. The 
universe appears to oscillate between a quasi-Wadecided 
state to indeterminateness or 'freedom'. Movement in sub-
atomic space operates beyond the scope of natural laws, 
against which it is unpredictable and conforms to no 
apparent 'logical' or 'rational' order. Quantum mechanics 
disputes not only the usual notions of space and time, but 
also mental categories - even logical principles such as 
those of identity and contradiction (see Blanche 1962). It 
becomes difficult to maintain that elementary phenomena 
are regulated by strict laws. Only probabilistic laws are 
possible and even these may be seen as an expression of 
imperfect knowledge. Quantum physics criticises the 
realist notion of a 'material substance' as the subject of 
any permanence. Elementary particles appear as pure 
configurations, where form replaces substance. If the 
concept of matter has thus been dematerialised, then 
`materialism' can no longer provide an adequate basis as a 
scientific philosophy in the natural or social sciences. 
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The indeterminateness and vagueness of the content and 
movement in sub-atomic space suggests that reality may 
rest against a background of unreality. Many physicists, 
among them Einstein, were unwilling to accept this pre-
supposition. They rejected the notions of randomness and 
chance and directed their research on the pre-assumption 
that a 'sub-stratum' existed as a mechanism which 
controlled indeterminate processes and acausal 
relationships in sub-atomic space. The new imperative in 
science is to pursue the theory of 'hidden variables and 
structures', which are a part of human existence. In terms 
of 'normal' scientific inquiry and understanding, physics 
collapses into metaphysical and para-psychological 
theorizings with a strong smack of mysticism. 
Quantum research is not only concerned with an 
investigation into physical phenomena but is increasingly 
shifting towards establishin.5 a relational linkage 
between sub-atomic particle movements and human behaviour 
and thinking. The transformation of physical events into 
mental events and vice-versa is pluralistic in function. 
Koestler (1978, 233-236) compares it to "a rapid series of 
quantum jumps". The classical view of the mind-body 
dichotomy is eroded. This is exemplified in language 
transmission and the contents of consciousness. Thoughts 
and images are somehow linked to the material brain by 
some medium of motion passing through invisible spatio-
temporal channels. This parallel is consistent with the 
linkage and relationship between atomic and sub-atomic 
particles in physics. Quantum 'waves' are seemingly 
`carriers' which support a communication network to the 
particles. Man too appears to have been biologically 
programmed in a similar way. His failure to tap and 
activate these complementary channels of thought is the 
subject of much contention and speculation. 
Psycholinguistics have attempted to uncover and sample 
human attitudes towards spatial perception, from which 
semantic barriers arise. Physicists, however, are 
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suggesting that the human condition is also geared in some 
capacity to a 'quantum' sense of rationality. This is 
otherwise an invitation to make admissions of other 
aspects of reality which have been pushed aside. 
Philosophically, this relates to the ways in which man 
chooses or refuses to exercise 'freewill'. Quantum 
theorising has taken various standpoints in these areas. 
Moreover, modern physics has assumed an increasingly 
holistic outlook - the 'whole' is as necessary for the 
understanding of its 'parts' as the 'parts' are necessary 
for understanding the 'whole'. 
The physiologist Eccles (1953, 276-277) proposed that the 
quantum indeterminateness of "critically poised" neurons 
in the brain made room for the exercise of freewill. He 
claimed that the will modified the spatio-temporal 
activity of the neuronal network by exerting spatio-
temporal "fields of influence". Eccles interpreted this as 
evidence of spatio-physical linkages between mind and 
matter, and of direct communication channels between mind 
and mind. 
Similarly, the astronomer Firscoff (1967, 102-103) 
suggests that there might be a transformation of physical 
energy into psychic energy and vice-versa, just as matter 
can be transformed into physical energy. 
The mathematician Dobbs (1967) has attempted to explain 
the linkage and mechanics of conscious/sub-conscious 
exchanges by an elaborate theory of telepathy and 
precognition. He suggests that quantum particles, which he 
terms as 'psytrons', act as the carriers of ESP phenomena. 
These relay and transmit another dimension of information 
to neurons in the brain. Dobbs's theory is heavily 
indebted to cosmological observations made in astro-
physics, but it is unable to comment on the origins of 
information access which must 'charge' these quantum 
particles. 
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The work of the physicists Wheeler (1962) at Princeton, 
and of Stephen Hawkin (1984) at Cambridge attempts to make 
similar inroads by developing a hypothesis of 'super' or 
`hyper' space. Both observers have been concerned with the 
theoretical physics of 'black holes' in the universe. The 
basic (and oversimplified) assertion is that a 'black 
hole' in the universe might emerge as a 'white hole' 
elsewhere. This suggests that space is endowed with an 
infinite number of dimensions. The three-dimensional 
universe is littered with such 'holes' or 'tunnels' which 
implies that it is brought into direct contact with 
`superspace'. In terms of its linkages, superspace has 
multiple connectivity. No theory has yet been forthcoming 
which might attempt to explain the impact of 
(superspatial' information systems within man's three-
dimensional metric. 
The theoretical physicists Bohn and Hiley (1974) have 
reinforced the claim that the acausal connectivity or 
relatedness of quantum particles in sub-atomic space 
demonstrates a recognition of order in this domain. 
Drawing on experimental evidence, they refer to the 
intimate interconnection of different systems that are not 
in spatial contact. When two particles have interacted and 
subsequently disengaged and moved off in opposite 
directions, interference with one particle will instantly 
affect the other, irrespective of the distance between 
them. There appears to be some kind of socio-spatial 
telepathy working between them. Such 'complementarity 
couplings' suggest a mutual dependence coexistensive of 
unity and completeness, and which strengthens the notion 
of 'unbroken wholeness'. This rejects the classical idea 
of the scientific analysis of physical and human phenomena 
by taxonomic means. 
These functions have also been observed in the physico-
chemical relations of human biology, and have equally been 
recognised in psychology. Quantum socio-spatial networks 
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and relationships are difficult to transpose for the 
purpose of explanation and understanding in human 
geography, if only on account of the recentness and 
intangibilities of quantum behaviour. Notwithstanding, 
there are significant parallels in the irregularities 
associated with human socio-spatial relations. Geographers 
have frequently noted that 'distance' may effectively 
weaken or destroy the linkages on which the reciprocation 
of harmonious relationships are based. The conventional 
geographical sense of distance generally implies a 
physical spatio-temporal concept, particularly in a 
distributional context, but there are also deep 
existential implications where the metaphysical or 'sub-
atomic' attributes of the human condition exert potent 
interactive tendencies. 
`Normal' experimental scientific methodology is largely 
inefficient in its attempts to decipher abstract 
inferences which are manifest in socio-spatial relations. 
Similar claims can be vested against political ideologies. 
The emotive anomalies and ambiguities which pervade the 
human character and which generate logical inconsistencies 
and disparities in socio-spatial transactions and dialogue 
are frequently dismissed as 'irrational' when they are 
examined and challenged in a holistic setting. This 
provides no insight as to the underpinning origins and 
causes of human incompleteness in the spatio-temporal 
sphere, except to indicate that the epistemological and 
ontological foundations are obscure. This goes some way to 
explain the human incapacity to manage his spatial 
environment equitably and justly, and equally man's loss 
of understanding with himself to comprehend the meaning 
and purpose of his relationship with nature and others in 
it. 
When socio-spatial problems are investigated by 
psychological methods of inquiry, the dissemination of 
observations and theorising remains a dilemma. Human 
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subjectivity is bound within obscure mental constructs 
such as emotion, mood and sensitivity. These involve 
unconscious and involuntary processes which are not 
understood and which frequently operate according to some 
acausal principle. 
Jung's (1960, 318) work on randomness and chance 
concurrence in spatio-temporal human encounters and events 
led him to conclude that: the simultaneous occurrence of 
two or more meaningfully but not causally connected 
events" could not be adequately explained by 
"coincidence". The degree of improbability expressing the 
relationship between' such phenomena would be 
mathematically untenable. Instead, in his theory of 
`synchronicity', Jung claimed that an acausal principle 
acts selectively making 'like-and-like' converge in causal 
space and time. Jung was unable to account for the means 
by which this acausal agency interfered with the causal 
order, except that in space it produces confluential 
events related by affinities of form and function, while 
in time it produces similarly related series. Nor was Jung 
able to explain the relationship between phenomena in the 
sub-atomic realm and the macro-world by the use of 
physicalistic theories. In the last resort, Jung (1983, 
341) was compelled to appeal to metaphysical theorising: 
"... the psychologist is continually coming up against 
cases where the emergence of symbolic parallels cannot be 
explained without the hypothesis of the collective 
unconscious". 
The aggregate of all quantum theorising implied that all 
branches of 'extraordinary science' are different 
manifestations under different conditions of the same 
universal principle. This integrative tendency operates in 
both causal and acausal ways so that the 'micro' and 
`macro' worlds are linked in a complementary relationship. 
This is true not only in physics but seemingly in human 
biology and psychology. This suggests that the human 
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condition expresses a 'connectivity' in man's thinking and 
actions between his finite spatio-temporal existence and 
infinite cosmological point of reference. 
The geographer is accustomed to analysing socio-spatial 
phenomena according to physically deterministic theory and 
criteria. This procedure is seen to be both scientific and 
rational. The behaviour and thinking of social actors in 
space are, however, frequently acausal and indeterminate, 
and do not freely conform to the autonomous designs and 
precepts prescribed by others. The interplay of 'deeper', 
`sub-atomic' symptoms cannot be overruled as being 
unscientific or irrational. 
Conversely, much of the decision-making and policy 
implementation of economists, planners, multi-national 
corporations and politicians reveal the same propensity to 
pursue disorderly principles and designs. These may 
frequently be motivated by greed, gain and power. In its 
geographical context, the outcome is typified by spatial 
imbalances and disparities. The consequential impact of 
spatial abuse is reflected in the pattern of social 
relations. On the one hand, the ones suffer directly as 
the recipients of 'bad' policy design - social 
deprivation; material exploitation; psychological 
distress; nervous and pathological disorders. The 
initiatories, although perhaps achieving their objectives, 
will - regardless of any attempts to conceal, deny or 
shift their accountability - ultimately become exposed. 
In the same way that the behaviour of sub-atomic and 
atomic particles conform to a given order in physics, 
man's socio-spatial transactions are somehow geared to a 
given universal value system, the transgression of which 
provokes all manner of instability. The fact that it is at 
all possible that man is able to override an otherwise 
universally operative principle of integration places him 
as a singular and unique entity. In the most simplistic 
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explanatory terms, human 'freewill' somehow becomes 
distorted, generating irrational and often malevolent 
terms of reference expressed in chaotic practical 
outworkings. The paradox consists of the fact that it is 
impossible to identify or isolate this disorganising 
agency while remaining consistent with scientific 
objectivism. Any emancipatory inroads from the limitations 
of modern science which might provide a point of access to 
a new epistemic strategy would require a parallelism which 
could make a comprehensible and valid contribution to an 
understanding of meta-inferences in 'normal' science (see 
Restivo 1984). This essentially remains tantamount to a 
Kierkegaardian 'leap' where scientific rationalism would 
conjoin with mysticism. 
Quantum theorizing has challenged the meaninig of 
scientific rationalism, under which human geography, as a 
science of man's spatio-temporal activity and 
relationships, is bound. Geography, as a scientific 
discipline of knowledge, strives to 'know' if it is 
possible to extract the internal law which motivates a 
phenomenon. The isolation and understanding of such a law 
may be coextensive to a revelation of 'pure reason'. It 
would explain the past and possibly predict the direction 
of future transformations. This is the ultimate goal of 
all philosophical schools of thought in the social 
sciences, but one which generates a fundamental 
disagreement in method. 
Basically, there is a bipolarised division of views. 
First, those who reject any notion of treason' unless a 
unity and order are established for man and his relations 
in the world, i.e. as a universal external. Secondly, 
those who claim that future knowledge is unconnected with 
historical space-time events, but is rather embedded in 
spontaneous 'creative freedom' which is activated by man's 
intuition alone. This group wishes to profoundly assert 
the automony of man in any epistemological discovery. 
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These problems have attracted diverse and conflicting 
attention in human geography. A methodological consensus 
which would adequately explain the spatial and 
sociological aspects in human geography would, by 
implication, be sufficient for all the social science 
disciplines. At its outset, a clear ontological 
explanation for man must be established before any 
epistemological standpoint and understanding are acquired. 
Toulmin (1983) emphasised parallels in quantum theory, 
`depth' psychology and ecology which he cites as a pre-
requisite for a reconciliation of discipline with 
discipline towards a reformulation for unity of knowledge. 
Toulmin suggests that science has entered a 'postmodern' 
phase, by which he means that science, philosophy and 
theology have all simultaneously been drawn onto a common 
ground. 
Quantum science, irrespective of its acausal and 
indeterminate inferences, not only displays an active and 
significant connectivity with the causal world - including 
man - but retains an observable holism. Although any 
notion of an absolutely exact measure has no meaning in 
physics, limitations have been assigned to man's spatio-
temporal physicalistic existence. Man's uni-directional 
space-time metric is seemingly sufficient for his purpose, 
yet the realisation and certitude of his existential 
finitude locks him into an ontological dilemma. The 
inadequacies and fragmentary nature of human knowledge are 
reflected in his disjointed and mismanaged socio-spatial 
relations. Yet human thinking and perception are not 
necessarily restricted and contained in a three-
dimensional physicalistic metric_man frequently 'reasons' 
in abstractive terms of reference which are largely 
aspatial and atemporal in their psychological 
constitution. The metaphysical content of epistemological 
constructs significantly uncovers variety and conflict in 
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the formulation and expression of social theory and its 
philosophical underpinnings. The pervading problem is to 
establish a 'rational' inter-relationship between the sub-
atomic (metaphysical) and atomic (empirical) components of 
man and the spatial environment. 
Science and philosophy both encounter the same problematic 
categories in the interpretation and understanding of 
meaning, rationalism, reason, reality, values and truth. 
The contribution of quantum science has further compounded 
the issue but at the same time, clarified the existence of 
a unity-in-variety and a holism in all things. For the 
social sciences, where the human element is of primary 
importance, the dilemma is grounded in the fact that the 
reasonableness of any proposition depends on which 
presupposition is adopted at the outset. The practical 
shortcomings and theoretical non-explanation of much 
socio-spatial analysis in human geography can be 
fundamentally attributed to his consideration. The study 
of quantum phenomena presents social scientists with a 
fresh challenge concerning the bases of their 
propositional theorizing. 
GEOGRAPHY, CONFLICT AND PESSIMISM 
The understanding of the administration and management of 
geographical space and the social relations within it is a 
mix of conflicting philosophical and ideological 
standpoints. Some geographers express a constructive, 
optimistic materialism; others a quasi-undecided 
pessimism, or an outright destructive nihilistic tendency. 
There is equally an uneasy accommodation between social 
systems with utopian goals and those which generate 
economic and socio-spatial disparities. In the cases of 
the political economy of Marxism and advanced capitalism, 
both respectively exert a dehumanising effect on their 
spatial relations. In each case, society is subordinate to 
a combination of economic and ideological determinism. The 
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interests of scientific technocracy/bureaucracy largely 
undermine historic and culturally defined norms and value 
systems. Both systems are analogous insofar that they 
ontologically appeal to a Darwinian evolution of 
impersonal space-time origins. In their behaviouralistic 
outworkings, man is subsequently reduced to something 
`less-than-man': his metaphysical essences are denied and 
rejected. 
An 'optimistic humanism' is equally prevalent in the 
phenomenological and existential schools of thought. 
Philosophers and social theorists in this category imply 
that the potential wholesomeness of man and, by 
implication, the interaction of social relations with the 
spatial environment, can only be realised either by the 
uncovering of essences, or by a closer examination of 
language. In the first category, the methodological 
demonstration for a discovery of essences is frequently 
obscure and unconvincing. Included here is Husserl's 
`radical reductionism' where external concealment 
(barriers to the discovery of truth) is. 'bracketed' in 
order to reach his 'transcendental consciousness'. 
Jasper's insistence on a person's encounter with 'ultimate 
situations' to gain a 'first-order experience' is equally 
ambiguous. The same is true for Merleau-Ponty's quest for 
a primordial or 'pre-intelligence', as is Scheler's 
transcendence of intellectual insularity to a meta-
contemplative state of 'value' reflection. 
Others who seek a linguistic path of enlightenment have 
been stimulated by Gadamer's assertion that the mastery of 
language is a precondition of understanding. Habermas's 
meta-linguistic theorising also makes claims towards some 
future emancipatory utopia. 
Those who express pessimistic reservations for any 
improvement in the quality of social relations, the 
eradication of material imbalances, or any hope for new 
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epistemological insights, provide little or no room for 
change. In this context, a present and future 
understanding of space assumes fatalistic overtones. The 
developmental possibilities of socio-spatial wellbeing 
are, according to this standpoint, impeded by an 
irreconcilable philosophical dualism. Durkheim's impasse 
was the insurmountable barrier between the material world 
and abstract concepts such as social ethics. Max Weber 
also recognised a perpetual conflict situation in the 
scientific rationality between material needs and value 
systems. Social reality is therefore conceived as a sphere 
of dominance in which individual actions are constrained. 
Foucault's socio-spatial reality is bound within an on-
going trend of power relationships, where 'normal' science 
and technology increasingly assert an authoritarian 
political rationality. Socio-spatial interests are 
dominated by state power. 
The philosophical underpinnings of pessimism have been 
endorsed by Kierkegaard and the later work of both 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein. The later work of Wittgenstein 
argued that the propositions of natural science were 
limited within the context of language and logic. The 
explanatory shortcomings of demonstrating scientific 
`reason' in this context led to a transposition of these 
propositions by mathematical formulations. The language of 
symbolics equally collapse into a scientific mysticism. 
Concerning the areas of values)ethics and meanings, 
Wittgenstein found only 'silence'. Man realises that an 
explanation needs to be there, but he cannot even talk or 
think about it, least of all, act upon it. 
The insufficiency of 'knowing' impairs human perception to 
such an extent that he has no certitude of 'knowing' the 
value and meaning of his spatial environment, nor of his 
social relations in it. The later work of Heidegger 
followed along similar lines. His search for the 
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ontological foundations of existence and meaning was also 
focused on language, but the Heideggerian perspective 
concerns the decodification of metaphysical and mystical 
questions, for which he made no convincing case. 
Finally, in the scientific domain of total non-
explanation, where neither spatial structure nor social 
process have meaning, nor render any plausible access 
towards understanding, Heidegger's (1962) work 'Being and 
Time' remains one of the most outstanding contemporary 
contributions to the current climate of phiInaphical 
nihilism. Indeed, it can legitimately claim to have set 
the direction of modern hermeneutics. In it, Heidegger 
makes several claims which are relevant to spatial form 
and social process in human geography. Heidegger's 
subject, the 'Dasein' (being-in-the-world'; 'being-at-
home'; 'the being-there that we are') is at once 
confusing, obscure and ambiguous in its meaning. 
Heidegger's understanding of 'being' (existence) is 
restricted to the empirical dimension. He does not seek an 
exegesis. Human existence, he claimed, cannot be evaluated 
in terms of a person's spatial relationship to other 
people or things, since any existential meaning or 
understanding is a private re‘xFxtionship which arises as a 
phenomenological revelation about the world which the 
individual 'cares' about. 
Perception - with the stress on the sense of making 
impartial judgments - is a rare, if not impossible 
position to hold. 
Heidegger's overriding consideration is 'mood', which 
generates unfixed and wavering values. People encounter 
the world always in a certain mood, so that paradoxical 
and self-contradictory values are attached to particular 
encounters and situations at different times. The danger 
which Heidegger emphasises - yet one which is a typical 
mode of behaviour - is when society ('others') conditions 
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thinking and actions. This impedes the individual's 
efforts to apprehend a primordial point of 'being' (what 
is-there to cause existence to-be). In abandonning this 
path, the individual inauthenticates the meaning of 
existence by failing to make the reality of self-dicovery 
(the 'uncanny' self) or to encounter the 'ultimate 
situation' - the realisation of death. 
The reality and meaning of all social and spatial 
relations, according to Heidegger, are grounded in the 
discovery and realisation of the 'angst' (dread). This is 
where the individual no longer 'feels-at-home' in the 
world. Human existence is finite, and death and 
nothingness are sure. 'Dasein' seemingly projects itself 
`towards something', but never encounters 'Being' (the 
pre-ontological essence of logos which would explain the 
origins and meaning of existence, and, by implication, the 
ultimate epistemological backcloth). 'Being', therefore, 
cannot be identified in spatio-temporal terms because it 
is impossible to define. 
For Heidegger, to entrust one's conscience in social 
relations ('being-with-others') or in theistic philosophy 
is tantamount to self-deception and the inauthentication 
of 'being'. Where man's spatial existence interacts with 
worldly norms (social, political, economic, ethical), the 
confrontation with the inauthenticity of his 'being' can 
instigate 'covert' forms of psychosis and varying degrees 
of schizophrenia which are hardly ever questioned or 
examined. Heidegger understood the manifestation of these 
socially accepted aspects of 'rational'/'normal' behaviour 
as expressions in the form of greed, envy, pride, deceipt 
and violence. 
Heidegger's analysis claimed that the meaning of spatial 
existence and of people in it could only be 'authentic' on 
a personal individual basis, where man ultimately faces 
the realisation of his 'nothingness'. His engagement and 
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participation in social relations (and any interpretations 
he makes about spatial phenomena and socio-spatial 
functions) are otherwise indicative of a deep-rooted 
existential fear about what he might discover about 
himself. The emptiness of public norms legitimate the 
supposition that the individual is not bound by principle 
to comply with any organising system. Because there is no 
meaning of 'being', guilt too is meaningless. Guilt is 
only valid when we consider 'what we have not done'; that 
is, to seek 'authenticity' through the realisation that 
the meaning of existence is 'nothing'. 
Heidegger's 'phenomenological' investigation of existence 
thus claims that in the absence of any encounter with 
`Being', it is impossible to give either an ontological or 
an epistemological meaning for human existence and man's 
spatial encounters. While Heidegger never categorically 
excludes the possibility of religious commitment in his 
philosophy, he is loathe to equate 'being' with a 
religious essence or entity. Moreover, 'Being' is not a 
specific entity, but a 'light' in which things are 
revealed. The inhibiting agent for the 'early Heidegger' 
is metaphysics, which stands between man and 'Being'. The 
resultant 'inauthenticity' of man is his personalisation 
4 	 • 	 • of 'Being' intoA theistic entity or some other Absolute. 
Although his use and structure of language is complex, 
obscure and often flirtatious with quasi-mystical 
connotations, Heidegger's remarks are nonetheless 
pertinent. The spatio-temporal existential meaning of man 
and nature is reduced to an extreme point of tension. 
Sartre's existentialism is possibly the only other 
contemporary example of philosophical nihilism comparable 
to the starkness of Heidegger's all-encompassing 
revelation of 'dread' and 'nothing'. Sartre's ontological 
structure is rooted in 'negation'. His outright rejection 
of metaphysics and mysticism strips knowledge of having 
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any possible teleological properties. In the spatial 
context of human encounters with situations, events and 
others, the objectification process of saying 'what (one) 
is not' detaches man from 'being' (existence). This 
logical negation of 'what is' provides an understanding of 
`non-being'. The ultimate phenomenological reduction is 
the discovery of 'nothingness': human spatial relations 
and encounters are a valueless, empty absurdity. 
CONCLUSION: HUMAN GEOGRAPHY AS SOCIAL SCIENCE - COMPLICITY 
OR DISSENT?  
Geography as social science has failed to endorse the 
terms of scientific 'objectivity': its epistemology 
overlooks the question of origins and the significance of 
values and ethics in human existence, so that its 
methodological procedures tend to alienate and dehumanise 
man as a fragmented socio-spatial actor. Geographic 
inquiry has yet to establish any clear definitional 
parameters on the basis of the scientific method. 
Moreover, the holistic nature of knowledge demands that 
geography should seek a more intimate cross-exchange with 
other disciplines in the social sciences, as well as those 
in the natural science. The plurality of methodological 
approaches in human geography which cuts across 
positivism-behaviourism to political economy and humanism 
make it increasingly unlikely that any one isolated theme 
of socio-spatial organisation will adequately reflect 
social reality. 
A scientific human geography cannot justify the primacy of 
spatial structure as the focus of its attention: its 
immediate priority concerns an understanding of human 
social process. If geography seeks 'relevance' than its 
content must incorporate a view toward the development of 
a social ethics with which it may gauge and internalise 
its objectives and policy implementation. Failing this, 
nothing can be known, verified or legitimated with any 
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certitude. The terms of an 'autonomous' scientific status 
for human geography need to be examined against the 
historical background of human thought and intentionality 
to grasp the contemporary mode of scientific assertions 
and assumptions. The question of autonomy is an area of 
persistent philosophical disputation where the themes of 
control, domination and power are recurrent and insipid. 
Rather than clarifying the origins and purpose of 
existence, scientific qua human autonomy confirms the 
distorted terms of reference by which it constructs an 
epistemological standpoint. 
There is no apparent consensus for the paradigm itself. 
The interrelationship between man and space is not 
strictly confined to the atomistic dimension of the macro-
world. Quantum theorizing suggests that human spatial 
perception is profoundly influenced by sub-atomic 
phenomena and the interaction of 'extraordinary' reasoning 
which elude the categories of 'normal' scientific 
explanation. The all-encompassing banner of 'progress' 
which is frequently used to validate the rationality of 
the directives in both the natural and social sciences not 
only represents an expression of an 'optimistic humanism' 
which is largely orientated towards some unspecified 
future time, but is a disproportionately meaningless 
concept in the reality of the present. 
If only from a materialistic standpoint, the increasing 
magnitude of global problems - widening socio-spatial 
differentials, distributional disparities; the tightening 
grip of geo-political and ideological forces on manpower 
and resources - indicate a flagrant disregard for 
unsatisfied basic human need. If, however, these 
manifestations are an inevitable product of the scientific 
control of socio-spatial systems, then human geography 
must choose between either a position of complicity with 
scientific norms, or one of dissent. The present 
predicament of human geography under 'normal' scientific 
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epistemology and its attendant philcsophical underpinnings 
is marked by intertia and pessimism. 
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PART THREE: HUMAN GEOGRAPHY AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
GEOGRAPHY AND SCIENTIFIC STATUS 
The origins of the 'conceptual revolution' in human 
geography of the 1950s and 1960s can be traced to Kant's 
classification of knowledge to Compte's logical positivism 
and then to Darwin's evolutionary postulations. This new 
geography' emphasised the need to move towards a more 
scientific geography where the explanation of phenomena 
necessitated the development of a body of theory whose 
mathematical representation could be justified by the use 
of statistical techniques to test hypotheses and models 
(Burton 1963; Haggett 1965; Chorley and Haggett 1965, 
1967). Kant's crude determinism and its historical 
idiographic standpoint was outlawed as a descriptive and 
gazeteering geography. Darwinian theory and the 
`environmental determinism' which it had generated had -
unlike the case of physical geography - been applied to 
human geography with considerable difficulty and with 
little success. Vidal de la Blache's efforts to define the 
inter-relationships between the human and physical 
features of a cultural landscape were hampered by their 
insistence on historical situationalism and the restricted 
scale of study areas. Vidal's work was more suited to pre-
industrial societies rather than with modern economies. 
The failure of 'possibilism' cannot be attributed to 
Vidal's fundamental concept of 'man-land' relationships, 
nor to the fact that neither one or the other seemed to 
predominate or dictate the human geography in a given 
area, but rather the fact that possibilism was essentially 
non-theoretical. 
Human geography's allegiance to the scientific method and 
its positivist epistemology sought a similar kind of 
academic and intellectual respectability enjoyed by other 
social science disciplines such as sociology, economics 
and psychology. For many, the 'incompleteness' of 
geography was the prime obstacle to its scientific 
acceptance and recognition (Berry 1959, 1973; Harvey 1969; 
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Hagerstrand 1973). Part of the dilemma was an attempt to 
reconcile - or otherwise decide between - the definitional 
status of geography as an academic discipline: it is 
either an 'objective' nomothetic social science or a part 
of the 'subjective' humanities and arts. 
Based on the presupposition that spatial patterns and 
regularities are empirical phenomena which repeat 
themselves on a global scale, scientific geographers 
devised their methodology along similar lines to that 
found in the natural sciences. It is therefore assumed 
that an understanding of generalisable spatial patterns 
will provide some insight and explanation for the 
processes that generate these patterns. A scientific 
geography will otherwise isolate the mechanics and gauge 
the contribution of the human input in relation to the 
spatial environment. In this way, a scientific geography 
might clarify the present shortcomings and future 
direction of decision-making (Morrill 1970; Abler et al 
1971; Ambrose 1972; Needleman 1972; Haggett 1977). 
Parallel to the positivist tradition, the emergence of 
behavioural geography has attempted to provide a fuller 
understanding of the processes which underpin human 
behaviour: "The aim of behaviouralism is to replace the 
simplistic and mechanistic conceptions that previously 
characterised much man-environment theory with new 
versions that explicitly recognise the complexities of 
behaviour" (Gold 1980, 3). The behaviouralist tradition in 
human geography contends that explanation of spatial 
patterns of behaviour can be derived from an examination 
of the cognitive processes which underpin that behaviour. 
Behaviouralism is a distinct part of sociobiology, which 
in turn is firmly rooted in biological theory. In this 
respect, it is an application of Darwinism to social 
behaviour which accommodates the insights of modern 
genetics. Behaviouralism is concerned with stimulus-
response data so that any integration of psychological 
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analysis to explain human behaviour has a strong 
physiological bias. Behaviouralism contends that animal 
behaviour can be understood in sociobiological terms which 
may then be transposed to provide a bearing on human 
behaviour. It formulates the view that egoism constitutes 
the most intelligible and rational type of behaviour, but 
that ultimately all human action must relate to questions 
of biological fitness, survival and the advantages 
associated with a position of dominance (see Wilson 1975). 
The development of behavioural geography is indebted to 
the school of environmental determinism in the geography 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Ratzel (1882, 1891; see Wanklyn 1961) argued that human 
communities struggle to survive against environmental 
constraints in the same way as other biological organisms. 
The resultant variety of forms in their adaptation are 
largely dictated by the prevailing physical conditions. A 
similar theme was advanced by the work of Semple (1911), 
Taylor (1937) and Huntington (1945). An ecological 
approach was also developed for urban-social geography 
(Park 1925; Burgess 1930; Hoyt 1939; Harris 1945) while 
another form of neo-environmentalism promoted the 
scientific method in economic geography (Losch 1954; Isard 
1956, 1960: Christaller 1963). This approach initiated 
model-based theoretical constructs and quantitative 
techniques. 
Although behavioural geography defies any easy definition, 
it closely adheres to the tenets of neo-Darwinism in its 
search for basis of rational human behaviour in man-land 
relationships (see Hurst 1974). Its acceptance as a 
branch of the scientific method in human geography has 
largely been pioneered by the work of Sauer (1925) and 
Kirk (1951, 1963) and has arguably, in some respects, been 
continued by Tuan (1974, 1976, 1977). 
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GEOGRAPHY AND POSITIVISM 
The positivist epistemology as the only authentic and 
legitimate basis for the scientific method in human 
geography has evoked a growing reaction by those who 
refute its dominance as a potential form of technocratic 
instrumentalism or on philosophical grounds of 
disputative.. Based on Compte, positivism maintains that 
natural (deterministic) laws can be transposed to explain 
social phenomena. In this way, the structure and process 
of society and its institutions can be made coextensive 
with the physical environment. Socio-spatial predictions 
can then be modified by manipulating causal variables. 
Social problems and political decision-making are thus 
subordinate to and transformed by the scientific 
methodology. Positivism asserts that there are fixed and 
generalisable social 'facts'. Social reality is uncovered 
as a consequence of the cumulative interaction of the 
`parts' which constitute the collective social 'whole', 
that is, the anticipated product or outcome. 
The scientific (positivist) methodology claims that by the 
mathematical representation of symbolising variables and 
relationships between variables, all ambiguities are 
minimised, if not removed. The internal logical 
consistency of its system of thought may well be 
verifiable, but the integration of affective values must 
be ruled out because they cannot be quantified. Comte was 
also largely responsible for establishing a position of 
philosophical 'neutralism' in science. The empirical 
replaces the metaphysical. Value judgments can have no 
place in a positivist science. Any knowledge which is 
derived outside the parameters of its methodology is 
meaningless and subjective. Kolakowski (1972, 18), for 
example, defines positivism as "a collection of 
prohibitions concerning human knowledge, intended to 
confine the name 'knowledge' or 'science' to the results 
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of those operations that are observable in the evolution 
of the modern sciences of nature." 
Positivism understands science as the antithesis of a 
mythical world. Any phenomena which have no empirical 
basis for testing the validity do not constitute 
scientific knowledge. This includes all judgments of value 
and normative statements as well as metaphysical essences. 
These are often interpreted as illusory shortcomings which 
characterise man's inability to appropriate nature, which 
otherwise reflect deficiencies in human reason. 
Conversely, scientific reason is concerned with means and 
ends and the technical procedures necessary to achieve an 
end, but not necessarily with the rationality of the end 
itself. The scientific method is therefore an instrumental 
reason. Instrumentalism dehumanises the subject of 
geographic inquiry insofar that man is made subordinate to 
technocracy. Without science, man is an unreasonable and 
non-rational social actor and thinker. 
Metaphysical assertions cannot be integrated within the 
world of scientific reality because they contribute 
nothing to the ongoing process of hypothetical modelling 
and testing. Predictability and probability demand a 
factual content which is uncommitted to any political 
(ideological) or moral standpoint (see Ayer 1964; Lacey 
1976). Positivism is therefore based on the naturalistic 
premise that all individuals conform to some general 
behavioural pattern of thinking. This is often termed 
`realism': "Positivist science is a conservative process, 
with knowledge accumulating along predetermined lines" 
(Johnston 1983, 24-25). Because society is said to behave 
according to deterministic criteria, man can be 
scientifically manipulated, modified and redirected 
through 'social engineering'. Its political translation 
amounts to the rise of a dominant elite which enacts a 
process of societal dehumanisation against a background of 
`scientific supremacy'. All forms of technocratic 
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instrumentalism are susceptible to becoming totalitarian 
forms of government - even contemporary Eastern European 
socialism appears to have swayed into the positivist 
scientific method. 
Positivism creates contradictions and paradoxes insofar 
that it equates social facts with natural facts and 
historical laws with the natural order. People belong to 
nature, but nature is not made by them; rather, it is 
simply used and modified by man. This inter-relationship 
demands a sense of responsibility and moderation on the 
part of man. A positivist science has not tendered any 
universal understanding of laws. Moreover, laws relate to 
a particular kind of societal organisation at given points 
in time. Laws are amended, revised and changed depending 
on the development of social structures and according to 
the designs and strategies of any dominant ruling elite. 
There exists no formula or constant but instead, a climate 
of pragmatism and opportunism predominates. 
Contemplative reason is 'no reason' because it is based on 
privatism. Lowenthal (1961) and Prince (1961), however, 
have both rejected the eclipse of human geography by a 
rigorous scientific methodology: a positivist science has 
failed to show that human knowledge can be reduced to some 
form of 'objective truth'. Graves (1980, 41) too has shown 
that individual world-views are shaped by all manner of 
personal experience, culture and language so that: "... we 
each have our 'private' geographies as well as the 
`public' geography." In failing to recognise its 
inconsistencies and shortcomings, positivism identifies 
itself as 'total knowledge' rather than a form of 
knowledge. 
The scientist contends that he is 'external' to what he 
studies and places himself 'outside' society. This is 
clearly an impossible position to hold, yet it is on this 
basis that positivist science attempts to exclude any 
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legitimate challenge to its presuppositions (Zelinsky 
1975). A factual science requiring an empirical treatment 
of societal phenomena may either appeal to a deductive-
nomological method or to inductive-statistical models. In 
the first case, theoretical propositions cannot easily be 
converted into laws. Different theories generating 
empirically consistent ends can be constructed but this 
does not remove the problem of propositional conflict if 
they are elevated to the status of laws (Guelke 1971). 
Questions of 'objective truth' remain beyond the finite 
range of empirical observations. In the second case, 
probability statements - themselves a doctrine of 
a priorism - are used to modify, develop and update 
theories. These models recognise that 'accepted' theories 
are not universal truths and must themselves be tested 
(Popper 1970, 1976). 
Deductionism does not consider external meanings. Any 
hypotheses derived from its methodology can be 'verified' 
by tautological mathematical manipulation. All hypotheses 
which are formulated from 'logical reasoning' depend on a 
priori assumptions. Man has few established socio-
behavioural laws so that in the social sciences it is 
highly unlikely that all forms of social behaviour and 
policy-making are based on reason and rationality. For the 
geographer, the resultant spatial product of social 
processes cannot be attributed to an accepted corpus of 
laws. Moveover, scientists speculate on untenable grounds 
so that their hypotheses too are no more than uncertain 
constructs: positivism is, according to Harvey (1969, 35) 
"controlled speculation". No law-like statement can be 
unequivocably proven because in its application for 
testing, no 'law' is omnipotent in time and space. 
Statistical regularities do not provide real explanation. 
Hypotheses test only the models from which they are 
derived. Much hypotheses formulation by empirical 
scientists are therefore based on first or second hand 
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personal experiences and are no more than subjective 
statements. 
Similarly, the inductive procedure is equally unreliable 
and cannot be claimed to be a rational, uncommitted or 
neutral form of reasoning. Sampling can easily become 
prejudicial and is unlikely to provide generalisations and 
laws. As probability theory is developed, hypotheses-
testing generates a number of sub-hypothes es as the model 
becomes increasingly complex. These cannot be incorporated 
or accounted for in the general framework of a problem. 
Nor can notions of 'randomness' and 'chance' be logically 
explained; moreover, they represent individual deviance 
from the generalisable 'reasoning' explicated by the 
scientific methodology. Any collection of 'social laws' is 
likely to be diverse and profuse because it represents a 
crude attempt to assemble an aggregate of individual human 
minds (see Keat 1981). 
Laws which pertain to represent generalisable aspects of 
social behaviour are at best part-truths, but the theory 
behind experimental scientific inquiry cannot be confirmed 
in its totality since social constructs do not adhere to 
any universal constants as do phenomena in the natural 
sciences. Experimental data can therefore be interpreted 
in a variety of ways to 'make the theory fit'. This 
renders much of positivist theory as synthetic. Different 
theories thus perceive the world in different ways, each 
with different emphases: "... most empirical propositions 
are in some degree vague" (Ayer 1964, 12). In order to 
identify the shortcomings or potential collapse of a 
theory - and therefore, what might be done to modify and 
improve it - Popper's (1976) scepticism of the positivist 
methodology inclined him to refuting the 'verification 
principle' for one of 'falsification'. For Popper (1965, 
256), a concept of falsifiability is a criterion not of 
meaning, but of demarcation. 
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Socio-spatial laws cannot be wholly deterministic since 
man inherently exercises his capacity of 'freewill' which, 
for positivists, is scientifically non-rational behaviour. 
Science, however, may argue that human 'degrees of 
freedom' are subject to physiological limitations so that 
all behaviour and beliefs are conditioned and determined 
by causal chains in thought processes. In this sense, man 
adopts unscientific 'beliefs' for what suits his purposes, 
or is perhaps motivated by the realisation and fear of his 
social and existential inauthenticity. He thus condemns 
himself to nonsensical and unreal metaphysical 
explanations for his social behaviour and his interaction 
with the spatial environment. If personal, religious and 
political beliefs are allowed to influence the 
interpretation of geographic data, then a positivist 
methodology becomes inadequate because it does not portray 
a comprehensive picture of human nature and personality. 
Hill (1981, 51) points out that although Ritter 
interpreted his geographical findings as evidence of God's 
handiwork, "... he was never able to present an objective 
rationalisation for his teleological interpretations". 
This hardly removes the metaphysical dilemma for 
positivist scientists. Wittgenstein (1961) shows that 
metaphysics can never be philosophically legitimated, nor 
be generalised or therefore be scientifically proven. 
Conversely, the reality of metaphysics cannot be 
existentially disproven, but must rather be passed over in 
`silence'. Similarly, Popper (1973) is loathe to conclude 
that metaphysics - as an example of non-testability - is 
equivalent to meaninglessness. A commitment to the 
positivist epistemology can be as charged with emotion as 
a religious or political credo, but in the absence of any 
recognition of metaphysics asserts its own autonomy as the 
basis for its rationale. 
By equating social facts with natural facts, the 
positivist method disregards the historicity of social 
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reality. Moreover, it can only speak of "the consequences 
of its hypotheses" (Lukermann 1965, 194). From its 
standpoint of non-commitment and neutrality, science 
assumes an abstract and non-historical facade which is 
seemingly detached from economic and social reality so 
that: "The relationship between science and society is 
lost or distorted, and science acquired a self-supporting 
special status, immune to historical contingencies" 
(Larrain 1979, 193). Science primarily seeks to dispel any 
relationship with ideology. To achieve this aim, science 
establishes itself as a special sphere of knowledge whose 
methodology insulates it from ideological distortions. No 
work, however, can be entirely atheoretical and all 
scientific statements are based on some kind of a priori 
theoretical structures, whose practical application is 
therefore grounded in some ideological premise. 'Pure' 
empiricism being impossible directs a methodology to its 
philosophical underpinnings and once more demands an 
examination into the validity of epistemological claims. 
Science has failed to evade the ideological trappings of 
its association with political economy and therefore, its 
contribution to the economic and social organisation of 
society. The unity of contemporary science is indeed based 
upon historical practice insofar that the technological 
rationality and technocratic consciousness of the modern 
nation-state demand the collaboration of science as an 
instrument of domination, indoctrination and manipulation. 
An instrumentalised science camouflages all manner of 
contradictions, disparities and injustices while its 
rationality generates a false consciousness which in 
itself attempts to conceal the very irrationality of its 
ideological position (see Marcuse 1964; Habermas 1976). 
Moreover, the historical intervention of science through 
industry has paradoxically on the one hand offered the 
conditions for human emancipation, while simultaneously 
contributing to an acceleration in the process of 
dehumanisation (see Marx 1974, 355). 
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Positivism, by its insistence on empiricism, attempts to 
make its hypotheses irrefutable. While the scientific 
approach has strived to force a common methodology between 
human and physical geography by taking the man-land 
formula as its prime concept, society does not always 
conform to any established rule of logic. The positivist 
methodology is largely inflexible insofar that its 
experimental procedures are fixed and do not acknowledge 
the dynamics of social change. Positivist theory is an 
unsatisfactory basis for human geography because it uses 
"stationary categories of thought with a shifting 
universe" (Harvey 1972, 327). 
A 'value-free' scientific approach reduces any 
considerations of social ethics to technical decisionism, 
but fails to demarcate the conditions and limits of its 
method or its findings. Ethics, moreover, implies some 
standpoint independent of scientific inquiry, yet 
according to Harvey (1969, 40): "Decisions cannot be made 
in a moral or ethical vacuum". A positivist human 
geography whose methodology and terms of reference are 
held in a state of eternal equilibrium and which purports 
to be operating within the parameters of a universal 
spatial logic, obscures the mediations which make human 
geography a distinctive discipline of social science (see 
Pahl 1975, 249-250). Moreover, human geographers regulate 
the extent of their inquiries according to the individual 
and collective limitations which they choose to 
circumscribe. Much of this reflects the geographer's 
ability and willingness to internalise the totality of the 
socio-spatial relationships which he perceives (see Tuan 
1971). In asserting 'value-freedom', a positivist science 
evolves another set of values in the ways in which it 
investigates human behaviour: "Treating people in a 
scientific and detached manner can result in not treating 
them as persons at all" (Trigg 1985, 117). Rather, 
anything distinctively human is ignored so that the 
subject of human geography is profoundly dehumanised. 
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A positivist geography claims that man can have no 
profound understanding of epistemological matters, nor 
therefore of truth because he has little or no control 
over the natural or social order. Nominalism and 
nomothetic methods have attempted to eradicate any room 
for the critical analysis of the philosophical 
presuppositions which underpin the standpoint of the 
scientific method. Moreover, it is manipulative, 
subversive and distortive in its outlook and design (see 
Olsson 1975; Lee 1977a), while its insistence on the 
primacy of spatial phenomena "diverted attention away from 
the underlying structural explanation of society and 
economy, as part of a general process of 'mystification' 
whereby surface manifestations are confused for root 
causes" (Smith and Ogden 1977, 54). Human values become 
meaningless against the background of a mechanistic 
scientific approach to geographic inquiry which takes no 
account of the acausal and indeterminate facets of the 
individual social actor. Rather, a scientific technocracy 
attempts to impose an unwavering and unconditional 
consensus which otherwise dictates the acceptability and 
credibility of all systems of thought. For science, 
instinctive behaviour provides a superior explanation to 
human thinking and actions rather than a reflexive, 
contemplative and intuitive stance. 
Contemporary curriculum modifications in human geography 
have largely upheld the existing political status quo, 
leaving questions of ideological and moral awareness 
beyond the parameters of scientific concern. The degree of 
autonomy and flexibility enjoyed by geography departments 
and institutions of higher education may be rapidly eroded 
by government policy imbued with positivist principles. 
This means that its curriculum must reflect a subservience 
and commitment to instrumentalism. Beddis (1983, 18) warns 
that this could lead to a "colourless and morally sterile" 
conceptual geography, "without feeling or compassion". 
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Human geographers are reduced to technicians of the 'new' 
orthodoxy. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEHAVIOURAL GEOGRAPHY 
Behavioural geography has no clear frontiers: it embraces 
many areas of investigation. It attempts to explain man's 
spatial behaviour in terms of the physiology and 
psychology of the individual, directly and/or indirectly 
observed. Behavioural geography is, moreover, a branch of 
neo-positivism, but also - as Gold (1980, 243) contends -
"an area of geography in which researchers have 
experimented with phenomenology and related non-positivist 
approaches". Behavioural geographers have largely followed 
trends developed in the biological sciences which were 
subsequently applied by social science disciplines 
including sociology, anthropology, economics, planning and 
architecture. Behaviouralism seeks to make 'scientific' 
that which is essentially intuitive in man. It claims to 
give geography a scientific philo-methodological base with 
a human face, but it is dubious as to whether it restores 
the primacy of man as the subject of human geography. 
Rather, its Darwinian foundations and insistence on the 
technocratic control and domination of society and the 
environment reduces man to a position of less-than-man, or 
of a machine (see Schaeffer 1973; Koestler 1967). 
Behavioural geography recognises that the inter-
relationship between man and his environment is one of 
reciprocal stimulus and response, where human cognition is 
paramount as the instrument of mediation which provides an 
explanation for human decision-making and policy 
implementation in a spatial setting. The multiplicity of 
stimuli which generate observable behavioural patterns are 
diverse in origin insofar that they are both conscious and 
unconscious in form, as well as being the product of 
socio-cultural forces. Value judgments, perception and 
sensory experience are all reduced to the area of 
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psychological inquiry, whereupon orthodox scientific 
techniques eradicate any interplay with the transcendental 
and mystical attributes of the human condition. Cognitive 
processes will not necessarily precipitate a rational 
outcome for human behaviour and decision-making, not the 
means by which they might be legitimated and confirmed by 
philostothical or ideological premises. Behaviouralists 
contend that the interpretation of human behaviour is 
synonymous with an understanding. of the origins and 
development of spatial cognition and behaviour. 
Behaviouralism suggests a multi-disciplinary area of 
inquiry, but one which is increasingly at pains to 
empiricalise the content and representation of the human 
inferences which become manifest in the area of cognition. 
Much of the terminology and concepts used in behavioural 
geography are ill-defined and poorly integrated and in the 
last resort must appeal to psychological and sociological 
theorizing in order to evolve a body of knowledge. In this 
respect, cognitive-behavioural studies run the risk of 
psychologism (see Ley 1977). In its most lucid and 
extended form, behavioural geography offers a profusion of 
methodological approaches, none of which can claim to have 
a scientific consensus and even less, an operational 
paradigm. 
Early behavioural science, under the auspices of 
structuralism and functionalism, attempted to probe human 
consciousness through philosophical introspection using 
laboratory conditions for the controlled scientific 
experimentation of its inquiry. It sought to identify and 
establish the linkages between the contents of the human 
mind. Psychology was thus concerned with both mind and 
behaviour so that its status as a natural or social 
science became increasingly uncertain. Darwinian 
functionalism focused its attention on the ways in which 
the individual strove to attain harmony with his 
environment. Sequential behavioural patterns were seen as 
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the product of ongoing stimulus-response chains between 
man and the environment. Behaviourists are concerned with 
the examination of chains of stimulus-response 
relationships in order to understand human behaviour, but 
dismiss the methodological primacy of psychology as the 
vehicle of enquiry into the human mind. Moreover, in 
geography, 'environmental determinism' was initially 
adopted as the yardstick which provoked human response 
against the dictates of stimuli in his external 
environment. Even the more recent advances of science in 
the fields of molecular biology and genetic engineering 
have not fundamentally abandoned the tenets of 
behaviourism: stimulus-response relationships are 
reducible to causal, physicalistic laws which govern 
inanimate matter. All those aspects which are specifically 
and exclusively related to human existence and which 
distinguish the uniqueness of its species are necessarily 
excluded. Considerations such as 'freewill', socio-
cultural and religious influences in behavioural patterns 
are deemed to be unscientific and otherwise irrelevant. 
Scientific reductionism, as a philosophical belief, 
presupposes that all human activities can be simplified 
and explained by the behavioural responses of animals -
Pavlov's dogs, Lorenz's geese, Skinner's rats and Morris's 
apes - so that any notion of an individual or collective 
social responsibility or of a social ethics find no place 
in behavioural social science. 
Reductionism can, however, be challenged biologically and 
from a qualitative human standpoint. The hierarchic 
approach of scientific investigation attempts to build 
theoretical models and discover general principles which 
are universally acceptable and applicable to biological, 
social and symbolic systems of any kind. Contrary to 
philosophical schools of thought, 'parts' and 'wholes' do 
not exist in any absolute sense. From a physiological 
standpoint, cells, muscles, nerves and organs all have 
their intrinsic rhythms and bio-patterns. These are 
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frequently involuntary, spontaneous and free from external 
stimulation. Although they may appear to be subordinated 
as 'parts' to higher centres in the hierarchy, they 
simultaneously function as quasi-autonomous 'wholes'. 
Moreover, they are self-regulatory entities which manifest 
both the independent properties of 'wholes' as well as the 
dependent properties of 'parts'. 
Cells in a growing embryo are all of identical origin and 
carry the same set of chromosomes. They develop, however, 
into many diverse products of widely differing functions. 
This would not be possible if they were governed by the 
same set of behavioural laws. Further, each specialised 
cell carries a unique structure in its nucleus. Yet each 
cell is dependent on the wellbeing of the embryo. If the 
spatial structure of the embryo is disturbed or disrupted 
in its early stages of development, the stability of the 
cell population could be in jeopardy (see Waddington 
1957). The growing individual is predetermined in the 
chromosomes of the fertilised egg, but the transposition 
of this blueprint into the finished product requires the 
precise moulding of billions of specialised cells into an 
integrated structure (see Koestler 1978, 1982). Life, in 
all its developmental forms, from morphogenesis to 
symbolic thought, appears to be governed by rules which 
promote stability yet flexibility. These rules, whether 
innate or acquired, are represented in coded form 
throughout all levels of the hierarchy. Even language is 
increasingly seen as a form of rule-governed behaviour 
which is characterised by an unlimited flexibility and 
freedom of choice which cannot be reduced to a behavioural 
set of laws. 
Qualitatively, man differs from the conditioned responses 
obtained from reductionist experimentation. The codes or 
ethics which govern human social behaviour are largely 
grounded in written and unwritten laws, traditions, 
beliefs and cultural indices. Human behaviour becomes a 
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subtle blend of fixed rules which define permissable 
moves, but where the choice of moves is left to the 
individual. His strategy may be influenced by the extent 
and scope of the resources available to him, so that the 
exercise of 'freewill' and choice in his final decision 
may be motivated by utilitarian, egotistic and hedonistic 
objectives, or alternatively, by responsible, caring and 
just precepts. 
The developments of Gestalt psychology (see Barber and 
Legge 1976) directly opposed behaviourism and its 
reductionist methodology. The Gestaltist position 
entrenched its philosophical backcloth in German 
phenomenological inquiry (Husserl and Scheler) and sought 
to draw emphasis on a holistic vision of man where the 
whole was greater than the sum of its parts, but where an 
examination of the parts "would never produce an 
understanding of the perceptual process as a whole" (Gold 
1980, 11). Gestalt psychology, moreover, attempted to 
introduce perception as a variable which intervened 
between stimulus-response relationships, and therefore 
revive the complexity of human psychology in behavioural 
analysis. Gestalt theory broadly differentiated between 
the world of perception and the world of actuality and 
elevated the former over the latter. Environmental 
geographers who were subsequently attracted to the Gestalt 
school increasingly embraced phenomenology and 
simultaneously digressed from the positivist standpoint 
(see Kirk 1951, 1963; Tuan 1968, 1971, 1972, 1973). Their 
approach either followed the line of mental-cognitive 
perception (verbalised or graphicised) or of behavioural 
observation, drawing on ethology, time-motion and 
operational research. 
The Gestalt thesis, in distinguishing between the 
behavioural and phenomenal environment in geography, 
becomes a hermeneutic project based on an epistemological 
problem. In this respect, Tuan (1971, 182) speaks of "two 
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worlds, two geographies " - the 'existential' and the 
`environmental'. Kirk's (193) position for behavioural 
geography was based on five basic tenets: the historicity 
of meaning in societies and cultures; that geography must 
have an historical basis for its observations; that 
environmental experiences and beliefs dictate man's 
actions and perception; that culturally-defined structures 
of meaning can be represented in sets of 'typical' 
(social/community) responses to changes in the physical 
environment; that this 'psycho-physical' field 
precipitates 'rational' human action. 
The incursion of phenomenological and existential 
philosophical thought in behavioural geography is, 
according to Rieser (1977, 208), unacceptable insofar that 
these approaches are uncritical and ultimately collapse 
into idealism and metaphysics, in which the hard 
realities of the world tend to get swamped in wishful 
thinking". The Gestalt school has equally been exposed for 
its lack of political expression. If the individual has no 
means of applying phenomenal perception to an 
understanding of social processes, then he is rendered 
sterile in the area of political decision-making. 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory portrays man as a non-
rational decision-maker whose behaviour reflects the 
resolution of conflicts in his personality, that is, the 
dynamic interaction between three mental components: the 
`id' (subconscious sexual-aggressive impulses); the 
`superego' (the conscience); the 'ego' (the rational self, 
which attempts to provide a synthesis between the 'id' and 
`superego'). Freud maintains that adult behaviour is 
conditioned by the formative years of human development 
and subconscious motivations, particularly those related 
to the libido. The 'integrative tendency' of most adults -
their 'need to belong' - is therefore basically infantile 
in its expression. Freud's outline of 'integrative 
tendencies' were: submission to authority; identification 
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with a social group; uncritical acceptance of that group's 
beliefs. Any group - political, religious or whatever -
needs, according to Freud, to constitute a credo on which 
a code of behaviour can be developed. It may be 
authoritative or bound in mystical symbolism. 
Once a part of a social grouping, man relinquishes his 
`wholeness' and accepts his identity in his 'partness'. 
Because most adult behaviour is emotionally immature, the 
pursuit of scientific truth and endeavour may exert a 
behaviourally pernicious influence on society which may 
pervert any sense of social ethics. Language, above all, 
is the instrument of this transformation. Connotation-
words such as 'loyalty', 'discipline' and 'duty', when 
used in the context of ideological propagation, may 
motivate social groups to perform destructive and 
irrational actions. If an allegiance to a social group 
requires an emotional commitment, which is often made 
concomitant to an expression of 'faith', then the basis of 
group's expression when incorporated in an 
institutionalised framework may become degenerative if in 
fact it is grounded in its own non-rationality. The 
apparent need for a form of universal social behaviour 
mirrors the individual's 'integrative tendency' towards an 
idealistic yearning for a social utopia. A society where 
ideological propaganda has been irrevocably removed and 
where individuals are isolated from their own 
suggestability would provide an instant remedy for social 
ills, but would in any case necessitate the enforcement of 
a status quo by a dominant elite. Any such system runs the 
heavy risk of stereotyping and eroding the individual's 
critical faculties so that behaviourally, the 
dehumanisation process becomes increasingly potent. The 
fundamental problem, according to Koestler (1978, 104) is 
to find "a cure for the paranoid streak in what we call 
`normal people', which is revealed when they become 
victims of group mentality". 
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The ramifications of Freudian 'psychoanalytic man' for 
human geography suggest that the dynamics and content of 
personality structure provide a greater measure of 
accountability for human behaviour than external 
environmental conditions. 
The contribution of environmental psychology to 
behaviouralism has, like that of behavioural geography, 
been multi-disciplinary in its structure and content (see 
Proshansky 1976). It attempts to study behavioural 
processes in the actual world rather than those which are 
synthetically staged under laboratory conditions. There is 
no accepted scientific definition of its concepts and 
methods: it is concerned with the relations between human 
behaviour and the physical environment (Heimstra and 
McFarling 1974); it is the scientific study of man's 
relationship to his environment (Lee 1976b); it examines 
the interrelationships between environmental and 
psychological variables (Leff 1981). 
Environmental psychologists maintain that man and the 
environment are in a state of dynamic interaction, but 
where the latter contains both physical and socio-cultural 
attributes. The individual is seen as a goal-directed 
being who acts on, and who is influenced by the 
environment. The environment is seen to dictate much human 
behaviour insofar that it imposes limitations in choices 
of action and demands necessary adaptation of its 
conditions (see Ittleson 1976). Environmental psychology 
asserts that man-environment transactions are bridged by 
perception and cognition, i.e. internal mental processes 
by which individuals make decisions about their 
environment, but can make no clear distinction between the 
two - perception becomes in itself a cognitive process 
where sensory stimulation is converted into organised and 
coherent experience. In this respect, environmental 
psychology has retained linkages with naturalistic 
science. 
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The behavioural motivations of individuals have largely 
been explained in physiological terms and instinctive 
impulses, but says little or nothing about the nature of 
abstract drives and desires. Most of its theorizing 
centres on the 'survival needs' of the species. Motivation 
is primarily accredited to learning processes rather than 
intuitive critical reflection, while 'emotions' - which 
often accompany motivation - are also reduced to physico-
chemical mental conditions which apparently intensify the 
urge and desire to achieve a goal. Again, any discussion 
about the moral desirability and justification for any 
particular form of behaviour is omitted. The ability to 
reproduce learning processes does not necessarily 
legitimate the validity of a set of behavioural laws. 
Moreover, it can expose the fact that instrumentalist 
systems of social organisation may be successfully 
operative in terms of the degree of manipulation and 
coersion which it exerts in a specific socio-cultural 
context. The crux of the matter is in knowing whether 
social attitudes can be changed, when to establish the 
correct timing and circumstances for initiating change, 
and for predicting the modified patterns of behaviour 
which will result from a reorientation of ideological 
propaganda. 
THE TENETS OF BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE 
Behavioural geography is philosophically and 
methodologically entrenched in a naturalistic science 
where man has been made the object of a behaviouristic 
psychology. According to Orme (1969), behaviourism and 
psychoanalysis are different aspects of the same field of 
inquiry where both schools express a greater degree of 
common agreement than irreconcilable intangibilities. 
Modern psychology, like behaviourism, is philosophically 
grounded in positivism. Behaviouristic psychology is 
presupposed to be lacking in purposiveness, freewill or 
any independent conscious awareness. Moreover, any form of 
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behavioural inquiry is made coextensive with a nomothetic 
search for causal laws, experimental analysis, and 
reductionist study of phenomena at the molecular 
(atomistic) level. A behavioural science is concerned with 
specialisation and the development of narrowly defined 
avenues of theoretical and empirical research. 
Behaviourism places man in a synthetic and controlled 
environmental setting where, as a biological organism, the 
individual is presupposed to have no pre-existing 
knowledge or any significant level of influence in his 
dealings with nature. For Gold (1980, 14), a behavioural 
science "that isolates man in an artificial environment 
runs the risk of sterility and irrelevance, and the 
phenomena studied may never occur outside that milieu". 
For human geography, behaviourism asserts that every 
aspect of an individuals's behaviour is the result of 
environmental conditioning, whether the conditioning 
occurred prior to birth and resides in the genes or 
subsequent to birth and resides in the external 
environment. An individual's actions are therefore either 
predetermined by his heredity or immediately determined by 
his spatial surroundings: "Personal exemption from a 
complete determinism is revoked as scientific analysis 
progresses, particularly in accounting for the behaviour 
of the individual" (Skinner 1971, 21). Behaviourism 
abolishes any notion of 'ego' as the focal point of 
personality. All behaviour is determined not from within, 
but from without so that man 'is not there'. All is linked 
to a predetermined causal chain of events. It therefore 
follows that if the environment can be controlled, then 
man too is made subservient to technological manipulation. 
In its political context, instrumentalism attempts to 
indoctrinate society with the idea that natural forces 
take the future out of man's hands. 
The nub of all contemporary thought in behavioural science 
is entrenched in neo-Darwinian theory. Evolutionary 
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thought has set up a new point of tension both within and 
between the sciences and the humanities. Scientific 
judgments about how society ought to be organised are 
increasingly accepted in an uncritical light. Science has 
been credited with its own rules, standards and procedures 
which are increasingly seen to dominate all other modes of 
thinking. To this extent, science has become artificially 
divorced from other forms of knowledge. The philosophical 
breach in the unity of knowledge during the Enlightenment 
denoted the dominant position of theology in natural 
philosophy and progressively rendered the Creator as a 
spectator in his own universe. The doctrine of 
catastrophism collapsed into one of uniformitarianism and 
gradualism. Freud too adapted Darwin's phylogenetic 
determinism to his own view of human behaviour to which he 
drew attention to the evolutionary shaping of early 
influences on the psyche. Mind was made coextensive with 
biology. 
Twentieth century molecular biology and genetics have 
challenged the conventional concepts of what it is to be 
human and have questioned the definition of individuality, 
freedom, responsibility, rationality and ultimately, 
truth. The most recent trends suggest that the biological 
and genetic structures of human existence are assuming a 
paramouncy over social ethics to the point where the 
biological sciences themselves redefine social behaviour 
and societal values, which are then legitimated by 
governmental and corporate policy implementation. Although 
sociobiology and behaviouralism are instrumental in both 
the advanced capitalist and Marxist systems of 
organisation, it does not necessarily follow that society 
at large is in agreement with all scientific thought and 
theorizing, nor of its apparent societal credibility. 
Behaviouralism would have it that all scientifically 
irregular/non-rational social behaviour can be explained 
in bio-genetic jargon. This is essentially devoid of any 
ethical commitment and moreover, is designed to avert any 
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notion of personal, collective guilt from human existence. 
As with all the social science disciplines, this dilemma 
is equally applicable for human geography. 
The transformation of geography from a pre-scientific 
ideographic subject into a scientific discipline of 
knowledge has largely been attributed to its embracing the 
tenets of Darwin's theory of evolution and moreover, the 
postulation that Stochastic (chance) processes are central 
to its understanding (see Stoddart 1966). Similarly, 
Graves (1980, 23-24) suggests that chance factors 
frequently dictate the course and outcome of events in 
human geography, remarking that according to Darwin: "... 
the organisms which survived in a changed environment did 
so not because they somehow adapted to these new 
conditions, but because chance mutations in the physical 
make up of some organisms made these capable of 
surviving". 
These principles are central to behavioural geography and 
have attracted much recent attention from both supporters 
and critics alike of behavioural science. Monod's work in 
molecular biology led him to the view that all life 
results from interaction of pure chance (unpredictable 
mutations) and necessity (Darwinian natural selection): 
"... chance alone is at the source of every innovation of 
all creation in the biosphere ... the central concept of 
modern biology is no longer one among other possible or 
even conceivable hypotheses. It is today the sole 
conceivable hypothesis ..." (Monod 1971, 112-113). Monod 
maintains that the only valid scientific position which 
accounts for human behaviour is that man is the result of 
the 'impersonal plus time plus chance' equation. If this 
thesis is correct, then all values are open to 
manipulation - anything can feasibly become a value: "If 
he [man] accepts this message...then man must at last... 
wake to his total solitude, his fundamental isolation... A 
world that is deaf to his music, just as indifferent to 
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his hope as it is to his suffering or his crimes" (Monod 
1971, 172-173). 
Monod attempts to construct an ethic of knowledge based on 
scientific objectivity. To achieve this necessary unity 
between knowledge and value, man must accept the objective 
consideration of the facts as presented by Monod together 
with the 'value' which resides in Monod's understanding of 
`objective knowledge' - anthropocentricism. From the 
choice and acceptance of this "primary value", knowledge 
begins (Monod 1971, 176). Monod developed his private 
system of values from the existential ethics of Camus so 
that it is essentially a solipsistic standpoint. 
Skinner's (1953, 1971, 1974) contribution to 
behaviouralism has profoundly influenced both the natural 
and social sciences. He bases his assertions about 
behaviouristic psychology on the observation of rats under 
experimental conditions. The ethos of Skinner's work is 
that all values derive from the survival value, that is, 
the biological continuity of the human race: "Survival is 
the only value according to which a culture is eventually 
to be judged, and any practice that furthers survival has 
survival value by definition" (Skinner 1971, 136). He 
establishes this naturalistic presuppositiron as a 
universal and presents the continuity of the race as the 
one value generated by chance. For Skinner, the 
qualitative attributes of the human condition (art, music, 
literture) and existential concerns (freedom, dignity and 
happiness) "have only a minor bearing on the survival of a 
culture" (ibid., 180). Yet, throughout all his discussion 
on the predominance of the 'survival value' above all 
other, Skinner is unable to extrapolate why the survival 
of the race is desirable. 
Skinner (1953) maintains that concepts such as 'mind' and 
`ideas' do not exist. Other concepts such as 'attitudes', 
`responsibility' and 'pride' are the result of social 
conditioning so that feelings are merely the outworking of 
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actions. Any form of scientific inquiry based on this 
principle must at the outset presuppose a mindless 
universe inhabited with mindless beings. The ultimate 
logical dilemma in Skinner's thinking is to identify the 
sources of the standard of 'good' and 'ill' in his ideal 
society while simultaneously by-passing an ethics which is 
dependent upon the conscious reflection of the 'inner 
person'. In attempting to explain cultural progress and 
develop a code of scientific ethics, Skinner claims that 
random tries, if successful, are preserved by a collection 
of 'reinforcers': "Things are good (positively 
reinforcing) or bad (negatively reinforcing) presumably 
because of the contingencies of survival under which the 
species evolved" (Skinner 1971, 103-104). Chomsky (1965), 
however, has shown that the concept of 'reinforcement' is 
based on a tautology and has no explanatory value: a 
person persists in his efforts because of the 
reinforcement he received, but reinforcement otherwise 
means that which makes him persist in his efforts. This 
introduces a philosophical circularity and raises the 
question as to 'what makes evolution evolve'. Equally, as 
for Skinner, the valuelessness of his behaviouristic 
values becomes obvious. 
Skinner, notwithstanding, recognises that within 
behavioural terms, a democracy controlled by the concepts 
of mindful beings is essentially impossible. Effectively, 
environmental conditioning genetically selects and shapes 
human behaviour so that modifications in human behaviour 
can be initiated by controlling the environment: It is 
the environment which is 'responsible' for the 
objectionable behaviour, and it is the environment, not 
some attribute of the individual, which must be changed" 
(Skinner 1971, 74). 
On the basis of Monod and Skinner as examples of 
behavioural science, a behavioural geography founded on 
the primacy of stochastic processes suggests not only a 
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strong tendency towards a potentially destructive 
existential system of social reorganisation, but equally a 
total scepticism in the area of epistemology. Who is going 
to control the controllers? Where are the boundary 
conditions that ascribe limitations of 'right' or 'wrong' 
on man's technological abilities? Other behaviourists such 
as Crick (1981) concede that there is no experimental 
evidence which might be used to verify stochastic 
theories, yet most retain an unspoken assumption that 
"chance occurrences enabled a mechanism to assemble 
itself" (Montefiore 1985, 62). 
Behavioural science postulates that human behaviour is 
totally mechanistic and can therefore in principle be 
explained in terms of physics. According to Sheldrake 
(1981, 25), this assumption is problematical for at least 
two fundamental reasons: 
"First, the mechanistic theory could only be valid if 
the physical world were causally closed. In relation 
to human behaviour, this would only be the case if 
mental states had no reality at all or were in some 
sense identical to physical states of the body or ran 
parallel to them or were epiphenomena of them. But if 
on the other hand the mind were non-physical and yet 
causally efficacious, capable of interacting with the 
body, then human behaviour could not be fully 
explained in physical terms... Second, the attempt to 
account for mental activity in terms of physical 
science involves a seemingly inevitable circularity 
because science itself depends on mental activity... 
Since physics presupposes the minds of observers, 
these minds and their properties cannot be explained 
in terms of physics". 
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Although many of the principles of scientific explanation 
accept that evolution came about through a series of 
coincidental changes, no genetics of behaviour has ever 
been proposed. Koestler (1978, 77) remarks that: If the 
forces behind the emergence of new structures are obscure, 
those behind the evolution of innate skills are shrouded 
in total darkness". The aberrations and antilogies of a 
neo-Darwinian behavioural geography are clearly related to 
the dehumanisation of the individual as the subject of its 
inquiry. Schaeffer (1973, 33) would go further and refers 
to the dispossession of man qua man: Only then can we 
turn from the inferred to the observed, from the 
miraculous to the natural, from the inaccessible to the 
manipulable". 
Objectively, man is a dependent part of his natural and 
social environment, yet he remains significant and affects 
the environment. Subjectively, man perceives himself as 
unique, self-contained and independently 'whole'. Moreover 
the most frequent aberrations of human thought and 
behaviour in disequilibrium are due to the obsessional 
pursuit of some part-truth, treated as if it were the 
whole truth. Behavioural science takes no account of man's 
sense of finitude and the ultimate realisation of his 
physicalistic death and non-existence, nor as to what 
bearing and explanation this may have on his socio-spatial 
transience. On a behavioural basis, man fails to logically 
internalise or rationalise the impending finality of this 
inevitability. The timing of an individual's death may 
appear to be an unpredictable and 'chance' event, but its 
certitude is a universal. The unwinding of man's 
biological clock provokes a 'death instinct' so that in 
behaviouristic terms, life has no integrative value and 
man has no true sense of 'belonging' with his spatial 
environment. A behavioural geography which elucidates 
`chance' as its central criterion has no terms of 
reference with which it might explain this paradox. 
Moreover, under the tenets of a behavioural geography, 
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human socio-spatial relations and encounters are typified 
by man's preoccupation with opportunism whose expression 
is frequently marked by the maximisation of material 
accumulation and territorial gain, and the 'value' which 
he attaches to these forms of behaviour. Much of this is 
an attempt to offset the reality of his dilemma as a 
private creature who - according to the behaviouristic 
rationale - contains no intrinsic metaphysical qualities 
or awareness. 
The credibility of a behavioural science for man collapses 
insofar that it fails to represent the complexity and 
sensitivity of the individual being and cannot, therefore, 
provide a convincing case of 'making sense' of the 
`rationally' unthinkable. For Von Bertalanffy (1969, 66), 
behaviourism and its neo-Darwinian backcloth suggest 
"that a theory so vague, so insufficiently verifiable 
and so far from the criteria otherwise applied in 
`hard' science, has become a dogma, can only be 
explained on sociological grounds. Society and 
science have been so steeped in the ideas of 
mechanism, utilitarianism and the economic concept of 
free competition, that instead of God, Selection was 
enthroned as ultimate reality". 
HUMAN GEOGRAPHY AND EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT 
Much of contemporary human geography which adheres to the 
scientific methodology - that is, to logical positivism 
and behaviourism - is hinged upon the tenets of neo-
Darwinian evolutionary theory. Its presuppositions are 
largely seen to constitute the sole legitimate backcloth 
for epistemological inquiry in all scientific disciplines 
of knowledge and for human geography in particular, to 
provide insights and explanations for the spatial 
organisation of society. The innovations which appeared in 
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human geography during the 'conceptual revolution' from 
the early 1960s onwards were primarily borrowed and 
applied from the physical and biological sciences. These 
not only included a methodology based on quantitative and 
statistical techniques, but also a general obedience and 
subservience to neo-Darwinian explanation for the 
ontogenesis of man as a physico-chemical product of the 
environment. The 'impersonal-time-chance' equation has 
subsequently been developed and extended in geography as a 
social science is an attempt to identify and tackle the 
problems of human socio-spatial behaviour and 
relationships. In the case of human geography, the 
theoretical preassumptions forwarded by stochastic 
principles - 'chance', 'selection', 'necessity', 
`survival' and so forth - have been widely integrated 
throughout the entire spectrum of its field of inquiry: 
regional analysis and area studies; urban-social and 
economic geography; rural and environmental geography; 
population geography and demography. 
The precepts advanced by neo-evolutionary theory are so 
firmly entrenched in the social sciences that the apparent 
unequivocal acceptance of the former by the latter has 
elevated the status of the scientific method to one of 
`recognised truth' and universal validity. Subsequently, 
the formidable position enjoyed by neo-Darwinism in 
scientific and academic forums has largely remained 
unchallenged. Moreover, in the UK the only significant 
modifications in syllabus design and curriculum innovation 
in secondary level geography during the 1970s broadly 
consolidated the scientific concepts expounded by the 
positivist-behaviourist methodology and thought. Similarly 
in higher education, the ongoing enhancement of neo-
Darwinisn as the basis for research in the social sciences 
and in education remains predominant: "Thus, evolution is 
not merely a biological theory, but is rather a full-blowm 
cosmology. The whole structure of modern public education 
from kindergarden through the postgraduate schools, both 
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in content and methodology, is built around the 
evolutionary framework" (Morris 1966, 136). In the USA, 
however, the State of Arkansas (December 1981) called for 
a balanced treatment of evolution science and creation 
science in the school curriculum. Montague (1984) points 
out that although the legal battle tends to favour the 
evolution case, the theory is rapidly disappearing from 
school text books and curricula. 
Such changes are unwelcome in many quarters, not least 
among those who maintain that modern evolutionary theory 
is an internally consistent science. Kitcher (1983), for 
example, concedes that creation can be taught as religion, 
but not as a science since the acceptance of creation 
science would require the abandonment of large parts of 
the physical and biological sciences. He emphasises that 
`flood geology' would need to be taught (see Morris and 
Whitcomb 1969) and that radiocarbon dating methods would 
need to be revised (see Enoch 1972; Morris 1973). The 
immediate ramifications are clearly significant for 
physical geography but are equally ominous for human 
geography when man's existence, knowledge and 
relationships with the phenomenal world are called into 
question. 
The ethos of neo-Darwinism as the cornerstone of the 
scientific method claims to provide an explanation and 
directive for human existence and development in an 
historical space-time context - past, present and future -
so that the naturalistic and nominalist approaches are 
reinforced as the criteria for understanding the human 
condition. Molecular biology and genetics have intensified 
the social and moral acceptability of modern evolutionary 
thinking in its wider societal context insofar that socio-
spatial problems and apparent impasses in decision-making 
can be attributed to human physico-chemical dysfunctions 
rather than to moral and spiritual shortcomings. Moreover, 
neo-Darwinism maintains that it provides not only a 
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rational basis to explain human and environmental 
phenomena, but equally implies that its theoretical 
assertions are exempt from any form of critical analysis. 
The scope and complexity of modern evolutionary theory are 
such that it embraces many aspects of the scientific field 
of knowledge and presents the social scientist with a 
daunting task if he is to unravel all its postulations. 
Notwithstanding, failure to undertake some measure of the 
historical development of evolutionary thought or of an 
examination of the truth-claims of neo-Darwinism will 
neither endorse its validity as the pivot of the 
scientific method nor conform its position as a legitimate 
basis of enquiry for human geography in education. 
HUMAN EXISTENCE AND BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
The idea of evolution long pre-dates the publication of 
Darwin's 'Origin of Species'. Moreover, the doctrine of 
spontaneous generation was universal among scientists and 
philosophers in ancient civilisations (see Moody 1962, 3). 
According to ancient cosmoganic myths - including those 
from Babylon, Egypt, Indian and Greece - it was widely 
thought that all forms of life, including man, were 
generated directly from mud or slime or some other 
inorganic medium (see Morris 1973, 75-76). Among the early 
Greeks, Anaximander claimed that men had evolved from fish 
and Empedocles that animals had been derived from plants. 
The world was interpreted as a system of primeval chaos 
upon which the 'gods' or the forces of nature instated 
order and knowledge. Almost all early civilisations 
thought exclusively in evolutionary terms, where the 
doctrine of 'special creation' was either unknown or if 
known, rejected (see Ley 1978). In the case of early 
Hebrew society, many contemporary commentators have 
suggested that the Genesis account of creation was written 
as an 'accommodation' to their simple culture because they 
were fundamentally incapable of understanding an 
evolutionary system of origins. While many ancient 
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astronomers and philosophers dated the universe almost 
infinitely old, the Biblical revelation of origins 
remained unique and was largely universally rejected and 
resisted until the spread of the Judaeo-Christian doctrine 
in Europe. The primacy of the Biblical view of origins was 
relatively short-lived and was ultimately undermined by 
the naturalistic promulgations of Lamarck and Darwin. A 
naturalistic science - and Darwinism in particular -
implied that any notion of a 'God creator' could now be 
eliminated from rational discussion about origins. 
Metaphysical and religious issues were no longer 
considerations in the ontogenesis of man. 
That Darwinian evolutionary thought became immediately 
popular in the public consciousness of Victorian England 
was no accident. Darwinism became a credo for all 
`progressive' and 'enlightened' people, so that as a 
theory it was raised to the status of a dogma. Everyday 
life was indeed seen as a struggle where the margin 
between success and failure was hinged on opportunism, 
ruthlessness and utility value. The Darwinian notion of 
`pure chance' was made coextensive with the idea of 
`progress' and material wellbeing. Temple (1934, 288) 
notes that: It is obvious that for some students at least 
the impulse towards acceptance of 'natural selection' as 
the one and only mode of evolution came from a mechanistic 
habit of mind and a desire at all costs to dispense with 
providential 'design'." The question of meaning is 
inextricably interrelated with origin and destiny, yet as 
soon as the question of origins and ends becomes a 
consideration, scientific and religious views clash 
uncompromisingly. The church, however, had hardly made a 
convincing case for its standpoint but moreover had 
dogmatically resisted any criticism of its social power 
and influence or of its political dabblings: "For 
centuries the doctrine of the special creation of species 
was seen as a moral justification for the Church's support 
for powerful autocrats throughout Europe. Not only were 
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species held to be immutable, but men were thought to be 
fixed in their position in life by divine ordinance" 
(Hoyle 1983, 26). 
Darwinism as such was relatively shortlived in terms of 
the theoretical consistence which it purported to show. 
Koestler (1978, 179-181) refers to the unveiling of the 
basic logical fallacy of chance variation (random 
mutation) in the human species by Jenkin (Professor of 
Engineering at Edinburgh University, 1867), who showed by 
logical mathematical deduction that no new species could 
ever arise from chance variations by the mechanisms of 
heredity accepted at the time. Natural selection became 
inoperable so that Darwin himself was subsequently 
compelled to resuscitate the Lamarckian view of the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics - an anathema to 
Darwinists. Lamarck's study of animal behaviour suggested 
thAtindividuals experienced improvements in physique, 
skills and ways of life according to the degree to which 
they adjusted to the environment. The resultant series of 
progressive changes which took place correspond to the 
vital needs of the species, which are genetically 
transmitted from one generation to another heriditarily. 
Evolution from the Lamarckian standpoint is a cumulative 
process directed by the purposeful efforts and 
experiential encounters of living organisms with the 
environment. For the (neo-)Darwinist, however, it is an 
accidental process, ruled by pure chance and one which 
rejects any notion of purpose or design. 
The rediscovery of Mendel's paper - dealing with 
experiments in plant hybridisation - in 1900 showed that 
`units of heredity' (genes) combined in a variety of 
mosaic patterns, but more importantly, were transmitted 
unchanged and intact to subsequent generations. These 
observations suggested that chance mutations survived long 
enough for natural selection to become operative. The 
legitimation of this contention is both complex and 
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problematic. To hold an unequivocal standpoint, a 
scientific evolutionary-based methodology would need to 
show that some permanent and heriditable change has 
occurred of an entirely different type than those 
potentially present already. Bonner (1962) shows that 
mutational changes are concomitant to the reshuffling of 
genetic material that is already given. Morris (1973) adds 
that this corresponds analogically to energy 
transformations in a physical system - nothing is actually 
gained or added, but rather the form becomes modified. 
Much of evolution is justified on nothing more than 
`artificial selection', i.e. cross-mutation within a 
species: "... mutations do not provide an explanation for 
the nature or temporal order of the phenomena of 
evolution; they do not create evolutionary novelties; they 
cannot account for the precise fitting together of the 
parts of an organ, and the mutual coordination of 
organs... Mutations provide chance, but not progress ..." 
(Grassg 1973, 351). 
Experiments with fruit-fly have shown no evolutionary 
advantage but rather that mutations display a prominent 
degree of susceptibility towards physical and biological 
decay. Mutation is essentially brought about by 
penetration of the cell by radiation, a mutagenic chemical 
or by introducing some other disorganising agent, so that 
the chromosomatic structure is disturbed. The agent which 
functions as the catalyst is not beneficial, but rather 
detrimental to the carrier: "Mutations and mutation rates 
have been studied in a wide variety of experimental plants 
and animals, and in man. There is one general result that 
clearly emerges: almost all mutations are harmful. The 
degree of harm ranges from mutant genes that kill their 
carrier, to those that cause only minor impairment ... a 
mutation is a random change of a highly organised, 
reasonably smoothly functioning living body. A random 
change in the highly integrated system of chemical 
processes which constitute life is almost certain to 
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impair it" (Crow, 1958, 19-20). Occasional but rare 
`beneficial' bacterial mutations occurring in artificial 
(laboratory) environments have been observed (e.g. 
bacterial resistance to pencillin), but to use such 
evidence as a basis for the entire development of all 
living organisms is highly improbable. 
Molecular genetics suggest that a 'genetic micro- 
hierarchy' in a growing embryo protects a species against 
the evolutionary hazards of phylogeny. This refers to 
random mutations taking place in the chromosomal genes of 
an organism. Biologists opposed to the 'synthetic theory' 
of evolution have postulated a concept of 'internal 
selection' in which there is a hierarchy of 'correctors' 
and 'proof-readers' which eliminate misprints and co-
ordinate acceptable changes. According to the orthodox 
neo-Darwinian standpoint, natural selection is governed by 
the pressures of the external environment. The concept of 
`internal selection', however, insists that any 
chromosomal change must first conform to the rules of 
internal selection which govern the physical, chemical and 
biological wellbeing of an organism before any 
evolutionary process is allowed to harness it. Koestler 
(1967, 133) demonstrates the concept of 'internal 
selection' for Drosophila: "If a pure stock of eyeless 
flies is made to inbreed, then the whole stock will have 
only the 'eyeless' mutant gene ... Nevertheless, within a 
few generations, flies appear in the inbred 'eyeless' 
stock with eyes that are perfectly normal". If then it is 
asserted that the gene-complex has somehow reshuffled and 
missing re-combined in such a way as to compensate forhmi sin
(eye-forming) gene, natural selection can provide no 
explanation. Nor, as evolutionary theory would have it:rsit 
a 'pure chance' process requiring millions of years to 
achieve its end. Rather, any genetic deficiency is 
seemingly rectified and recoordinated by a design matrix 
which governs the structure of the entire gene complex 
according to a set of rules. 
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Many biologists have acknowledged this discrepancy in 
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evolutionary theory and have subsequentlyAcompelled to 
review their theorizings. Monod, for example, on the one 
hand refers to evolution as 'nature's roulette' to 
illustrate the transition by 'blind chance' from cold-
blooded to warm-blooded mammals: The universe was not 
pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man. Our number 
came up in the Monte Carlo game" (Monod 1971, 145-146). 
Conversely, Monod (1971, 9) postulates a second basic 
principle of evolution besides chance, which he terms 
`teleonomy': One of the fundamental characteristics 
common to all living beings without exception [is] that 
of being objects endowed with a purpose or project, which 
at the same time they exhibit in their structure and carry 
out through their performances ..." Monod (1971, 22), 
seemingly aware of the dilemma implicit in this remark, 
continues: "The cornerstone of the scientific method is... 
the systematic denial that 'true' knowledge can be got at 
by interpreting phenomena in terms of final causes - that 
is to say, of 'purpose' ... objectivity nevertheless 
obliges us to recognise the teleonomic character of living 
organisms, to admit that in their structure and 
performance they act projectively - realise and pursue a 
purpose ..." Inferentially, the Lamarckian explanation 
appears to provide a clearer view of nature for Monod -
despite it being unable to offer a mechanism for the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics - than that of 
neo-Darwinism. 
Similarly, the ethologist, Thorpe (1978, 21) remarks that: 
"Biologists have long hoped to find a really 'primitive 
cell' illustrative of the stages between the supposed 
primitive acellular life and life as we know it ... there 
are no primitive cells living on earth. All the cells that 
we know are of fantastic complexity. I believe that no 
biologist or physicist has yet been able to propose even 
the outlines of a theory as to how such a cell might have 
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been 'evolved'. Monod himself sees that the evolution of 
even the simplest cell 'presents herculean problems.'." 
Science itself recognises that 'purpose' is increasingly 
implicit in the fact of biological organisation, yet to 
succumb to the real sense of this term in evolution would 
essentially destroy the basis of the theory. Although the 
variety of life-forms is profuse, the uniformity of basic 
chemical and organic matter imposes limitations on 
existing and possible life-forms. It is unlikely, 
therefore, that the suggested passivity of behavioural 
`adaptation-response' processes renders man as an object 
determined by environmental contingencies. In reality, man 
does not passively adapt and respond to the environment 
but adapts it to his own specific needs by critically 
questioning and exploring it (see Coghill 1929). Man's 
intuition and initiative appear to carry a greater 
influence than any impact of selectivity and environmental 
constraints. Human skills may be chromosomatically 
acquired 'because they are useful', but even in a 
Lamarckian sense the mechanism by which this occurs 
remains obscure. 
Evolution, by its own terms of reference is a wasteful 
process where those lines which have survived have become 
inert, bringing the theory to an abrupt halt: Huxley 
(1964, 13) notes that most species reach "blind alleys" in 
their evolutionary transformation so that extinction and 
stagnation indicate over-specialisation and failure to 
adapt to environmental changes. If evolutionary theory is 
to explain this dilemma, then it must attempt to 'retrace 
its steps' in the sense of 'reculer pour mieux sauter' to 
eliminate developmental cul-de-sacs. This is known as 
paedomorphosis - temporary regression followed by an 
`adaptive' leap forward. Such a methodological twist 
raises the questions of time and of the reliability of 
taxonomic techniques used in evolutionary theory. Orthodox 
evolutionists regard all life-forms as only temporary and 
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fluctuating so that their classification must be cast in 
an evolutionary mould. The unique and discrete character 
of different kinds of organisms - both past and present - 
is overlooked; one could fill a library with 
illustrations of staggeringly complex patterns of 
instinctual activities of various species of animals which 
defy any explanation in terms of the Darwinian mantra" 
(Koestler 1978, 178; see also Tinbergen 1951, Macbeth 
1971, Meldau 1972). Equally, the absence of any evidence 
in the biology of present processes for any significant 
biological change - except very small and generally 
debilitative mutations - suggests there is no evidence for 
evolution in present genetic processes. 
The phylogenetic taxonomic method (building the 
evolutionary histories of particular organisms) must not 
only attempt to resolve lines of stagnation but also 
account for 'gaps' and 'saltations' between species, 
genera and families. Much of the fossil evidence on which 
evolutionary taxonomy is based is either incomplete or 
missing. Alternatively, the available fossil evidence does 
not always fit conveniently into the theoretical grid. The 
construction of phylogenetic 'trees' are compiled from 
taxonomic systems in the absence of fossil records. This 
is an inductive method based on normative thinking. The 
`trees', however, are subsequently used to modify the 
taxonomic systems on which they are founded. 
Philosophically, the circularity of the phylogenetic 
approach does not justify its scientific validation, not 
least because the 'modern evolutionary synthesis' cannot 
account for the known facts of biology with which it 
deals: "... the influence of the Darwinian mythology has 
impeded the advance of biology" (Thompson 1962, 567). The 
eminent palaeontologist, Simpson (1944; 1953) -
recognising that palaeontology has failed to produce 
evidence to support the theory of organic continuity of 
descent by gradual, completely continuous transitional 
sequences - continues to maintain that homology is 
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determined by ancestry and that homology is evidence of 
ancestry. Yet, according to the biologist, Arnold (1947, 
7): as yet we have not been able to trace the 
phylogenetic history of a single group of modern plants 
from its beginning to the present." 
Much of the taxonomic debate in evolutionary theory is 
intrinsically entwined with the problem of time. 
Evolutionary thought is governed by the principle of 
uniformity by which it is hoped that present-day processes 
can be extrapolated into the distant past/future to 
explain all that ever has, or will happen. True 
(methodological) uniformity concerns the inviolability of 
natural law (i.e. of thermodynamics), but not the 
uniformity of process rates (i.e. substantive uniformity). 
All of the various processes of the universe - whether 
physical, biological, geological, chemical, or any other 
field of science - must operate within the framework of 
the first and second laws of thermodynamics, that is the 
laws of energy conservation and deterioration. These laws 
define the state of the measurable universe as a 
physicalistically closed system as one of quantitative 
stability and qualitative decay. The First Law states that 
although energy can be transformed in various ways, it can 
neither be created nor destroyed. The Second Law states 
that in all energy transformations there is a tendency for 
some of the energy to be converted into non-reversible 
heat energy, i.e. to be lost in a 'heat-death' (see 
Ubbelohde 1955). This means that left to itself any 
isolated system or process ultimately runs down and wears 
out. Thus in a closed system, entropy can never decrease, 
but conversely increases (see Lindsay 1959; Potter 1964). 
With the rejection of 'vitalism' in evolutionary biology, 
it follows that all physico-chemical processes in 
biological systems must conform to the two laws of 
thermodynamics. These must have a universal application in 
the case of man. Man and his spatial environment are both 
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part of an isolated system which moves towards greater 
randomisation and a higher probability function, i.e. a 
tendency to become disorganised, disordered and decayed 
(see Blum 1955). Locally and temporarily, there may be an 
excess inflow of ordering energy into a particular system 
- that is, the recovery and recycling of some energy from 
entropy - so that there appears to be growth and 
development for a while, but this is shortlived and the 
decay principle ultimately predominates. 
The principle of evolution is precisely the converse of 
the laws of thermodynamics, postulating that present 
processes are the same as those by which the universe came 
into existence and is thus still coming into existence. 
Evolutionists assert that it is a uni-directional, 
irreversible historical space-time process which leads to 
higher degrees of organiation and integration, greater 
differentiation and increasing complexity. This could only 
conceivably be the case in an open system where the laws 
of thermodynamics - and particularly that of entropy - 
could be discounted: The system will be an open one and 
must have a supply of raw material and, in some way or 
another, a supply of free energy" (Crick 1981, 56). 
In attempting to defend the evolutionist standpoint, 
SchrOdinger (1944, 72) challenged the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics when he asserted that: "What an organism 
feeds on is negative entropy." By this, he implied that 
instead of running down and dissipating into chaos, living 
organisms build themselves up toward higher levels of 
complexity and functional coordination so that 
environmental constraints were mastered and eliminated. 
SchrOdinger's notion of 'negentropy' was later extended by 
the biologist Szent-GyOrgyi in 1974 (cited by Koestler 
1978, 223-224) in what he termed 'syntropy'. This refers 
to an innate drive in living organisms towards growth, 
synthesis and self-perfection. These are both 
fundamentally forms of neo-vitalism where the `non-living' 
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becomes life through some quasi-mystical entelechy. 
Although the exact physiological mechanism which is 
responsible for the aging and death of a biological 
organism has never been fully determined, Curtis (1963, 
686-694) attributes it to sudden changes in the structure 
of the somatic cells incurred by radiation or other 
mutagens affecting the organs and general body cell 
structure of an individual. While germ cells appear to be 
better protected from factors causing mutation than are 
the somatic cells, the general trend is deleterious so 
that organs ultimately function less efficiently, decay 
and die: "It is suggested that the mutation rates for 
somatic cells are very much higher than the rates for 
gametic cells, and that this circumstance ensures the 
death of the individual and the survival of the species" 
(Curtis 1963, 694). Equally, some species may eventually 
experience accelerated decay and even extinction with the 
accumulated effects of generations of mutations, and 
disturbances in the ecosystem which are frequently 
instigated by man. 
Contrary to the evolutionary position, any attempt to 
explain the biological and cultural progress of the human 
race by the concept of paedomorphosis strongly suggests 
that these phenomena cannot be explained solely by the 
atomistic laws of physics and chemistry. It is, however, 
clear that physicalistically, the individual bioligical 
organism conforms to the two Laws of thermodynamics. 
Science, in a holistic sense, becomes a study of energy 
and its transformations from one state to another. Yet 
science deals with present processes which are not, by 
definition, processes of origination and integration but 
rather of conservation and disintegration. Evolution 
cannot be said to be an empirical fact of nature at the 
present time, nor a fact of scientific certitude in the 
prehistoric past: 
"the history of the earth and its inhabitants cannot 
be subject to scientific experimentation; the events 
are non-reproducible and, therefore, not legitimately 
subject to analysis by means of the so-called 
`scientific method'. (Morris 1973, 29). 
Many evolutionists such as Waddington (1961) have 
recognised that causality and finality are complementary 
principles in the sciences of life; if finality and 
purpose are rejected, then biology and psychology are 
rendered as nonsensical. If such concepts are retained, 
then the scientific method is still confronted with the 
presence of a (neo-)vitalist principle: The joint efforts 
of palaeontology and of a molecular biology purged of 
dogmatism, ought to lead eventually to the discovery of 
the precise mechanism of evolution - but possibly without 
revealing to us the causes which determine the direction 
of evolutionary lineages, and the purposefulness of 
structures, functions and vital cycles. It seems possible 
that confronted with these problems, biology is reduced to 
helplessness and must hand over to metaphysics" (Grass4 
1973, 401). 
HUMAN GEOGRAPHY AS EVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE 
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that a scientific 
geography which attempts to explain socio-spatial 
phenomena on the basis of neo-Darwinian postulations 
cannot provide an adequate ontogenesis for man, nor any 
convincing foundations for the epistemological and 
methodological assertions of the 'scientific method'. The 
theory of natural selection cannot be proved by empirical 
prediction and control and even less can be said about 
future evolutionary trends. Both Lamarckism and (neo-) 
Darwinism lack the experimental evidence to explain life 
or the role of the environment in the behavioural 
conditioning of life forms. Neither has shown how the 
adaptive evolution of any single organism or any single 
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organ might be explained nor how an 'acquired' bodily or 
mental feature could alter the 'genetic blueprint'. Denton 
(1985) believes that the scientific method moreover 
demonstrates the inadequacy and shortcomings of neo-
Darwinian evolutionary theory and along with Hoyle (1983), 
claims that evolution could not have taken place because 
there has not been time or opportunity, and that so 
complex an organism as life could not have evolved by 
chance on earth (i.e. that the earth in itself is not 
sufficient to have provided the conditions for the 
evolutionary development of life forms). 
Such a challenge has important ramifications for the 
teaching and study of human geography for as long as it 
continues to draw on neo-Darwinian principles: "It is 
quite clear that for the general public educated in 
Western society, scientific accounts of the origin and 
destiny of the world and of the status of human beings 
within it, have replaced the traditional mythical accounts 
given in various forms in all religions, including in 
particular biblical religion ... Scientific theory has the 
status of cosmological myth in our society as can be seen 
in the way 'origins' are taught in schools, and in the 
popularity of media presentations of fundamental science, 
both of physics and biology" (Hesse 1983, 51). 
While many evolutionists have become increasingly 
concerned with overcoming the shortcomings of theoretical 
presuppositions and methodological difficulties - Reid 
(1985), for example, advocates a move away from 
reductionism in evolutionary thought towards one of holism 
- Popper (1976) considers that it is important to show 
that Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a 
metaphysical research programme which may be criticised 
and improved upon. Although there is a considerable 
divergence of opinion among scientists concerning not only 
the causes of evolution but also about the actual process, 
it is unlikely that the scientific method will easily 
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relinquish the present academic and social status of 
evolutionary theory as a credible explanation for social 
and territorial behaviour, as well as for the existence of 
all life-forms. Popper's invitation to introduce an 
element of 'falsifiability' in evolutionary thought is 
indeed likely to fall on barren ground: "This situation, 
where men rally to the defense of a doctrine they are 
unable to define scientifically, much less demonstrate 
with scientific rigor, attempting to maintain its credit 
with the public by the suppression of criticism and the 
elimination of difficulties, is abnormal and undesirable 
in science" (Thompson 1960, 2). 
The insistence of the scientific method on the impersonal 
origins and character of man and his environment does not 
provide an adequate basis for socio-spatial inquiry, nor 
for the explanation and understanding of geographical 
phenomena. Moreover, a scientific human geography whose 
epistemological underpinnings are entrenched in the tenets 
and rationale of evolutionary theory fails to convincingly 
authenticate both the status of and interrelationship 
between man and land. 
A behavioural geography cannot scientifically legitimate 
the contention that human socio-spatial activity is 
contingent to the primacy of the environment by the 
subordination of the role of man as a 'mindless' being. 
Equally, attempts to integrate a phenomenological bias in 
a behavioural - positivist matrix generates methodological 
inconsistencies and intangible philosighical discrepancies. 
Evolution emphasises the instinctive drive in human 
behaviour and largely fails to recognise the presence of 
any intuitive content which motivates the intentionality 
of social actors. Evolutionary theory easily lends itself 
to the rationale of technocratic instrumentalism, so that 
rather than providing new horizons for those disciplines 
of knowledge which espouse its tenets, the result is a 
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dehumanised society mortified in the grips of politico-
scientific authoritarianism. 
While evolutionary theory is increasingly at pains to 
justify its claims through the biological premise, this 
does little to clarify the validity and authenticity of a 
human geography based on the 'scientific method'. Because 
human geography deals with human social problems in a 
spatial context, it needs to establish clear parameters 
about the ethos of the world in which man lives. This may 
provide insights into the respective roles of and 
relationships between man and land as well as fresh 
perspectives for the direction and substance of 
geographical inquiry. The natural sciences - particularly 
the contribution of physics - offer a possible route for a 
re-evaluation of the fundamental questions about knowledge 
and existence which are also implicit in the social 
sciences. Science purports to achieve this goal through 
the inroads made in contemporary cosmological 
investigations. 
While it is clearly beyond the scope of this study to make 
a detailed and exhaustive examination of scientific 
progress in this field of knowledge, a simplified overview 
of cosmological inferences - insofar that they are 
relevant to an understanding of man and the earth - have a 
significant bearing on the backcloth of human geography as 
a scientific discipline of knowledge. 
COSMOLOGICAL SCIENCE, MAN AND THE EARTH 
A human geography based on the scientific method is 
largely preoccupied with the task of ascribing meaning and 
significance derived from its empirical observations of 
man and his interaction with the spatial environment. Much 
of this work is hampered by the nature of the 
presuppositions which govern the direction of 
contemporary scientific inquiry both in the natural and 
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social sciences, that is fundamentally the notions of 
randomness, chance, and the impersonal which have resulted 
in the creation of everything out of nothing. 
Subsequently, a scientific human geography must somehow 
purposefully strive towards making sense of man and the 
socio-spatial world. It undertakes this prerogative by 
identifying and attributing form, structure, order and 
reason to the processes within and between man and his 
spatial environment, but against a theoretical background 
of value-freedom, neutrality, detachment and non-
commitment. A substantial part of scientific human 
geography has emulated the methodology of the natural 
sciences insofar that it has appealed to the primacy of 
mathematical and statistical techniques to investigate the 
socio-spatial field of inquiry. Man and land are little 
more than quantitative expressions but in order to 
understand their significance and meaning at any given 
point in historic space and time requires an explanation 
of origins. 
Contemporary research in theoretical physics and modern 
astronomy suggests that science must increasingly harness 
a reductive methodology not only to explain the origin of 
the universe, but equally to acquire a deeper 
understanding of the earth and its life-forms in a 
present-day context. The potentiality of fresh insights 
into the questions of existence and knowledge by 
cosmological theorists not only challenges many of the 
presuppositions on which the 'normal' scientific method is 
based, but also bears a direct relevance for human 
geography as a social science inasmuch that the dynamics 
of socio-spatial phenomena may be investigated from other 
perspectives. 
Although the cosmological problem presents much divergence 
and conflict among scientists, the profusion of the 
various standpoints and views about the origin of the 
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universe points unequivocably to the 'big bang' theory as 
the predominant mode of explanation. The theory broadly 
postulates that the observable universe exploded from a 
point of 'singularity' from the boundary of time and from 
the beginning of space beyond which there is neither space 
nor time. The fact that an initial explosion ever took 
place in a situation beyond space and time is clearly 
beyond the parameters of scientific investigation, but 
Hubble's Constant provides the theoretical basis for the 
initiation of the universe by the 'big bang'. Hubble's 
observation of the 'red shift' distortion in the colour of 
galactic light suggested that galaxies were distancing 
themselves from one another, so that the space between 
them is expanding. Further, he postulated that the 
residual heat which bathes the universe is confirmatory 
evidence of the initial explosion of the concentrated 
`primeval nucleus' of matter and radiant energy into the 
space-time continuum. 
The 'scientific method' demands that the validation of the 
`big bang' theory is necessarily subject to its 
quantitative verification so that the point of 
`singularity' and the events which preceded it might 
possibly be explained: We shall only have achieved the 
goal ... when this possibility has been expressed 
quantitatively" (Atkins 1981, 110). The Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, when projected forwards, suggests the 
ultimate 'heat death' of the universe when maximum 
disorder or dynamic equilibrium is reached. In its 
restrospective projective, the universe appears to have 
had a point of origin, since the state of thermodynamic 
equilibrium has not been reached. Because the total 
entropy in an infinitely large isolated system never 
decreases, the process is irreversible. The quantification 
of the very earliest moment of the universe and the period 
of exponential expansion and 'supercooling' which took 
place can only be described by mathematical symbols (see 
Weinberg 1977; Atkins 1981). 
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To illustrate this point, scientific calculations estimate 
the 'big bang' explosion to 15 billion years ago, yet in 
the world in which we live where matter is composed of 
atoms, only during the first five minutes after the 'big 
bang' would conditions have been sufficiently hot for 
nuclear reactions to have taken place (see Gribben 1983). 
Further, between the first three minutes and the first 
half million years, matter could exist only in the form of 
nuclei and free unbanded electrons prior to showing how a 
featureless universe developed recognisable complex 
structures. The earlier the stages in the 'big bang', the 
more matter seemingly splits into even smaller components: 
between 10-4 seconds and the first three minutes, matter 
consisted of particles and electrons; between 10-12 and 
10-4 seconds, it could only exist as quantum material; and 
between 10-43 and 10-35 seconds, energies and temperatures 
were so high that it is reckoned that only one single 
unified force could have been present in the universe. 
The 'big bang' theory is, however, itself the subject of 
contention in terms of various interpretations which the 
experimental problem raises. Theoretically, the aim is to 
try and reconstruct the sort of energy required at the 
genesis of known cosmic processes. The presumption is that 
the explosion and subsequent 'supercooling' and expansion 
period would have destroyed the initial symmetry of matter 
and anti-matter, so that this breach would account for the 
existence of a universe which contains a preponderance of 
matter (see Tryon 1984). If all distinctions between 
particles and the different forces which control them 
would vanish in a space-time context, then it would be 
possible to identify the elementary particles of the 
universe and to account for the way in which the 
properties of the macroscopic world emerge from their 
aggregation and combination. This would presumably shed 
light on the 'organising principles' which not only govern 
particle physics, but also those which determine 
intelligent life-forms. 
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Barrow and Silk (1984) claim that prior to the 'big bang' 
up to the point of 'singularity' a state of ultimate and 
perfect symmetry existed which otherwise comprises a unity 
and revelation of complete understanding. All physical 
laws were in perfect harmony and all natural elementary 
constituents interacted freely and democratically. They 
apply a paraody of 'Paradise Lost' to the general theme of 
their study so that 'paradise' is made synonymous with 
perfect symmetry, while the key to 'paradise's' collapse 
will be found when it is possible to explain the breakdown 
of cosmological symmetry. According to this view, all 
scientific speculations which seek explanations from 
Planck time (i.e. 10-35 second and beyond) require a 
theory of 'quantum gravity'. Until recently, gravity and 
theories of 'supergravity' have resisted the 
(renormalisation methods' which permit the eradication of 
divergences with other related phenomena such as 
electromagnetism and quantum mechanics. Meaningful 
mathematical calculations have not therefore been 
possible. In 1985, Green and Schwarz devised a 
mathematical model for a four-dimensional super-symmetric 
theory of quantum gravity known as the theory of 
tsuperstrings'. It remains to be seen whether this theory 
will provide a holistic explanation for forces, particles 
and space not only in the quantum sphere, but equally in 
the macroscopic world of everyday experience. 
If human geography intends to draw upon contemporary 
advances in the natural sciences in order to gain possible 
insights about man and his inter-relationship with space, 
then cosmological theory via particle physics and modern 
astronomy continues to generate many uncompromising 
postulations. Essentially, scientific theory has yet to 
unify the fundamental forces of the cosmos which have 
enabled life and structural form to emerge on the Earth. 
Moreover, it presently lacks the ability to explain the 
remarkable array of 'constants' which have ensured the 
development and relative stability of galaxies. In the 
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case of the Earth, very slight changes in the value of any 
one of many constants - the distribution of gases; the 
heat of the universe; the weight mass of neutrinos, the 
universe and of electro-magnetic particles; the force and 
strength of gravity and of nuclear reactions in the 
universe; the structure of carbon forms - would 
precipitate the catastrophic termination of the entire 
observable universe in the form which it currently 
understood (see Weinberg 1977; Davies 1982, 1983). 
According to the concept of the 'big bang', the existence 
of the universe does not necessarily imply creation out of 
nothing but that the energy/matter which evolved from the 
explosion of the 'singularity' is perhaps a "disconnected 
fragment of spacetime" (Davies 1983, 40-42), as if space 
and time are synthetic components/parts. Beyond the 'big 
bang', the components which comprise the space-time 
continuum had a pre-existence within a primordial state of 
being which preceded space and time. Science can only 
speculate about the origin and creation of the universe 
from a 'singularity', or of the mechanism which determined 
the conditions of the 'big bang' and the constants of 
nature which provide the laws under which the universe 
must operate. 
The dilemma is further compounded by questions which are 
related to the specific conditions which are necessary for 
the development of intelligent life, and primarily that of 
human existence. If an impersonal-time-chance 
presupposition is adopted, then it would seem logically 
inconceivable that intelligent life-forms would appear in 
the hypothetical structure of 'symmetry breakdown' if this 
process was indeed initiated from a point of 
`singularity'. Moreover, it would be extremely unlikely to 
find any evidence of distinct and unique life-forms had 
they not at some time pre-existed in a state of 'perfect' 
(primordial) symmetry. Equally, the presumption that the 
forces which shaped the physical world and intelligent 
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life-forms which began to 'freeze' out as temperatures 
cooled could hardly have enacted a gradualism towards 
`more complex systems' if the Second Law of Thermodynamics 
holds good. If the point of 'singularity' is made 
coextensive with symmetry collapse, then a scientific 
explanation based on randomness must account for those 
forces responsible for gas and filament condensation into 
precise structural forms, as well as those forces which 
gave the impetus to the modelling of intelligent life in 
the cooling process. 
The basis of the normal scientific method is grounded in 
an epistemology which presupposes the existence of an 
uncaused universe which has subsequently assumed its 
present structural appearance by chance. Although this 
view is widely held in both the natural and social 
sciences and used unconditionally for theory development 
and the construction and testing of models, it is clear 
that even by scientific criteria, specific conditions are 
necessary for the development of intelligent life. Human 
existence has required the universe to evolve an 
infinitesimal series of complex, finite and particular 
conditions which defy the notions of probability and 
coincidence by the random assembly of points and patterns 
in space and time (see Ward 1982). Scientific inquiry 
continues to seek theoretical avenues which may possibly 
provide an adequate explanation for physico-chemical and 
biological 'coincidences' in the evolutionary history of 
the observable universe. 
The work of Bondi, Gold and Hoyle on the 'steady-state' 
universe/`continuous-creation' theory has largely been 
rejected by scientists in this field of study. In this 
case, contemporary scientific evidence refuted the claim 
for the 'continual evolution' of matter of 'negative 
energy' once cosmic background heat radiation had been 
positively verified. Although the 'big bang'/expanding 
universe theory predominates as the modus operandi for the 
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development of the universe, there is a wealth of 
conflicting theory and method which is primarily focused 
on the problem of accounting for the 'coincidences' and 
constants which make life possible on the earth. The 
various theories which have been tendered to explain the 
natural order in the universe are all fundamentally 
impaired by the absence of observational or experimental 
data which might support their theoretical presuppositions 
(see Montefiore 1985, 33-38). Many of these scientific 
postulations are not only highly speculative, but 
frequently appeal to meta-theoretical concepts in an 
attempt to gain explanatory power. Moreover, they do not 
explain why these 'coincidences' and constants contain 
empirically recognised values. 
When no convincing case for the origin and development of 
man and the natural environment can be elucidated by 
empirical evidence drawn from physicalistic phenomena, 
then the focus of scientific inquiry falls squarely on the 
existence of man. Carter's (1974, 293) postulation of a 
`weak anthropic principle' in cosmology is based on the 
fact that: "... our location in the universe is 
necessarily priviledged to the extent of being compatible 
as observers". That man observes at this given place and 
time in cosmological history, where there is a definite 
limit to the possibility of life as the sun cools, seems 
to impose a biological constraint on the features of the 
physical world. Further, a 'strong anthropic principle' 
lays claim to the fact that as observers, human existence 
is the primary cause of the development of the universe: 
The Universe must be such as to admit the creation of 
observers within it at some stage" (Carter 1974, 294). 
Hawking (1974) has also shown that human existence is only 
possible because the universe is expanding at just above 
the critical rate which, in turn, also sustains the 
isotropy of the universe itself. If this were not so, then 
the universe would either recollapse if it were expanding 
too slowly, or would not form bound systems if it were 
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expanding too fast: "Since we could not observe the 
Universe to be different if we were not here, one can say, 
in a sense, that the isotrop of the Universe is a 
consequence of our existence" (Hawking 1974, 285). That a 
joint state between the isotropy of the universe and 
observers in it should be the actual case is equally 
improbable and is one which eludes normal scientific 
explanation. 
The 'anthropic principle' does not explain the origin or 
the presence of the constants and 'coincidences' which 
comprise the fundamental forces of the cosmos, but as 
Weinberg (1977, 154-160) notes, it is inconsistent with 
the preassumption that the universe arose by chance and 
that man is the product of biological evolution. Although 
the 'anthropic principle' may have presently brought 
questions about the existence and purpose of the universe 
and man to the boundaries of scientific investigation and 
theoretical knowledge, it emphasises the significance of 
man in the history and development of the cosmos, as well 
as the shortcomings of 'normal' science to provide an 
adequate explanation for these phenomena (see Barrow and 
Tipler 1985). 
Rees (1981, 273) while asserting that: "... the anthropic 
principle cannot provide a scientific explanation of the 
universe in the proper sense", reverts to meta-theoretical 
assumptions in an attempt to explain the physico-chemical 
process which operated in the 'primordial' universe prior 
to the 'singularity', and which ultimately made life 
possible on earth. Similarly, Crick (1981, 15-20) suggests 
that life may have been despatched to Earth by intelligent 
beings elsewhere in the universe: this, he called the 
theory of "directed panspermia". Hoyle (1979, 1981, 1983) 
too makes equally ambiguous scientific assumptions 
claiming that life arrived on earth from comets, 
meteorites and new stars. Elsewhere, he claims that the 
present biochemical structure of human beings was 
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inherited: from ... a previous era, from a previously 
existing creature ... that was not carbon-based, one that 
was permitted by an environment that existed long ago" 
(Hoyle and Wickramasinghe 1981, 25). 
The parameters of scientific knowledge clearly suggest 
that 'normal' channels of explanation for the existence of 
man and the earth collapse either into metaphysical 
speculation and mysticism or into a meaningless 
`nothingness'. This is broadly in agreement with the 
limits of philosophical systems of thought. It is, 
however, possible that questions of knowledge and 
existence demand a personal rather than an impersonal-
time-chance explanation: "... all explanation is reducible 
to personal explanation, in the sense that the operation 
and causal efficacy of the factors cited in the scientific 
explanation is always explicable by the action of a 
person" (Swinburne 1979, 201). Similarly, Schaeffer (1972, 
94-95) argues that : "... it does not matter how 
theoretically unrelated a man in his philosophy is, in 
reality ... all men act as though there is a correlation 
between the external and the internal world, even if they 
have no basis for that correlation". 
If the methodological guidelines and epistemological 
underpinnings of the cosmological theory are taken to be 
representative of some of the most recent and dynamic 
ideas in the field of scientific 'inquiry', then a human 
geography which adheres to the 'scientific method' should 
recognise the conceptual constraints and limitations posed 
by the pre-assumptions of this branch of 'normal' science. 
Although an 'anthropic principle' has been formulated as 
one of several explanations for the existence of man and 
the earth (i.e. the spatial environment), this standpoint 
is treated with caution and scepticism, if not discredited 
by must of the scientific community. A human geography 
which moulds itself on the 'scientific method' must 
therefore innovate a similar platform where man is removed 
229 
from a position of primacy to one among many others 
indisciminate entities. Following the impersonal basis of 
the scientific method, geographic socio-spatial analyses 
are devoid of any ontological formulations for which the 
terms of social reality and the scientific epistemology 
whose central theme is one of 'chance' variations and 
occurrences cannot explain how 'something' evolves from 
`nothing', nor why the search for order-in-chaos should be 
at all necessary, desirable or possible, nor does it show 
how its methodological impasses can be logically 
consistent within the philosophical basis of its belief 
systems. Man can never know the origins, place or purpose 
of his existence, so that in a geographical sense, socio-
spatial relations are at best ambiguous and synthetic, and 
more generally, incomprehensible and meaningless. 
CONCLUSION: THE INADEQUACY OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
No study of human geography which is based on the 
`scientific method' is able to legitimate the authenticity 
of its philosophical premises on the bases of social 
reality. Any methodology which appeals to logical 
positivism for its preassumptions and propositional truth-
claims concerning the inter-action and relationships 
between society, space and place, cannot justify a 
position of 'value-freedom' where neutrality and 
impartiality are necessarily the case of the scientist-as-
observer, and therefore, as a criterion for scientific 
`objectivity'. Moreover, the dualism between the notions 
of 'subject' and 'object', 'insideness' and 'outsideness' 
is reinforced as long as the analyst is unwilling to 
surrender the untenable standpoint of having an 
`autonomous' scientific status. The geographer, as a 
social scientist, is as much dependent upon the same 
socio-spatial systems as those which are the focus of his 
attention and must therefore consider himself to be an 
integral part of that situation. No geographer can truly 
claim to occupy an independent horizon from which he might 
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assert a 'disengaged' scientific view of man and space: he 
is compelled to adhere to some philosophical, ideological 
or doctrinal tenet either directly or indirectly. 
In a contemporary socio-spatial context, positivism 
increasingly manifests itself as an instrumentalist 
philosophy associated with technocratic domination and 
control. Behaviouralism reinforces this theme insofar that 
its ontology of socio-spatial reality is one of a 
`mindless' universe inhabited by 'mindless' beings. A 
comprehensive and representative human geography which 
restricts its epistemological formulations to systems of 
knowledge in the social sciences alone is likely to 
inhibit its field of vision and impede the geographer's 
depth of understanding of social processes and spatial 
structure. The biological and cosmological considerations 
of human existence which precede history provide an 
indispensable backcloth to human self-understanding, the 
possibilities of human action and the socio-spatial 
organisation of society. This cannot, however, be 
adequately explained by the evolutionarly schemata nor by 
any other scientific approach which bases its 
methodological inquiry on the impersonal and random 
treatment of social and environmental phenomena. If holism 
and purpose are excluded from or rejected by the 
scientific method, then human geography likewise condemns 
itself to incertitude through the fragmentary nature and 
general inadequacy of its terms of reference. The 
scientific manipulation of society and the spatial 
environment prescribes a cumulative process of 
dehumanisation and a disregard for the fundamental inter-
relationship between man and land - insofar that care, 
responsibility, moderation and equitable distributional 
policies take primacy over repression, power and greed. 
Ultimately, a human geography which operates on the bases 
of the 'scientific method' has little prospect of 
uncovering any profound sense of meaning or of knowing. 
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PART FOUR: HUMAN GEOGRAPHY AS POLITICAL ECONOMY 
GEOGRAPHY, THE STATUS QUO AND RADICALISM 
The significance of political economy has largely been 
ignored and excluded in geographical education. The 
geography curriculum has perpetuated an uncritical 
standpoint toward any explanation for the basis of work, 
or the way in which the development of capitalism has 
structured man and his socio-environment. The geography 
curriculum is designed to reflect an unequivocal support 
for the political status quo and is itself increasingly 
manipulated by consensual bodies in terms of financial 
provision and therefore of policy design in what may or 
may not be taught. The curriculum does not prescribe a 
critical basis for evaluating the merits and shortcomings 
of different political philosophies - even in the most 
simplistic terms - insofar that this has a bearing on the 
geographical distribution of material wealth. The relative 
inertia of the geography curriculum for the incorporation 
of political literacy in its teaching programme means that 
most students are denied any access to any genuine, 
unprejudiced political understanding or awareness which 
might clarify the attendant ideologies and mechanics that 
govern the bases of political and economic systems. 
Syllabus design and content in the present geography 
curriculum are, in the main, rigid and inflexible and do 
not provide scope for any profound, radical interpretation 
of the economic, social and political tensions which are 
prevalent in the study of human geography. Radicalism in 
geographical education is, moreover, unfavourably 
interpreted as an outright assault and critique of 
advanced capitalist societies which seeks to undermine and 
replace them with a form of state socialism akin to the 
communist regimes of the Eastern bloc. This is not, 
however, necessarily always the case. Although much 
radical geography has been equated with Marxism or forms 
of anarcho-communism, its expose can equally be applied to 
a critique of a Marxist-based socialism. 
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While much radical geography has been charged with being 
pure ideology posing as science, all systems of social 
control may similarly be said to fall into the same 
category. If radicalism is made coextensive with the 
dynamics of epistemological thought, then its exclusion 
from human geography means that change and improvement 
become sterile and meaningless concepts unless people 
understand how and why revisions need to be implemented. 
The failure to accommodate radicalism/revisionism in 
geographic inquiry may on the one hand achieve some 
measure of passive acceptance for the consensus view of 
the ruling order for some, but alternatively invites forms 
of social extremism and cultural nihilism for others. 
Without radicalism, it is difficult to show how the class 
divisions of society are reflected in geography, and the 
ways in which these are represented in government 
decision-making, or the contradictions and problems which 
are contained therein and those which may subsequently 
arise therafter. 
Notwithstanding, many geographers continue to advocate the 
inclusion of basic political concepts such as welfare, 
justice and power, even in the secondary curriculum. 
Huckle (1983b, 86) remarks that these concepts may reflect 
widely different meanings and generate a diversity of 
interpretation depending on their context but emphasises 
their importance in an attempt to de-ideologize the real 
causes of socio-spatial imbalances. A critical review of 
the institutional forces which structure society and space 
in urban-social studies, development education and 
environmental studies appears both essential and 
beneficial in geographical education: "It is more 
important to develop an understanding of the forces and 
mechanisms at work in the world than to describe the great 
static configurations ..." (Claval 1978, 165-166). 
234 
NEOCLASSICISM AND THE WELFARE APPROACH IN GEOGRAPHY 
Human geography as political economy must examine the 
nature and meaning of work within its full social and 
historical context (see Cook 1983). There is considerable 
variation in the social basis for coordinating individual 
activity in production. The social relationships which 
constitute a socio-spatial structure may take the form of 
tribal kinship, a status system based on ownership, a 
price system with a stratified class society or a 
socialist system which attempts to remove competition and 
class division through a centralised or decentralised 
planning system. Most systems are dominant in one form or 
another and in such a way that it is difficult for 
individuals to be socially collectivised so that all 
things are held in common. Like other disciplines of 
social science, human geography is also concerned with 
seeking a method where it may be possible to integrate and 
equate social, political and economic activity to 
establish a stable society and equitable distributional 
networks. 
Polonyi (1968, 148-149) provides a useful conceptual 
framework for the historical background and development of 
social and economic activity. He essentially distinguishes 
between systems of 'reciprocity', 'redistribution' and 
`market exchange'. 
Reciprocity is based on mutual exchange between 
individuals or groups where the goods in kind are seen to 
have some quality of value. Fried (1167) terms such 
societies 'egalitarian', where voluntary cooperation is 
sustained by social custom as in primitive tribal groups. 
The measure of reciprocity is not, however, necessarily 
constant, but may deviate into 'unbalanced' movements 
(discrimination by those who have certain goods against 
those who are without) or 'negative' movements (material 
embezzlement or stealing). Levi-Strauss (1963) defined 
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`egalitarian' societies as those groups where there is a 
potent relationship between the individual and nature (the 
`sensuous' environment). It encompasses those who are able 
to evolve systems which are divorced from the social and 
economic complexities of urban life. The ethos of 
reciprocity depends on some degree of social homogeneity. 
Redistributive economic systems are established on some 
measure of group centricity. A small ruling elite holds 
economic authority and dictates the scope of choices made 
available to society. This elite controls both the means 
of production and determines social practice by forming 
political institutions. These societies correspond to 
forms of feudalism, some of which were suffused with 
religious beliefs and superstitions. In the case of 
European feudalism in the Middle Ages, rights to the means 
of production were either based on property ownership or 
by some 'moral' condition. Alternatively, the perpetuation 
of the system could be guaranteed by force. In the case of 
Tibet, peasant populations unconditionally sustained the 
ruling monastic elite through fear, magic and mysticism. 
Where the social structure becomes hierarchically ordered 
and forms some kind of stratification based on status, 
prestige, power or restricted knowledge, the geographical 
network tends also to become increasingly rigid and 
tightly contained by political controls. 
Market exchange systems, as in capitalist societies, 
attempt to achieve stability and integration by price-
fixing markets. It is a highly technocratic mechanism 
which depends on the division of labour and the geographic 
specialisation of production to retain control of profits. 
The market is geared to the concepts of competition and 
scarcity. This too results in social stratification and 
generates social and geographical differentials to the 
material access and accumulation of goods. 
According to the Protestant 'work ethic' adopted by 
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seventeenth century European capitalism, man was supposed 
to authenticate the purpose of his existence through the 
accumulation of material wealth as a result of his work 
and efforts. Much of the justification for the Calvinist 
standpoint was selectively derived from the Old Testament 
- God rewarded the just and faithful with wealth. The 
secularisation of this ideal created an ethical dilemma 
insofar that self-interest, the indefinite accumulation of 
wealth and the manipulative social power invested in it 
could no longer be adequately defined or related to any 
scriptural context. Adam Smith's economic 
conceptualisation of man served only to reinforce the 
Protestant 'work ethic'. Nor did it provide any predictive 
insight to the oncoming crisis which would later emerge 
from the technocratic organisation of society under 
advanced capitalism. Smith did, however, attempt to 
establish a theory of value based on the labour cost of 
production whereby all economic activity would be 
determined by human need based on the concept of a 'just 
price'. This must be understood in the context of a pre-
industrial economy when the scarcity of goods retained a 
more definite and real meaning. Notwithstanding, Smith's 
idealism attempted to uphold a moral prerogative which 
might maintain a sense of social justice and 
distributional fairness. 
The rapid growth in productive output and the level of 
technological maturity in industrial societies soon 
displaced the notion of an ethical commitment attached to 
the value and acquisition of goods. Neoclassical economic 
theory shifted the emphasis on value away from labour onto 
the 'marginal utility' of goods in relation to supply and 
demand. The transition from production to the marketing of 
goods introduced a subjective element into economic theory 
and practice inasmuch that some measure of 'consumer 
preference' (i.e. the ability/willingness to pay for an 
item) needed to be gauged by industrialists. The concept 
of 'rational economic man' supposedly resolves this 
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requirement, but is itself a normative index of human 
economic behaviour to which positive (real) 
rationalisation is attributed by reference to the 'long-
term' (some unspecified future time). The pricing 
mechanism was accordingly structured to reflect the 
presupposed long-term costs of production. An increase in 
production cannot be automatically related to accruements 
in the general welfare of society since these supposed 
material benefits are not immediately reflected at the 
spatial distributive level. A 'welfare' economics not only 
attempts to identify the general trends of consumer 
practice from the aggregate of individual preferences, but 
uses value-empty terms to legitimate an otherwise 
undefined and illusory subjective measure of 'utility' for 
goods. There can be no clear indication as to what 
constitutes individual wellbeing or if resources are 
allocated in such a way that every individual has access 
to particular goods or services. The crucial element of 
subjectivism which is apparent in neoclassical theory is 
tantamount to economic irrationalism from which the source 
of distributional and spatial imbalances can be traced. 
The positivist paradigm which has dictated the form and 
style of work in human and economic geography under 
advanced capitalism is indebted to liberal economic 
location theory and the behavioural postulates of 
neoclassical 'rational economic man'. The analytical 
models devised by positivist methods of geographic inquiry 
in the sphere of political economy have tended to gain 
their appeal and scientific endorsement largely because 
they initially appear to present an empirically relevant 
case for understanding the structural issues at hand. The 
positivist pursuit has failed to critically review the 
imputation of the conceptual basis of its economic 
theorizing (see Harvey 1973, 153-189). Moreover, it tends 
to raise nothing more than superficial generalisations 
about economic activity and human behaviour and provides 
little scope for tracing the origins and historical 
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development of social spatial organisation. Its deficient 
epistemological dictums suggest that "... much current 
formal theoretical work in economic and urban geography 
appears to be heading in the wrong direction" (King 1976, 
308). 
The incredibility of the neoclassical 'rational economic 
man' concept has also been challenged by Pred (1967) who 
demonstrated that locational analysis did not conform to 
economic reality because the machinery which formulates 
policies and implements decision-making is not 
sufficiently scrutinized. If the ambiguities of the 
behavioural economic model are exposed, the economic 
geographer is either compelled to accept the non-
rationality of the theory per se, or substitute its 
conceptual status by introducing a normative stance. This 
does little to clarify the epistemological position of a 
`rational personality' and continues to suggest that a 
`normal' scientific approach provides man with a complete 
understanding of economic problems, even if he is unable 
to presently act upon them. Hollis and Nell (1975), 
however, assert that any concept of 'economic man' is 
neither a normative model of what ought to happen and nor 
is it a positive indicator of what actually does happen. 
Normative judgments tend to imply that a greater measure 
of social justice becomes apparent in distributional 
networks. This postulate demands some consideration of 
economic 'needs' and 'wants' as social concepts and to 
what extent these are derived and directed by an 
artifically created materialism. Harvey (1973, 103) 
suggests that if market demand is adopted as a socially 
just measure of need, then it is widely assumed to be 
socially just, but in practice, this is rarely the case. 
Public services, for example, are not fairly allocated 
throughout the class structure (see Smith 1978, 1979). 
Their provision is largely determined by their cost-
benefit advantage and not according to need. Nor have 
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local and regional governmental reforms and administrative 
changes succeeded in creating spatial equality in the 
distribution of goods and services. The decentralisation 
of economic decision-making is not therefore indicative of 
a greater measure of democracy or socio-economic 
responsiveness. Rather, political influences create 
resource constraints so that the needs and preferences of 
poorer working class areas, such as those in the inner 
city, are overlooked and become irrelevant. Resources are 
accordingly directed away from the inner city poor areas 
and attributed to the more affluent peripheral areas. 
The geographical mobility of the working class in the 
inner city is increasingly constrained by economic 
measures which restrict the spatial choice of residence: 
they have little hope of improving their social status or 
of moving into environmentally superior areas. The 
phenomenon of the inner city poor is contained and 
perpetuated where political decision-making eclipses 
economic concern in such a way that privileges are 
maintained only in those areas which are spatially 
distinct by their class exclusiveness (see Harvey 1974). 
The political and economic status quo of neoclassical 
geography reinforces the material quality of life to 
control their poverty (see Smith 1971, 156-157). 
The situation is further compounded by the diminishing 
role of the sovereign state in the contemporary 
international geopolitical arena. Efficiency of scale in a 
spatial context increasingly implies the loss of political 
power at the national level where the emergence of super-
national structures and inter-continental alliances 
centralise political and economic activity (see Johnston 
1977; Lee 1977a; Harvey 1981). Under this arrangement, the 
provision and distribution of public goods and services do 
not easily achieve a consensus unless it is presupposed 
that individuals are unselfish and participate equally in 
their concern for the acquisition of essential resources 
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(see Miller 1984). In effect, the responsibility for this 
role is left to quasi-independent corporations and multi-
national concerns which frequently pursue their own 
private interests without accountability to government. 
These enterprises may dictate wide areas of economic 
policy so that any expression of welfare or social justice 
is precluded by the overriding interest of profit margins. 
Rational choice and distributional equity become ever-
elusive so that socio-economic disparities and 
geographical imbalances are aggravated and become the 
norm. Economic decision-making of this type remains 
committed to the concept of sustained economic growth 
This serves only to advance the long-term ideal that 
disparities are gradually being recognised and remedied. 
The normative is harnessed as the nub of neoclassical 
economic systems. Hirsch (1976, 190) adds emphasis to the 
dilemma, remarking that: "Society is in turmoil because 
the only legitimacy it has is social justice ... The 
central fact of the modern situation is the need to 
justify." 
All the various social groups in advanced capitalist 
societies attempt to legitimise their different 'needs' 
through behavioural attitudes and group preferences. The 
intervention of political forces may generate wide social 
economic differentials through class discrimination which 
are reflected on a variety of geographical levels - local, 
regional, national and global. History confirms that 
policies which are supposedly intended to create full 
employment, sustain market competitiveness and efficient 
taxation programmes which would prevent disparities and 
injustices in the accumulation of material wealth, have 
failed to come to fruition in post-war Western Europe and 
North America. The problem fundamentally concerns the 
rigidity of the theoretical underpinnings in neoclassical 
economics and to what extent any genuine shift in 
government policy towards a socially 'just' distribution 
of resources would contradict the ethos of advanced 
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capitalism. Locational analysis serves as little other 
than a tool to measure economic profitability rather than 
a means to redress geographical disparities. The market 
system in capitalist societies is exploitative and its 
ends are inconsistent with any notion of social care or 
distributional equity. 
The values embodied in the 'perfect market' situation 
raise a number of ambiguities. Economic utility (use 
values) may assume a clear and definite meaning if, for 
example, it refers to the physical wellbeing and 
biological survival of individuals. Conversely, the market 
exchange economy may create superficial use values for 
goods and services which are not, by definition, essential 
needs but which are moreover designed to condition tastes 
and fashions. When individual social actors respond to 
these use values, consumer lifestyles and the nature of 
human social relations have a vague and unspecified 
identity which are manifested at the socio-spatial level, 
i.e. the identification of affluent and under-privileged 
areas and regions. Harvey (1973, 160) refers to these use-
values as: "... a mix of social needs and requirements, 
personal idiosyncracies, cultural habits, life-style 
habits ..." where each individual strives to improve his 
lot. If 'value' determines use, the commodity allocation 
may become susceptible to artificial scarcities and 
speculative pricing systems and ultimately, to deprivation 
for some. When scarcity is used to generate profit, it has 
no real validity as an economic concept, but has an 
immediate impact on geographical distribution patterns and 
resource controls. The capitalist market economy generates 
an overwhelming concentration of surplus product. This 
challenges the concept of scarcity on which the system 
depends for some of its profit-making. Much of this 
surplus must be consumed in anti-social ways (e.g. 
dumping, storage, defence spending) because there is no 
other alternative. 
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A revisionist outlook in neoclassical economic theory 
which raises the concepts of 'welfare' and 'social 
justice' suggests some measure of social responsibility, 
care and goodwill. These terms are charged with social 
ethics, i.e. some adherence to the lawful base of inquiry. 
Such an ultimatum at once appears practically elusive and 
idealist: how is it to be conceived, interpreted and 
applied? Any evaluation of social justice and welfare in 
terms of the 'common good' or 'merit' may remain dubious 
criteria for practical assessment and may easily be 
confused with the terms of neoclassical 'efficiency'. The 
ethos of the 'welfare approach' in economics and human 
geography (see Smith 1978) is that limitations on the 
accumulation of material wealth should be imposed where 
the interests of one or more individuals significantly 
outweigh those of another. This formula presumably 
functions at all societal levels and on every geographical 
scale. 
The welfare concept is preoccupied with the initiation of 
changes in the redistributive market economy. According to 
Rawls's (1971) theory of distributive justice, the 'more 
advantaged' may be persuaded (presumably on humanitarian 
grounds) to channel a part of their earnings towards 
improving the lot of the 'least advantaged'. This 
proposition seems, at best, an untenable form of liberal 
idealism as it is highly improbable that the rich will 
relinquish their wealth in sufficient quantities or for 
any sustained length of time to be of any substantial 
value to the world's poor. 
Welfare geography is not, by definition, a radical 
alternative to geographical problems. Moreover, its 
political liberalism provides little or no impetus for any 
sweeping changes in the exercise of political and economic 
power in social processes. Nor does it fundamentally 
abandon the classical aggregate economic growth model of 
Western capitalism. Smith (1973, 117-118) has attempted to 
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resolve the uncertainty of the welfare approach by 
emphasising its humanitarian content. He refers to "... a 
`people geography' ... for the people ..." which upholds 
the "... freedom and dignity of the individual ...". 
Welfare thinking does not entirely refute the positivist 
position in economics and geography, but attempts to 
somehow cut across it by fusing it with "... a passionate 
concern for the condition of mankind" (Smith 1974, 297). 
While welfare policy is committed to the eradication of 
injustices and the 'equalisation' of prevailing economic 
disparities, it tends also to suggest that ideological 
precepts are obstacles to individual freedom, human self-
fulfilment and wellbeing. This standpoint suggests that 
any understanding of government policy becomes fragmented, 
peripheral and barely meaningful and questions how this 
programme can be achieved, controlled, checked and 
regulated, and by whom. 
The emphasis of the welfare approach is strictly on the 
normative and idealistically appeals to the formation of 
interpersonal equality, yet has no real terms of reference 
with which to discuss the ethical considerations which are 
central to its argument. The welfare position is unlikely 
to avoid the ideological encounter. Folke (1972, 15), 
bas ing his evidence in Scandinavia, maintains that a 
liberal-social democrat order does not endorse a welfare 
approach: "... they are not interested in equality or 
justice, but in profit". 
Similarly, O'Riordan's (1976, 1980) environmental-
ecological approach which draws upon liberal humanitarian 
traditions does not appear to have made any significant 
impact towards policy reorientation and change in 
capitalist societies. Bale (1983, 68) adds that unless the 
economic and political power structure of multinational 
corporations, and the spatial discrimination and social 
inequality which their investment policies generate are 
discussed, then a welfare geography cannot adequately 
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explain the problems or advocate changes in developing 
countries. From a quantitative standpoint, Wallace (1978, 
94) highlights the limitations of the Lorenz criteron and 
expresses strong reservations as to the success of a "... 
just ordering of economic opportunities over space", owing 
to the complexities contained in a regional redistribution 
of factors of production and scale economies. The concept 
of the 'public welfare optimum' - like that of the 
`perfectly competitive market' - is both abstract and 
fictitious. A 'social welfare' model is strictly a 
planners' view of society, but is hardly recognised or 
accepted at the individual societal level (see Chisholm 
1971, 123-130). 
The dilemma of the liberal 'welfare' approach is in its 
insistence on the quantitative reshuffling of resources on 
the spatial level alone, so that the prescription for 
social ills is hinged on locational adjustments where: 
"... the geographical problem is to design a form of 
spatial organisation which maximises the prospects of the 
least fortunate region" (Harvey 1973, 110). Capitalism, 
however, is exclusively concerned with the accumulation of 
material wealth, the maintenance of (class) inequalities 
and economic competition, so that spatial disparities 
reflect the organisation of work, and in particular the 
division of labour which is clearly a social process which 
in turn generates spatial ramifications: "Inequalities are 
products of social and economic structures of which 
capitalism in its many guises is the predominant 
example... the solution of inequalities must be sought in 
the restructuring of societies" (Coates, Johnston and Knox 
1977, 256-257). 
MARXIST THEORY AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 
Marx fundamentally asserted that the capitalist mode of 
production could not resolve the contradiction between 
production for need and production for profit. Capitalists 
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broadly seek to multiply their gain over and over again. 
There are seemingly no limits to the accumulation of 
material wealth so that any notion of 'equality of 
distribution' or 'social justice' are quickly dismissed. 
Man becomes a part of the commodity market and the product 
of his labour is reduced to monetary equations. His work 
and effort are stripped of any personal hallmark so that 
under capitalism, work becomes an expolitative and 
dehumanising activity. Man is not only alienated from the 
product of his labour and from the control over the means 
of production, but through the division/specialisation of 
labour under capitalism, workers are progressively 
socially alienated from each other in the process of 
individual cooperation. This effectively fragments and 
alienates the individual himself expressed in terms of 
loss of purpose, meaning and self-identity. 
In his critique of capitalism, Marx shows that capitalism 
is not particularly concerned with what it produces nor 
with the distributional aspects of its production and 
marketing, but rather with the maximisation of profit 
which is derived from the sale of goods. Although Marx 
equated this universal phenomenon only in its economic 
context, he sought to enlighten the proletariat by 
emphasising the social and historical significance of 
every individual in a manner which he could understand 
(see Kolakowski 1978, Vol. 1, 131). For Marx, inequality 
and poverty are cumulative ills of the capitalist wage 
system which are identifiable in both a social and 
geographic context and which are subsequently passed on 
from one generation to the next: "... the directing 
motive, the end and aim of capitalist production, is to 
extract the greatest possible amount of surplus-value, and 
consequently to exploit labour-power to the greatest 
possible extent" (Marx 1967, Vol. 1, 331). Capitalism pays 
labour a sum less than the value of goods produced by the 
workers. It attempts to explain its position by asserting 
that different types of labour require different levels of 
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education, technical training and skills so that wages 
must ultimately reflect income differentials between the 
various categories of workers. Marx acknowledged the 
potential within capitalism to achieve 'balanced growth' 
but refuted this as a practical possibibility on account 
of the structure of social relations which are perpetuated 
in a capitalist society. The working class have inequality 
of access to the skill hierarchy and fewer educational 
opportunities. As capital accumulates, interclass 
inequalities grow against a background of class struggle 
and antagonism that emanates from the individual's social 
conditions of existence. The problems associated with this 
scenario may be further compounded when new trends in 
consumption are relayed through the consumer-oriented 
communications media. 
The point of tension, endemic in advanced capitalist 
societies, arises when overproduction, economic recession, 
public/welfare sector expenditure cuts and other 
rationalisation measures are recognised. This is generally 
coupled with diminishing levels of social and occupational 
mobility and the debilitation of spatial structures. These 
indicators pierce the myths of capitalist dogma and 
explodes the presupposition which allegedly equates 
increasing productivity with greater rewards and 
opportunities (see Peet 1977a). Moreover, productivity is 
necessarily checked, labour is shed as its value stagnates 
as a commodity while the internal contradictions in the 
social formation generate distinct areas/regions of 
geographic inertia. Crises within the capitalist society 
and the basis upon which Marx establishes his concept of 
class struggle and revolutionary practice is the 
transformation of the social and spatial environment. 
(i) DIALECTICAL THINKING 
Marx needed to transcend and ideally fuse two divergent 
modes of philosophical thought - that of the philosophy of 
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consciousness (an ontological idealism) and the new 
scientific rationality (a mechanical materialism) - in 
order to establish his methodological position. The common 
thread in both schools of thought was that man and his 
reason were autonomous and that objects (i.e. externals) 
should not dominate man. Unlike Kant, Marx's epistemology 
does not assume an absolute dichotomy between subject and 
object, but intrinsically inter-relates the two. Hegel and 
Feuerbach had attempted to uncover the earthly core of 
religion thereby reducing it into the human essence. Both 
Hegel and Marx agreed that the standpoint of subjectivity 
is negative. It lacks any explanatory power or the ability 
to shed meaning and understanding about the world. While 
`objective reality' is coerced in the subjective 
consciousness, this needed to be transcended to restore 
real vision about man and his environment. For Hegel, 
philosophical romanticism and its emphasis on 'subjective 
freedom' was aimless, discordant and self-fragmentary. 
Hegel's solution proposed the dialectical tension between 
apparent (positive) reality and its negative opposite. 
`Truth' is the whole, that is within the 'negation of 
negation' in which the 'contradiction' between thesis and 
antithesis is resolved at the 'higher' stage of synthesis. 
In Hegelian dialectics, the real world is the external 
phenomenal form of the process of thinking (i.e. 'the 
Idea'). The creation of pure thought which is superimposed 
on nature and society presupposes their unreality at the 
outset. Hegel's dialectics is a method based on man's 
active participation in historical process and his self-
reflective ability to understand this participation. By 
recognising the dialectical unity of the 'being-for-
itself' and the 'being-in-itself', the subjective 
consciousness surrenders itself to the realisation of 
`Absolute Spirit', that is, the final metaphysical 
synthesis. Marx rejected Hegel's system of an academic 
abstraction with the consequent loss of all objectivity 
external to the spirit. Marx substituted the Hegelian 
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`spirit' by the historical class and its practice so that 
material reality became the basis for both science and the 
critique (secularisation) of religion. The ontological 
basis of the philosophy of consciousness is transformed by 
Marx into man as the active social being (subject) in 
practice, but one which becomes historically concrete 
through his participation in work for his material 
existence. While Hegel's metaphysical premise effaced 
man's intellect and excluded questions of matter, Marx 
rejected the notion of any immanent logos as the 
embodiment of reason. By conceiving material reality as 
historically made by men and open to change through their 
practice, Marx's dialectical materialism interprets man 
and his 'freedom' in an evolutionary historical context 
rendering man as an 'object' of 'historical forces'. The 
existentialist doctrine of the unobjectifiability of human 
subjectivity is, by implication, rejected (see Pivcevic 
1970, 138). 
(ii) MARX AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
Marx argues that consciousness and knowledge are products 
of a social situation. Although Marx wanted to eliminate 
any dualism which divorced consciousness from reality, he 
simultaneously wished to maintain the independence of 
consciousness from external being (see Lorrain 1979, 37-
38). Marx rejects the notion of the spontaneity of ideas 
or any form of unconscious thinking which "... proceeds 
outside the above perception and imagination ..." (Marx 
1970, 207). Primarily, Marx claims that consciousness is 
determined by economic circumstances and cannot, 
therefore, be independent of man's material conditions. 
Marx suggested that concepts were the product of the 
assimilation and transformation of perceptions and images. 
Conceptualisation thus takes place in a social context 
against the background of a dominant economic base. 
Concepts and categories in themselves have no value 
position attached to them. According to Marx, they have no 
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existence outside of man, nor can they be teleological or 
constitute universal metaphysical 'truths' which have no 
definite structural relationship in an historic space-time 
context. 
For Marx, consciousness is intrinsically a part of basic 
human necessity, whose material expression is the need for 
man to cooperate with others to satisfy the conditions for 
his survival: "Consciousness is, therefore, from the very 
beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men 
exist at all (Marx and Engels 1970, 51). All human 
thinking and reasoning is relayed through the historical 
reality of society so that: "... consciousness can never 
be anything else than conscious existence, and the 
existence of men is their actual life-process ... Life is 
not determined by consciousness but consciousness by life" 
(Marx and Engels 1970, 47). Marx also notes that in a 
primitive societal context, man's consciousness is 
constrained and limited to the immediate social and 
natural environment, but in an advanced economy, it is 
conditioned by the prevailing set of social relations. 
Consciousness is never autonomous, nor can it emancipate 
itself from real (material) existence, i.e. the mode of 
production: It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their being, but ... their social being that 
determines their consciousness" (Marx 1970a, 181). 
Marx attempts to uncover the nature and form of the 
internal structure of society and consciousness in terms 
of its mode of production. Marx recognises that with the 
division of labour - particularly the division between 
manual and non-manual labour - consciousness risks 
assuming forms of idealism (in which Marx cites 'pure' 
theory, theology, philosophy and morality) so that man is 
placed in opposition to his material existence. In his 
scientific (cognitive) understanding/critique of 
capitalism, Marx stresses the primacy of existence over 
consciousness so that consciousness is unequivocably 
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reduced to material terms of reference, thus eluding the 
falsehood of idealism which reduces existence into 
particular states of consciousness. 
(iii) THE MODE OF PRODUCTION 
The guiding principle of Marx's work is centred upon the 
survival of the social system. To achieve this, men are 
compelled, independently of their will, to enter into 
social and productive relationships with one another. The 
realisation of these relationships constitute the economic 
structure of society upon which a superstructure can be 
formed. The concept of the mode of production as the 
foundation of the structure of society and as its 
determinant base is the logical conclusion of a 
materialistic philosophy (Peet and Lyons 1981, 191). 
Through this idea, Marx attempts to provide a structural 
explanation rather than a pre-formed science. This means 
that as a 'science', Marxist theory seeks to construct and 
reconstruct sets of theoretical relationships which 
transforms the structures of the social world. Marxism 
challenges society to surrender the ways in which it 
organises its experience and forms it values about the 
world. Macintyre and Tribe (1975) argue that Marxist 
theory leads society to think in terms of the world which 
falsifies the theory rather than the theory which disrupts 
social relations with the world. 
Insofar that the economic base is determinant, Marx's 
analysis asserts that the general process of social, 
political, cultural, religious and intellectual inferences 
are found at the 'lower' superstructural level. Human 
`freewill', as such, is not a recognised consideration. 
Since the economic base conditions superstructural 
relations, then man is without an inner consciousness as 
there can be nothing independent of his social and 
economic existence. Practice is man's specific mode of 
existence and this, according to Marx, is not the 
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manifestation of an external determination. The concept of 
work is man's sole condition of 'freedom' insofar that man 
satisfies his material needs and 'liberates' himself from 
environmental constraints. Practice, as conscious 
activity, is meaningful and purposive. 
Marx recognised that in capitalist societies where the 
division of labour sets up class differentiation, social 
reality emerges as a contradictory reality on account of 
the permeation of ideology in consciousness and existence 
itself. The conditions under which men work are the 
conditions of the rule of a definite class which maintains 
contradictory relations with other classes. Given that the 
division of labour is a result of man's reproductive 
practice, it is not a consciously intended result. The 
majority is controlled by those structures imposed by the 
dominant class and has no apparent means of removing them. 
The role of ideology is to negate and conceal those 
contradictions which are sustained in consciousness and in 
practice. Marx refers to the negation of real 
contradictions as an inversion of reality. As the 
capitalist process develops, the antagonism and 
contradictions which emanate from the individual's social 
conditions of existence are clarified and may precipitate 
a crisis (see Marx 1967, Vol. 1; Habermas, 1976; Held 
1980). 
The overthrow of capitalism and the subsequent elimination 
of the contradictions and antagonisms perpetuated by 
ideology in the class struggle can only be realised, 
according to Marx, through revolutionary practice. This 
alone has the power of transforming social relations so 
that labour is no longer contained in relations of 
domination. Marx, however, rejects the notion that 
revolutionary practice is contingent on men's freewill, 
but moreover insists that it is a transformatory practice 
which is conscious of the determination of circumstances 
to the extent that productive forces have so permitted. 
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For Marx, revolutionary practice, as the vehicle toward 
the removal of contradictions, is not effected by 
theoretical deductions or intellectual critique, "... but 
only by the practical overthrow of the actual social 
relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug" (Marx 
and Engels 1970, 58-59). 
SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF MARX: 
(i) ALTHUSSER AND PIAGET 
Although Marx has identified and isolated this existence 
of real problems in the social relations of production, 
his work has tended to generate more unsolved questions 
than it has answered. This is particularly the case in 
both the theoretical interpretation and the practical 
transposition of his theory. Much contemporary debate and 
controversy has focused on the dialectical relationship 
between base and superstructure and the possible extent to 
which this mediation has surpressed the role and 
significance of the latter. While Marx insists that the 
base guarantees the equilibrium and survival of the social 
relations of production, the harmony of superstructural 
relations may be equally important for the base to 
function smoothly. In Marxist terms, practice mediates 
between consciousness and social existence but there is no 
clear indication that social existence can be identified 
with or made exclusive to the base. Although social 
existence cannot be wholly dissociated from the economy, 
nor is it unconditionally subservient to the base (see 
Kosik 1976). 
The ambiguity of the distinction between base and 
superstructure was largely initiated by Marx himself 
insofar that he arbitrarily switched his terms of 
reference from one polarity to the other. Larrain (1979, 
64-66) shows that the treatment of the base-superstructure 
polarity in isolation from the theory-practice polarity 
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may compound the issue even further: "... the reduction of 
one polarity to the other may lead to either a theory of 
reflection or an idealist theory of interdetermination". 
Marx broadly recognised that superstructural elements are 
susceptible to all manner of ideological deviance (i.e. 
false consciousness) which are manifest in terms of social 
dogmas that influence/stifle societal change. 
Notwithstanding, socialism for Marx works best when the 
superstructure is cleared of any idealism, that is, when 
the totality of its forms - and the state of consciousness 
- is supportive, reflective and reducible to its material 
(base) condition. Concerning the position of scientific 
knowledge, however, Marx (1973, 699) posits it not only as 
a force of production (base), but also as belonging to the 
superstructure as a form of social consciousness. If an 
orthodox Marxist stance is taken, then particular (or all) 
forms of knowledge must be excluded from the 
superstructure. Timpanaro (1974, 17) suggests that if 
scientific knowledge (objective truths) is made 
coextensive to the concept of superstructure then it is 
decimated and becomes "... as relative and subjective a 
phenomenon as religion or law". 
If social survival requires the upholding of a particular 
economic base, then it follows that all superstructural 
elements must be made consistent with the mode of 
production. The economic preservation of a system can only 
be assured through the social stabilisatiaon of its 
participatory elements. This role is generally undertaken 
by the 'state' and appears in some form of 
instrumentalism. 
Jakubowski (1976, 38-59) asserts that some aspects of 
economic relations are directly conditioned by legal and 
political elements so that Marx's base-superstructure 
polarity may be theoretically acceptable for 
methodological formulations, but is untenable and probably 
non-existent in practice. In this light, it is difficult 
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to differentiate/identify which elements of social reality 
are operative, and to which level they are contained. 
Althusser's (1969) interpretation of Marx makes the 
relationship between base and superstructure as indirect 
and mediatory "through the various levels of a 'foliated' 
totality" (Gregory 1978, 110). Althusser's concept of 
structural causality is rooted in the historical movement 
of the mode of production in the capitalist system in 
which he raises the issues of 'contradiction' and '(over) 
determination'. Althusser shows that during pre-capitalist 
modes of production, workers had their own independent 
means of production so that surplus needed to be extracted 
from them by political (state) or ideological (the church) 
bodies. In the capitalist mode of production, workers no 
longer have ownership to the means of production so that 
surplus is directly obtained through the economic 
mechanism, i.e. the wage-labour market. In Althusser's 
concept of social formation under capitalism, the economic 
level is both determinant and dominant, so that the 
material, political and ideological conditions of 
exploitation must be reproduced both inside and outside 
production. Althusser suggests that the contradiction 
within the economic base of the structure, that is between 
the forces and relations of productions, determines the 
nature of the social formation since it reflects the 
dominance of a particular instance at any point in time. 
Contradictions, for Althusser, are cumulative and arise 
from different instances in the social formation, moving 
and developing unevenly through time, so that each 
instance is disproportionate in importance to other 
instances, yet all are intrinsically part of an 
interrelated and holistic network. Althusser's 
structuralism not only establishes a dialectical 
determination in the relations between the base and 
superstructure, but attributes a relative autonomy to the 
latter insofar that theory and practice under capitalism 
concern the material, legal, political and ideological 
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forms of the mode of production (Althusser 1978, 19-20). 
Furthermore, the concept of revolutionary change from one 
social formation to another does not, for Althusser, imply 
a definitive radical shift of all instances in the 
structural whole. A revolution in the mode of production 
does not - as Marx would want it - transform the 
superstructural instances, some of which (e.g. trade 
unions, the church) are resilient to modification/coersion 
and survive relatively intact (see Peet and Lyons 1981, 
195). 
Althusser's concept of social structure establishes a 
dialectical relationship between spatial relations and the 
social formation seen as a totality: spatial relations are 
structured by the social formation, while the social 
formation is itself partly determined by its relations 
with the spatial environment in which it is located. 
Reality, then is contained within this structured relation 
(see Callincos 1976). Althusser's dialectic of the 
structured relations between space and society had tended 
to intensify and compound understanding and explanation of 
human geography as political economy, not least through 
his insistence that it is not possible "to think of the 
process of development of the different levels of the 
whole in the same historical time" (Althusser 1975, 99), 
but rather to perceive each instance of the totality in 
terms of its own rhythm and temporality. If space also 
functions in this manner, then it too becomes disjointed 
and fragmented according to shifts within the temporality 
of the totality. Following Althusser's framework, Castells 
(1977) attempts to uncover spatial structure in terms of 
the mode of production whose elements comprise the 
economic (base) structure, the politico-legal instance and 
the ideological (cultural-symbolic) instance (see 
Castells 1977, 126-130; Gregory 1978, 118; Peet and Lyons 
1981, 198-199). Castells fundamentally bases his analysis 
on the assumption that spatial structure is a secondary 
consequence/expression of social structure. This delegates 
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space a position of relative inertia within which the 
dynamics of social structure - where the production 
element is paramount - invest space with significance and 
meaning. Space provides a means by which it is possible to 
make geographic differentiations of social and economic 
characteristics within and between regions. 
Under capitalism, it is seemingly unrealistic to review 
social relations in terms of a spaceless vacuum: the basic 
structures and contradictions in the mode of production 
are revealed in the dialectic between social and spatial 
relations. This assertion, however, raises the question of 
spatial fetishism so that space is attributed some degree 
of autonomy. Space may then appear as a unique structure 
with its own laws of inner transformation (see Harvey 
1973, 302-313). The concept of space must necessarily 
constitute a part of the totality since spatial structure 
is "also the domain within which - and, in part, through 
which - class relations are constituted ..." (Gregory 
1978, 120). The spatial environment - and perhaps, more 
importantly, the natural resources contained within it -
appears to occupy a relative autonomy but only insofar 
that man interacts with it in his practice. Man ultimately 
possesses the power and the means to participate 
responsibly with his natural (spatial) surroundings or 
alternatively, to abuse his domination over it. The over-
exploitation of natural resources in some regions, or 
distributional inequalities in the transfer of value from 
one area to another will be reflected in the structure of 
(socio-)spatial relations. In this respect, the 
impoverishment/abuse of the spatial component is not only 
contingent on the practices of the social structure, but 
simultaneously, spatial structures emerge as dynamic 
elements within the totality of structures and relations 
insofar that space expresses the positive and negative 
attributes of man's (social) decision-making, i.e. the 
concepts of determinate social formations. 
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On this point, Althusser's discussion of structuralism 
does not convincingly show how conscious human action 
transforms society and space. Moreover, he imposes a 
dualism between the role and contribution of science and 
ideology within the concept of the mode of production. In 
doing so, Althusser deviates from orthodox Marxist theory 
through his rejection of the concept of revolutionary 
practice as the means for transforming existing structures 
into a different form. 
On the one hand, ideology, for Althusser (1969), consists 
of images, concepts and primarily, structures which 
unconsciously imposes itself within the conditions of 
social existence. It is an objective level of social 
reality, but one which surpasses individual (conscious) 
subjectivity. Ideology appears as a determinate structural 
form and provides men with a particular representation of 
their world, and of their relations to it. Its function in 
relation to historical materialism is that it ensures the 
execution of essential forms of practice (work) and makes 
these tasks more tolerable. Althusser (1975, 66) attempts 
to defend his interpretation of man's ideological 
dependence through the insistence of the obtuseness and 
intransigence of social structure for individuals who are 
a part of this structure. Man mythicizes the 
representation of the world and therefore, the conditions 
of his existence in relation to other men. Ideology, for 
Althusser (1971, 156), is given and pre-existent to man, 
yet it is not an ideal concept but one which pervades 
material existence. Men live ideology by their 
participation in work. Althusser presents ideology as an 
ahistorical concept which is unrelated to class 
contradictions and, by implication, spatial inequalities. 
While ideology is made a functional requirement of social 
existence, Althusser is unable to explain its role in 
maintaining the cohesion of the social totality. 
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Ideology seemingly coerces and subdues the interests of 
the dominated classes, proliferates contradictions and 
cancels the possibility of revolutionary practice; that 
is, the conception of a non-ideological consciousness by 
Marx's terms. 
Since practice does not afford men the possibility of 
arriving at true knowledge and a profound understanding of 
the social or spatial structure, Althusser initiates 
science as the vehicle on which theoretical practice may 
be founded. Science becomes the antithesis of ideology and 
is locked in a permanent struggle against it to emancipate 
the consciousness of men. Science too, for Althusser, 
exists beyond historical contingencies, but moreover, it 
eradicates the need for class struggle in revolutionary 
practice and in effect, reduces man to a function of 
instrumentalism. Scientific truth which arrives from 
without, and which imposes itself by itself "is precisely 
and nothing less than the a priori of positivism" (Larrain 
1979, 197). Althusser's account of structuralism is not 
one where the result is accomplished in its mediation by 
human practice, but where science as the embodiment of 
knowledge teleologically produces knowledge by itself'. 
Science is otherwise elevated to an absurd mythical status 
above all other contingencies, while man's structures and 
practice are made subordinate to a quasi-transcendental 
idealism contained in ideology. 
Althusser's reading of ideology nonetheless remains 
pertinent insofar that under the structuralist tradition 
in classical Marxism, individual actors do indeed appear 
to participate in practice, while systematically failing 
to understand the social and spatial structures in which 
they are enmeshed and reproduce. The recognition of this 
aspect of the structuralist problematic has increasingly 
encouraged a reconsideration of the basic 
concepts/interpretation of Marxism, that is, towards a 
greater emphasis of the role of the individual agency (the 
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human condition, and all this implies and embraces) to 
discover contradictions and to provide a fresh perspective 
to review the tensions contained in social existence. The 
ramifications of such a theoretical reconstruction plainly 
invites a shift towards methodological individualism in 
socio-spatial analysis (see Giddens 1984, 1985; Elster 
1985). Moreover, in terms of Marxian analysis, it implies 
a move away from the primacy of the mode of production 
(determinant base structure) to the totality of the social 
formation: "... the social formation cannot be resolved 
into the classical Marxist formula of economic base and 
its ... superstructures. Legal and political apparatuses 
and cultural or ideological forms provide the forms in 
which the conditions of existence of determinate relations 
of production are secured, but they are not reducible to 
their effects and they are not organised into definite 
structural levels which merely reflect the structure of an 
underlying economic base. This means that political forces 
and ideological forms cannot be reduced to the expression 
of 'interests' determined at the level of economic class 
relations" (Hindhess and Hirst 1977, 57). 
The ethos of this methodological reorientation must not be 
seen in terms of attributing an autonomy to the 
superstructure, nor as an attempt to establish a specific 
co-presence in the base-superstructure and of structural 
causality. It simultaneously challenges the revolutionary 
schema embodied in Marx's science of history, and 
particularly the philosophical anthropology and ontology 
attached to Piaget's (1971) operational structuralism - 
that man has no determinate nature save the assumption 
that through his activity, man transforms his environment 
and therefore, himself. Piaget's position, in short, is 
broadly in agreement with Althusser's concept of 
structural causality and has attracted the attention of 
several geographers (see Harvey 1973; Brookfield 1975; 
Sayer 1976). Piaget's conceptual ontology of structuralism 
is strictly couched in bio-genetic evolutionary terms and 
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fundamentally can only discuss the mechanical 
(determinate) shifts in the "relations among [the] 
elements" (Piaget 1971, 9), but is unable to account for 
the dynamism of the totality (whole). As in all 
dialectical equations which deal with societal 
transformations (i.e. structural changes in the relations 
within and between the elements comprising the whole), 
Piaget's schema also encounters the ongoing problems and 
confrontations generated by the emergence of new conflict 
situations and contradictions in every synthesis. Piaget 
(1971, 98) equates structures with 'logical procedures' 
and 'natural processes' which fashion and shape the whole. 
His social totality is reduced to a logico-mathematical 
model in which man constructs/deconstructs, modifies and 
transforms his own 'universals'. Piaget fails to 
convincingly explicate the 'logic' (dynamism) of the 
`natural' process which govern his structuralism, both in 
terms of its historical spatio-temporal origins or of its 
scientific validation. 
The value of Piaget's epistemology in terms of its 
application to spatial structures is dubious. From a 
Marxist standpoint, it does not provide a bridge between 
theory and practice, nor does it expose/explain the 
relations between social and spatial structures and 
concepts, nor the means for resolving conflicts and 
contradictions once and for all. Piaget's model otherwise 
smacks of positivism insofar that its theoretical (logico-
mathematical) constructions do not lend themselves to any 
verification of the presuppositions and conditions which 
might determine the validity of the theory (see Hindess 
1977, 161). 
(ii) MANNHEIM'S 'SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE' 
Progress in human geography is seemingly contingent on its 
willingness to abandon classical Marxist (structural) 
theory to both explain the social relations of production 
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and also, to gain a clearer insight to the meaning of and 
relationship between society and the spatial environment. 
This calls for the unconditional (re-)introduction of 
human primacy not only in the theory of social and 
economic practice and its interaction with nature, but 
equally to uncover the meaning and purpose of individual 
and collective human social existence against the 
background of the natural world. This demands a 
clarification of man's ontological position in terms of 
socio-spatial reality and will therefore permit and 
reflect the reasoning through which he constructs his 
epistemological terms of reference and his methodological 
presuppositions. 
Such modifications must necessarily reject the notion of a 
causally determinate economic structure and process and 
removes the concept of work and labour from a position of 
predominance to explain social existence. Practice - as in 
a strict economic sense - becomes an inadequate measure as 
a basis for investigating social and spatial formation, so 
that its meaning must be reconsidered in a wider 
perspective Giddens (1985) has remarked that the legacy of 
socialist, social analysis remains useful insofar that it 
provides a yardstick for identifying the ills and 
contradictions in present society, but cannot 
simultaneously be interpreted as some futuristic, 
qualitatively superior, utopian idealism. Lefebvre (1977, 
349), however, in his 'Politics of Space', can envisage no 
other alternative and enforces the counter-argument that 
there can be "... no [new] ideas without a utopia". This 
form of reasoning (i.e. founded on the epistemological 
assertions of an underpinning 'optimistic humanism') 
constitutes an immediate risk to the potential 
realisation of truth claims and their validity in human 
geography, and more generally threatens to undermine the 
development and understanding of social theory. 
Any reorientation of geographic thought which seeks to 
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emphasize the significance of the individual consciousness 
(subject) of each social actor by the rejection of the 
terms of reference contained in classical Marxist 
structural explanation also risks the ideological 
encounter in the theoretical development of its 
standpoint. Much concerns the possibility of an objective 
truth being established within the context of historical 
social reality. A theory which associates itself with a 
form of utopian idealism must conclusively show that it 
has a complete and definitive understanding of truth in 
order to explain the necessary future direction of policy-
making and its social implementation. A utopianism whose 
claim is the offer of a new (future) perspective of social 
reality, realisable in practice, is coextensive with an 
epistemological absolutism based on an understanding of 
social life which commands the consensus of a universal 
class view. It must also necessarily transcend the 
interpretation of specific cultural phenomena. 
Mannheim (1968a) argues that when the development of a 
sociology of knowledge permits the participation of a 
`knowing subject' (man), then its methodology (as a social 
science) cannot interpret cultural phenomena exclusively 
in terms of the methods employed by the natural sciences. 
The types of knowledge established by the physical 
sciences, Mannheim contends, are derived from 
immanent/logico-mathematical laws, whereas the social 
determination of cultural objects requires an 
interpretation which "involves the location of cultural 
products within a totality of which they constitute 
meaningful parts" (Larrain 1979, 101). Conversely, in the 
social sciences, the determination of the genesis of 
knowledge, its content, scope and validity demands the 
recognition of existential reasoning (Mannheim 1972, 240). 
Further, Mannheim qualifies his position insofar that the 
realisation of qualitative truths in a sociology of 
knowledge cannot be achieved "except in the framework of 
an existential correlation between subject and object" 
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(Mannheim 1968b, 194), and again that "social relations 
and processes comprising the prevailing pattern of social 
life are determinants of the mental life corresponding to 
that particular social structure" (Mannheim 1968b, 192). 
Mannheim's position - derivative from both the work of 
Marx and of German historicism - is further compounded by 
the interpretation/relationship of the cultural products 
(elements) within a social totality (whole), since he is 
seemingly unable to specifically isolate the meaning of 
`totality' (see Mannheim 1968a, 73) and cannot therefore 
precisely say what categories are contained in it (see 
also Jay 1985, who encounters an identical impasse in his 
Marxian outline of the concept of 'totality'). Mannheim 
precludes the existence of eternal truths in the 
relationship between social thought and social structure 
so that his basic presupposition towards an understanding 
of the totality and its parts (and presumably then to an 
ontology of social reality) is a position of autonomy for 
the role of the 'subjective knower' (man). Insofar that 
Mannheim's analysis of social reality admits to the 
theoretical reconstruction of the particulars to uncover 
the mode of the totality, his procedure is akin to the 
inductive methodological approach (positivist) deployed by 
the natural sciences. Yet, the existential input in 
Mannheim's conceptual framework must cede to the existence 
of irrational aspects in the totality and its parts which 
are not reducible to 'normal' scientific analysis. 
In order to 'universalize' all the categories within his 
terms of reference, Mannheim (1968c, 289) disengages from 
the tenets of classical Marxism by dissociating knowledge 
and conscious reflection from the economic interests of a 
class: "We cannot relate an intellectual standpoint 
directly to a social class ..." (Mannheim 1968d, 184). In 
effect, Mannheim's 'existentially-determined' field of 
knowledge relativizes all disciplines of social science. 
This does not, however, provide a clearer insight and 
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understanding about the sociology of knowledge, nor of the 
truth-claims pertaining to the reality of social 
structures and nor, by implication, to spatial structures 
as composite parts of the totality. Moreover, Mannheim's 
attempt to reconstruct the theoretical foundation of the 
sociology of knowledge is rendered increasingly 
problematic by the imperative to establish a 
correspondence between the intrinsic (immanent) meaning of 
thought and the extrinsic (functional) meaning of its 
interpretation in social practice (i.e. to ground the 
meaning of the relationship between the transcendent and 
empirical reality). Mannheim (1971) introduces a dichotomy 
between ideological and 'sociological' interpretation in 
the structure of human thought. Unlike Marx, Mannheim does 
not attribute an ideological interpretation to the 
historical evolution of social contradictions and modes of 
production, but fixes it as a condition and expression of 
the social determination of a social group and its 
struggle against other (competing) forms of thought. The 
extrinsic manifestation of ideology arises therefore when 
individuals participate in a common social and historical 
process whose constraints and limitations restrict the 
potential experience and shape the mode of thought of 
those individuals (Mannheim 1968c, 291). The sociological 
interpretation becomes a 'relational' concept insofar that 
it attaches a functional meaning to the intrinsic (idea) 
meaning of a thought and therefore liberates it from the 
snares of ideology by locating it to a wider social 
context (i.e. to 'objective truth'). Conversely, the 
perpetuation of (different forms of) ideology is the 
result of the competition among social groups for 
supremacy which have generated different interpretations 
of truth and social reality. Ultimately, there are now 
fewer but more dominant world-views (Mannheim 1968b, 198-
210). 
Mannheim (1971, 124) does not, hoever, convincingly 
explain how the intrinsic truth of a thought is transposed 
265 
intact by its functional interpretation, thus evading the 
ideological sphere: "... extrinsic interpretation, while 
relativizing 'immanent meaning' by functionalising it, at 
the same time bestows a new sense on it, precisely by 
incorporating it into a higher context of meaning." It 
remains that the validity of any truth-claim of an idea is 
highly subjective insofar that Mannheim's 'existentially-
determined' approach becomes atheoretical by confining 
ideology to its extrinsic meaning and divorcing it from 
the intrinsic meaning of thought. Mannheim's (1972, 255) 
concept of 'particularization' (i.e. the limitation of the 
scope and extent of the truth-claim of an idea) renders 
the notion of relationism as neither entirely meaningless 
and false, nor absolute. Truth "cannot be formulated 
absolutely, but only in terms of the perspective of a 
given situation" (Mannheim 1972, 254). Mannheim thus tends 
to relativise the validity of truth-claims in his reading 
of the totality of society science, except insofar that 
the expression of ideology reflects the style of thought 
or outlook of the world held by particular social groups 
at particular instances in history. 
Mannheim does not, however, invite a critical examination 
of the truth content of 'social determination' (i.e. the 
interests, aspirations and characteristics of the social 
groups in which he posits the content of his analysis) so 
that falsehood or dogma can only be understood in 
relation to the truth or untruth of what it refers to" 
(Adorno 1973, 197). Ideology and truth are intrinsically 
connected one with the other, yet Mannheim - while 
acknowledging the ideal of absolute truth - refutes the 
possibility in practice of anything but partial truths, 
none of which can ever reveal the complete reality of the 
social totality. Equally, structures based on partiality 
cannot be mediated - dialectically or otherwise - towards 
the achievement of a definitive and permanent synthesis 
between socially differentiated and polarized categories 
of thought. Mannheim broadly sets ideological distortion 
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and utopian thought in opposition to one another. Neither 
can be decisive or total. While ideology "fails to take 
account of the new realities applying to a situation ... 
conceal[ing] them by thinking of them in categories which 
are inappropriate" (Mannheim 1972, 87), utopian 
distortions are "... those orientations transcending 
reality ... which, when they pass over into conduct, tend 
to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of 
things prevailing at the time (Mannheim 1972, 173). Thus, 
ideology reinformces the social reality of those who 
believe that their interests are represented in the 
present, while utopian (transformatory) standpoints 
represent a tendency in practice to destroy the social 
unreliaty/outdatedness of a prevalent ideology (i.e. the 
status quo). 
Mannheim (1972, 183-184) further distinguishes between 
`absolute utopias' (non-realizable) and 'relative utopias' 
(whose potential realisation is checked by the ideological 
strength of an existent social order). Yet, in the case of 
`relative utopias' which have come to fruition, many have, 
in retrospect, been suffused with ideology insofar that 
their social realization has imposed new unfreedoms 
concealed in the fabric of their social reality. 
Mannheim suggests that Marxist (socialist) thought and 
those social orders organised under capitalism represent 
the only two kinds of absolute utopian expression which is 
reflected in their perspectives of totality. This, for 
Mannheim (1972, 225) is a self-defeating position which is 
unable to sustain itself and whose false idealism will 
ultimately be superceded by the realisation and acceptance 
of the limitations of particular standpoints which are 
held by particular social formations. The 
limitations/partiality of the validity of truth claims 
does not, for Mannheim, obscure the accessibility/reality 
of the social totality, but moreover, the recognition of 
`existentially-determined' knowledge contributes to the 
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ongoing process of assimilation and transcendency in the 
"historical succession of thought styles" (Mannheim 1972, 
135-136). 
Although Mannheim's position is clearly a transgression of 
Marxist structuralism, if not, expressively 'counter-
revolutionary' in its theoretical content, it nevertheless 
recalls the epistemological debate into the arena of the 
`world-view' rather than restricting it to a specific 
class context. The most significant aspect of Mannheim's 
study for human geography is the reinstatement of the 
individual agency in the explanation of social and spatial 
formation and the extent to which ideology consciously 
deceives the 'knowing subject'. Whereas Marx restricted 
the scope of ideology as a distorted knowledge (false 
consciousness) imposed on the working class by a dominant 
elite to conceal contradictions and maintain the political 
status quo, Mannheim begins by universalizing ideology in 
all given historical social situations so that it becomes 
psychologised. In time, ideology progressively assumes a 
specific instrumentalist character and can be equated with 
the representation of the conscious deceipt and illusions 
of political parties and group interests. The partiality 
of truth and error in Mannheim's schema suggests that his 
interpretation of ideology contains little meaning and 
inhibits any possibility of epistemological certitude 
about socio-spatial phenomena. Marx, conversely, rejected 
the proposition of ideology as the universal determination 
of knowledge and did not consider his theory to be 
coexistent with ideology. Marx, on the one hand, professes 
the potential realisation of holistic social formations 
(truth), while Mannheim's rejection of the possibility of 
an exhaustive (absolute) truth suggests that the 
perspective of the thinker has somehow become 
existentially estranged from meaning, purpose and reality. 
Mannheim's version of social formations is therefore one 
of different shades of idealism as men seek to assimilate 
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different points of view. The relativisation of all 
propositironal truth-claims and categories of thought 
places human geography in a position of hopelessness where 
nothing - save partial truths - can be known. The 
partiality of all standpoints collapses the possibility of 
totality, objectivity and truth into a universal spirit of 
scepticism. The relationship between social process and 
spatial structure remains essentially obscure. Value-
freedom and suppositionless modes of thought will 
constitute the terms of social reality so that any 
representation/explication of socio-spatial phenomena 
through praxis is reduced to pragmatism. Moreover, the 
likelihood of any universal laws which might determine 
historical development must be dismissed since no absolute 
truth can ever be uncovered. Human geography - by this 
measure - is cast into the mould of Feyerabend's principle 
of 'anything goes' so that the outcome of all social and 
spatial structures can only be understood as products of 
`blind chance'. 
POST-STRUCTURALISM, NEO-MARXIST THEORY AND BEYOND: 
(i) THE HERMENEUTIC ENCOUNTER IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 
The hermeneutic schools of thought broadly call for a 
reconstruction of the theoretical foundations of social 
theory which in turn, might clarify the formation of 
social and spatial structure. All philosophical reflection 
is bound in a conflict of interpretations and because 
there is no agreement on a general hermeneutics, social 
scientists cannot speak of universals, but only of 
theories dealing with the possible avenues towards such a 
hermeneutics: The hermeneutic field ... is internally at 
variance with itself" (Ricoeur 1970, 26-27). Of the two 
main categories are 'restorative' hermeneutics and the 
`hermeneutics of suspicion' (see Ricoeur 1981, 6). The 
former seek to restore meaning by (empathetically) 
reconstructing the past (messages) and transposing it into 
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an understanding of the present: The true histories of 
the past uncover the buried potentialities of the present" 
(Ricoeur 1981, 295). The latter standpoint adopts a 
critical scepticism towards the given and categorically 
rejects the interplay of metaphysics (the symbol) and 
mysticism (the sacred) in human experience. Rather, the 
`hermeneutics of suspicion' regard the truth claims of the 
contents of consciousness as dubious, if not 'false' and 
seek to transcend this falsity through a reductive 
interpretation and critique. 
Post-structuralism addresses itself to an examination of 
contemporary social and political issues where history 
continues to motivate the nature and development of the 
underpinning philosophy and the style of social analysis. 
The emphasis is focused upon a reappraisal of the terms of 
reference on which rationality, reason, social reality and 
truth might be discussed. Post-structuralism attempts to 
identify those forces which inhibit radical change and 
which therefore prevent the realisation of an 
`emancipatory' route towards justice and freedom, and 
particularly those social institutions connected to the 
state. Although post-structuralism follows Marx insofar 
that it exposes the mechanics of the social and economic 
ills generated by advanced capitalism, it does not confine 
the possibilities of rationality and truth to specific 
class interests. While Marx contended that no claim to 
objectivity and truth could be separated from the 
practices of a particular social class (the proletariat), 
Lukacs (1971, 204) challenged the orthodoxy of this 
standpoint by drawing attention to Marx's failure to 
recognise the role of human subjectivity and individual 
consciousness in the determination of (objective) social 
practice: "(The consciousness of the proletariat is) by no 
means the invention of the proletariat, nor was it 
`created' out of void". Lukacs effectively subordinated 
the historical practice of the class to the conditions and 
limitations of consciousness. Following Dilthey and Hegel, 
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Lukacs (1971, 262) attributes consciousness a certain 
reflexive autonomy so that the 'subject (consciousness)-
object (practice)' equation - as the basis for the 
revelation of the social totality - becomes redefined: 
"... the strength of every society is in the last resort a 
spiritual strength. And from this we can only be liberated 
by knowledge." 
An equally important problem encountered by post-
structuralism concerns the seemingly inseparable 
relationship between science and ideology. As with Marx, 
post-structuralism reaffirms the disregard of history as 
the main source of ideological distortions, and therefore 
seeks a critique of ideology towards the development of a 
non-authoritarian/non-bureaucratic system of organisation. 
Notwithstanding, the 'determinist' and 'positivist' bias 
on the (Marxist) interpretation of historical materialism 
and its restricted methodology limited to the practices of 
a social class, renders the post-structuralist standpoint 
to reject most contemporary forms of socialism: "Soviet 
Marxism, with its dictatorship of the 'political, economic 
and military bureaucracy', is not equated with a programme 
for genuine socialist development" (Held 1980, 48). 
KNOWLEDGE AND KNOWING 
If the aim of the historical-hermeneutic sciences is to 
clarify meaning, then "geography will have to dismantle 
the oppositions between subject and object, actor and 
observer, and emphasize the mediations between different 
frames of reference" (Gregory 1978, 146). A purely 
subjective meaning of places risks locking geography into 
a narrow private assessment of personal experience which 
has little or no application to a general understanding of 
real social and spatial structures. Knowledge is an 
historical and anthropological constant in the 
constitution of social life, and therefore, of human 
existence. Societal reproduction cannot simply be reduced 
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to its material reproduction expression, but is always 
cultural: social groups of all types depend on and are 
mediated by knowledge. Stehr and Bthme (1986) refer to 
contemporary society as a 'knowledge society' within which 
all its spheres of activity are penetrated by scientific 
knowledge. It therefore follows that a scientific human 
geography must provide the bases for explaining and 
understanding the dynamics responsible for hierarchies and 
stratification, social class differentials, distributional 
imbalances and the measure of political influence 
contained therein, the meaning of individual and 
collective socio-spatial cohesion and intergration. 
The immediate pitfall associated with these issues tends 
towards the idealistic forms of interpretation which the 
position invites. A purely objective positivist stance 
collapses the question of meaning into an impersonal 
dimens ion which masks the interplay of conscious human 
activity in the formation of social and spatial 
structures. This cannot constitute the basis for a 
complete scientific human geography. Moreover, the 
relationship between 'systems of ideas' and concrete 
socio-spatial structures raises a philosophical dilemma. 
Kant fundamentally initiated a division in the unity of 
knowledge by his distinction between 'phenomenon' (the 
natural world) and 'noumenon' (the abstract world of 
thought/spirit). While the former is governed by causal 
laws of explanation, the latter is indeterminate and 
requires other ways of understanding. Heidegger (1962a) 
relayed the impact of Kant's thesis insofar that human 
imagination and the temporal nature of existence provided 
the only legitimate forum for examining the meaning and 
purpose of authentic being. For Heidegger, philosophy, 
rather than science, expresses the struggles, truths and 
deceipts (contradictions) of being-in-the-world. 
Husserlian phenomenology, with its insistence on the 
transcendental 'epoche' refutes the claim that historical 
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reflection can provide universals in the scientific 
understanding of society. Husserl's rejection of an 
empirical methodology in the social sciences casts his 
philosophical standpoint into one of over-subjectivity and 
cannot constitute the basis for a hermeneutic framework. 
Dilthey rejected any attempt to introduce metaphysical 
speculation in the corpus of historico-societal reality: 
the introspective notion of 'inner experience' was 
replaced by the concept of "structural relations in a 
psychic nexus" (Rose 1981, 108). Dilthey needed to 
transpose the subjective content of being into objective 
reality without recourse to metaphysical inferences. The 
description and analysis of the 'psychic structure' would, 
Dilthey maintained, reveal an epistemological basis for 
human science. This presupposes a 'reflective experience' 
within the psychic nexus which is then able to make 'inner 
experience' the object of legitimate inquiry. In this way, 
an understanding of the 'life expressions' (concepts, 
judgements, human actions and affective expressions) of 
the intersubjective (social) world could be reached. 
Although Dilthey recognised that the 'psychic' and the 
`natural' are distinctly separate, the mediation of 
experience intrinsically cuts across and links subject and 
object. Experience therefore dictates the function and 
relation in the meaning of the parts from which an 
understanding of the whole of experience is derived. 
Dilthey's hermeneutic approach is, nonetheless, 
problematic. The emphasis on 'lived experience' is 
unreliable insofar that Dilthey's system is grounded in 
the autonomy of man as the basis for all knowledge and 
understanding. Man creates his own fundamentals but has no 
certain point of fixed reference from which he can verify 
the authenticity of the particulars (meanings) which 
constitute the whole. The nature of human experience 
remains highly subjective and cannot be made coextensive 
with rational scientific analysis on the presupposition 
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that 'historical reflection' generates an 'empirical 
consciousness'. All understanding hinges on man's critical 
reflective judgement of historical experience. This 
standpoint is further restricted by the interpreter's 
specific cultural identity and by ideology (see Gibson 
1978, 139). An understanding and explanation of socio-
spatial structures through historical time and events 
remain rooted in human ideas and belief systems, but evade 
the question of any universal ethical determinates: "... 
the geographer's purpose is to understand man's 
experience; not primarily to judge what is lawful" 
(Lukermann 1964, 172). 
Weber's study of social structures suggests that 
`objectivity' had to be reduced to the terms of individual 
behaviour and then produce grounds on which some empirical 
validation could be made. Weber's concept of 
`rationalisation' is an attempt to uncover the 
`irrational' motivations which inspire human action, and 
to then attribute them a scientific understanding. Weber 
rejected Kant's standpoint of 'pure reason' and 
constructed an 'ideal type' of rationalisation in order to 
mediate between the subject-object dichotomy. Although 
Weber particularly wished to uncover the inspirational 
source of the irratironal actions/emotions which might 
explain the inhumanity of industrial capitalism, he 
rejected the Hegelian reductionist approach. Rather, the 
`putting of one's self in the place of the actor' to 
understand (past) intentions and actions still did not 
explain the nature and source of meaning. Nor could any 
measure of 'ideal' mediation through empathetic 
participation be an adequate vehicle for the 
objectivisation of subjective meaning. Religious and 
artistic experiences, as well as particular psychological 
states of mind (anger, ambition, pride, greed, loyalty, 
and so on) are difficult - if not impossible - to 
exteriorize in communicative form. Weber's principle of 
`causally adequate interpretation' for a sequence of 
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events, on which the probability of one action being 
linked with another by statistical analysis, hardly 
touched the subject-object dichotomy. 
On the other hand, Weber is attempting to clarify the role 
of freedom-of-choice in human intentions/activity, but he 
also seeks a value-free position for an a priori 
scientific methodology. This is tantamount to a philosophy 
of opposition which Weber fails to resolve: no 
(scientific) observer can be loyal to all interested 
parties: no scientist will theorize or accept a standpoint 
(value) in which he expresses little or no belief (see 
Bernstein 1976, 166-167; Gregory 1978, 145). Weber's 
obscure methodology does not make a convincing case for 
hermeneutic inquiry in the social sciences. 
It becomes apparent that a hermeneutic approach to socio-
spatial structures has largely been inhibited by the 
rigidity of competing paradigms in human geography. Much 
of the dilemma is an attempt to encourage any one 
particular 'concensus' of geographers to critically review 
their respective position and say what their paradigm is 
not'. This suggests the possibility of paradigm mediation 
where one or more philosophical standpoints may be 
theoretically fused with another (competing) paradigm in 
an attempt to formulate fresh epistemological perspectives 
and innovatory methodological procedures. Schutz (1967) 
argues that there can be no criteria for objectivity in 
the behaviour of individual social actors unless there is 
some consensus for subjective meaning. Although Schutz -
like Weber -- sought the empirical validation of his 
concept of the 'life-world', he needed to integrate a 
phenomenological input in his hypothesis to represent the 
problem of (subjective) meaning, and accordingly turned to 
Husserl. Hindess (1977, 57-58), however, notes that Schutz 
failed to show how a reflexive category could be 
integrated within a scientific (positivist) framework. 
Conversely, to abandon a rational (positivist) standpoint 
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towards a postulation that all life is Geist is tantamount 
to suggesting that 'Being' (existence) expresses itself 
most completely in art, philosophy and religion rather 
than materialism (practice). 
Gadamer's route towards the realisation of a complete 
hermeneutics is to sever the 'romanticism' contained in 
the historical consciousness. Unlike the 'objective' 
methodology of the natural sciences, man cannot truly 
`take a distance' in historical events because he is 
always situated in history. A person's own recalled past 
experiences are reflected upon in an attitude of 
wholesomeness by his consciousness. This ought to permit 
the conditions for "placing ourselves" in the context of a 
particular historical situation (Gadamer 1975, 271). For 
Gadamer, it is the primacy of 'judgement' in man's 
thinking and behaviour towards the social world which 
releases the potential of the hermeneutic standpoint. 
Thus, the 'authority' of social actors is based less on 
`reason', more on the 'acceptance' and 'reception' that 
their 'judgement' and insight are 'superior' (Gadamer 
1975, 248). Gadamer therefore attempts to place claims to 
(historical) truth in the concrete setting within which 
they are first experienced. The revelatory path to 
understanding and truth is encountered in pre-theoretical 
experience rather than in the objective (outside) sphere 
of scientific reason. 
Gadamer contends that only a radical ontological unheaval 
- set within the parameters of temporality and the 
finitude of existence - can produce the epistemological 
and methodological clarity which, as yet, obscures the 
true historical dimension of man (i.e. understanding). 
Gadamer's hermeneutics provides no transcendental 
grounding for human experience. Rather, it is a 
`metaphysics of finitude' not unlike Heidegger's terms for 
Dasein's 'potentiality-for-being-a-whole'. The conditions 
of truth and understanding are, according to Gadamer 
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(1985), to be found in the finitude of historical 
dialogue. Put otherwise, existence can be understood in 
language which becomes a possibility - condition of truth. 
Any consensus over the interpretation of language 
necessitates a structure of presuppositions which are 
bound in cultural tradition. It therefore follows that 
Gadamer's hermeneutics require a prejudgement structure 
for the interpretation/understanding of meaning to which 
all cultures have access. 
In terms of its relevance to socio-spatial understanding 
and explanation in human geography, the historical-
hermeneutic approach neither dismantles nor resolves the 
tensions and oppositions between subject and object. The 
hermeneutic sciences maintain that human thoughts and 
actions - and therefore, the basis for meaning - are 
grounded in rationality. Guelke (1981, 140), in his 
idealist interpretation of geography, maintains that: 
"Once a geographer has been able to demonstrate a rational 
connection between the geographical behaviour of a group 
and its thought ... he has succeeded in providing an 
explanation of their behaviour. This explanation does not 
rest directly on laws or theories", Guelke (1974, 202; 
1981, 141) claims that the causality of human behaviour in 
specific social, economic and political contexts defines 
the conditions for rationality. On the one hand, Guelke 
(1974, 193) wishes to represent the terms of rationality 
as purposeful, observable specific acts that enable "a 
method by which one can rethink the thought of those whose 
actions he seeks to explain". Conversely, Guelke (1981, 
136) concedes that "meanings will vary in relation to the 
ideas and backgrounds of those who might be concerned 
about then", so that "different interpretations can often 
survive quite happily because of the lack of data and the 
difficulties in precisely inferring an agent's intentions" 
(Guelke 1974, 202). 
An idealist interpretation for human action and meaning 
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collapses at this point because there can be no 
consensus/understanding or rationality since its bases can 
neither be subjectively defined nor objectively verified. 
It cannot be presupposed that there is any rational 
connection between what people do and think. Geographical 
behaviour - insofar that it refers to the ways in which 
man exploits environmental resources and builds socio-
spatial structures in which distributional networks 
function - does not always reflect rational strategies. 
Moreover, geographical activity is frequently motivated on 
a non-rational basis. This does little to reinforce 
Gadamer's (1975, 262) claim that the task of hermeneutics 
is to "clarify the conditions in which understanding can 
take place". Rather, it emphasizes the shortcomings of a 
social science whose hermeneutical methodology is 
restricted to the terms of conscious meaning, while 
omitting the deeper, unconscious content of knowledge from 
the problems of existence. 
The major pitfall in the hermeneutic approach to human 
geography is found in its methodological introspection, 
expressed in its detraction from value judgements, for 
which it lacks any adequate terms of reference. While 
Giddens' (1976, 1979, 1984) 'concept of structuration' 
attributes greater importance to the role of individual 
actors in the transformation of structures, he maintains 
that 'social forces' may only be interpreted as the 
configuration of intended or unintended consequences of 
action undertaken in specifiable contexts. Nor does 
Giddens claim that these necessarily constitute a rational 
basis for moral or political judgement. Moreover, Giddens 
(1985) view of historical objectivity/change seemingly 
posits social actors in conjunctures of causal processes 
over which they have little or no influence (see Bhaskar 
1975). This suggests that although social actors produce 
and transform social and spatial structures, the absence 
of a universal axiom which might provide the norms for 
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social behaviour imposes limitations on human 
understanding and explanatory ability. 
Insofar that theories of unintended consequences permit 
the process of social and political life to be explained 
in an 'objective' and structural manner without clear 
recourse to the intentions and purposes of the social 
actors participating in these processes, the essence and 
appearance of the social and historical totality may be 
covertly promulgated as ideology (see Minogue 1985). The 
dilemma of dehumanized man - whose actions and 
epistemological terms of reference are couched in a 
concept of 'autonomous freedom' - reflects his loss of 
meaning and purpose which the historical-hermeneutic 
sciences have failed to recover. Theories of 
`reconstructive' sciences cannot hope to be 'pure' or 
ideologically 'emancipated'. Ideology permeates through 
every level of thinking and social explanation on the 
basis of the hermeneutic mode of inquiry (see Hesse 1982, 
115). The real impoverishment of the human condition 
remains concealed behind the theoretical facade of value-
freedom. The historical-hermeneutic position cannot 
provide a 'logical sequence' of thought in human 
intentionality, nor a rational belief for discussing human 
actions. Moreover, the defining features of individual 
human existence are unlikely to be found in human praxis, 
thus confirming the failure of hermeneutics "to elucidate, 
to bring into our consciousness, the constitution of 
irredeemably practical structures " (Gregory 1978, 146). 
The preclusion of a moral imperative in human thinking and 
behaviour immediately fragments any understanding and 
explanation of socio-spatial process and structure. 
Theories and concepts of historical change and objectivity 
do not unequivocally clarify fundamental problems relating 
to epistemological and existential uncertainty. Rather, 
they direct attention to the need to grasp the factors 
which bring about man's state of being and which 
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precondition and set limits on the possibilities of 
historical change. To these ends, Guelke (1975, 138) 
suggests that an understanding of human behaviour is 
ultimately beyond the scope of human geography alone, and 
that geographers "need to rethink not their techniques but 
their philosophy". Conversely, for Blowers (1972, 291) the 
prerequisite "is that the values upon which research is 
based are made explicit [so that] we may unmask the false 
objectivity that covers much of our research and confuses 
our interpretation of findings". 
Perhaps the most daunting postulation to emerge from the 
historical-hermeneutic sciences is that historical 
knowledge is intrinsically tied to the historical 
condition in which human existence is contained. On this 
basis, a science free from prejudice is impossible. 
Moreover, "the privileged experience ... is no longer the 
history of the historians, but rather the history of the 
question of the meaning of being in Western metaphysics. 
So it seems that the hermeneutic situation within which 
the interpretation unfolds ... is provided by the history 
of metaphysics" (Ricoeur 1981, 69-70). 
(ii) CRITICAL THEORY: 1. THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL 
The 'Frankfurt School' and the 'critical theory of 
society' which it expounds has an important bearing on the 
nature and interpretation of socio-spatial structures in 
human geography. As a school of neo-Marxist thought, 
critical theory attempts to draw attention to the 
reasonableness of means and ends in scientific procedure, 
and particularly those designs and processes which are 
associated with the technocratic state under advanced 
capitalism. Critical theory questions the rationality of 
state decision-making and human praxis when it is governed 
from the standpoint of instrumental reason. It suggests 
that the scientific manipulation of social processes has 
subjectivized the meaning and understanding of reason to 
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reinforce the political and economic interests of the 
technocratic elite. The practical translation of this 
dominance is the distortion of social reality which, in 
turn, reflects the instability and contrived nature of 
spatial structures. 
Like Marx, critical theorists are concerned with the 
problem of social domination and the possible routes by 
which individuals might be emancipated from the rigidity 
of their present structures. While critical theorists also 
maintained the historicity of knowledge, they diverged 
from orthodox Marxism through their insistence that claims 
to objective reason and truth were not dependent on the 
practices and interests of a particular social class. 
Following Lukacs, critical theorists reiterated the 
underscoring of human subjectivity and consciousness as 
the fundamental shortcoming in Marx's understanding and 
interpretation of human praxis. Rather, critical theorists 
sought the possibility of an independent moment of 
criticism" (Held 1980, 15). The early work of the 
Frankfurt School in the 1930s - especially that of 
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse - was focused on the 
development of a critique of ideology which would expose 
those beliefs which conceal and distort social reality, 
particulary those aspects of 'false consciousness' and 
social contradictions perpetuated by social systems of 
organisation. Horkheimer and Adorno (1972, 26-28) claim 
that technological reason in industrial society compels 
people to conform, comply and participate in society in 
the (self)interest of survival. This is synonymous with a 
pragmatic acceptance of existing institutions in the state 
machinery and the adoption of its false consciousness 
(ideology). People do not understand the reality they 
experience. The conservative ideology, within which and 
from which socialization processes are contained and 
disseminated, is otherwise unrepresentative of individual, 
privatistic reality and moreover imposes deviance and lack 
of consensus in meaning and understanding. 
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The critique of ideology propounded by the Frankfurt 
School drew upon an interdisciplinary research programme 
whose theoretical rubric accommodated political, economic 
and cultural phenomena together with psychoanalysis, from 
which it was intended to reveal social antagonisms at the 
level of the individual actor. The sense of critique 
necessitated the subjection of all spheres of life to new 
ways of (radical) reassessment. Horkheimer and Adorno did 
not envisage any impending transformation of capitalism 
but thought that through a critique of ideology, a 
conscious awareness of its systematic mechanics could be 
enhanced, precipitating a possible challenge and 
undermining of the existing dominant structures: "The 
Frankfurt School's criticisms of contemporary culture, 
authoritarianism, bureaucracy and so on were intended to 
help foster independent thinking and the struggle for 
emancipation" (Held 1980, 363). 
Although Lukacs based his account of historical 
materialism in terms of class and class conflict - 'the 
standpoint and struggle of the proletariat' - his concept 
of 'reification' enabled critical theory to gain impetus. 
Horkheimer and Adorno recognised that by the terms of 
scientific reason, reification reduces social relations to 
an impersonal, objective level. The onus is squarely upon 
the productive processes which diminish the worker and his 
product to the appearance of commodities. Under scientific 
technocracy, men on the one hand believe that social and 
technical processes create conditions of freedom from the 
constraints of nature which promise new, superior 
structures; yet, in reality, its 'enlightenment' is 
totalitarian and enslaving. The appearance of structures 
is the outcome of illusion so that subjective rationality 
becomes the subjection of all reality to logical 
formalism. The reification of the industrial world is the 
central structural problem of capitalist society in all 
its aspects" (Lukacs 1971, 83). A critical analysis of the 
nature and impact of reification contains, for Horkheimer 
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and Adorno, the means for apprehending the "relative 
irrationality of the total process " (Lukacs 1971, 102) as 
well as the possibility for establishing some truth-claim 
about the reality of the social whole. 
Critical theory is concerned with the relationship between 
structure and social practices, but largely disconnects 
this examination from any particular class interest. The 
analysis of social phenomena provides the ground where the 
mediation of the objective and subjective is apparent. 
Much of critical theory is focused on capitalism as a 
specific historical form and that social practices tied to 
its material conditions are unreasonable insofar that they 
reflect only one facet of conscious existence. Although 
critical theory follows the traditions of Kant and Hegel, 
it rejects those aspects which resort to forms of 
transcendental methodology and idealism. This stance also 
outlaws the position of phenomenlogical and existentialist 
philosophies. A positivist understanding of science is 
equally dismissed on account of its autonomy and 
detachment from meaning and purpose in the social world. 
Orthodox Marxism and dialectical materialism can neither 
provide a basis for the reality of process and structure - 
critical theory rejects the primacy of determinate 
economic laws which futuristically move society and space 
towards some ideal state of existence in history: The 
acknowledgement that Marxism in its Stalinist 
manifestation became a repressive ideology - thereby 
confirming that as a body of ideas it is not the sole key 
to truth - constitutes one of the crucial premises of 
critical theory" (Held 1980, 359). Moreover, the 'critical 
activity' which emerges from the social structure is 
essentially related to the nature of the social totality 
so that the concept of the (capitalist) mode of production 
is central to critical theory, but with the proviso that 
critical theorists "interpret the economic categories of 
work, value and productivity exactly as they are 
interpreted in the existing order, and ... regard any 
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other interpretation as pure idealism" (Horkheimer 1972, 
206). 
The fundamental shortcoming of critical theory in the 
Frankfurt School is in its admission over the difficulty 
and extent to which individual social actors might be 
`enlightened', and therefore, the degree to which subjects 
would actively participate in a struggle against existing 
structures. Bernstein (1976, 184) contends that the 
Frankfurt School lacks a convincing argument to show how 
conflicts and contradictions in traditional theory are 
eclipsed by the 'better judgement' of hermeneutics and 
linguistics. The nature, and the means of addressing the 
concerns of the 'emancipatory' potential are largely 
underplayed by Horkheimer and Adorno. To this extent, the 
Frankfurt School - with the notable exception of Marcuse's v4ocV_ 
-fo,.As 1/40 eceilNe. One con/Aims for an 
k active radical political economy or 	 social and spatial 
organisation. Its conception of society fails to reconcile 
the individual's constant engagement and struggle with 
political (authoritarian) domination and the economic 
mechanisms which govern the distribution and allocation of 
resources, and which are therefore responsible for the 
shaping of socio-spatial structures. Additionally, Held 
(1980) and Jay (1973, 1986) both suggest that a 
significant deficiency in the Frankfurt School's 
conception of capitalist and socialist development might 
be attributed to its experience of the authoritarian state 
under National Socialism and Nazism. 
Moreover, critical theorists have seemingly been unwilling 
to consider/assimilate human attributes which cannot be 
adequately contained or discussed by the terms of 
reference of 'normal' scientific inquiry, and particularly 
if these are non-reducible to the material essence of 
social practices and structures. This is seen most 
pertinently in the area of metaphysics, idealism and 
belief systems. Critical theorists refute the validity of 
any propositional truth-claims which expire from these 
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forms insofar that they are not based on reason or 
rational (critical) systems of thought, and cannot, 
therefore, purport to provide the epistemological 
foundations for theory and practice. Although the 
development of critique in the Frankfurt School 
encompassed wide interdisciplinary areas of thought, 
`closed' and meta-philosophic systems are clearly 
anathema to critical theorists and exemplify the case 
where they "resisted any eclecticism which threatened to 
attenuate their critical intentions" (Gregory 1978, 157). 
EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY IN THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL 
The legacy of the Hegelian dialectical methodology 
provides a vital insight to the structure and aims of 
critical theory under the work of Horkheimer, Adorno and 
Marcuse. Their interpretation of Hegel's philosophy and 
method illuminates both the possibilities and limitations 
of contemporary critical thought and the extent to which 
social processes can realize the goal of 'emancipation' 
and therefore, the emergence of new, 'rational' 
structures. The divergent theoretical positions generated 
by the work of these three critical theorists merit 
further attention insofar that fresh perspectives and 
interpretations about the present and future nature of 
socio-spatial process and structure are discernible. Human 
geography, moreover, is afforded the opportunity to review 
the apparent advantages of incorporating a wider 
interdisciplinary approach in its methodological inquiry 
and equally, towards a reappraisal of its epistemological 
backcloth in the light of a critical interpretation of 
contemporary political economy. It is at this juncture 
that geography is confronted by, and becomes interlocked 
with ideology in its most disclosed terms of reference. 
Put otherwise, the ideological forces which attempt to 
mask social reality and reason and the rationality of 
human structures (and more generally, of existence itself) 
are most acutely defined in the context of their material 
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expression. Ideology establishes an arena in which the 
individual social actor is cast an an alienated, 
depersonalised and unknowledgeable being. Against the 
backdrop of a potentially totalising dynamics of 
domination and dehumanisation, human geography, it seems, 
is ultimately compelled to clarify its philosophical 
allegiances through a confrontation with, or submission to 
the ideological premise, and thus, critically reinterpret 
the presuppositions on which its epistemological status is 
based. 
MARCUSE 
Marcuse (1968) adopted critical theory as a means for 
uncovering distortions in social structures so that a 
recovery of truth would promote a clear understanding of 
social practice under past and present conditions. This, 
he maintained, would expose the unrealized potentialities 
contained in the human condition which, in turn, are 
"linked directly to the realization of nature's inherent 
possibilities" (Held 1980, 243). Marcuse asserts that 
historical conditions - rather than epistemological 
precepts - constitute the validity of propositional truth 
claims. He begins with the presupposition that man is the 
logical and rational point of departure in social analysis 
and reason as determined in specific social situations. 
Marcuse (1964, xv) primarily sought a synthesis within a 
sharply defined dialectic which postulated: "(1) that 
advanced industrial society provides the scope for 
qualitative change for the forseeable future; (2) that 
forces and tendencies exist which may break this 
containment and explode the society". 
Marcuse maintained, on the one hand, that the multi-
faceted organisational structure of capitalism appeared to 
safeguard its forseeable economic future. This, he 
claimed, had largely been assured by the development of 
its productive forces - the concentration of capital and 
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financial control, technological innovations, the 
increasing curtailnment of free competition and growing 
state intervention. Contemporary nation-state economies, 
Marcuse argued, were eclipsed by an international 
structure which, in the capitalist world, integrated 
economic and monetary strategy with military (geo-
political)concerns. Technocracy and corporative interests 
increasingly occlude the antagonisms which exist in socio-
spatial structures. Conversely, Marcuse (1972, 7-37) 
counterbalances the material and ideological expansion of 
capitalism with the possibility of revolutionary 
transformation, but in a less forceful vein than in 
orthodox Marxist theory. The revolutionary struggle 
against domination is, according to Marcuse, restricted to 
a diminishing number of activists in advanced capitalist 
nations - state propaganda (ideology) masks contradictions 
(reality) and checks individual disequilibrium.— 	 and 
is manifested in a climate of general social and economic 
unrest. 
The mainstay of Marcuse's concept of revolutionary change 
is grounded in the belief that international capitalism 
will ultimately self-destruct when its contradictions 
attain a critical point. More explicitly, Marcuse (1972, 
7) points to the growth of poverty, wide disparities in 
the distribution of wealth between "a vast working class" 
and "a small, parasitic ruling class", the increasing role 
of technology in production processes, material wastages 
and conspicuous economic and distributional imbalances in 
the Third World which will foster the formation of anti-
capitalist social forces. Two further provisos emerge from 
Marcuse's observations: first, the intensification of 
ideology (the threat of international communism) and the 
possibility of (nuclear) conflict; secondly, the possible 
emergence of fascist movements as a result of the 
uncohe5iNe • expression and geographical disparateness of 
protest in the capitalist world. 
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Marcuse (1972, 124) envisages harmony in the social 
structure only through "the development of an effectively 
organised radical Left, assuming the vast task of 
political education ..." The route towards this 
`emancipatory' process and the demise of the capitalist 
order is, in Marcuse's view, conA2.ained by the weakness of 
the human 'sujective factor'. In order to transcend the 
ideological tenacity of instrumental reason, Marcuse 
appeals to a reinterpretation of the Hegelian dialectic 
and to certain aspects of Marx's early ideas concerning, 
for example, the themes of alienation, the potential for 
socialism within the 'anarchic' working class and the 
utopian perspectives of future trends. Central to 
Marcuse's theoretical arguments is Hegel's (1966) concept 
of determinate negation. Hegel rejected the notion of a 
dichotomy between subject/consciousness and reason as 
being independent to the objective domain. Consciousness, 
moreover, clarifies its relations with the objective world 
through a process of continuous negation. The subject-
object relationship can only be fused through the critical 
reconstruction of knowledge. Nor, Hegel maintained, did 
the conditional nature of (partial) knowledge necessarily 
collapse into scepticism or relativism, but rather 
directed the subject to the 'the truth of the whole'. 
Hegel's dialectical method challenged the apparent 
rigidity and dogma of systematic philosophies and belief 
systems which, on Hegel's account, resisted the 
possibility of critical reflection and dismissed dissent 
as irrational thinking. 
Critical theory, by the Hegelian method, claims a means 
for surmounting the partiality of perspectives, but unlike 
Hegel's final transcendence of all subject-object dualism 
in the ultimate revelation of the universal, absolute 
Idea, Marcuse (1960, xiii) needed to show that Hegel's 
philosophy could be grounded in a materialist critique 
not by substituting for reason some extrarational 
standards, but by driving reason itself to recognise the 
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extent to which it is still unreasonable, blind, the 
victim of unmastered forces". This change of emphasis 
represents a crucial difference between the 
presuppositions held by Hegel (the notion of the complete 
or 'closed' dialectic). Critical theory, for Marcuse, 
does not accept the inevitability of fulfilment (i.e. the 
realisation of the ultimate/ideal structures) through the 
`negation' of the negation'. Rather, no dialectical 
process can be 'closed' in a social and economic sense 
until social actors - through their autonomous 
reason/critical reflection - achieve the condition of 
`emancipation' (freedom). 
Marcuse's interpretation of the dialectical method 
stresses its potential to actualize the 'coming-into-
being' of concrete reality (social relations). Hegel's 
dialectical thinking represents not only the possible 
realisation of the universal (the totality of relations) 
and an understanding of the components (particulars) which 
constitute its 'whole', but also the embodiment of the 
rational structure of being (existence). The (presupposed) 
content of the universal must be lodged in the 
concept/notion attributed to it by the inquirer - thus, 
for a critical theorist, the 'emancipation' from the false 
reality of technocratic structures. The dialectical method 
is made synonymous with 'truth' insofar that it allegedly 
contains the dynamics of 'being' and potentially unfolds 
the realization of 'completeness' (subject-object 
reconciliation). In terms of the unmasking of ideology, 
Marcuse (1960, viii) believes that 'determinate negation' 
exposes the internal inadequacy (the contradictions) in 
current structures by disclosing "the way in which the 
real opposes and derives potentialities inherent in 
itself" (Held 1980, 229). 'Negative thinking' therefore 
exposes the essence of any finite object both in terms of 
`what it is' and 'what it is not', thus enabling the 
process of synthesis (seen here as a 'stripping-away' or 
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`bracketing' of the contradictions which conceal the 
reality/truth of a thing) to continue. 
Both Hegel's and Marcuse's concerns tend to raise aspects 
of phenomenological investigative methodology, especially 
in the problems encountered in the transcendence 
(negation) of contradictions towards the unveiling of 
reality. Although Marcuse broadly recognised Heidegger's 
concept of the 'inauthenticity' of existence, he rejected 
the abstract/quasi-metaphysical terms of 'Being' for the 
social analysis of human structures. Moreover, Marcuse 
wanted to ground the phenomenological (reflexive) aspects 
of thought into a dialectic of concrete (historical-
materialist) existence. Heidegger's standpoint needed to 
be overruled because its content suggests room for 
ahistorical (mystical) interpretations which defy the 
bases of scientific enquiry. Instead, Marcuse (1966, 113-
114) appeals to Freud for a conception of the ontological 
meaning of Being: "Ananke [scarcity] is experienced as the 
barrier against the satisfaction of the life instincts, 
which seek pleasure, not security ... the 'struggle for 
existence' is originally a struggle for pleasure". 
According to this interpretation, human existence is 
grounded in eros, but the increasing coercion of the 
individual ego by social (technocratic) reason estranges 
it as a subject of eros. For Marcuse (1970, 13-17), the 
"reification of the ego itself" is tantamount to the 
surrender of the individual's (self-)identity and ego-
ideals to the 'group ideal' as is manifest in state 
ideology. The psychology of the individual becomes 
ideologically stereotyped and constrained by false values. 
`Being', as such, is inauthenticated by the irrationality 
of thought and practical structures. The repressive impact 
of the reification of social relations through ideology 
creates a 'disembodiment' of the ego from the individual's 
(personal) existence. The expression of the totality of 
social realtions, for Marcuse (1970, 24) is one of 
alienation and fear (angst). 
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The retrieval of individual wholesomeness becomes, for 
Marcuse, a two-fold function. First, a reconciliation with 
material needs insofar that scarcity can only be mediated 
by practice (labour) so that the ego is satisfied. Eros 
and labour are therefore intrinsically connected. 
Secondly, the more abstract individual "drive for integral 
gratification" which surpasses the terms of historical 
materialism (Marcuse 1966, 18). This is otherwise a search 
for truth, not only in the area of epistemology, but also 
towards a recovery of the repressed harmony of 
sensuousness and of reason" which psychoanalysis offers in 
its thexhieutic techniques (Marcuse 1966, 130). On this 
account, Marcuse suggests that the potentiality for 
harmonious (socio-spatial) structures and the 
`wholesomeness' (true reality) of the social totality not 
only concerns a materialist critique of (rational) 
economy, but equally the emancipation of the individual 
from false consciousness (ideology) through the self-
internalisation of fact and value, and not - as Freud 
would have it - in the 'group psychology' situation. 
Critical theory, according to Marcuse, can only expose the 
contradictory nature of social and productive relations by 
drawing upon particular aspects of Marx's philosophical 
writings and his theory of labour. Marcuse endorses Marx's 
critique of both Hegel and Feuerbach. By detaching the 
Hegelian dialectic from its ontological base and by 
grounding the essence of man and truth in the historical 
process of practice, Marx effectively negated Hegel's 
standpoint by historical reality itself. Marcuse (1960, 
251-273) accepts the 'negation of philosophy' as a 
necessary precondition for a critique of the social 
totality. Philosophical concepts must be reduced to 
(Marxist) social and economic categories (Marcuse 1960, 
258), since the 'emancipatory' possibilities immanent in 
the existing order requires "man's historical action to 
fulfil them" (Marcuse 1960, 315). While Marcuse accepts 
Marx's critique of capitalism and the structural primacy 
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of the proletariat, he overrides the concept of a 
determinate (economic) base and substitutes it for 'man's 
essential being' - a knowing and conscious activity - in 
the historical labour process. 
By negating Hegel's purely philosophical concept of the 
universality of reason, Marx suggested that capitalism 
restructured a (false) universality of reason-in-practice: 
"Capitalism developed the productive forces for the 
totality of a uniform social system ... and transformed 
men into 'world-historical empirically universal 
individuals' " (Marcuse 1960, 287). This manifestation of 
universality, however, is totalising insofar that it masks 
reason and social reality, and alienates men from one 
another through class contradictions. Moreover, 
individuals are denied the right of access to express 
their freedom in the labour process. For Marcuse (1960, 
261-292), the "negative universality" of the proletariat 
signifies the extent of their unself-fulfilment, 
exploitation and alienation in the work process, yet, 
through their "universal character", they retain the human 
potential for revolution and emancipation from the 
unfreedom of the capitalist order: The proletariat is the 
negation ... of ... man as such. All specific 
distinguishing marks [property, culture, religion, 
nationality] by which men are differentiated lose their 
validity ... His concern to exist is not the concern of a 
given group, class or nation, but is truly universal and 
world historical". 
Marcuse needs to show that material need and fulfilment 
constitute the basis for human existence and praxis, and 
that labour can be made an a priori category of human 
existence. Labour, for Marcuse, must represent the raison 
d'etre of all human activity and be able to demonstrate 
its 'higher' rationality over all other social practices. 
Following Marx, Marcuse (1973, 18) maintains that through 
and in the world of (material) objects, man expresses his 
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`self-creativity' and realizes his 'self-(human) 
objectification'. In short, 'Being' (the essence of 
existence) is reduced to the objective expression of human 
work, although neither Marcuse nor Marx can present no 
solid truth-claim to validate this presupposition. 
Moreover, Marx's only justification for this claim was 
primarily derived from his critique of Feuerbach's thesis 
on religion, from which he reinterpreted the concept of 
`species being'. Feuerbach's (1957, 152-153) 
reduction/trans-mythologization of the essence of religion 
into the essence of man was broadly hinged on the 
presupposition that each species can conceive of nothing 
higher than itself: The history of mankind consists of 
nothing else than a continuous and progressive conquest of 
limits, which at a given time pass for the limits of 
humanity, and therefore for absolute insurmountable 
limits. But the future always unveils the fact that the 
alleged limits of the species were only limits of 
individuals ... Thus the species is unlimited; the 
individual alone limited". 
While Feuerbach neither dealt with the problem of the 
underlying causes of human alienation, nor resolved the 
reasons of the fundamental tensions/disunity within human 
existence, neither could Marx justify the reduction of the 
essence of man/human existence to the totality of social 
relationships. In support of Marx's a priori standpoint of 
historical materialism, it is hardly surprising that 
Marcuse's (1960, 321-322) view of critical theory can 
readily dispose of epistemological and ethical relativism 
to legitimate its 'truth'. For Marcuse, a (Marxist 
interpretation of) theory "that retains the consciousness 
of the practice necessary for the progressive attainment 
of this ideal society" (Held 1980, 240) is synonymous with 
the realization of 'new' rational structures and social 
practice. This, simultaneously, ensures the complete 
eradication of contradictions (ideology) and achieves the 
goal of 'emancipiation'. 
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Marcuse's (1964, 220) reading of critical theory is to 
uncover the 'truth value' of social practices which, he 
believes, can be theoretically assessed by the dialectical 
method. The 'truth' of human existence and potentiality is 
defined not by appealing to a metaphysical (immanent) 
value system or a concept of 'pure thought', but through 
historical action (Marcuse 1968, 73). Nor does Marcuse 
(1973, 218) believe that the knowledge generated by 
critical thinking directs the goal of 'emancipation' into 
the realm of utopian structures. This, however, is a 
position which Marcuse (1967) is at pains to defend: he 
fundamentally seeks the 'negation' of capitalism and 
instrumental reason and its replacement by a 'new radical 
order', about the nature of which he says little. Marcuse, 
nonetheless, maintains that the increasing occurrence of 
crises within capitalist societies (the concentration of 
power and wealth) will culminate in the self-destruction 
of its internal technological and economic structure (in 
which Marcuse anticipates a recurrent cycle of war and the 
pursuit of a 'pacified existence'). This will, according 
to Marcuse (1970, 84-94), be initiated by the vast numbers 
of the 'underprivileged' in capitalist societies (the 
structurally unemployed, displaced by automation), by 
`national liberation movements' in the Third World 
(fighting the repression of [neo-]imperialism), and by the 
radical critiques of the 'oppositional intelligentsia' 
(academics). 
ADORNO 
Critical theory, for Adorno, must be based on a systematic 
critique of philosophy. Structures, on this account, 
cannot be adequately understood or explained unless a 
radical shift in philosophical awareness (consciousness) 
is initiated. The truth of any theory of social structure 
could only, for Adorno (1977, 132), be established through 
a (critical) dialectical method, which he termed 'negative 
dialectics' or 'non-identity thinking'. The primacy of 
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philosophy represents, for Adorno, the terrain on which 
the stimulation and development of self-consciousness is 
grounded: such awareness, without any preconceptions as 
to where it might lead, would be the first condition for 
an ultimate break in society's omnipotence" (Adorno, 
quoted by Held 1980, 72). 
Adorno was essentially preoccupied with the problem of the 
subject-object dualism and the ways in which distorted 
interpretations of its structural relation falsified the 
appearance and identity of phenomena in the world. For 
Adorno (1973, 174), subject and object are internally 
related, interdependent structures, but which are neither 
constituted by nor irreducible to the terms of one 
another, so that their relation is "neither an ultimate 
duality nor a screen hiding ultimate unity". Moreover, 
Adorno wishes to expose, in his view, the dominance of 
(uncritical) subjectivism in political economy, and thus, 
the ways in which ideology permeates into an 
interpretation of social structure. Subjectivism, for 
Adorno, is expressed most widely in bourgeois idealism 
(`identity thinking') where objects are subsumed under the 
a priori concepts of systematic philosophies. Adorno's 
anti-positivist stance was focused on the internal 
inconsistency of empiricism and the philosophical 
scepticism/pragmatism which it generated. Although Adorno 
integrated (a revised form of) Hegel's method of 
determinate negation into his critique of social 
existence, he rejected most other aspects of Hegel's 
concept of philosophy, the relations between (the 
dominant) subject and object, and the pre-supposition of 
the Absolute Idea (the 'closed' dialectic). Hegel, for 
Adorno (1973, 198), "hypostatized the mind", and in so 
doing, presented "the object ideologically, calling it a 
free agent of the absolute spirit ... recogniz[ing] in the 
subject a self-representing objectivity, thus failing to 
appreciate the degree to which ideology impinges upon the 
individual" (Adorno 1973, 350). Put otherwise, Adorno 
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rejected the view that the structure of social reality 
could be apprehended from a position of philosophical 
externality ('outsideness'). Rather, the historical 
process and events which constitute present society can 
only, in Adorno's view, be conceived 'negatively' and that 
the discrete identities of both subject and object cannot 
be made to coalesce in unity. 
For Adorno, the dynamics of the 'emancipatory' goal are 
contained in a critical assessment of the (subjective) 
`unintentional (part) truth(s)' about socio-cultural 
formations, that is, interpretations of structure. Drawing 
on Benjamin's (see Buck-Morss 1977, 307-316) work, Adorno 
maintained that concrete individual phenomena expressed 
some knowledge about the universal within their own 
structure. The truth about phenomena is locked into 
concepts about concrete world structures and whose process 
and objective interpretation becomes modified in 
historical space and time. It is the recovery of the 
`truth-content' of these 'ideal' (perception) which 
dictate the form and grounding of Adorno's philosophy and 
method. Following Nietzsche, Adorno (1973, 23) rejects 
idealism and teleological systems as insufficient to 
explain the social formation since, in his view, there are 
no absolute criteria to which appeal can be made. Rather, 
for Adorno (1973, 54), the cognitive process and the 
unfolding of structural change in history are 
"internalized in the structure of thinking", that is, 
contained in a 'closed' developmental system where man 
autonomously asserts the 'rationality' of his thinking and 
decision-making at particular points in time. The recovery 
and understanding of (true) structures, is, for Adorno, 
contingent on man's ability and willingness to develop new 
methods of inquiry (but not those whose philosophical 
underpinnings presuppose the notion/existence of a pre-
existing 'idea' or 'absolute' authority). Conversely, 
Adorno refutes the (Nietzschean) view of the validity of 
all philosophical systems whose presuppositions are based 
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on need or want. Such systems, according to Adorno (1973, 
144-154) are non-reflexive insofar that they pragmatically 
seek to identify/coerce objects by subjective terms of 
reference, that is, through instrumental reason. 
For Adorno, the struggle for 'emancipation' and the 
emergence of new, rational social structures can no longer 
be realized through the transcendence of present 
conditions under historical materialism, that is, through 
the 'revolutionary' social forces envisaged by Marx. 
Rather, Adorno maintained that crises and class 
conflict in capitalist societies can potentially 
be contained, although perhaps not always to the extent 
where the state is able to legitimate the reasonableness 
of theory and practice unconditionally. The terms of 
historical reference, for Adorno, are those of practical 
disunity and are moreover based on the concepts of 
domination and power. Under liberal capitalism, the notion 
of 'free competition' and concepts such as the 'just' 
distribution of goods were fostered by philosophies which 
were also reflected in the organisation of socio-spatial 
structures. The dignity of the individual was retained in 
the freedom-of-choice which he exercised through his 
participation in the social and economic fabric. Social 
classes in their structures were entwined in an expression 
of concrete unity. In advanced capitalism, the fetishism 
of the commodity has undermined the freedom of the 
individual, while the increasing division/specialisation 
of labour has driven the man (subject)-work (object) 
relationship further apart. Moreover, the capitalist 
relations of production have inverted this equation so 
that man (and his knowledge) has become progressively 
alienated both in the labour process and in his social 
relations. Social and spatial structures have become 
increasingly incomprehensible and reflect the tensions and 
contradictions generated by the dictums of the 
technological rationality (see Pollock 1957). The meaning 
of truth is occluded by the 'false consciousness' imposed 
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by instrumental reason and whose 'values' mirror state 
ideology. Technocratic domination is a function of 
reification and the impersonal, while the concepts of the 
`rational' consumer and 'individual autonomy' have 
redefined the terms of objectivity. 
For Adorno (1973, 21), capitalism subverts the freedom of 
the individual and obliterates any sense of unity in its 
(re-)construction of the totality: "[its] philosophical 
systems were antinomical from the outset ... entwined with 
their own impossibility." Critical theory, in Adorno's 
view, must therefore constitute an immanent critique of 
philosophy since: "History does not and cannot provide a 
stable foundation for any thought system" (Held 1980, 
213). Adorno's method of 'negative dialectics' does not 
offer the practical transformation of structures, but 
intends to disclose the unfulfilled human potentialities 
for emancipation. Adorno wishes to eradicate the falsehood 
of conceptual systems of philosophical thought which deny 
the mediation of subject and object through the isolation 
of the latter (the object as 'reality') from that (the 
subject) which initiates it. Objects (socio-spatial 
structures) have their genesis in man (subject) and exist 
for man's purposes in a personal dimension of relations. 
Through his negative dialectics, Adorno (1967, 32) is 
otherwise attempting to 'deconceptualize' subjective 
thinking by teasing out the contradictions between the 
object's idea of itself (the deceptive, ideological 
content) and its concrete (true) existence, thus inducing 
a "heightened perception of the thing [object] itself." 
This does not, however, necessarily precipitate an 
absolute view of the totality, but rather points to the 
limitations of structural constellations. The concepts 
generated in the cognition of 'non-identity' are, 
according to Adorno (1973, 149-150), more wideranging and 
specific than those in systematic philosophiies 
('identity-thinking') since they elude the terms of the 
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ideal/utopian rationale and can connote what an object 
(social formation) 'is' and 'is-not'. 
On the basis of negative dialectics, socio-spatial 
structures can be evaluated in terms of the internally 
related categories which constitute their formation, and 
may indicate the mechanisms responsible for the dynamics 
of structural modification and change in an historical 
context. Further, 'non-identity' thinking implies that 
society is a subject-object: "Society is subjective 
because it refers back to the human beings who create it, 
and its organisational principles too refer back to 
subjective consciousness and its most general form of 
abstraction-logic, something essentially subjective. 
Society is objective because, on account of its underlying 
structure, it cannot perceive its own subjectivity, 
because it does not possess a total subject and through 
its organisation it thwarts the installation of such a 
subject" (Adorno 1969, 33). By Adorno's reckoning, the 
philosophical treatment of socio-spatial structures - and 
thus, the social totality - cannot presuppose them to be 
`neutral objects'. To proceed from this standpoint, little 
will be gained from attempting to understand formative 
(social) processes which shape structures. Simultaneously, 
the concepts used to reconstruct process and structure are 
susceptible to idealisation/distortion if external 
(untenable subjectivism) categories are introduced. The 
undoing of ideology in socio-spatial analysis - the 
ontology of the wrong state of affairs" (Adorno, 1973, 11) 
- requires, in Adorno's (1969, 69) view, a theoretical 
basis to its interpretation so that the truth/untruth of a 
phenomenon must be presupposed on the basis of what the 
object would, left to itself, like to be. 
For Adorno (1968, 84), the reification of social relations 
under capitalism is mirrored by unfreedom (the 
authoritarian state) and structural inequality so that 
"every 'image of man' is ideological except the negative 
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one". The (ideological) repression of the individual's 
personality in the capitalist state, Adorno (1968, 86-88) 
argues, is tantamount to the psychological destabilisation 
of the masses (the 'group'). Its expression is found in 
the weakness of the (individual) ego and is manifested 
through its inability/helplessness to perceive meaning and 
choice, truth and untruth in the form of its social and 
spatial structures. Contrary to Freud's concept of 'ego 
self-awareness' - where the ego internalizes a 
contradiction and rationalizes the resolution of a problem 
- the pressures of the modern political state, Adorno 
maintains, reify the ego itself and inhibit its potential 
for self-differentiation. Rather, the ego is driven for 
the sole interest of self-preservation and regresses 
towards ego-libido. In so doing, the ego develops 
narcissistic tendencies and identifies itself with the 
(authoritarian) state. In sum the state capitalizes on the 
frailty of individual cognitive (conscious) awareness -
given that all id (unconscious) impulses are reducible to 
Freud's libido principle - and masks the dynamics of 
process and structure through the perpetuation of 
ideology. Ultimately, the individual social actor 
surrenders all his critical judgement and passively 
coexists with structures unaware of his dilemma, or to the 
extent of his dehumanisation. 
On the basis of this standpoint, Adorno - unlike Marcuse -
did not believe that the proletariat possessed the 
potential for emancipation. Moreover, the surmounting of 
contradictions and false consciousness could only be 
expressed negatively, yet, in his wish to transcend 
historical materialism and metaphysical belief systems, 
Adorno's (1973, 407) own position for the discovery of a 
universal is one of increasing pessimism. The essential 
problem in the social formtion, as Adorno (1973, 320) sees 
it, is the domination of men over men: "Universal history 
must be construed and denied. After the catastrophes that 
have happened, and in view of the catastrophes to come, it 
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would be cynical to say that a plan for a better world is 
manifested in history and unites it ... No universal 
history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there 
is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb". On 
this account, the likelihood of a truly 'human' goegraphy 
with 'just' and responsible socio-spatial structures is 
remote. Social 'enlightenment' becomes the domain of state 
ideology, while 'emancipation' finds its real expression 
in the human potential for self-destruction qua 
annihilation. 
HORKHEIMER 
The view of critical theory espoused by the work of 
Horkheimer represents one of the most challenging of 
standpoints in its application to contemporary human 
geography as political economy. Horkheimer - unlike his 
principal contemporaries in critical theory, Marcuse and 
Adorno - was inconsistent in his views for a critique of 
society. Moreover, there was marked break between his 
`early' work (broadly, from his appointment as director of 
the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research in 1931, until 
the early 1940s) and his 'later' writings (which 
particularly expressed a profound turnabout, if not, 
ambiguity from his 'orthodox' position, from the 1950s 
until his death in 1973. See Jay 1973; Held 1980). During 
this time, Horkheimer's position digressed from one of a 
radical (neo-Marxist) and practically-oriented critique of 
economic and social structures (mainly those in capitalist 
societies) to one which increasingly withdrew from the 
direct issues raised in historical materialism and which 
ultimately retreated into the metaphysical and theological 
domains. Horkheimer's growing mood of pessimism and his 
flagging faith in the political moment to initiate new, 
`emancipatory' structures cannot be attributed to any one 
particular factor or event, but rather precipitated in 
response to the cumulative impact of adverse experiential 
developments. Amongst these, Horkheimer (1972) refers to 
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the 'totalitarian' state capitalism generated in Nazi 
Germany, the (post-1945) growth of monopoly capitalism, 
the collapse of Marx's critique towards the development of 
socialism into Stalin's authoritarian (elitist), 
technocratic state bureaucracy, and the non-realisation of 
revolution/proletarian revolutionary consciousness in the 
West. Many of these points - and more generally, 
Horkheimer's epistemological and methodological shift in 
emphasis - will serve as pertinent reminders to human 
geography that no critique of social process and socio-
spatial structure can be adequately contained within the 
`normal' (autonomous) terms of reference of scientific 
inquiry. 
`EARLY' HORKHEIMER 
Horkheimer's standpoint for critical theory is essentially 
grounded in the anti-positivistic mode of inquiry. Unlike 
Adorno's insistence for a purely philosophical approach 
towards a critique of the structure of society, Horkheimer 
wanted to sharpen and develop the applied aspects of 
philosophical theory to the history and social context of 
the structural relationship between the individual and 
society. The traditional philosophical schools of thought, 
for Horkheimer, "naively posited either 'an abstract, 
isolated individual' [e.g. existentialism] or a 
`hypostatized social totality' [e.g. Hegelian idealism] as 
the fount of life and proper object of social inquiry" 
(Held 1980, 32). A reconstruction/reformulation of 
methodological procedure was equally paramount to 
Horkheimer's project and was essential to (a rejection of) 
the case of orthodox Marxism. 
Horkheimer's recasting of the Hegelian dialectic into the 
`materialist' or the (historically) 'unconcluded' 
dialectic did not hold the promise of the surmounting of 
societal contradictions, nor the ultimate realization of 
utopian/ideal structures. Rather, its success (progress) 
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was contingent on the historical practices of men, in 
which the conceptual manifestation of the terms of 
`objective' reality remained, for Horkheimer, impossible 
and inconceivable. Put otherwise, individual (subjective) 
thought can never, on Horkehimer's account, grasp the 
meaning of 'absolute truth' without resorting to an 
ahistorical perspective: The claim that there is an 
absolute order and an absolute demand made upon men always 
presupposes a claim to know the whole, the totality of 
things, the infinite. But if our knowledge is in fact not 
yet final, if there is an irreducible tension between 
concept and being, then no proposition can claim the 
dignity of perfect knowledge. Knowledge of the infinite 
must itself be infinite, and a knowledge which is 
admittedly imperfect is not a knowledge of the absolute" 
(Horkheimer 1972, 27). 
In sum, Horkheimer's philosophical position outlaws the 
ground of (classical idealist) metaphysics in which 
concept and object become fused. The tension which 
Horkheimer maintains in the concept-object relationship is 
a reference to the ways in which ideology distorts the 
subject's perception and understanding of social reality 
and existence. Following Feuerbach and Marx, Horkheimer 
seeks to detach the dialectic from its (Hegelian) idealist 
form by ascribing all philosophical and theological 
categories to the terms of autonomous human reasoning, and 
thus to the determinate basis of (Marx's) practice. All 
knowledge is effectively reduced to Marx's notion of 
praxis and the social totality portrayed as a formation 
which is forever restructured and transformed by human 
activity, yet there is no general formula for handling 
the interaction of the forces" which constitute the 
dynamics of societal process and which generate structural 
form (Horkheimer 1972, 29). The relationships between the 
forces which comprise the social totality can only be 
understood historically, but never in terms of constants 
and universals. 
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Central to Horkheimer's philosophical and methodological 
reformulation of process and structure is the 
unconditional eradication of metaphysics from the content 
of (critical) theory. Although he claims that dialectical 
theory provides the vehicle for this aim, Horkheimer must 
then also make dialectics coexistent to the concept of 
truth if it is to avoid the charge of relativism/ 
pragmatism. On the basis of this presupposition, with the 
elimination of the "metaphysical character of finality, 
the solemnity of a revelation, [dialectical theory] 
becomes itself a transitory element bound up with the 
destiny of men. The unconcluded dialectic does not however 
lose the stamp of truth ... the uncovering of limitedness 
and onesidedness in one's own and in other's thought, 
constitutes an important aspect of the intellectual 
process ... The theory which we see as right may one day 
disappear because the practical and scientific interests 
which played a role in its conceptual development, and 
more importantly the things and conditions to which it 
referred have disappeared ... but a later correction does 
not mean that an earlier truth was an earlier untruth .. 
the dialectic freed from the idealist illusion overcomes 
the contradiction between relativism and dogmatism" 
(Horkheimer, quoted by Held 1980, 182). 
Through dialectical theory and its procedural method of 
`immanent criticism', Horkheimer (1974, 171), at all 
costs, wishes to dispense of the classical philosophical 
tenet of 'thesis-anithesis': "The assumption of an 
ultimate duality is inadmissable ... The two poles cannot 
be reduced to a monistic principle, yet their duality too 
must be largely understood as a product". Horkheimer 
grounds the notion of universal ideals in the (false) 
political and moral philosophy of the bourgeois social 
order, whose expression was found in the ideology of 
liberal capitalism. Its universalistic principles of 
'justice, equality and freedom' were negated in practice 
and were thus exposed as an enslaving dogmatism. 
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In order to justify the legitimacy of critical theory, 
Horkheimer initiates two philosophical (non-rational) 
`leaps' which otherwise attempt to express an optimistic 
(futuristic ideal) condition of 'hope' towards the 
discovery of the 'universal law' within the historical 
totality. First, insofar that critical theory is grounded 
in the practical interest of 'emancipation' from state 
domination and social (class) divisions, Horkheimer 
(drawing close to the view of Lukacs) insists that only a 
revolutionary (radical) political consciousness can 
mediate the gap between theory and practice, and thus 
concretize the conditions of real material freedom; that 
is, by unmasking the contradictions contained in ideology. 
Secondly, through the realization of the first goal, 
immanent criticism will be able to claim the classical 
notion of truth for itself so that "things can be called 
by their right names" (Horkheimer 1974, 179-180). This 
latter standpoint must also presuppose the possibility of 
an 'uncoerced ego' within the autonomous categories of 
(rational) man whose reasoning is entirely free from 
ambiguity and incertitude (see Olsson 1978). 
In sum, the 'early' Horkheimer is broadly in agreement 
with many of the fundamental tenets of orthodox Marxism, 
so that structural change through praxis concerns the ways 
in which ideology distorts consciousness, and thus, the 
individual's perception and understanding of reality. On 
Marx's account, societal development is grounded in the 
unfreedom of individual participation in the relations of 
production due to the competitive element within the 
commodity economy. The contradictions and false 
consciousness generated by the capitalist system demands 
that the individual surrenders/negates his individuality 
(unique, personal identity and attributes) to a position 
of 'blind and anarchistic' individualism (the egotistic 
and impersonal). 
LATE HORKHEIMER 
By the late 1930s and early 1940s, Horkheiker (1972, 220-
221) hints to a growing pessimism over the possibility of 
the unconditional realisation of 'emancipation' (i.e. new 
structures) from the economic structure of capitalism 
through the practice of the working class. Although 
Horkheimer believed that the antagonisms and 
contradictions prevalent in state-capitalism are 
indicative of the eventual collapse of its structures (its 
potential self-negation), he did not envisage the facile 
removal of a 'totalitarian form' of capitalism through 
revolution (based on Horkheimer's views of the 
authoritarian-fascist state in Nazi Germany). Horkheimer, 
moreover, switches his terms of reference for critical 
theory/emancipation to the potential for a 'rational 
society' through human praxis, but one which no longer 
expresses a specific class interest. 
By the mid-1960s, Horkheimer's (1972, xviii) position on 
the critical interpretation of society and its structures 
- and any philosophical presuppositions which underpin a 
critique - harnessed an ethical imperative to protect, 
preserve, and where possible, extend the limited and 
ephemeral freedom of the individual". Horkheimer clearly 
sought a re-evaluation - and possible integration - of 
metaphysics and theology in human existence, that is, 
man's conception of the transcendental infinite (Being) -
Horkheimer's 'Wholly other'. Horkheimer ultimately claimed 
that the 'theological moment' constitutes the means by 
which society is able to transcend the limitations and 
contradictions of actual (immediate) reality, and thus 
realize the goal of emancipation (see Siebert 1976; 
Carlebach 1978). The legitimation of this standpoint - as 
Horkheimer saw it - necessitated the validation of human 
experience which transcends the parameters of empirical 
('normal') reality. Although Horkheimer rejected the 
possibility of radical political change qua structural 
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transformation, he did not abandon the precondition of 
human autonomy (in theory and praxis) for the removal of 
ideology. For this reason, Horkheimer's conception of 
theology was necessarily areligious insofar that it 
refuted those views postulated by traditional belief 
systems, and otherwise attempted to ground the 
(unknwan/impersonal) terms of a 'first-order experience' 
into individual social reality. From this, Horkheimer 
hoped to develop the interest in a rational society but 
failed to show how this could be made coextensive with "a 
quasi-religious belief in something other than the 
present" (Held 1980, 419), or with the meaning/expression 
of human autonomy. 
2. HABERMAS 
The view of critical theory expounded through the work of 
Habermas has generated an important neo-Marxist 
perspective for the study and interpretation of socio-
spatial structures in contemporary human geography, as 
well as calling into question the epistemological and 
methodological conditions on which social scientific 
inquiry is based. Habermas is, above all, concerned with 
the emancipatory interest, that is, an interest in reason 
and a presupposed potential and capacity for individual 
social actors to express self-determination and self-
reflection in their social existence. The emancipatory 
interest is then achieved by "involving the active 
participation of everyone in the control of social 
phenomena ... people must be subjects and not objects" 
(Kolakowski 1978, V3, 392). Habermas seeks to transcend 
the limitations of critique advanced by the Frankfurt 
School, although like Horkheimer, he contends that 
knowledge is historically rooted and interest bound, and 
that subjects need to be practically engaged in the 
content and formation of critical theory: "[The] internal 
telos [of critical theory] is to enhance the autonomy of 
individuals and to abolish social domination and 
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repression. It aims at communication free of domination. 
Such a critical theory ... can become practical ... by 
initiating processes of self-reflection ... [leading] 
toward practical emancipation" (Wellmer 1976, 258). 
Habermas posits himself somewhere between the optimistic 
radical view of social transformation expressed by 
Marcuse, and the pessimism of Adorno and (the later) 
Horkheimer. Moreover, Habermas develops the view that -
contrary to Adorno - there are definite foundations for 
knowledge and values. These can be apprehended, on 
Habermas's account, through a reformulation of the 
competing traditions of philosophy and social thought so 
that through a critique of human interests, some 
clarification of truth might be established. Habermas 
contends that the spread of instrumental reason and the 
emergence of technocratic consciousness impose a 
disintegrative effect on social existence and fragment 
human understanding. Practical (structural) problems are 
annexed into the technical domain so that the terms of 
scientific rationality assume a "simultaneous double 
function, as a progressive force of production and as 
ideology" (Larrain 1979, 206). For Habermas (1971, 89), 
the basis of scientific rationality is unacceptable since 
"neither the model of the original sin of scientific 
technical progress nor that of its innocence do it 
justice". 
Habermas broadly contends that since the 'age of 
enlightenment', the rise of scientism has progressively 
eroded the concept of epistemology as the critique of 
knowledge. Science has subsumed all conditions of possible 
knowledge into its paradigm and is itself immune from 
philosophical critique. The (de--)emphasis of knowledge in 
terms of its technical expression has subordinated the 
role of epistemology to one of methodology. This clearly 
has important ramifications concerning the status and role 
of the 'knowing subject'. In the classical tradition, the 
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constituting activity of the cognizing subject determined 
the basis for understanding knowledge. Under the 
scientific rationality, there can be no court of external 
appeal independent of science by which its enthronement of 
instrumental reason as the sole basis of human action and 
cognition has led to "the meaning of knowledge itself 
becom[ing] irrati onal - in the name of rigorous 
knowledge" (Habermas 1972, 68-69). By drawing on Weber's 
concept of rationalization, Habermas contends that 
capitalism - marked by its increasing state intervention 
and the manipulative ideological basis achieved through 
its harnessing of technology and scientific research - has 
coerced human communicative interaction and replaced it 
with a system of 'purposive-rational action', that is, the 
logic of scientific-technical progress and the social 
structures which is prescribes. Its success is geared to 
the potency of the ideological forces which maintain its 
appearance so that the 'technocratic consciousness' (the 
ideologization of the masses) in effect depoliticizes 
human subjects. Social actors lose their capacity for 
self-reflection and self-understanding. Contrary to the 
standpoint of orthodox Marxism, Habermas (1971, 114) 
rejects the thesis of revolutionary emancipatory movements 
towards the transformation of structures. Rather, the 
scientific-technical rationality is able to offset and 
contain these trends through the ideological 
enforcement/legitimation of political power. 
Habermas (1972, 1974) maintains that a critical social 
theory must be based on an examination/critique of 
knowledge-constitutive interest and their relationship to 
human praxis. Further, Habermas (1979, 1984) also proposes 
a concept of 'communicative competence' so that the 
`systematically distorted communication' imposed by 
instrumental reason may be removed and the condition of 
self-(critical) reflection restored. This implies an 
unmasking of the ideology which pervades the scientific-
technical rationality. On this account, the aims of 
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critical theory are diverse and complex when it encounters 
the mesh of the technocratic state. The growth of multi-
national corporations, the interdependence of science, 
technology and industry, the increasing domination of the 
state over society and its attendant means-end rationality 
fosters the need for an emancipatory "struggle for the 
critical soul of science" (Wellmer 1974, 53). 
Habermas seeks to ground the conditions for knowledge, 
understanding and ultimately, the acquisition of new 
structures in a complex reformulation of historical 
materialism. The 'survival value' is taken as the logical 
point of departure since the reproduction of human 
existence is, for Habermas, bound within man's historical 
material conditions. Habermas (1979) contends that the 
orthodox Marxist view of historical materialism is 
concerned with an analysis of work (the way in which human 
labour reproduces and transforms the material conditions 
of its existence) and interaction (the cultural and 
political aspects of the institutional framework of 
society and the ways in which this is modified through 
revolutionary historical struggles). The dialectical 
relationship between these two realms generates, in 
Habermas's view, an irreconcilable dualism between 
scientific-technical progress (the forces of production) 
and the institutional machinery (the relations of 
production). The former is marked by an impression of 
creative, innovatory freedom, while the latter 
characterises the distributional machinery which directs 
and organises patterns (modes) of social integration (and 
therefore, also inspiring social/class conflict where 
particular class interests are not represented) through 
power structures and ideology. On Marx's account, social 
processes - and their expression in the formation of 
practical structures - are locked in to the two-fold 
confrontation with technical and practical activity. 
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Habermas (1974, 168-169) argues that Marx tends to reduce 
practical activity to the terms of the technical so that 
productive labour (work, and the instrumental reason 
associated with it) "becomes the paradigm for the 
generation of all the categories, everything is resolved 
into the self-movement of production. Because of this, 
Marx's ... insight into the dialectical relationship 
between the forces of production and the relations of 
production could very quickly be misinterpreted in a 
mechanistic manner." Put otherwise, Marx's dialectical 
interplay between 'freedom' and 'necessity' is collapsed 
to the crude deterministic (positivist) terms of the 
latter (i.e. instrumental technical-scientific activity). 
Marx, moreover, presents a natural science of man where 
the categories of knowledge are restricted for the purpose 
of domination and control (see Habermas 1972). The 
epistemological and methodological status of Marx's 
account of historical materialism is largely impaired by 
the usurpation of communicative action (speech) to 
instrumental action. So long as the structure of speech is 
constrained in this way, there can be no conception of an 
anticipated form of social existence where value-norms 
(truth, freedom, justice, equality) are possible. 
While Marx stressed the importance of the productive 
forces in historical materialism as the primary condition 
of 'learning processes' in a theory of social evolution, 
Habermas (1979, 97-98) seeks to transcend this position by 
extending it to the dimension of moral insight, practical 
knowledge, communicative action, and the consensual 
regulation of action conflicts - learning processes that 
are deposited in more mature forms of social integration, 
in new productive relations ... that ... make possible ... 
new productive forces". In this light, Habermas tends to 
regard Marx's theory of capitalist development as "a 
tsubtheory' of historical materialism" (Held 1980, 270). 
The basis of all human interests are, Habermas contends, 
necessarily a priori grounded. These experiential domains 
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include the interests of work and interaction (language), 
as well as the institutional framework which dictates and 
legitimates the organisational (rule-governed) nature of 
the system. The overriding (a priori) interest in reason 
and rational activity in human existence generates, 
according to Habermas, a form of knowledge which invites 
the potential realisation of individual autonomy and 
responsibility. This, more precisely, constitutes the 
basis for Habermas's 'emancipatory interest', which in 
turn focuses upon the recovery of the forgotten 
experience of reflection" (Habermas 1972, vii). 
The tripartite formulation of interests which contain the 
terms of reason and rationality in human existence - and 
which provide the means for interpreting and understanding 
social processes and structures - are represented by 
Habermas as: (i) the empirical-analtyical sciences (the 
technical-work sphere of action); (ii) the historical-
hermeneutic sciences (the practical-communicative sphere 
of intersubjectivity); (iii) the critical sciences (the 
emancipatory sphere concerned with the removal of the 
asymmetrical aspects of social relations, that is, 
domination and ideology). 
In the first case, Habermas contends that the interests of 
the empirical-analytical sciences are devoid of any 
emancipatory content. The scientific rationality 
fundamentally constrains communicative interaction (a 
condition of 'undistorted'/de-ideologized speech) through 
its institutional framework. The empirical-analytical 
sciences are grounded in presuppositions (a priori 
interests) which generate rules for the technical 
conception, domination and manipulation of social 
phenomena. This corresponds to a process of socially 
institutionalised, deterministic system of praxis. 
Empirical statements, laws, theories and hypotheses are 
represented and validated as 'values' which are imposed on 
socio-spatial and economic systems in the guise of 'truth 
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conditions'. An authoritarian/paternalistic system based 
on the (technocratic) domination of process and structure 
precludes the possibility of individual expression and 
impairs self-reflection (critical awareness). The 
unity/totality of knowledge is fragmented and individuals 
are both devalued and dehumanized. 
The developmental trends in advanced capitalism - state 
intervention and technology - have progressively reified 
the meaning of social reality. The concept of 'free 
market' commodity exchange has been eroded by the forces 
and interests of instrumental reason. The public sphere 
has been accordingly subjected to processes of 
depoliticization and 'refeudalization' by the 'rational' 
controls/organisational principles of the technocratic 
order. The (dominant) state regulates the economic process 
and therefore, the outcome of social-spatial structures. 
It is moreover concerned with the containment/ 
rectification of dysfunctional tendencies, thus supporting 
the interests of large corporative concerns and the 
private utilization of capital. For Habermas, scientific-
technical innovation undermines the concept of surplus 
value dependent on labour. Marx's labour theory of value 
is displaced, as are his theories of base-superstructure, 
class struggle and ideology (see Habermas 1971, 104), 
since economic exchange processes are directly regulated 
in the institutional (non-economic) framework. Political 
regulation assumes a 'negative dimension' which does not 
presuppose a 'free' consensual representation of 
structures. 
The ideological function of the technocratic consciousness 
is the legitimation of dominant political interests at the 
expense of all other (competing) societal sectors. Moral 
considerations are repressed and dismissed by the 
`objective necessity' of science and technology, whose own 
value - survival - is fraught with hermeneutical problems 
and smacks of pragmatism. The statements and observations 
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made by empirical-analytic knowledge are no more than 
expressions of "the success or failure of [technical] 
operations" whose factual reality is grounded in "an a 
priori organisation of [human] experience in the 
behavioural system of instrumental action" (Habermas 1972, 
308-309). 
Further, the scientific (positivist) paradigm is unable, 
within its own terms of reference, "to account for the 
possibility and nature of ordinary language and of 
intersubjective agreement in general" (Held 1980, 303). 
The scientific interpretation of intersubjective 
communication must, according to Apel (1972, 8), appeal to 
metaphysical suppositions which disclose a "pre- and meta-
scientific rationality". The eradication of the 
communicative function of language, and its reformulation 
in physicalistic-behaviouristic terms is tantamount to a 
position of 'methodological solipsism' which asserts "the 
tacit assumption that objective knowledge should be 
possible without intersubjective understanding by 
communication being presupposed" (Apel 1972, 10). Such a 
position, according to Habermas (1972, 91) is untenable 
since "the task of methodology is not to clarify the 
logical [objective] structure of scientific theories but 
the logic of the procedure with whose aid we obtain 
scientific theories". 
The purposive rational procedures postulated by the 
empirical-analytical sciences fail to legitimate or 
explain the role of intersubjectivity and language in 
scientific activity. The theoretical knowledge generated 
by scientific inquiry is concerned with prediction. It 
excludes the terms of practical (human) reason and cannot 
provide a sufficient account of social reality. The domain 
of reason and rationality towards the construction of 
practical structures collapses, by implication, into the 
sphere of privatistic reflection "justified only by 
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reference to a decision or a commitment of belief or 
faith" (Held 1980, 306). 
In the second case, Habermas contends that the hermeneutic 
sciences disclose an alternative conception of social 
reality which has important ramifications regarding 
methodological procedure and the question of human 
interest. The constituting interests of the historical-
hermeneutic sciences are not those of technical control 
but rather the claim that its knowledge "grasps 
interpretations of reality with regard to possible 
intersubjectivity of action-orienting mental understanding 
specific to a given hermeneutic starting point" (Habermas 
1972, 195). Habermas does not attempt to formulate the 
ontological roots of social reality but instead suggests 
that hermeneutic inquiry presupposes that individual human 
behaviour, thinking and actions are related to a system of 
intersubjective meanings. This, in turn, clarifies an 
understanding of the motives, purposes and beliefs which 
underpin human praxis. The specific meaning of human 
phenomena are, according to Habermas, constituted in a 
twofold expression: a diachronic dimension which 
emphasizes 'self-formation'; a synchronic dimension based 
on intersubjective understanding and linguistic 
communication. 
Following Dithey's concept of understanding (verstehen), 
the central task of the interpretative approach is focused 
on an analysis of human consciousness on the basis of 
empathy. The understanding of experience is contingent to 
the reconstruction of a subject's intentional actions or 
the symbolic object of his thinking/aims. In this way, 
meanings are recovered. Understanding is a process 
dependent on the psychological re-enactment of 'lived 
experience' which enable the historical world to be 
reconstructed. Such a methodology is fraught with problems 
and risks the charge of psychologism, descriptivism, 
objectivism and relativism. The validation of social 
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reality by the hermeneutic method of inquiry cannot be 
justified on the (scientific) basis of the repetition of a 
unitary psychological state, but rather on its ability to 
recapture the meaning of individual intentionality, 
purposes and actions. The understanding gained by this 
method supposedly generates a form of public knowledge 
from which symbolic structures can be constructed. Socio-
cultural phenomena are thus represented in language. 
Although Habermas would contend that knowledge itself can 
only be refined through the pursuit of intersubjective 
understanding, this goal in turn becomes constrained by 
the individual's willingness to explore self-
formation/realization, as well as the extent to which 
actors are prepared to reciprocally recognize each other 
as intentional subjects who share common meanings which 
are related to practice. 
Although all propositional truth-claims must be open to 
critical verification/modification, hermeneutics - for 
Habermas (1972, 172) - provides a hypothetical basis for 
the mediation of the subject-object dichtomy which is 
contingent on the ability of social scientists to "learn 
to speak the language that they interpret". Ordinary 
language cannot be limited to the analysis of systems of 
grammatical structures since understanding is 
intrinsically tied to practical reality. Conversely, a 
phenomenological bias towards 'pure objectivity' severely 
impairs the possibility of undistorted dialogue. This will 
tend to introduce a 'break' between theory and practice, 
fact and value, and science and life (reality) so that the 
validity of truth-content and the degree of (self-) 
deception (i.e. the ideological input) will remain 
undisclosed. The interests of the hermeneutic sciences are 
reduced to an uncritical (descriptive) study whose 
premises are grounded in relativism. Nor does it 
adequately satisfy the imperative that: "The plausibility 
of critical social theory depends on an acceptable 
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explication of the relation between language, action and 
history" (Held 1980, 311). 
Interpretation cannot, according to Habermas (1972, 194), 
be grounded in a context-free neutral standpoint, nor can 
any appeal be made to some external, ahistorical 
transcendental subject which might provide the 
preconditions for the constitution of possible 
experiences. Understanding is bound in language, whose 
meanings are disclosed in the mesh of history and 
tradition. The criteria which Gadamer (1975) introduces as 
the 'conditions of understanding and meaning' in the 
hermeneutic sciences seemingly provide important insights 
into the problems of structure and process. These 
fundamentally relate to certain presuppositions about the 
nature of knowledge and historical truth. The process of 
understanding is made synonymous with the original 
character of the being of human life itself" (Gadamer 
1975, 230). Language becomes a possibility-condition of 
truth. The propositional truth-claims of the 'knowing 
subject' cannot, however, be divorced from the historical-
temporal structure and are the products of socio-cultural--
tradition. Tradition endows phenomena with meaning, while 
history provides accessibility to meaning through space 
and time, i.e. it prescribes the conditions for empathetic 
understanding. 
Gadamer argues that the content of tradition contains 
prejudices/prejudgements which are integral elements of 
understanding. The process of objective understanding is, 
in this hermeneutic tradition, inseparable from the 
developmental subjective process of self-
understanding/self-formation. 
Habermas rejects the standpoint of the hermeneutic-
historical method of inquiry for social sciences largely 
on the basis of his objections to Gadamer's procedure. The 
a priori structure of tradition/prejudice imposes 
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constraints on intersubjective communication and 
interpretative understanding. It does not lend itself to 
critical analysis. If tradition - and the knowledge and 
understanding that it generates - cannot be made a 
condition for critical investigation, then any 'consensus 
of tradition' is tantamount to a prejudgemental structural 
dogmatism which does not enhance the understanding of 
meaning. Truth-claims must be rejected since they are 
grounded in 'distorted communication'. A hermeneutics of 
the history of tradition can only assert its 'authority' 
through the legitimation of a false (ideological) premise. 
Any interest in reason is, in effect, "under suspicion of 
being pseudo-communicatively induced" (Habermas, quoted by 
Held 1980, 315), so that it is reduced to non-reason. 
Ordinary language, Habermas argues, must be open to 
critical review insofar that the medium of communication 
both conceals and reveals the meaning of social reality, 
and thus clarifies the role of tradition (culture) and 
authority in human interests. 
Finally, it is within the case of the emancipatory or 
critical interest that Habermas wishes to root man's 
interest in reason. This concept seeks its expression 
through a unity of knowledge and understanding, but one 
which is grounded in the human struggle for 'self-
preservation', i.e. survival value. The possibility-
condition of the critical enterprise is largely governed 
by man's capacity to reconcile theoretical knowledge with 
practical activity through self-reflection/self-
determination (see Habermas 1972, 197-198). The attainment 
of critical self-reflection requires, in Habermas's view, 
the use of Freudian psychoanalysis (that is, 'depth 
hermeneutics'), where the validity (truth content) of the 
interpretation of a phenomenon (active or symbolic) is 
manifested through the recovery of the past in the 
unconsciousness of the analysand. Freudian psychoanalytic 
techniques therefore attempt to expose the origins and 
expression of pathological disorders in the behaviour and 
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thinking of the subject. The recognition of such 
deformations may then be transposed into the domain of 
critical thought and analysis in the social sciences. 
Habermas wishes to bridge theory and practice through a 
theory of communicative competence since on the social 
anthropological level, the 'evolutionary' historical 
development of the human species has generated distinctive 
human social organisational systems and codes of legality 
and morality through the modus operandi of linguistic 
communication. Man otherwise transforms his thinking and 
practice through cognition - based on linguistic inter-S 
 - and acts upon this as a purposeful and 
meaningful basis in his material existence. Unlike Marx's 
insistence on the mode of production to explain structural 
phases of economic development, Habermas claims that human 
rationality supercedes that of the technological sphere. 
Moreover, the institutional forces which govern societal 
organisation are more closely embedded in belief systems 
and moral representations of socio-cultural lifeforms than 
they would care to admit. 
Habermas's (utopian) concept of an 'ideal speech 
situation' (i.e. a genuine, undistorted linguistic 
consensus) is based on normative structures which must be 
open to rational justification. Habermas must presuppose 
that all speech is ideally oriented towards a condition of 
truth in which 'justice' and 'freedom' are expressions of 
the fulfilment of emancipation (the embodiment of 
rationality). Practical emancipation thus implies the 
existence of "generalizable interests ... which can be 
communicatively shared" (Habermas 1976, 108). Further, the 
extent to which social actors can be engaged in the 
`emancipatory interest' is a function of the process of 
self-reflection (i.e. a willingness to participate in 
critical thinking). 
The anticipation of the possibility - condition of an 
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ideal form of social existence recognizes the need to 
surmount the actuality of a systematically distorted 
communication (i.e. ideologies/belief systems which are 
unable to rationally legitimate their standpoints). In 
this sense, the emancipatory interest is also tied to a 
discussion of power and domination and offers a key 
whereby distorted views of social reality can be 
rationally identified and unmasked. This view constitutes 
the ground for Habermas's (1976) 'legitimation crisis' 
where the normative basis of the false consciousness -
which sustains an existing socio-political order and its 
economic structures - is severed by rational critique. 
The expression of human cognitive interests is manifested 
through linguistic intersubjectivity so that language 
discriminates between value and fact and is therefore a 
vehicle of social transformation. Contrary to Marx, 
Habermas maintains that the foundations of social 
organisation cannot be reduced to the 'base' needs of 
economic structures (material existence and its 
reproduction), but are historically rooted behind 
technology in non-economic institutions. The emancipatory 
interest must not only confront the falsehoods (non-
rationality) attached to the mechanics of economic systems 
of production/distribution, but must initially deconstruct 
the tenets of the ideologies systems of distorted 
communication) which underpin them: "... there is no 
certainty that emancipation will follow automatically from 
greater technical progress" (Schroyer 1973, 155). 
Normative structures are, on Habermas's reading, a 
`superstructural' phenomenon by Marxist definitional terms 
so that: "Cultural traditions are the basis of the 
rationalisation of action" (Held 1980, 281). 
Habermas's theory of cognitive interests (the inter-
relationship between the empirical-analytic, the 
historical-hermeneutic and the critical sciences through 
which reality is disclosed) nonetheless remains 
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problematic and controversial. According to Gregory (1978, 
158), "... the imperatives of the critical sciences rests 
on an equivalence between the three interests", yet 
Habermas often clearly subordinates the content of all 
cognitive interests to the emancipatory condition, so that 
the interest in emancipation becomes an interest in the 
transcendence of ... structures of distorted 
communication" (Held 1980, 319). Even so, if Habermas 
wishes to maintain that a critical science is not a 
separate form of knowledge - but is derived through a 
dialectical relationship between the empirical and 
hermeneutic interests - then he must also presuppose that 
instrumental action and language contain all the 
components which constitute a universal (ideal) 
understanding and explanation of social organisation. 
Moreover, Habermas recognizes that the cognitive 
strategies which underpin the interests of human existence 
represent both the transcendental conditions of knowledge 
and yet, at the same time, are naturalistically grounded 
in the reproductive structures of human labour and 
linguistic intersubjectivity. Put otherwise, cognitive 
interests are either empirically based when the terms of 
reference are grounded in a natural history of 
(autonomous) individual determinism, or they have a 
transcendental status of a constituted objectivity 
external to the constituting subject man (see McCarthy 
1978, 111). The postulation that particular interests 
pertaining to human history must be validated within a 
theory of social evolution necessarily demands some 
presuppositions about the pre--historical conditions of the 
socio-cultural life-world, i.e. of transcendental 
subjectivity. The theory of cognitive interests smacks of 
philosophical circularity on account of the tension 
generated by this unresolved dualism. Habermas (1974, 14) 
too acknowledges this dilemma insofar that the 'quasi-
transcendental' status of cognitive interests is "a 
product of an embarrassment which points to more problems 
than it solves". 
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The theoretical dichotomies in Habermas's work are equally 
extended in other related considerations. While Habermas 
(1974) wishes to pursue the scope for actual human 
development possibilities in a materialistic setting 
through the rational reconstruction of the historicity of 
social existence, he recognizes that the critical element 
of reflection in the self-formative process of the 
individual social actor engages him in the 'deep' 
(transcendental) structures of unconscious (sensuous) 
activity. This provokes a need to examine other questions 
such as the ontogenesis of thought, the content and 
meaning of moral consciousness, and the role of myth and 
mysticism. 
A SUMMARY CRITIQUE OF HABERMAS 
If man is to engage in critical self-reflection - and 
participate towards the transformatory goal of an ideal 
social formation - Habermas must first show that 
linguistic philosophy transcends all other theoretical 
structures. This position is fraught with difficulties. A 
theoretical ideal form of social organisation has yet to 
be practically concretized. Such a proposition may be 
challenged in itself as being an ideological concept which 
is politically and economically untenable. Habermas (1974, 
33) recognizes that decision-making cannot be "justified 
theoretically and then carried out organisationally". 
Moreover, any form of strategic action is prone to "an 
irreducible element of uncertainty and risk" (Held 1980, 
349). Insofar that Habermas wishes to elevate 
communicative activity over productive activity as the 
predominant function in the constitution of human praxis, 
inter-subjective communication is made the basis for 
social reality and rationality. The removal of the 
instrumental rationality which governs contemporary 
politico-economic and legal systems is contingent on a 
consensual disengagement from the 'motivational 
commitment' which perpetuates the normative (ideological) 
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basis and existence of a state system. A systems 
(legitimation) crisis signifies the inability of the state 
apparatus to conceal political and economic contradictions 
(or the failure to offset a crisis by relaying 
contradictions from one part of the sub-system to 
another), but Habermas is not optimistic about such an 
eventuality in advanced capitalist societies. 
The philosophical 'closed' system of thought on which 
instrumental reason is based outlaws critical 
(emancipatory) thinking as dissenting and irrational 
(aconsensual). The preservation of the system (and its 
attendant ideology) necessitates the suppression/coersion 
of individual expression (freewill). A dominant order 
which entrenches its dictums through the fragmentation of 
cultural values (and thereby restricting access to 
alternative ways of thinking) otherwise masks the holistic 
structure of knowledge and social reality. Social actors 
will not then generally understand the reality they 
experience - that is, their relations with nature, with 
others or within themselves. 
Contrary to Habermas's anticipatory assertions, there is 
little evidence to support the suggestion that society is 
shifting into a radically different 'post-modern' era, 
where the desire to establish universally generalizable 
political and ethical norms is imminent. Rather, the 
normative consensus which sustains an instrumental 
rationality is preserved as long as the possibility of an 
`unconstrained discourse' among individuals who 
participate freely and equally is rejected as being 
practically unrealizable. For Habermas, inter-subjective 
communication remains a 'conflict situation' until such 
time when all forms of existing state control are removed 
by the emancipatory interests of society. It remains 
uncertain, however, as to whether Habermas's hypothetical 
proposition - that individuals will spontaneously move 
towards a universal linguistic consensus - will 
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necessarily become the case. Given that the state and 
language would need to be connected to explain the reasons 
which underpin the suppression of 'generalizable 
interests' (see Gouldner 1976, 150-152) - and thus to 
provide the ground for understanding/transcending the 
theoretical domain of instrumental control in order to 
reconstruct the 'relations of production' in practice -
any 'new organizational universal' beckons the arrival of 
other forms of (state) centralization whose norms, values 
and beliefs-systems may not be representative of the 
diversity of human needs. In this sense, the ability of 
society to transform itself implies the coexistence of 
`emancipation' as a goal inherent in reason with the 
danger of new forms of dependencies. 
Habermas ultimately fails to provide any outline -
provisional or definitive - concerning the likely form 
that any new social formation may take. His only solid 
emphases are directed towards the issues of (an 
ideological confrontation with) state power and the 
development of a (utopian) communicative ethics (see 
Benhabib 1986). The emancipatory task does not 
convincingly initiate the grounding of (a new) rationality 
becasue Habermas cannot show how the terms of the 
universal generalizability of interests are achieved by 
individual (autonomously-derived) reason. More 
pertinently, the realization of the emancipatory goal may 
rather, in the first instance, be tied to people's 
conscious awareness of increasingly unmanageable 
contradictions (irrationalities) and material wastages 
generated by particular modes of production (see Mandel 
1975, 501-507). Where the technocratic ideology is unable 
to provide a 'technical' solution to such contradictions, 
the concept of a 'legitimation crisis' is then supposed to 
explode the irrationality of the dominant system. 
While Habermas's neo-Marxist perspective is oriented 
towards the eradication of class struggle in advanced 
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capitalist societies and to unmask the contradictions 
which sustains them, Larrain (1979, 210) argues that the 
truth may be on the contrary, that the ruling class has 
succeeded in camouflaging itself by using the name of 
science. Science has not replaced class contradictions as 
the source of ideology, but the dominant class has 
instrumentalized the name of science to pretend it has. 
While science is not in itself ideological, it can only 
function effectively, according to Colletti (1975), with a 
principle of 'no-contradiction'. The charge of a 
`dialectic contradiction (an apparent logical opposition 
of interests) in the social reality of science implies the 
struggle of opposites in a philosophical context. This 
would seem to suggest that the fundamental contradiction 
of society is not in the social relations which entwine 
men with nature, but concerns the human condition itself. 
Put in its historic context, Kant recognized that the 
concept of reason advanced by Enlightenment thinking 
contained a dialectic between 'pure' universal reason, and 
reason as an instrument of domination. This view 
emphasized the dualism between the transcendental element 
in the human 'self' (and the subject's conscious awareness 
of the holism of being) and the function of (material) 
self-preservation which calls upon the (empirical) 
objectification of man's relations with nature. The crux 
of the problem is rooted in the concept of the 'domination 
of nature' as it is grounded in the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition, and moreover, the way in which it has been 
progressively secularized according to the developmental 
interests of philosophical and politico-economic systems. 
Insofar that scientific-technical progress has been made 
synonymous with knowledge in contemporary times: "whatever 
does not conform to the rule of computation and utility is 
suspect" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972, 6). Put otherwise, 
the scientific paradigm insists that man's relations with 
nature can only be known through a mathematically 
formulated universal science, so that nature -- as pure 
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matter - becomes an object of manipulation and domination. 
Man thus turns against himself as the thinking subject, so 
that those with privileged (ruling) access in the system's 
hierarchy reinforce and perpetuate the dualism between man 
and nature, and man with man in the interest of power and 
domination. 
Through the distortion of the theoretical basis of 
religious belief, science is made to represent the sole 
authority, unmediated by social relations. The scientific 
concept of domination is necessarily all-embracing and its 
practical (economic) outworkings (i.e. the reproduction of 
material existence/self-preservation of the system) tend 
to exert oppressive and divisive socio-spatial 
consequences. In short, the expansion of technico-
productive forces has failed to prescribe the conditions 
for human emancipation. 
The social and economic contradictions generated by 
instrumental reason have become increasingly 
`rationalized', insofar that the technocratic state 
legitimates its authority through the manipulation of 
material needs (in the interest of survival) against the 
backdrop of the depoliticization of the masses. The 
permeation of ideology in science is not - as Habermas 
would appear to claim - an appendage of advanced 
capitalist societies, but is rather indicative of the 
historically contradictory condition of man himself. Man 
enslaves himself in states of false consciousness on 
account of the loss of categories concerning the origin 
and purpose of his existence. This primarily appears to 
confirm man's preoccupation with/over-emphasis on the 
material accumulation of goods, ad infinitum. It tends 
also to reflect the global disequilibrium of human socio-
spatial relations and is manifested through the terms of 
`social injustice' and 'distributional imbalances' and 
other similar themes recurrent in contemporary radical 
geography. 
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Ideological struggles will not necessarily be resolved 
under the terms of Habermas's concept of 'unconstrained 
discourse', but rather through a profound reconsideration 
of human value systems (and the behaviour/decision-making 
these generate), critically situated in an historic space-
time context. While the modern institutionalization of man 
is, in many ways, symptomatic of the suppression/removal 
of human dignity, Habermas's emancipatory idealism towards 
acultural society does not guarantee the preservation/ 
reinstatement of human 'true worth'. The use of Freudian 
psychoanalysis in critical theory as a route towards 
emancipation is open to scepticism. Psychotherapeutic 
techniques - which claim to enhance the individual's self-
reflection - are, according to Ottmann (1982, 86), the 
"emotional acting-out of the conflict" rather than a 
primary cause of liberation. 
The concept of understanding the meaning of phenomena as a 
fundamental goal of science, speaks from the basis of a 
(socio-cultural) tradition primarily because such a 
history exists. Critique too, according to Ricoeur (1981, 
99-100) is a tradition hinged on the concept of 
emancipation, but that: "Perhaps there would be no more 
interest in emancipation, no more anticipation of freedom, 
if the Exodus and the Resurrection were effaced from the 
memory of mankinl". This would seem to imply that 
Habermas's rejection of monadological/mythico-magical 
world-views as a part of the emancipatory structure of 
critical thinking is suspect. 
3. CRITICAL THEORY AND THE ETHICAL IMPERATIVE 
The work of the Frankfurt critical theorists and Habermas 
suggests that the terms of reference which may define an 
ontology of socio-spatial reality - and, by implication, 
the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings in human 
geography - are confined to one of three possible 
standpoints: 
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First the transcendence of the present social, economic 
and political order through the autonomous achievements of 
man and his ability for (critical) rational thinking 
towards a nein 'emancipatory' state of being. This retains 
many of the themes used in Marxist analysis (albeit 
subject to critical reinterpretation) and in particular, 
is in broad agreement with Marx's reading of ideology. 
Insofar that this case focuses its goal on the realization 
of (futuristic) ideal/utopian social formations, it is a 
form of 'optimistic humanism' which has clearly been 
supported by Marcuse and Habermas. 
Secondly, an unconditional consensus of submission to 
technocratic and corporative institutions and their 
attendant ideologies. This implies the acceptance of 
reification, that is social ills, economic contradictions 
and false consciousness in the interest of material 
survival. At a covert level, this standpoint is synonymous 
with a climate of pessimism, fear and nihilism, yet - in 
Adorno's view - corresponds to the conditions of 
contemporary social reality. 
Thirdly, an appeal to an adjudicating principle which is 
neither concealed in an ahistorical vacuum (i.e. non-
verifiable), nor metaphysically detached from 'being', but 
whose propositional truth-claims can be internalized and 
rationally shown to mediate through historical space and 
time in an omnipotent (universal) and immanent capacity. 
This standpoint is coextensive with the transcendental 
`theological moment' sought by Horkheimer. If this 
standpoint is to be consistent with the terms of the 
emancipatory interest, it must be tied to a universal form 
of communication (linguistic expression) free from 
internal and external constraints from which the 
individual social actor can ground a rational 
understanding of praxis. McCarthy (1973, 153) in his 
discussion of an 'ideal social condition', cites four 
`validity claims' which must all be met to satisfy the 
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terms of communicative competence: (a) The statement is 
comprehensible. (b) That all propositions are true. (c) 
The speaker is justified in making the statement. (d) The 
speaker means unequivocally what he says. 
It also follows that the statement must be authoritative 
(but not authoritarian) and that the source of this 
authority is legitimate and verifiable as such. The 
directive provided in ib; propositional truth-claims must 
express a 're-organizing principle'. To this extent, it is 
law-giving, but not in the scientific-technical 
(instrumental) sense of the domination, manipulation and 
unfreedom of its recipients. If individual social actors 
are to be endowed with responsibility and care (affective 
yet practically translatable attributes) towards their 
socio-spatial relations, then this standpoint must 
therefore constitute a social ethic. Each social actor is 
accountable to the terms of the propositional truth-claims 
of the principle in both a personal-individual context and 
the wider collective social sense. Social actors are not 
required to surrender/deny their personal individuality 
but rather to enter into relations with the ethos of the 
principle on an inter-subjective and purposeful basis. 
This relationship is mutual and reciprocal and based on an 
undertaking of trust and 'good faith'. 
It is not synonymous with a concept of 'optimistic 
humanism' insofar that it does not unconditionally 
pursue/promise an 'ideal' (utopian) outcome because 
individual social actors retain the freedom-not-to-
comply/recognize its propositional truth-claims. Its only 
finite standpoint is in its justification. 
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CONCLUSION:  
(i) THE PRIMACY OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 
A human geography of political economy frequently depicts 
the economic content in terms of the particular political 
interests to which it is made subordinate, rather than the 
conditions of social reality. Economic geography tends 
therefore to underscore any element of human freewill in 
individual choice and decision-making which is otherwise 
usurped by a synthetic theoretical value system. Human 
`bads' (selfishness, egoism, etc) have become an integral 
part of this theoretical rationality. The 'rational 
economic actor' is made contemporaneous with the 
maximisation of personal welfare (individual gain, ad 
infinitum) to the disregard of the material predicament of 
others. Utilitarianism, hedonism and egocentricism, 
override personal values (human '.,ppds') such as 
responsibility, care, trust, restraint and so on. The 
theoretical framework of economic explanation and 
prediction regards rational activity in terms of atomic 
individuals with fixed patterns of consumer behaviour. 
Non-conformity with these ideals (which will otherwise 
contradict and possibly invalidate the theory) is 
dismissed as non-rational thinking/behaviour. 
Few human geographers have examined the origins of 
economic 'wants'. This suggestion threatens to divest the 
individual social actor in his conceptual role as an 
autonomous, free economic agent. The rejection of human 
reason in the determination of economic choice and wants 
outlaws any notion of freedom. The belief that by changing 
socio-economic structures, individuals can be 
transformed/encouraged to pursue 'freedom-through-
automony' is a standpoint frequently promulgated by 
`welfare' and radical geographers. Lee (1979), for 
example, equates the socio-spatial problems and stagnation 
of cities in advanced capitalist nations with the 
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structural defects of its mode of production, rather than 
a 'malfunctioning' of the system (similar views are 
propounded by Harvey 1973, Castells 1977, Peet 1977 and 
Harloe 1981). 
A Marxist interpretion of human geography needs to show 
that its emphasis on the primacy of economic structures 
gives a true account of the reality of social relations. 
If, as according to Marx's (1973) thesis, egotism and 
inequity arose as products of bourgeous capitalism, then 
changing the economic structures will alter individual 
behaviour. Revolutionary (Marxist) ideals therefore tend 
to omit any reference to the human affective condition so 
that 'meta-inferences' such as greed and selfishness have 
no place or meaning in socio-economic praxis. Rather, man 
has no conscious meaning/awareness until economic and 
historical antecedents come into play. Any attempt to 'get 
behind' practice sets man as a biological expression in an 
existential vacuum where he is otherwise represented as 
`nothing'. Such a standpoint is contradictory insofar that 
(orthodox) Marxism posits a utopian ideal grounded in the 
presupposition that 'perfect structures' will transform 
individuals into 'perfect (materially fulfilled) beings'. 
If the Marxist assertion is incorrect - so that 
individuals are innately egotistical - then no amount of 
structural change will unconditionally guarantee a radical 
transformation in the equality of individual existence -
material, aesthetic or otherwise. 
In both the cases of the neoclassical and Marxist views, 
the representation of human material wants - whether they 
are grounded in a biological and/or socio-economic premise 
- are fundamentally made to correspond to impersonal 
forces which have no basis for the inclusion of moral 
(just) preferences and values. Neoclassical economics 
broadly refutes an altruistic solution as non-rational 
behaviour as it undermines the individual's ability to 
maximise his utility. Altruism cannot be realistically 
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implemented by law (i.e. enforced cooperation against the 
individual's personal interest for the welfare of others). 
Law cannot, therefore, be a substitute for social ethics 
and neither do the capitalist or socialist systems 
necessarily generate loyalty and trust to laws and 
institutions. 
The tension within the philosohpical dualism which sets 
`man' against 'structures' as the true point of reference 
for social scientists qua human geographers, is offset by 
an interesting twist: An emphasis on the individual need 
not involve ignoring the importance of wider social and 
economic considerations, but it may induce some scepticism 
about how much can be achieved by social and economic 
change alone. On the other hand, emphasizing the priority 
of society may involve absolving the individual of any 
responsibility for social evils" (Trigg 1985, 142). 
Further an institutional (structural) revolution devoid of 
spiritual content is invalid: "For it is privatistic 
iniquity, not social iniquity, which is the root cause of 
evil ..." (Ley 1974, 71). 
While institutions in political economy attempt to 
maximize some ethical end - perhaps on a criterion of 
`aggregate social welfare' -- a concept of 'perfect 
rationality' in neoclassical terms fails to eradicate the 
`free-rider' problem as long as utilitarianism remains a 
`legitimate principle' in its theoretical framework (see 
Hamlin 1986). Moreover, under a concept of 'imperfect 
rationality' individual social actors are more likely to 
become aware of their inability to make correct judgements 
- even if they fail to 'learn from experience'. From this 
perspective, however, the primacy of the individual 
overrides any coercive reference to socio-economic 
background or the nature of protective, institutional 
power structures. 
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(ii) WORK 'FOR MAN' OR MAN 'FOR WORK': THE CONCEPT OF WORK 
AND PERSON  
The concept of work is synonymous with any human activity 
(praxis) whether manual or intellectual. From work, 
dignity is derived. In a contemporary context, political 
and economic ideologies have eroded this ideal. The 
compartmentalization of man into his various aspects of 
geography, culture and civilization, together with the 
tensionsconflicts and crises generated by the tempo of 
scientific technological change (qua 'progress') 
increasingly demand a redefinition of the meaning of work. 
The disproportionate distribution of wealth and poverty 
and economic disparities between regions, nations and 
continents have stimulated geographical research into ways 
of initiating a more equitable programme of development. 
The preoccupation with the 'class' question as the central 
issue of socio-spatical debate has increasingly been 
eclipsed and superceded by the 'world' question. Moreover, 
it is the global sphere of inequality and injustice which 
amplifies the meaning and proportions of a class problem. 
If work is understood as a transitive activity, then its 
origins are grounded in man (the human subject) so that 
work is the external object of human effort and 
application. This presupposes that all environmental 
resources can be discovered and used by man for his ends 
through his conscious activity. This standpoint postulates 
a specific dominion of man over the visible earth insofar 
as it comes within the range of man's influence and of his 
striving to satisfy his material and physical needs. As 
man confirms this ongoing state of dominion, he 
nevertheless remains in the original ordering of things. 
This implies that phases of economic growth and 
acceleration and periods of scientific and technological 
discovery and innovation have never exceeded the initial 
fixed content given at the outside of all existence. This 
conceptually embraces all past ages of civilization and 
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economy as well as present reality and all future phases 
of development. This process is universal and embraces 
every individual on both a conscious and unconscious level 
and covers every historical phase of economic and cultural 
development. 
Technological progress, on the one hand, facilitates man's 
work by perfecting and accelerating it. Productivity is 
then quantitatively and qualitatively enhanced. 
Conversely, technology can be imposed detrimentally where 
the mechanisation of work supplants man by depriving him 
of personal satisfaction and the incentive to creativity 
and responsibility. At best, man is reduced to new forms 
of economic serfdom or otherwise effectively loses his 
relationship with technology in the case of redundancy. 
This dilemma is charged with content and tension of both a 
social and an ethical character. The basis for determining 
the value of work is not primarily the kind of work being 
done, but the fact that those performing the work are 
persons. This means that the primary basis of the value of 
work is man himself and that ethically, work is 'for man' 
and not man 'for work'. It follows that work cannot solely 
be assessed in terms of its socio-occupational value but 
by the measure of dignity of its subject. Even 
presupposing that work constitutes a purpose, this purpose 
has no definitive meaning in itself because it is man who 
provides the purposeful input. The implicit danger is the 
treatment of work as a specific kind of 'merchandise' or 
an as impersonal 'force' needed for production. This 
concept is prevalent under all forms of materialistic 
economism, whether capitalist of collectivist, and is 
reflected in the spatial organisation of society. Where 
the emphasis is centred on the objective dimension of 
work, then man - as the subjective component - is reduced 
to an instrument of production in a secondary capacity. 
This historical background to the conflict between labour, 
capital and technology under liberalism and capitalism and 
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the subsequent rise of the 'proletariat question' and the 
emergence of socialism is well established. For human 
geography, the attraction of the 'radical' Marxist 
approach in socio-spatial analysis is considerable. It 
seemingly offers a clear explanation of the historical 
formation and development of capitalism, the degradation 
and exploitation of workers, and unmasks many of the 
ideological precepts on which world capitalism is based. 
In its practical translation, the orthodox Marxist 
standpoint presupposes the 'collectivisation of the means 
of production' so that through the eradication of the 
private ownership of capital and resources, labour will be 
truly emancipated. The collectivist solution 	 implies the 
elimination of regional imbalances and the economic 
disparities which bedevil the geography of the capitalist 
world order. Notwithstanding, some fundamental objections 
can be raised against the position of radical geography. 
The position of authoritarian capitalism is clearly 
unacceptable insofar that it dogmatically defends the 
exclusive right to the private ownership of the means of 
production. This inevitably generates social injustices 
which are manifested in a geographical context though the 
manipulation of capital and resources between and across 
spatial areas at varying magnitudes. Following a principle 
of the common access of goods, some forms of the 
`socialisation' of goods and certain parts of the means of 
production are necessary and legitimate. The bureaucratic 
centralization of the means of production under a 
collectivist system does not, however, ensure any 
transformation towards any emphatic socialisation process. 
It may give priority of labour, but may also claim a 
monopoly of the administration and disposal of capital 
which, in turn, does not necessarily guarantee an 
unequivocal equilibrium in the spatial distribution of 
resources. 
Labour has yet to be associated with the problem of the 
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ownership of capital. The opposition between labour and 
capital cannot be derived from the structure of the 
production process or from the structure of the economic 
process. Rather, labour and capital have always been 
intrinsically connected but with the proviso that 
everything contained in the concept of capital is a 
collection of things (objects) which are the result of 
human labour. Man alone is a person, both as the subject 
of work, and independent of the work that he performs: 
"... capital cannot be separated from labour ... [nor can] 
labour be opposed to capital or capital to labour, and 
still less can the actual people behind these concepts be 
opposed to each other ..." (Pope John Paul II 1981, 45). 
The 'consistent image', in which the principle of the 
primacy of person over things is unconditional was 
fragmented by the social evolution of the 'economistic' 
perspective, that is, by a philosohical shift of emphasis 
in human thought. In this way, labour was separated from 
capital and set in opposition to it, and vice-versa, 
reducing them to two (impersonal) production factors 
juxtaposed in a common perspective. The individual person 
and his moral values cannot, however, logically be made 
subservient to the premises derived from materialist 
theory (i.e. the primacy and superiority of what is 
material) unless man is prepared to surrender his status 
as a person (i.e. to admit that he is less-than-man). 
Accordingly, the spatial ramifications which emanate from 
these terms of reference must also concede de facto the 
role of man as impersonal 'subject' against the 
predominance of the production process (a collection of 
`things'). In this context, the 'human' element of a human 
geography of political economy must clearly be withdrawn, 
so that any observed distributional patterns or figments 
of spatial organisation must rightly be referred to as a 
`geography of things'. 
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PART FIVE: HUMAN GEOGRAPHY, POWER AND ETHICS 
HUMAN GEOGRAPHY, POWER AND CONFLICT 
Human geography is increasingly marked by a climate of 
frustration and uncertainty in the areas of epistemology 
and methodological procedure. The social reality of the 
geographic environment broadly manifests a lack of 
purpose, meaning or direction. The eros‘on of social 
relations and the dysfunctioning of the spatial fabric of 
distributive organisation ref,f4e.cts the growing anonymity 
and alienation of individual social actors not only in 
culturally-specific situations but also in the wider 
global context. Declining levels of intersubjective 
communication and understanding have offset and 
accelerated the deterioration of mutual participatory 
action towards the redressing of socio-spatial 
disequilibrium and environmental debilitation in both 
advanced industrial economies and nations in the 
developing world. The confusion and ambiguity which 
pervade the terms of reference employed by science (i.e. 
those which define the reasoning and rationality of its 
decision-making) generally amplify the growing 
predominance of two juxtaposed themes: the power of the 
(increasingly authoritarian) political state; the absence 
of any clearly defined social ethics. 
Technocratic planning and political instrumentalism have 
tended to intensify socio-spatial problems. They are 
impervious to the pursuit of individual creativity or to 
the realisation of self-expression. Socio-spatial problems 
increasingly tend to mirror the shortcomings attributable 
to the dictums of centralised technocracies, particularly 
those in the advanced capitalist world: the accumulation 
of material wealth and the obsession with political and 
economic power and domination. Much of this is a chaotic 
scenario where social conflict may be closely related to 
the economics of unemployment whose spatial expression 
discloses wide geographical imbalances within and between 
regions. A deeper examination of the causes of these 
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problems may only be found at the level of state ideology 
and the covert ways in which the application and 
interpretation of the state's philosophical underpinnings 
are manifested in practice. Alternatively, the scientific 
and technical sophistication of the authoritarian state 
may be channelled into open military conflict, either to 
destabilize the political economy of an 'adversary' or in 
an attempt to radically modify geo-political frontiers and 
thus undermine the cultural fabric of specific areas in 
the world which are seen to constitute a threat to the 
dominant ideological system. 
Much of this is a geography of psychological disorder 
which either dismisses or distorts ontological and 
epistemological considerations in its evaluation of the 
purpose and use of the spatial environment. For those 
individual actors whose praxis is situated in the socio--
spatial formation, the overriding emphasis on the 
materialistic terms of social reality not only devalues 
the spiritual and aesthetic content of being (see Bailey 
1986), but simultaneously dehumanizes the geographic 
subject through a synthetic and incomprehensible 
representation as to the purpose and meaning of man and 
his existence, and his relationship with nature. 'Well-
being', 'happiness', 'contentment' and 'wealth' are devoid 
of any substantive content and whose materialistic terms 
of reference are coextensive with 'getting', 'having' and 
`wanting' rather than clarifying the more profound 
ramifications of these concepts. What then is to be done 
and how might it be achieved? Is radical and lasting 
change which takes account of the fullness of the human 
personality, its value and belief systems, a conceivable 
and rational possibility, or is a social and spatial 
exegesis an untenable optimistic expression of Freudian 
`wishful-thinking', and therefore a practical nonsense? 
Johnston (1982) has argued that no real progress or 
understanding can be made in human geography until an 
adequate theory of the state - and a methodology which 
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elucidates the rationale of state policy-making - has been 
evolved. Any investigation which attempts to examine the 
(re-)organisation of space will encounter the dualism 
between the institutional (power) structures of the 
political state and the ways in which it prescribes and 
attempts to legitimize the behavioural climate of social 
relations (some norm of social conduct). The apparent 
tension and irreconcilability between the standpoints and 
intentions of the technocratic state and a social ethics 
which evokes the spiritual (psychic) and affective 
attributes of human existence is a paradox inasmuch that 
their schism indicates not only philosoical differences 
of opinion but moreover, the fundamental disunity and 
condition of 'unknowingness' within man himself. 
POWER, ETHICS AND THE POLITICAL STATE IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 
Technocratic rationalism has broadly made 'materialism' 
(the capitalist world order) and 'work' (the socialist 
nations) the measure of 'progress' and 'success'. Both 
systems prescribe an 'ethic' of (a seemingly limitless) 
technico-scientific mastery and power of man over nature. 
Much of this can only be achieved when (moral) value 
systems emanating from cultural and religious practices 
are swept aside and/or 'scientifically' reinterpreted. The 
ethos of the 'technocratic ethic' is to emphasize a sense 
of peoples' unlimited 'freedom' to manipulate and exploit 
the natural and social world for their own ends. The 
purpose and meaning of existence are founded on the 
principles of hedonism, utilitarianism and egoism. There 
can be no sense of responsibility, care or accountability: 
all are inconsistent (non-rational) with its terms of 
reference. 
While the sense and meaning of 'political rationality' 
remain essentially obscure, the concept of power in the 
contemporary political state is more clear. Essentially, 
it legitimizes itself by fear, repression and threat to 
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its subjects. Insofar that the political state (or the 
international grouping of nation-states through a common 
system of economic, political and military interests) is 
contained by territorial (spatial) delimitations, its 
functions are rightfully of concern to human geographers. 
The political state has largely conferred its own relative 
autonomy as a law-making entity, devising its own 
regulations and structures. The effectiveness of state 
power is hinged on various techniques which encompass the 
economic, social, cultural and religious fabric of life. 
Primarily, the state requires obedience and achieves this 
through its relations of power within society. The 
influence of such power and jurisdiction is ultimately 
marked by geographical parameters. The primacy on the 
technocratic domination of all aspects of life implies 
that the authority of the modern political state is not 
based on a juridical or moral guarantee. Moreover, the 
role of technocratic elitism concerns the preservation of 
its power structures and to check trends which potentially 
threaten to undermine its authority and, by implication, 
the system of social and spatial relations it has 
prescribed: "So why bother ... with the rank-size rule, or 
any so-called laws of location; much more relevant is the 
basic political law - 'get power and then hang on to it' -
which has many spatial ramifications" (Johnston 1977a, 7). 
The technocratic state maintains a front of pseudo-
paternalism which otherwise conceals an authoritarian 
machinery whose function is to (ideally) prescribe and 
regulate both process and structure within the social 
formation. The manipulation and control of the socio-
spatial system by the state power structures undermines 
any concept of 'democratic planning' procedures. Public 
participation is shunned and the wider sphere of the 
collective social interest pertaining to "the various 
goals that are being considered ... in resources, as well 
as in personal and cultural values" (Wirth 1939, 508) is 
otherwise dismissed. Rational planning under the 
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technocratic state is a purely secular business whose 
`organising principles' are totalizing and which provide 
no basis for explaining human discontent or 'estangement' 
(see Relph 1976, 1981). Power - and its supportive network 
of ideological precepts - masks social reality to create 
an illusion of meaning to further its own ends: 
domination, enslavement, gain, the proliferation of 
injustice, and so on. All existence becomes distorted by 
the philo-scientific theorizings of the technocratic state 
about the human condition, where opportunism, and 
pragmatism govern all its concerns and intentions. 
As the power structure in advanced political economies 
(whether capitalist or socialist) increasingly displace 
any notion of truth, people become stereotyped and deluded 
by the bureaucratic elites which govern their interests. 
Technocracies qua 'scientistic orthodoxies' dispossess 
their subjects of all that is of real cultural and social 
value, that is, the individual is denied any 
responsibility for independent moral judgement. 
Responsibility, as such, implies a condition of complete 
subservience to the state (i.e. the ruling elite) so that 
"people will [not only] see things that do not exist" 
(Tuan 1974, 246) but will also believe in values which do 
not exist. State power is to a large extent sustained by a 
form of 'group hallucination' or condition of social 
schizophrenia. So too will the organization (and any 
dysfunctioning) of the spatial structure reflect the 
relationship between power structures and society, and the 
extent to which 'lived experiences' of the immediate is 
offset by some (ideological) preoccupation with utopian 
futurism, or whatever. 
As in all forms of knowledge, human existence is also 
subjected to the scientific demystification of life. A 
structualist explanation of human geography will restrict 
the socio-cultural understanding of geographic phenomena 
to purely political and economic terms, so that in terms 
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of the relations of power with society: The ultimate goal 
of the human sciences is not to constitute, but dissolve 
man" (Levi-Strauss 1966, 247). If, however, the 
subjectivity of human beings is constituted in the main by 
cultural and religious practices, then no individual 
social actor can authentically 'externalize' (distance) 
himself from the specific cultural instance in which the 
terms of social reality are grounded. The false 
consciousness generated by the ideological tenets of state 
power structures concerning the nature and organisation of 
space and society can be effectively undermined through 
human reflexivity (i.e. self-understanding). Trigg (1985, 
204), however, offers a paradoxical proviso insofar that: 
"A reflexive social science applying its findings to 
itself will soon destroy itself". 
Jung and Koestler have both stressed that the balance 
between the conscious and unconscious life of the 
individual is of critical importance for the maintenance 
of awareness and wholesomeness and therefore, to fully 
apprehend and understand social reality. An atheistic 
(psychically mert), secular culture finds no intrinsic 
meaning or purpose in human existence, nor the true sense 
of the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom and least of 
all, the value of moral responsibsility. Its only appeal 
is to the finite terms of reference of scientific 
explanation couched in bio-chemical, physicalistic and 
materialist expressions only. Levi-Strauss (1963), 
however, maintains that symbolism, ritual and mysticism 
are sacrosanct even to the most secularized technocracy. 
Further, Foucault and Jung associate the development of 
the modern Western state and its structures of power with 
the concepts evolved in the institutionalization of 
Christianity. Foucault (1982, 213-215) claims that the 
`pastoral power' and its conceptual framework in the 
Christian Church has lent itself easily to forms of 
political imitation. The political state has accordingly 
revised, reinterpreted, distorted and inverted such power- 
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forming concepts as 'service', 'pastoralism', 'sacrifice', 
`confession', 'salvation' and 'truth' to suit its own ends 
and purposes. 
If individual social actors are necessarily to be made 
subordinate to the political state, then ideology must 
mask/eradicate metaphysics and religion which are made 
coextensive with a "dependence on and submission to the 
irrational facts of experience" (Jung 1983, 357). 
Religion, moreover, claims to offer an external point of 
reference from which the individual is able to exercise 
judgement and fairness in his decision-making. Further, 
the role of religion provides an extramundane category 
which relativizes the claims of political power structures 
and affords the individual an existential justification 
for the exercise of spiritual (psychic) and moral 
reflexivity in his deliberations of society and space. 
State policy can potentially be exalted to a credo above 
all critical reflection so that the (totalitarian) 
political state becomes an 'object of worship'. It alone 
has the power to prescribe and interpret its doctrines/ 
ideology 'authentically'. The political state, moreover, 
must use its structures of power to perpetuate its own 
authority and existence. To achieve this goal, it may 
establish socio-spatial differentials and disparities 
which can be reinforced by media campaigns, systems of 
surveillance and statutory administrative machinery. 
Essentially: The mass State has no intention of promoting 
mutual understanding and the relationship of man to man... 
The more unrelated individuals are, the more consolidated 
the State becomes, and vice-versa ... The dictator 
State... is based on the greatest possible accumulation of 
depotentiated social units" (Jung 1983, 399-400). 
The contemporary political state can rarely claim to have 
absolute (totalizing) power. Conflicts (systems or 
legitimation crises) are frequently generated in the 
relations between the structures of power and society (see 
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Foucault 1982; Habermas 1976; Held 1982). These typically 
arise against forms of state domination (social, ethnic, 
religious), of exploitation (economic) and of subjectivity 
or submission (where individual rights are attached). Any 
combination of these may exist at any one time. 
`Antiauthority' conflicts generally arise when some facet 
of individuality is apparently threatened by political 
power structures so that a (sub-)system crisis identifies 
and attacks a specific form of power. The spatial 
inequalities generated by unfairnesses in the allocation 
of goods and the environmental scarring of landscapes in 
the exploitation of primary resources tend to reflect the 
general mode of social consciousness. If certain uses of 
knowledge constitute a 'threat' (physically and/or 
psychologically) to human existence, it is rarely 
disdained by the dominant politico-scientific elite if 
such knowledge reinforces the structures of power. The 
technico-scientific rejection of 'limits' and the absence 
of moral responsibility in social planning and development 
attempts to foster a social climate of uncritical 
acceptance towards the aims of the political state. The 
individual social actor is rarely encouraged to inquire 
into the roots of his specific ontogenesis, nor of the 
possible correlation it may have with the conditions of 
contemporary social and economic existence. The 
epistemological and methodological standpoint of the 
technocratic state is rigorously maintained through the 
political relations of power with society. The prospect of 
confronting the issues which uncover the real sources of 
global injustice - even in the distributive terms which 
concern the human geographer - is not only problematic but 
may also raise scepticism, ridicule, outrage and conflict, 
particularly if the ideological structures of power are 
unmasked: "... the historical background of practices ... 
which make objective social sciences possible, cannot be 
studied by context-free, value-free, objective theory; 
rather, those practices produce the investigator and 
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require an interpretation of him and his world" (Dreyfus 
and Rainbow 1982., 166). 
Geographers have increasingly become attracted to the 
problems of social injustice and inequalities in the 
allocation and distribution of goods in a spatial context. 
Put simply, the ideal redistributive terms implies 
permitting access to goods and services hitherto denied to 
those who have been excluded from equitable participation 
in the economic and technical systems of the technocratic 
state. Such a change in emphasis also suggests removing 
(some of) the material advantages and benefits of those 
who exploit the oppressed. Short of those who advocate 
radical structural transformation (revolutionary Marxist 
theory) in advanced capitalist systems, others have 
attempted to formulate a liberalist solution. This calls 
for an idealised articulation of Western man in terms of 
his ability for moral self-understanding. Gauthier's 
(1986) principle of 'minimax' relative concession 
presupposes that people are unequal in material endowments 
but that a rational point of agreement can be reached by 
the limited reappropriation of wealth through a system of 
bargaining. It requires that each actor acquires needs 
sufficient as to neither jeopardize his own position, nor 
worsen the situation of others. Equality, as such, is 
manifested as a consequence of prohibitions on particular 
forms of unfairness and exploitative relationships. 
Notwithstanding, all decision-making concerning the 
allocation of resources requires some consideration of the 
effective aspects of a social ethics at the level of 
collective as well as individual conscience. O'Neill 
(1986) suggests that the ideal social order is one which 
transcends concepts of justice and instead fosters a 
climate of mutual trust and beneficience. 
A liberalistic 'middle ground' which echoes theoretical 
concepts such as social justice and egalitarian notions 
largely fails to establish the bases for its supposed 
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objectivity. This approach tends to be self-legitimating, 
pre-assuming the validity of its procedural method while 
simultaneously deriving 'principles' and 'justice' from 
them. The objective grounds for a moral consensus depends 
upon the adequacy and plausibility of the 'internal 
strategy' which seeks to justify the criterion. 
Conversely, a subjective morality - which frequently 
promulgates absolutist expectations - is generally 
unacceptable/untenable because it requires the existence 
of an 'external strategy', that is, some metaphysical or 
religious concept to which it is possible to appeal and on 
which a consensus can be achieved (see Fishkin 1984). 
Much, however, must be read against the content of the 
propositional truth-claims of a metaphysically grounded 
social ethics when measured against the magnitude of 
social and economic ills and the basis for political 
decision-making in the modern technocratic state. 
The technocratic state largely bases the terms of its 
rationality on the dictum that all human needs are 
ultimately fulfilled through materialism (practice). Marx, 
for example, understood social justice in terms of a 
material struggle, not as a cultural or metaphysical 
quest. Philosophically, Marxists must develop an account 
of truth which is neither instrumentalist nor a 
correspondence view. Any extrapolation of truth raises 
moral issues, yet Marxists have consistently rejected 
morality as a product of pure ideology in class societies. 
Lukes (1985), however, exposes this view as a paradox: 
when Marxists reject morality as ideological, they are 
rejecting morality in the narrow sense of any system of 
rules. All systems, however, will treat individuals in 
accordance with a common standard, but if all individuals 
are intrinsically different by definition, then 
organisational (political) systems will treat people 
unequally. This will inevitably be reflected in the 
spatial organisation and structure of society. While 
Marxism's 'moral philosophy' is precariously hinged on a 
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strong utopian view of the socialist future, it 
nonetheless concedes that the need for a social ethics 
unavoidably arises as a 'realm of necessity' whose 
expression corresponds to a precognition of some 
fundamental human 'good'. 
Habermas - in his attempt to ground the conditions for a 
consensus view in a 'rational' society - draws heavily on 
Kohlberg's (1971) cognitive developmental psychology. 
This may otherwise be discussed in terms of a search for 
an 'ethical optimum'. Kohlberg's theory broadly suggests 
that there are stages in law and morality and in world-
views which are apprehended on both the individual and 
collective social levels. For Habermas (1979, 120), this 
corresponds to an "expansion of ... consensual action", 
that is, stages towards a universal rationality. Lukes 
(1982) and Thompson (1982) both remark, however, that 
there is no scientific evidence which might justify the 
notion of sequential stages in the development of 'moral 
consciousness' and nor, by implication, can there by any 
realistic terms of reference for discussing an 'ethical 
optimum.' The relaxation and possible discarding of all 
social and cultural values which Habermas seeks in his 
theory of communicative ethics may conversely precipitate 
"a reprimitivisation of instinctual demands" (Ottmann 
1982, 95). Such an eventuality would be tantamount to an 
increasing aggressiveness directed (in the first instance) 
against the structures of power in the political state 
which otherwise constitute the institutional forces of 
social oppression. Put in its geographical context, it 
invites a situation of possible spatial anarchy which 
finds no recourse to acknowledge the legality or ('moral') 
principles of any political order which attempts to 
organize social and spatial structures 'from above'. The 
rationale of Habermas's 'communicative' and 'emancipatory' 
ethics becomes suspect and "... must not be seen in terms 
of a liberation from power and authority as such, but in 
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terms of an attempt to legitimate 'just' forms of power 
and authority" (Ottmann 1982, 96). 
Mackie (1977, 91-99) goes some way towards reinforcing 
this argument in his claims that any (ethical) 'principle 
of universalization' is unlikely. Society, he claims, 
evaluates morality in terms of relevance and less by the 
size of numerical differences between one group and 
another. Differences in moral interpretation reflect 
differences in personal perspectives. For Mackie, these 
differences can only be reconciled by seeking a 
generalizable maxim which might accommodate such variance 
at some point of acceptability. Mackie's standpoint, 
however, smacks of pragmatism and moreover, can claim no 
solid grounds for working towards a position of 
`acceptable moral compromise' through rational discourse. 
The ethics of the political state introduces a definite 
distinction between (the primacy of) economics and moral 
understanding: the latter is generally subsumed in terms 
of the former. Both corporate capitalism and centralized 
state socialism elevate the role of science and technology 
as the final solution to all human needs and problems. 
This corresponds to an instrumentalist ethical format 
orchestrated by the institutional (power) structures of 
the political state rather than through any spiritual and 
cultural transformatory process within society. A social 
ethics which presupposes that (structural) socio-spatial 
change must first be preceded by a change in the 
consciousness of individual social actors is anathema to 
the technocratic state. Roszak (1975, 193-197) suggests 
that there is a 'psychic price' to be paid for scientific 
enlightenment and the technological mastery of nature: 
people often experience social alienation and estrangement 
in their relations with the structures of power but their 
"spiritual disconnectedness" cannot be satisfied by any 
political order. 
The technico-scientific rationalization of ethics is 
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otherwise an attempt to ground the metaphysical element of 
human existence in materialism and therefore, to subjugate 
the theory and formation of ethics to the structures of 
power in the dominant political state. The 
demythologization of cultural and religious values 
implicit in the content of ethics corresponds to the 
secularization of the mystical and the sacred. It has led 
Dickinson (1983, 1) to inquire: "Should 'wealth' be 
measured only in terms of money and the material 
possessions it will buy, or should spiritual and cultural 
values be assessed?" All forms of societal organisation 
which are institutionalized by a code of ethics will 
generally be suffused with some combination of customs, 
rituals and symbolism. Modern society still appears to 
require some sense of quasi-mystification acting as a part 
of its guiding principle(s). This suggests a search for 
ontological origins which are derived from epistemological 
inquiry but one which in a contemporary secular context 
implies an optimism that this 'mysticism' will provide 
meaning to the purpose of existence and to the reality of 
institutional structures (see Gaskin 1984). 
The spatial organisation of society has increasingly 
necessitated that human geography should develop and 
clarify a value-position from which the terms of its 
rationality and its interpretation of social reality might 
be evaluated. This is an essential pursuit if geography as 
a discipline of knowledge in the social sciences is to 
legitimate its status with a raison d'etre as well as to 
"prescribe a standwIlhealth" (Roszak 1973, 368). The 
elucidation of a social ethics is not only fraught with 
philosophical conflict but will also encounter the 
ideological structures of the political state. Many of the 
conflicts which philosophical reason fails to resolve will 
frequently generate a social ethics which is established 
on a set of prohibitions, over which the political state 
presides. Kant's quest for a moral principle which might 
be objectively and universally valid for human decision- 
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making could not be grounded a priori on the standpoint of 
`duty' as the formal content of reason. Kant's 
`categorical imperative' (practical rule), moreover, 
demonstrates that any attempt to evolve a universal law 
which is grounded in the terms of reference of an 
autonomous human reason will become relative and 
pragmatic, so that almost anything can be formulated as a 
`general rule' (see Horkheimer and Adorno 1972, 85). 
Rather than removing the dichotomy between subject and 
object, disparities are reinforced because, in practice, 
there is no adequate means for assessing competing ends in 
society. Kant's extrapolation of practical (moral) reason 
emphasizes the inconsistency of human thinking and 
behaviour. Any appeal to the unconscious realm of human 
reason collapses the ethical dilemma into the metaphysical 
domain (i.e. non-reason). 
Enlightenment philosophy provided the foundations for an 
`ethics of pessimism' whose expression is frequently 
grounded in utilitarianism. This, according to Hampshire 
(1984), signifies a position of conflict and general 
disagreement in the area of moral knowledge and the 
inadequacy in the choice and scope of the philosophical 
terms of reference with which to deal with the problem. 
The impetus which has granted contemporary expedience to 
utilitarianism qua 'decisionistic ethics' can be most 
pertinently grounded in the (nihilistic) writings of the 
Marquis de Sade (1740-1814). De Sade exploded the logical 
inconsistency of the (pseudo-)moralism of liberalistic 
philosophical thinking and expounded the full 
ramifications of Enlightenment thinking. De Sade's 
philosophical ideas were encapsulated in a form of 'bio-
chemical determinism' so that every aspect of existence 
must be understood in purely mechanistic terms. Social 
ethics, on this account, are incidental and moreover, 
irrelevant, non-rational manifestations of the human 
condition: "Morals become only a word for a sociological 
framework ... a means of manipulation by society ... The 
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word 'morals' ... is only a semantic connotation word for 
non-morals. What 'is', is right" (Schaeffer 1975, 39). 
Effectively, reason is reduced to instrumentalism so that 
its 'use-value' is superior to its propositional content. 
The morality that is formulated and enforced by the 
technocratic state is grounded in ideology whose 
expression is found in behaviourism and (Freudian) 
psychological determinism. 
Fut in a geographic context, the presuppositions which 
underpin the ideology of the technocratic standpoint 
suggest that social actors respond instinctively to 
stimuli and disincentives (obstacles) within the spatial 
environment. Space - and those actors who participate in 
the socio-economic fabric of the territorial entity - is 
characteristically competitive, exploitative and 
hierarchical in terms of the organisational structures and 
social stratification superimposed upon it. Space is 
attributed a subjective dimension in which people are 
objectivized as (passive) opportunists who are essentially 
preoccupied with the maximisation of their own ends. There 
is no moral content in any consideration of conceptual 
criteria such as distributional justice, fairness in the 
accessibility to goods and services, and so on. Man is 
otherwise discredited with having any measure of intuitive 
reflexivity in his interaction with the spatial relations 
of society. He cannot, therefore, critically evaluate the 
legality of state power machinery which implements and 
maintains the spatial structures which constitute the 
basis for social praxis and ecconomic practice. The social 
ethics of the technocratic state offer no proviso for 
moral collective responsibility. Citizen participation, as 
such, is orientated towards the recognition of political 
authority and obedience to the 'moral' interpretations 
predetermined by the state itself. 
The morality which is formulated and enforced by the 
technocratic state is socially and spatially divisive. 
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Moreover, it is tantamount to the legitimization of 
(politically and legally) controlled forms of 'social 
anarchy' where the actual causes of differentials remain 
untouched. The totalizing autonomy bestowed on human 
reason alone affords the modern political state a position 
of unrestricted power and authority which, in terms of 
Nietzsche's 'anti-system', negates any notion of freedom, 
justice or fair representation. The extent to which human 
geography is able to resist the dehumanization of its 
content will largely depend upon the nature and intentions 
of the political apparatus which controls the relations of 
power in society. These will be reflected in educational 
policy-making and may be specifically tied to syllabus 
design and content. The state may determine and implement 
`national guidelines' across the educational curriculum. 
Such measures may introduce a format for the ideological 
presentation of disciplines of knowledge in the social 
sciences, whose aim is to mask or desensitize those issues 
which are controversial and/or value-laden. Alternatively, 
the state may unconditionally prescribe what can and 
cannot be taught. In either case, it is an attempt by 
government to offset or eradicate social conflict which is 
generated through the necessity for a moral 
interpretation. Moreover, the effectiveness of state 
power is challenged in any confrontation with society 
which threatens to undermine the authority of its 
philosophical and procedural rationale. The imminent 
danger constituted by the intensification of the relations 
of power is where the knowledge imparted through education 
is reduced to a condition of complete subservience and 
impo tence under the totalitarian state. 
In this light, the 'survival value' is reinforced as the 
exclusive ethical principle of human existence over which 
the 'will to power' of totalitarian thought and practice 
predominates. A naturalistic social science which expounds 
a behavioural ethics fundamentally requires to be 
critically deconstructed and redefined in a natural 
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perspective so that it may become a means to human 
fulfilment rather than an end in itself. To these ends, 
Smith (1980, 147) adds the reminder that: "Unlike other 
sciences, human and natural ecology are contemplative and 
judgmental in spirit." Under the tenets of 'normal' 
scientific inquiry, however, the terms of 'freedom' and 
`responsibility' are largely synonymous with an 
individualistic concern for 'self'. This standpoint is 
divorced from and indifferent to any moral considerations 
about the problems and difficulties of 'others', and that 
socio-spatial differentiation and a psychological 
distancing from others become the overriding criteria for 
individual well-being. In sum, the unity of (moral) reason 
and domination in technocratic society presides over an 
understanding of social ethics, but one whose 
philosophical terms of reference readily collapse into 
solipsism. 
HUMAN GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL ETHICS: THE PROBLEM OF THE 
`VALUE APPROACH'  
Contemporary ethics are broadly based on situationism. 
This standpoint presupposes that human existence consists 
of a series of situations and that each situation 
manifests of itself a norm of action. This is made 
synonymous with a person's thinking, decision-making and 
actions. Every concrete situation must be accepted and 
experienced in its totality, disregarding any concern for 
`outside' inferences. Abstract (metaphysical) norms are 
necessarily excluded from the corpus of concrete and 
existential experience. Situationism places the primacy of 
experience over virtue and otherwise recognizes no general 
norms in human existence beyond the immediate situation, 
that is, the context of experience. A situationist ethics 
is in opposition to the views expounded in Kantian 
`ethical formalism' which claims that every material 
(concrete) ethic is empiricist by definition and 
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ultimately degenerates into forms of hedonism and 
utilitarianism. 
Simplistically, situationism rejects any concept of 'moral 
duty' or 'responsibility' in social praxis but instead 
substitutes these terms for the notion of 'freedom'. For 
these reasons, situationism is philosophically most 
closely related to existentialism and pragmatism, since it 
tends to place excessive emphasis on the role of the mood 
of the subject at the expense of the objective structure 
of the person to whom reference action is directed. 
The significance of situationism, existential philosophy 
and the ethical dilemma which this area raises is of 
considerable importance to human geography and has not 
been entirely neglected. Existentialism has been 
popularized primarily through the work of Sartre who 
sought to formulate a new method of inquiry which would 
replace the unsatisfactory presuppositions of positivist 
epistemology. Existentialism is concerned with the ways in 
which people define their personal relations with the 
world. For Sartre, 'man first of all exists' and 'is 
nothing else but what he makes of himself'. Jaspers too 
supports the case for the primacy of subjective 
(anthropocentric) inquiry, arguing that the world has no 
objective (external) point of reference so that space and 
time are essentially projections of subjective 
configurations of thought and experience. The 
existentialist methodology is equally concerned with the 
concept of 'distance' or 'estrangement' so that its 
philosophical expression is one of dualism: on the one 
hand, man wishes to engage in social relations with others 
but conversely, must disengage (distance) himself from 
social relations in order to retain/verify the 
authenticity of his existence/being (see Buber 1957). The 
philosophical circularity generated by existentialism 
suggests that man dreads the loneliness and isolation on 
the side of 'disengagement' because he is confronted with 
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`nothing'. If 'disengagement' is made coextensive with 
`authentic being' and thus, 'freedom' from the 
inauthenticity of organized socio-spatial relations, then 
all existence is absurd because man cannot reconcile the 
dichotomy (disunity) of his dilemma (the problem of 
being). Existential man is condemned to a fragmented 
understanding of his own (self-)existence and that of 
others. 
It follows that there can be no possibility of social 
integration nor any certitude of 'knowing' in the 
organization and management of the spatial environment. 
Either all existence is (and always had been) absurd, 
impersonal and anarchic ('nothingness') or man must seek 
an alternative explanation to uncover the meaning of 
`being'. Few contemporary existentialists have stood their 
ground because they are unable to formulate any 
constructive terms of reference on the basis of 
meaninglessness ('nothing'). Rather, in his attempts to 
gain insight to his ontological alienation, man frequently 
succumbs to the (logically inconsistent) standpoints 
offered by political ideologies and 'normal' science. 
These hardly succeed in removing the dilemma of 
existential emptiness nor the need for 'relatedness' and 
`belonging'. An existential geography becomes a wasteland 
of placelessness and human hopelessness grounded in a 
philosophy of alienation and pessimism from which no sense 
or meaning of an 'ethical content' in existence is 
forthcoming, or indeed necessary. If it is presupposed 
that man 'makes his own reality' - and that a person's 
understanding of perception constantly changes over 
historic space and time - then a generalizable (cultural-
specific or universal) social ethics which cuts across 
perceptive (observable) society and space is unlikely to 
develop. 
Existentialism qua situationism leads man to assign 
meanings to places, where some places become more 
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meaningful than others (through a numerical consensus of 
those with similar outlooks/experience) while others 
become increasingly obscure or lost in the 'historical 
consciousness'. Any understanding of 'meanings' in the 
wider existentialist context is in fact meaningless 
because there is no firm epistemological basis in which 
the propositional truth-content of 'meaning' can be 
grounded or verified. Essentially, although man seems 
compelled by necessity to assert himself in a societal 
context and enter-into-relations with others as a means of 
attempting to confirm the authenticity of being, it 
remains that he fundamentally seeks to subjectively 
reconstruct a landscape (space and place) on an 
individualistic basis. From this standpoint, the 
existentialist dilemma is reinforced by the inadequacy of 
any terms of reference which might explain/resolve the 
`distance' barrier which separates authenticity (truth) 
from inauthentic relations (untruth). The pragmatic aspect 
of existentialism/situationism implies that the 'source of 
creativity' which inspires thinking and conscious 
awareness cannot be identified so that the existentialist 
condition "becomes a history of man's encounter with 
himself" (Samuels 1978, 37). 
A situationist ethics which derives many of its concepts 
and methodological procedures from existentialist 
philosophy fails to clarify the linkages which would 
otherwise permit man to 'relate' to the phenomenal world 
and others in it, and neither does it arouse his 'concern' 
which might ultimately motivate him to overcome his 
`detachment' from others. The existentialist content of 
situationism renders any notion of a 'fixed' ethics as 
both absurd and a hindrance towards the realization of 
human potential. Moreover, the assertion that the 
individual social actor must first be 'true to oneself' 
cannot possibly be qualified within the terms of reference 
of existentialism. According to the situationist-
existential standpoint, there is 'nothing' in either the 
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present or the future which suggests any shift in philo-
psychoanalytical emphasis that might enlighten the 
problems inherent in the human condition. All men are 
ontologically alienated because they have no universal 
framework in which to discuss the existential dilemma. 
Man's 'estrangement' is not only observable in a 
contemporary social-spatial context, but indeed runs 
through his entire history of being. For the human 
geographer, it is not simply an enhanced understanding of 
the spatial environment (perceived natural phenomena) that 
will provide him with a generalizable code of social 
ethics which satisfy the terms of existential reality. 
Rather, he must seek meaning and understanding within 
`self-awareness'. Yet, the pursuit of this goal appears to 
suggest that man must transcend the terms of conscious 
(empirical) reality, because the autonomous 
(anthropocentric) standpoint of the existentialist 
approach fails to resolve the disunity (despair, 
pessimism, alienation, etc) and the ethical vacuum 
associated with the human condition. 
Existentialism lacks any adequate terms of reference which 
might uncover the significance/content of man's 
unconscious (spiritual or psychic) existence or of the 
ethical consequences of his thinking and actions. Rather, 
the philosophical existentialism which underpins a 
situationist ethics reinforces the claim that human values 
can only be derived from human (experiential) existence, 
but with the proviso that: "No God, therefore no essence 
of man" (Grene 1959, 44). Although existentialism provides 
certitude in revealing the personal inauthenticity 
(nothingness) of human socio-spatial relations, it has no 
basis for providing a constructive explanation of the 
meaning and purpose of existence. Many of the values which 
man employs in attempting to evolve a 'common ground' or 
`universal syntax' (which aggregates generalizable social 
attitudes yet simultaneously preserves the individuality 
of the social actor) frequently appeal to social, cultural 
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and political criteria for their propositional (truth) 
content. These, like ethical ideas, may brobdly be based 
on subjectivism (prejudice) and are otherwise 
theoretically suspect. For Williams (1985), the 
contribution of philosophy to ethical thought is 
explicitly negative and that the one possibility for any 
adequate methodological basis of inquiry is the grounding 
of ethical life in considerations about human nature. The 
issues which underpin these considerations are essentially 
metaphysical rather than materialist or linguistic. 
The integration of ethical values in a spatial ontology of 
human social relations not only presupposes the 
existential alienation of man at the point of origin, but 
also acknowledges the need for a reaffirmation of human 
dignity in a contemporary setting where the meaning and 
purpose of 'being' are increasingly obscured by advanced 
technological societies. Macquarrie (1972, 267) believes 
that when existentialism (situationism) is made synonymous 
with atheistic humanism then individuals are 'autonomous 
moral agents' whose actions are based on self-
determination and freedom, while for others, the untenable 
(existentialist) bases for (self-)authentication inspires 
individuals to pursue "those very limits of existence 
where faith arises". An existentially grounded 
situationist ethics is unconcerned with the verification 
of any propositional truth-claim which raises the 
possibility of an encounter/relationship between man and 
`Being' (logos). Yet it tends to ambiguously concede that 
some meta-ethical (non-rational) imperative is inevitable, 
despite the inadequacy of its philosophical terms of 
reference with which to understand the meaning of the 
concept. In the face of these difficulties people 
nevertheless "for good and evil, whether sane or insane, 
rational or irrational, well-intentioned or demonic, make 
their choices and their landscapes" (Samuels 1981, 131). 
When man attempts to rationalize the meanings and 
359 
significance of his surroundings (place) on the basis of 
existentialist philosophical underpinnings, then every 
landscape becomes a unique expression of each individual's 
perception of space in a specific situational context. Any 
ethical values which are raised by the situationist 
standpoint will be problematic and may only be able to 
claim a social consensus (a level of generalizability) 
with considerable difficulty. Moreover, any prospective 
development of ethical norms in human geography is likely 
to encounter the meaning of 'goodness' and 'evil' if 
individual social behaviour and decision-making are to be 
sufficiently explained. This suggests the need for a view 
which recognizes the fundamental disunity in the human 
condition - man's dignity and his depravity. Midgely 
(1984) argues a case for the recognition of the existence 
of evil and claims that every individual has a capacity 
for 'wickedness'. This reinforces the view that people are 
responsible for their own (moral) choices and actions and 
in this sense, the interpretation of 'conscious 
development' (self-awareness/authentication qua 'truth') 
expounded by Nietzsche and Freud is rejected inasmuch that 
people's motives are varied and multiple. Nor is it 
sufficient to attempt to explain the concept of evil in 
behaviouristic terms which forlornly seeks to equate 
`public wickedness' with 'social problems' and 'private 
wickedness' with 'mental disorders'. Put otherwise, 'evil 
motives' are transposed into 'evil purposes'. People do 
not invent new motives or values which can then be 
articulated in ethical terms, although individuals and 
institutions frequently attempt to legitimize the content 
of their ethical reasoning through ideology. This does 
little or nothing to clarify the terms of social reality 
but rather distorts and conceals the rationale of true 
intentions and purposes: "Evil is personal, an ingredient 
of man's nature, hence its tenacity, hence the flimsiness 
of social science models of man and the failure of plans 
based on such models" (Ley 1974, 71). 
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The enhancement of opportunism, hedonism, utilitarianism 
and egoism - together with the ideological dehumanization 
of individual social actors under the technocratic state 
and corporative agencies - is a contemporary global 
phenomena which is steadily eroding the moral fabric of 
society. The institutionalization of power relations under 
the political state and corporative agencies seek to 
legitimize particular forms of behaviour and attitudes in 
the interest of maintaining the status quo, even if this 
sanctions public immorality. While the ethics of 
capitalism stress aggressive competition and the 
conspicuous differentiation of the successful from those 
who fail" (Smith 1978, 358), the socialist state too is 
found wanting since it broadly fails to recognize that 
there are both finite and ethical limitations in the human 
capacity to improve the 'quality of life', while 
categorically rejecting any notion of (innate) human 
greed. 
Unless 'care' and 'responsibility' are recognized as 
essential parts of human virtue (goodness), then human 
freedom - on which existentialism and a situationist 
ethics are based - is necessarily devoid of content, 
meaning and truth. Nor will man be able to experience or 
exercise 'justice' or 'fairness' in any real capacity. The 
development of a substantive ethics for human geography 
demands the unconditional integration of a personalistic 
norm in the social sciences. The world of objects consists 
of people and 'things', but a 'thing' is not only devoid 
of intelligence but also of life. No animal or plant can 
rightfully be called a 'thing', yet can neither rightfully 
be equated with a person. The fundamental difference 
between a person and other life-forms is not one of degree 
- nor one which is inferred by man's superior intelligence 
- but rather the infinite distance betweelnthe psyche of an 
animal and the spirituality of man. The 'inner life' 
(geist) of the person not only distinguishes his 
uniqueness but enables him to assert himself with 
361 
knowledge and understanding about the meaning of truth and 
his environmental relations. A person is ultimately free 
to choose his course of thinking and action according to 
`good' or 'evil' intentions and this essentially 
constitutes the basis of 'freewill'. Put otherwise, 
individual decision-making is motivated on a personal and 
moral level, while animals react on a natural and 
instinctive level. 
The person is capable of rising above his instinctive 
nature through the spiritualization of his inner life 
(psyche). This precludes the using of others so that under 
a personalistic norm, relationships between people are 
based on dignity. Hedonism and utilitarianism are outlawed 
since they are in contradiction with the real structure of 
human (social) praxis. Failing this, there can be no 
discussion or realization of the 'common good' of society. 
Human freewill, in turn, is governed by man's willingness 
to reason over the question of existence. All people 
participate in the general order of existence (being) but 
no life-form has existence of or by its own means since no 
entity contains the source or final cause of existence. 
Man is a limited being in every sense and is self-
sufficient in no profound way. Many human value systems 
are fictitious and largely based on historical and 
experiential disillusionment. The 'ideal' and reality 
become polarized giving way to a social ethics grounded in 
a non-rational philosophic romanticism. This may quickly 
collapse into a widespread social climate of intolerance 
and even hatred, so that man is intrinsically unable to 
discern the values of others. This is partly based on the 
individual's mistrust of others - their motives and 
desires - but is equally a reflection of his own 
(inauthenticity' (shame, alienation, aggression, etc) 
which he also perceives in others. 
Most forms of psychological analysis tend to idealize 
concepts such as truth, responsibility, justice and 
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freedom because they are evaluated in an 'emotional-
affective' way. The interplay of emotions in the 
methodological input often endows the object of enquiry 
with values which correspond to subjectivism. Yet even as 
psychology attempts to uncover the structure and 
foundation of man's inner life, it increasingly confirms 
that the most significant characteristics of the psyche 
are focused on truth and freedom. Truth, therefore, cannot 
be dissociated from human cognition: "Truth is for man a 
function and a task for his reason" (Wojtyla 1982, 77). 
For truth to be grounded in an awareness of, and a 
distinction between truth and falsehood, much depends on 
the individual's attitude towards moral values. Questions 
of 'attitude' and 'awareness' are, however, situated 
beyond the parameters of material existence. Put in a 
geographic context, an evaluation of the spatial problems 
which arise from inequalities in the distribution of 
resources - and particularly those relating to the 
developing world - strongly suggests that the (moral) 
values of the person cannot be subordinate to economic 
policy or political ideology. The socio-spatial problems 
associated with impoverished areas frequently attract an 
emotional-affective reaction from those who have the means 
to rectify the disequilibrium. Because the attitude is 
based on 'reaction', the content of truth remains obscure 
as the internationalization of the causes of social 
injustices and spatial disparities requires - in the first 
instance - a critical evaluation of self. 
Scheler's (1958, 1970, 1970a) philo-anthropological 
approach to the problem of human values provides a 
challenging perspective to the development of contemporary 
social ethics. In contradiction to Kant's 'ethical 
formalism', Scheler argued a case for an ethical theory 
based on a phenomenological analysis of 'social emotions'. 
Put otherwise, Scheler claimed that a 'material ethic of 
values' was not necessarily empiricist or materialistic, 
but rather that the 'emotional' content of human existence 
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constitutes an a priori ethic. Scheler's position is based 
on the presupposition that man has a privileged and unique 
access to 'essences' which correspond to an 'objective 
hierarchy of ideal values', open to phenomenological 
investivation. Scheler's 'a priori of the emotional' 
extends the discussion of an 'ethic of values' into the 
metaphysical (non-rational) sphere. For Scheler, only by 
transcending the limitations of rational (scientific) 
thinking can the individual establish an authentic 
relationship-with-others which, in turn, confirms the 
authenticity of the individual self and its role in the 
world. 
Like Husserl, Scheler advocated a Cartesian 'act of 
withdrawal' insofar that man is able to 'disengage' 
himself from the spatio-temporal context of existence. 
Unlike Husserlian methodology, Scheler rejected a 
reductionist-style 'bracketing' of existential judgments 
where an 'Absolute essence' is isolated from the world of 
Life. According to Scheler, the Spirit (geist) in man is 
activated by his participation in Life but this represents 
a constant struggle and tension (disunity) between 
spiritual/psychic (intransient) existence and the forces 
of natural/worldly (transient) existence. Rather than by 
exercising an approach based on intellectual rationalism, 
the self-assertion of Spirit in man is achieved through an 
attitude of 'contemplative ideation'. The notion of the 
gradual (mutual) permeation of Spirit and Life enables man 
to transcend scientific knowledge and to discover the true 
meanings of (metaphysical) 'essences', that is, ideal 
values. Although Scheler's 'primacy of man' emphasizes the 
purposiveness of his economic activity, it predominantly 
asserts the person's ability to transcend the limitations 
of a materialist existence through his 'detachment' from 
worldly things. Because man is intrinsically both 
spiritual and physical, neither facet of his existence can 
be discussed without reference to the other. Ethics are 
specifically a manifestation of man's spiritual condition. 
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While neither a phenomenological approach nor the 
scientific methodology provide an adequate philosophical 
understanding of human existence, the latter tends to 
undermine and ultimately destroy the meaning of ethics and 
values because it identifies them as a threat to its 
supremacy. If - as is promulgated by scientific 
explanation - human cognition is exclusively concerned 
with producing or reflecting 'mirror images' of the 
`object world', then the psyche must also be 'material' in 
essence which refutes any charge of 'contemplative 
spirituality' in the area of human values. If science is 
to provide an ultimate frame of reference for social 
values, then it must define both the origin and content of 
those values and the way in which they are transmitted in 
the social world within culturally - specific contexts. 
Sperry (1983) envisages a science-based value theory 
through a union of science with ethics and religion, but 
where 'states of consciousness' (values) are synonymous 
with 'mental phenomena' arising from complex brain 
structures. His contention is that science can determine 
values. Although Sperry draws attention to social and 
geographical 'evils' including overpopulation and 
environmental pollution, his theory fails to justify the 
philosophical 'leap' from considerations about 'mentality' 
(states of consciousness/awareness) to considerations 
about the formulation/articulation of 'values', and then 
to the contention that 'science' can provide all solutions 
to social evils. 
The apparent schism between science and values is of 
increasing concern to geographers, but one which moreover 
demands a reconsideration for the basis of 'truth' 
(certitude) in relation to 'freedom'. Much of what 
constitutes a 'scientific ethics' is grounded in 
behaviouristic theorizing and/or the generalizability of 
socio-cultural practices, all of which are steeped in 
ideology, relativism and pragmatism. The metaphysical 
attributes of the human condition are unconvincingly 
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`dymystified', 'rejected' and reduced to purely 
empirical/objective phenomena without any adequate 
scientific explanation. A 'scientific ethics' otherwise 
attempts to legitimate its 'value-position' by appealing 
to its own internal categories and assumptions, but these 
are grounded in an impersonal view of human existence and 
are essentially non-reflexive. The scientific standpoint 
is ambiguous insofar that it precludes the meaning of and 
interrelationship between truth and human freedom in 
social ethics. Rather, the widening of horizons in human 
geography and a more profound understanding of its content 
and contribution to the questions of knowledge and 
existence depend upon "a heightened awareness of the basic 
issues amongst geographers ... resolving conflict between 
scientific and ethical values ... a consistent, individual 
effort to develop ethical guidelines, and to follow 
them..." (Mitchell and Draper 1982, 198). 
To transcend the parameters of a scientifically-defined 
ethics in human geography is tantamount to an attempt by 
man to pursue an unpragmatic and unidealised account of 
truth based on the exercising of human freewill. This 
view presupposes that truth is a condition of freedom and 
a realization of freedom based on that truth permits 
individuals to 'distance' themselves from values which 
seek to exclusively tie the purpose and meaning of 'being' 
to material existentialism. Expressed in terms of 
cognition and praxis, a social ethics which is grounded in 
an intrinsically related concept of truth and freedom 
permits man to grasp the real sense of self-determination 
in his decision-making and accountability for his actions. 
Although the essence of such an ethics is unequivocably 
metaphysical, its cognitive transposition is manifest in 
practice and assumes a purposeful dimension. 
It follows that any reference to 'commitment' and 
`problem-solving' in geographical investigation is only 
possible on the basis of a concept of truth which 
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emphasizes the ethical completeness of the person. Failing 
this, there can be no legitimate appeal to a psychological 
(scientific) completeness of the individual for the 
development of values in human geography. An ethics which 
stresses a commitment of genuine care, concern and 
responsibility fundamentally recognizes the personalistic 
value of others. If this is not the case, then such a 
`commitment' collapses into a form of egoism. Where 
geographical decision-making is based on a behaviouristic 
`ethic' or on a systematic state ideology (or on some 
combination of the two), the value of the person is 
subordinated to it and is invalidated. There is no basis 
for meaning or understanding in terms of respect, loyalty 
and dignity between one person and another. The mode of 
socio-spatial organization exacted by the technocratic 
state is motivated by egoism and ultilitarianism from 
which it dictates its position through an 'authoritarian 
ethic'. This does not constitute a norm grounded in 
concepts of truth, freedom, responsibility or care, but 
rather finds its expression in suppression, manipulation, 
alienation and fear. Ethics embrace a person's interior 
and external behaviour: either the two are inseparably 
linked, or - where the personalistic norm is discarded -
an irreconcilable dialectic of 'insideness-outsideness'/ 
`subject-object' imposes itself. Without a clear norm or 
principle from which the full value of every psychological 
situation can be deduced, there can be no 'ethic of 
commitment' towards geographical problems. 
Scheler adds weight to the discussion insofar that he 
attributes much of the dilemma in developmental ethics to 
man's 'resentment' or unwillingness to pursue truth (the 
authenticity of 'being'). Man's apparent lack of 
objectivity in his judgement and evaluation of the world 
has its origin in 'weakness of will'. Moreover, man 
(freely) elects to adopt an erroneous and distorted sense 
of values to offset the real significance of his 
ontogenesis and of knowledge. 'Resentment' devalues the 
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credibility of intersubjective relationships (respect for 
the other) and therefore exerts a dehumanizing influence. 
It falsely asserts that egoism, hedonism, utilitarianism 
and subjectivism are acceptable human attributes and that 
there are no moral dilemmas to be encountered in 'being'. 
On this basis, there may be a bilateral accommodation 
between (competing) egoisms, but it is likely to be 
relatively shortlived. Nor can it be legitimately claimed 
that 'emotive-affective' reactions towards socio-spatial 
phenomena are necessarily 'authentic'. Primacy of 
`emotion' cannot, however, be held over person; rather, it 
is the reverse: "'Authenticity' of feeling is quite often 
inimical to truth in behaviour" (Wojtyla 1982, 163). 
Although man is charged with the responsibility of 
judgement in his spatio-temporal domain - and, as such, is 
the sole executor of justice, welfare, fairness and so on 
- it does not follow that he is the author of truth. Put 
otherwise, the 'evidence of one's feelings' is not a 
satisfactory criterion for the evaluation of others, nor 
for decision-making in the wider social (collective) 
context. The subjectivisation of all situations may, in 
fact, tend to exert a destructive influence and therefore 
generate a 'distancing' of relations with others. To 
experience the real value of others - their grievances and 
problems - not only calls for a critical evaluation of 
empirical data but also demands the transcendence of 
`emotional-affective' senses through the 'spiritualisation 
of the psyche' (inner life). The secularization of a 
social ethics for human geography can only deal with the 
external manifestation of phenomena ('outsideness') and 
provides no basis for explaining concepts such as 
`discontent', 'estrangement' and 'emptiness'. The 
completeness of ethics requires the recognition of a 
metaphysical precept in its content so that "the way 
forward is the way inward" (Roszak 1975, 239). 
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PART SIX: CONCLUSION 
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The conscious subject of all geographical inquiry in the 
social sciences is man, without whom there can be no 
definite point of reference of any meaning or 
significance. Human geography, notwithstanding, has become 
increasingly concerned with the problematic issues of 
epistemology and methodology which might explain and 
possibly resolve the apparent tension within the 
discipline itself. The pursuit of these objectives has 
interlocked human geography with the questions raised by 
its relationship with science, knowledge and existence. 
Geographers - akin to other social scientists in allied 
disciplines of knowledge - have, on the one hand, sought 
academic recognition and respectability through the 
adjudication of science, but are conversely at a loss to 
clarify and defend the essential nature and content of 
geography within the parameters of the scientific citadel. 
Moreover, the dilemma in which geographers find themselves 
is rooted in the confusion, uncertainty and ambiguity 
which circumscribe the area of epistemology. Those 
questions which pervade an understanding of the ontology 
of socio-spatial reality tend to be treated with even 
greater reluctance and obscurity on the part of social 
scientists. The ontogenesis of human existence - and that 
of the natural environment in which the concepts of space 
and place are grounded - is a fundamental pre-requisite to 
the understanding of human geography. Yet it remains a 
`grey area' which is evaded or dismissed without adequate 
explanation by science, presumably because it demands 
`getting behind' the philosophical standpoints which 
attempt to ground the conditions for 'knowing'. Short of 
postulating a behaviouristic (impersonal) thesis based on 
the tenets advanced by (neo-)Darwinian explanation, 
science has largely been unable to present a coherent view 
of the meaning and purpose of human existence, or of man's 
relationship with and dependency on the natural 
environment and its resources. These shortcomings provoke 
a consideration of the negative attributes which 
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constitute the basis for the management of distributional 
networks and the geographical problems associated with 
economic disparities, social deprivation and injustices 
and so on. While ontology implies an investigation of 
`essences', metaphysical theorizing is largely anathema to 
science because it has no adequate terms of reference to 
explain the inference of acausal (indeterminate) 
principles in practical social reality. Meta-theoretical 
considerations, moreover, are frequently discounted by 
science as possibility-conditions of phenomenal 
investigation. 
Human geography must ultimately reconsider the wider 
implications of its status as a 'science'. Science grounds 
its interest and prescribes its method through its own 
autonomous categories of theory and practice. The 
technical interest threatens to eclipse the individual in 
such a way as to dominate every aspect of existence. The 
instrumentalization and orchestration of society and space 
by the technocratic state and corporative institutions 
constrain individual freedom of choice and expression so 
that the relationship between science and society becomes 
increasingly opaque. The permeation of ideology in science 
and society plays a crucial role in the distortion of fact 
and value. Notwithstanding, the grounding and 
dissemination of these contradictions (states of false 
consciousness) are fundamentally attributes of individual 
and collective self-deception which reflect a general 
condition of existential inauthenticity. Despite a growing 
momentum in contemporary science and society towards a 
position of a 'post-everythingism', this otherwise 
reflects an apparent inability and pessimism to deal with 
the actual. 
Progress in human geography has been largely constrained 
by the modern Western scientific paradigm which prescribes 
what is factually admissable (truth) or inadmissable 
(delusion). While the overriding issue of the scientific 
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paradigm primarily concerns the need to discover a 
universal concept of truth which will effectively 
innovate/restore unity within the disunity of opposite 
(competing) ends in human (social) existence, all its 
arguments must, notwithstanding, presuppose a distinction 
between subject and object if any meaningful statement is 
to result. The causal laws of the natural (objective) 
world constitute the rules of the paradigm and provide the 
explanatory mechanism which 'makes sense' of human 
experiences. For human geography, socio-spatial phenomena 
are situated in a behavioural matrix where the individual 
actor is the ongoing product of a system of social 
engineering. Human existence, however, cannot be 
simplistically reduced to an impersonal physico-chemical 
expression. Nor is a purely atomistic view of the human 
mind a sufficient basis for supporting the notion that the 
person is a, product of sensory behaviour patterns which 
are exclusively geared to concepts of materialism or work. 
No convincing case can be found in the normative 
presumption that a seemingly ongoing dialectical function 
between the components which comprise the social formation 
will - at some unspecified, future point in time - provide 
the ultimate synthesis towards a new dynamic understanding 
for the management and organization of people and space. A 
structural explanation of human geography switches the 
emphasis of the scientific paradigm towards the concept of 
power and the ways in which technocracy attempts to 
legitimate and extend its authority. Scientific progress 
qua paradigm change increasingly risks the charge of 
sterility, inertia and dogma. Science tends to 
unconditionally resist and exclude forms of knowledge 
which digress from its referential parameters of reason 
and rationality, yet many of these elements are widely 
manifest in human thinking and behaviour and have a 
profound impact on the constitution of social reality in 
its spatial context. Put otherwise, that which cannot be 
assimilated into the propositional mould of scientific 
inquiry (causal empiricism) is suspect and unacceptable. 
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Much of the current debate in human geography is deeply 
entrenched in a frantic search for a viable schema of 
action whose overriding concern is with the material and 
physical survival and reproduction of society. The 
magnitude and proliferation of geographical problems in 
contemporary global society are both legion and awesome: 
the technico-scientific mismanagement of environmental 
resources, the distributional imbalances in the allocation 
of the goods which satisfy basic needs, the geo-political 
ramifications of military hostilities and conflict are but 
a few. Geographers have increasingly tended to become 
preoccupied with a developmental programme which 
interlocks socio-spatial processes and structures with 
political practice, through which it is believed possible 
to realize the goal of an 'ideal' mode of social and 
economic existence. 
Differences in political persuasion amongst geographers 
have released a plurality of approaches whose thematic 
expression range from 'technical control' (positivism/ 
instrumentalism), enhanced 'mutual/intersubjective 
understanding' (humanism) and the 'critical-emancipatory' 
school of thought. Although geographers have become 
increasingly aware of the depth of philosophical choice 
which underpins the presuppositional content of the 
various modes of inquiry, the relative degrees of insight 
generated through the plurality of different perspectives 
amounts to little more than a grasping of fragmentary 
partial truths about society and space. No philosophical 
school of thought has yet to generate a firm 
epistemological basis on which human geography might 
establish a more complete (holistic) view about the nature 
of reality and truth. While a plurality of paradigms in 
human geography may be useful in exposing the merits and 
shortcomings of competing approaches, it may achieve 
little else than to ensnare geographers within the 
circularity of philosophical discourse. 
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The pace and scope of paradigm change is, however, 
typically constrained by the 'scientific acceptability' of 
any new criteria, that is, the ease with which knowledge 
can be integrated into orthodox (ideologically dominant) 
systems of thought. While paradigm shifts are taken to 
represent real structural changes in the social formation, 
they frequently fail to take account of the dynamics of 
social changes and are unrelated to the expression of 
values and attitudes which question the meaning and 
purpose of existence. Such myopia not only imposes 
definite parameters which restricts the developmental 
horizons of knowledge, but simultaneously initiates a form 
of censorship which precludes any possibility-condition of 
truth. Under the 'normal' scientific paradigm, 'scientific 
knowledge' counts as the only form of intellectual and 
spiritual knowledge but must ground this claim in the 
contention that man is a 'perfectly rational agent' in the 
social/cognitive sciences - which clearly he is not (see 
Cherniak 1987). Rather, there is greater reason to suggest 
that there is a disproportionate relationship between 
scientific progress and social wellbeing than had 
previously been recognised. This tendency inevitably 
reverberates through the spatial fabric of social 
relations especially when scientific and technical 
developments are innovated into the social formation (that 
is, both at the 'infrastructural' and 'superstructural' 
levels) by the political state and its ideological 
machinery. 
This view appears to unequivocably tie human geography to 
political action in order that it may harness a practical 
expression at the collective social level. Conversely, the 
ideological inconsistencies and the socio-spatial 
shortcomings contained in a political economy approach of 
human geography readily collapse the (presupposed 
predominance of the) material aspects of existence to the 
terms of a moral dilemma. Neither a geography in 
capitalist societies nor that which is formulated under a 
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Marxist structuralism has been able to develop an 
acceptable social and environmental ethics on the basis of 
scientific knowledge qua materialism alone. The tasks of 
`commitment' and 'emancipation' under the aegis of a 'new 
regional geography' must not only relate processes of 
social change (and therefore modifications in spatial 
structures) to a mediation between the cultural-specific 
and global level of explanation (see Janos 1986), but 
equally extend its paradigmatic horizons beyond the 
confines of a 'neutral' and impersonal science. Failing 
this, there can be no understanding of man as the personal 
agent in human geography, nor of the dynamics which 
underpin his beliefs, value systems and behaviour. 
The pursuit of concepts such as 'emancipation', 'justice' 
and 'rational decision-making' in human geography must be 
preceded by an enhanced understanding of 'self'. Put 
otherwise, it is necessary to 'know' the substantive 
content of any 'commitment' through the authenticity of an 
individual's personal existence. Human understanding - as 
the basis for meaningful intersubjective relations - is 
unlikely to be adequately contained in the structure of 
language. If language is raised to a quasi-independent 
`external' status (subject) then man (object) is 
effectively made subordinate to it. Language cannot 
function as a vehicle of mediation to express human 
thinking and reflection about the relations within the 
social formation. Rather, as Heidegger and Wittgenstein 
have shown, when philosophical and methodological 
procedure are geared to the primacy of language, then 
questions of meaning, rationality and reality (in the 
context of geographical inquiry) ultimately collapse into 
the realms of metaphysical speculation and (linguistic) 
`silence'. 
Understanding, moreover, must be grounded in meta-
psychological processes where human intuition corresponds 
to an immediate awareness of the meanings embedded in 
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perception and experience. Intuition, therefore, becomes a 
vehicle for the transfer of psychic inferences to the 
conative and affective attributes. Put in this 
perspective, the individual actor is value-laden and 
carries within his cognitive reflexive thinking a 'moral 
fabric' in his geographic decision-making which is 
exercised through his freewill. This would seem to suggest 
that 'truth' is a property of judgements rather than 
propositions, since a cognitive understanding of 
intersubjective relations and social ethics can only find 
a sufficient basis in the personal intuitive mind (see 
Reid 1986). 
The learning process in human geography consists of active 
construction/reconstruction of personal meaning in which 
content and context are crucial to an enriched 
understanding of knowledge and existence. This challenges 
the inductivist view of science and is at once at variance 
with the idea of an impersonal and 'neutral' (value-free) 
procedure which sets behavioural (Piagetian) psychology as 
its mainstay to explain learning processes. Although 
`normal' science primarily seeks unity through the fusion 
of mind and body, it fails to accommodate a whole range of 
`extraordinary' phenomena which are otherwise expressions 
of the individual's spiritual or psychic existence. Far 
from dismissing these attributes a superstitious or 
illusory residues from the primordial (pre-scientific) 
past, 'intuitive understanding' - and the mysticism which 
it frequently evokes - reflects a timeless thread in human 
existence which cuts across history and space through the 
`collective unconsciousness' or psychic memory. The 
`collective memory' of the human race operates on both a 
cultural - specific and universal level and carries the 
meaning and purpose of existence and reality regardless of 
personal world-views or belief systems. 
The philosophical systems of thought which underpin the 
understanding/explanation of geographical phenomena are 
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broadly lacking insofar that they fail to account both for 
the inconsistencies and tension of opposites generated 
through competing interests, as well as the possible 
inter-connection of 'synchronistic occurrences' (causally 
unrelated events) which permeate into the world of social 
(objective) reality. Moreover, the conditional (time 
dependent) status of an autonomous science means that its 
propositional truth-claims may perhaps be satisfied at one 
time, but not at others (see Wright 1987). The increasing 
momentum towards the complete dehumanisation of human 
geography is seemingly ominous unless a radical shift in 
its philosophical and methodological emphases is 
forthcoming. The reconstitution of a meaningful and 
purposeful human geography demands a reworking of the 
ontology of social reality, and thus, of man himself. That 
this suggests an upheaval in the order of an 
`epistemological break' which otherwise challenges the 
legitimacy of the categories on which the 'normal' 
scientific paradigm bases its concepts and internal 
stragey, is undeniable. Failing this, however, an 
impersonal social science will be relativist, pragmatic 
and unreliable insofar that nothing can ever be known with 
any certitude, nor understood in any profundity that the 
humanitarian and moral considerations so frequently raised 
by human geography can be apprehended with a new sense of 
awareness and urgency (see Head 1986). 
Human geography - perhaps more than at any other time in 
its comparatively recent historical development - has 
reached a decisive crossroads where it must choose between 
a purely secular and mechanistic cast for the explanation 
of socio-spatial phenomena, or to tread the more uncertain 
path where the existential structures of 'normal' 
scientific inquiry collapse into the mystical and 
`extraordinary' domain of human experience. While the 
standpoint of modern (post-enlightenment) science has 
increasingly sought to expel mysticism from the content of 
its rationale, all branches of scientific inquiry - 
377 
natural (physical), biological, cosmological and social -
indicate that there is an unequivocal unity-in-diversity 
behind and within the universe which has been established 
by a 'law-giving' or 'organizing principle'. Paradigm 
shift - for want of a better term - is tending towards the 
realization that observer and the observed are one and 
cannot be meaningfully separated. The postulation of an 
`anthropic principle' in cosmological science should not, 
therefore, preclude its application to the social 
sciences. For human geography, an 'a priori' materialist 
preoccupation with the efficiency and organization of 
(socio-)spatial distribution systems is but a partial 
representation of human completeness and invites all 
manner of deviance and contradictions in term. 
Rather, the materialist concerns and dilemmas expounded by 
an applied human geography cannot be holistically 
apprehended unless they are preceded by the individual's 
self-knowledge ('individuation') of his participatory role 
in spatio-temporal processes and structures. Seemingly, a 
return to something akin to a Baconian standpoint for a 
`natural' scientific approach in human geography - where 
the mystical/indeterminate has a recognised and 
indispensable place in human rationality and reason -
provides an increasingly logically consistent alternative 
to the dehumanising and non-explanatory impasse offered by 
an instrumentalist philosophy of existence (see Capra 
1983). If the fusion of physical (normal) and metaphysical 
(extraordinary) provides the necessary key to the unity of 
`insideness' and 'outsideness' (i.e. understanding), then 
a realism which must essentially comply with the tenets of 
a 'non-positivist' empirical methodology that Johnston 
(1986) would have for human geography is clearly 
inadequate on this basis. 
The central dilemma of human geography has been marked by 
the fundamental philosophical and existential disunity 
between body, mind and spirit. Much of the onus for the 
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acceleration of this tendency can be attributed to the 
deterministic character of modern scientific development. 
Modern man's terms of reference have become increasingly 
orientated towards the (over-)emphasization of the 
empirical categories of the world (i.e. (outsideness'). 
The scientific insistence of the unconditional causal 
explanation of all social-spatial phenomena has brought 
any metaphysical view of the world into disrepute. This 
has been accompanied by a parallel movement towards the 
demystification of transcendental images perceived in the 
phenomenal world. Whilst the ideal of a 'pre-established 
harmony' (an absolute synchronism between the physical and 
the psychic) by an antecendent order which is a priori to 
human consciousness - yet endows man with meaning and 
purpose - has been fiercely opposed by 'normal' science, 
the notion has hardly been disproven (see Leibniz 1962). 
Moreover, Jung's (1985) postulation of the 'principle of 
synchronicity' may increasingly be seen less a 
superstition, more a hidden truth. The psychic level of 
intuitive awareness (`insideness') is a phenomenal world 
in itself which can be reduced neither to the neurological 
nor the metaphysical, but from which emerges a clear 
distinction between that which is apperception about the 
external world, and that which is true perception. While 
`apperception' corresponds to an isolated (fragmentary) 
state of mind confined to conscious activity and 
reflection about man, space and place, 'perception' is 
conversely tuned to the laws and dynamics of unconscious 
phenomena (that which is 'behind' apperception) and 
transcends the fixed categories of spatio-temporal 
knowledge imposed by 'normal' scientific explanation. 
By this measure, the goal of true perception is one of 
individual pursuit directed towards the restoration of a 
rational unity between the seemingly transient and 
intransient aspects of existence. Far from being a retreat 
or disengagement from the 'real' world, the activation and 
transposition of 'inner awareness' to the cognitive level 
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of articulation and reason will explode the 'unreal' 
parameters of an 'autonomous' science and its ideological 
systems which constrain and confound geographical thought 
and inquiry. 
GLOSSARY 
Absolute: A concept which is complete, unconditional and 
self-existent. It cannot be modified by cultural, 
psychological or any other circumstantial inferences. 
Sometimes used an an antithesis of relativism. 
Anthropic Principle: The postulation that precise physico-
chemical circumstances are necessary to enable the 
universe to be cognizable, that is, if it is to be capable 
of evolving observers who can be aware of its pattern and 
structure. 
Anthropocentrism: The view that all thought and 
considerations are ultimately grounded in man and human 
structures. 
Anthropology: That which deals exclusively with man, his 
relationship with himself and with other men, this 
including the studies of sociology and psychology, but 
nothing beyond man. 
Antithesis: The direct opposition of contrast between two 
things. 
Archaeological method: After Michel Foucault. A theory 
which suggests that the human sciences can be analyzed as 
having an internal self-regulation and autonomy. The view 
that discourse is a rule-governed system and which is 
self-referring. 
Archaeological (structural) holism: After Michel Foucault. 
That the whole determines what may be admissable even as a 
possible element. Where the whole is therefore greater 
than the sum of its parts. That there are no parts except 
within the field which identifies and individuates them. 
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Archetype: After Carl Jung. The psychological 
interpretation of dream symbols that have appeared 
throughout the history of man. 
Authenticity: A term used by existentialists whereby man 
validates the genuineness of his existence by an act of 
the will or a feeling of dread. 
Autonomous man: The right of personal freedom or of 
freedom of the will, as in Kantian philosophy. 
Axiom: An established principle or self-evident truth. 
Background practices: The historical social, cultural, 
religious and linguistic elements which endow the subject 
and institutions with meaning. 
Behaviourism: Doctrine that, given adequate knowledge, all 
human actions admit of analysis into stimulus and 
response. 
Being: A term denoting the area of bare existence. 
Connotation: The implication of meanings to words other 
than the definition of the word. 
Cosmology: The scientific study of the evolution of the 
universe. 
Deduction: A form of a priori reasoning or inference where 
the particular is grounded from a logical analysis of 
general premises and propositions. 
Determinism: The view that human behaviour and action is 
not free but controlled by motives regarded as external 
forces which render freewill an illusion. 
Dialectic: A method of reasoning whereby change takes 
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place by means of triadic movement. Two opposites (thesis 
and antithesis) are resolved in a synthesis which in turn 
becomes a thesis and the process thereby continues. 
Dualism: A theory which recognizes two independent 
principles. 
Empiricism: The belief that knowledge is the result of 
experience, not of theory. 
Epistemology: That branch of philosophy which is concerned 
with the theory, nature and source of knowledge, its 
limits and its validity. 
Existential: Relating to and dealing with moment by moment 
human existence. Dealing with empirical reality rather 
than theoretical considerations. 
Existentialism: An anti-intellectual philosophy of life 
which maintains that human experience cannot be grounded 
in nor explained by scientific or rational terms of 
reference. Existentialism emphasizes that man is free in 
his decision-making in a contingent and seemingly 
purposeless world. 
Geist: Spirit. An expression of intellectuality and 
sensibility. 
Hermeneutic: That which concerns the area of 
interpretation. 
Humanism: There are two meanings: (1) Any philosophy or 
system of thought thotbegins with man alone which attempts 
to explicate a unified meaning of spatio-temporal 
existence; (2) That part of humanistic thinking in the 
above wider sense which emphasizes the hope of an 
optimistic future for mankind. 
Humanism is sometimes associated with the philosophies of 
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phenomenology and existentialism. 
Hypostatize: A metaphysical and theological term of 
reference. That which is rendered as unsubstantial or 
attributed to an abstract expression. 
Idealism: A system of thought in which the object of 
external perception is mind-dependent. 
Ideographic: A method which attempts to isolate the 
singularity and uniqueness of a phenomena. 
Individuation: After Carl Jung. The process of self-
becoming or of self-awareness in the development of the 
individual. 
Induction: The inferring of general law established on the 
basis of the observation and study of particular 
instances. The theorem is deemed to be valid that if it is 
true of any particular case then it is also true of the 
next case in a series. 
Instrumentalism: A term associated with the orchestration 
and manipulation of ideas and knowledge which is grounded 
in a pragmatic philosophy. 
Linguistic Analysis: A branch of philosophy which attempts 
to extrapolate the meaning of philosophical concepts in 
terms of their natural (ordinary) language context. 
Philosophy is a vehicle for the clarification of 'surface' 
structures rather than offering explanations, particularly 
those allied to a value position. 
Logical Positivism: A philosophical school of thought 
which restricts knowledge to facts derived from observable 
phenomena. It holds that all metaphysical theories are 
strictly meaningless since, in the nature of the case, 
they are unverifiable by reference to empirical facts. 
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Materialism: The view that reality is nothing but matter 
and its movements and modifications. Consciousness and 
mind are wholly due to material agency. 
Metaphysics: The theoretical study of knowledge and 
existence which critically examines the meaning of 
reality. That which is beyond physics. 
Methodology: The study of the procedures and principles 
whereby the question of truth and knowledge is approached. 
Monadological: A philosophical term, after Liebniz, 
denoting the ultimate unit of being, that is, of God or 
some divine principle. 
Monism: A theory which rejects the duality of matter and 
mind. 
Mysticism: Two meanings are prevalent: (1) A tendency to 
seek direct communion with ultimate reality of the 
divine' by immediate intuition, insight or reflection; (2) 
A vague speculation without foundation. 
Naturalism: The view that reality is constituted through 
the empirical world alone, not by some supernatural 
agency. 
Negative Dialectics: A critical mode of enquiry 
which assesses the relation between concept and object, 
between the set of properties implied by the concept and 
the object, between the set of properties implied by the 
concept and the object's actuality. It attempts to show 
the developmental contradictions in the object's own 
claims about itself and about what is possible. 
Nihilism: A denial of all objective grounds for truth. A 
belief that existence is fundamentally senseless and 
meaningless whose scepticism and negativity frequently 
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precipitates destructive tendencies in the individual or 
in society. 
Nominalism: A doctrine that asserts that only the 
particulars (elements) are real and that universals and 
abstract concepts are mere names. 
Nomothetic: A method which is law-seeking and concerned 
with the formulation and verification about phenomena. 
Ontogenesis: The origin and development of the individual 
being. 
Ontology: A branch of metaphysics which is concerned with 
the essence of things or being in the abstract as opposed 
to material existence. 
Pantheism: Doctrine that God and Nature are identical. The 
universe is an extension of God's essence rather than a 
special creation. 
Paradigm: An ambiguous concept which broadly corresponds 
to a set of beliefs, values and methodological procedures 
which are recognized and shared as a consensual view by 
those who adhere to a particular school of thought. 
Parallelism: A concept which attempts to establish a 
relationship, correlation or contact between two 
opposites, such as mind and matter or good and evil, so 
that any imbalance, disunity or tension is no longer 
apparent. 
Phenomenology: A philosophical school of thought which is 
broadly the antithesis of the logical positivist 
standpoint insofar that the subjective encounter 
(reflexivity) of experience and consciousness is paramount 
to the areas of knowledge and truth. 
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Practice: The realm of work; the organisation and (re-) 
production of materialism. 
Pragmatism: A philosophical viewpoint which assesses the 
criteria of meaning and knowledge solely in terms of its 
practical bearing upon human interests, that is, through 
experiential and experimental inquiry. 
Praxis: The wider sphere of human activity in its social, 
cultural, religious and other related facets. 
Premise: An assertion from which a mode of thought is 
inferred and developed. 
Presupposition: A belief or theory which is assumed 
beforehand as the basis of argument or logic. Such a prior 
postulate often consciously or unconsciously affects the 
way a person subsequently reasons. 
Propositional Truth: Truth which can be communicated in 
the form of a statement in which a predicate or object is 
affirmed or denied regarding a subject. 
Psychologism: The view that all statements of fact and 
value can be subsumed under psychological terms of 
reference. 
Quantum theory: A branch of physics which investigates the 
behaviour of sub-atomic particles and other related 
phenomena. 
Rationalism: That which is related to or based upon man's 
power to reason consistently. That reason alone is a 
source of knowledge and is independent of experience. 
Realism: A view that universals or general ideas have 
objective existence. That reality is not mind-dependent. 
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Reification: A process whereby a person, social phenomena 
or abstract concepts take on the appearance of things. The 
reduction of the personal to the impersonal. That which is 
alienating. 
Relativism: A view that knowledge can only be understood 
in terms of its relations to place, time and belief 
systems. 
Romanticism: A philosophical view of life or reality that 
has no base in fact, but is rather the product of an 
exaggerated optimism. 
Scientific Method: The development and procedures by which 
a science obtains knowledge. A term which is usually 
equated with logical positivism. 
Semantics: (1) Science of the study of the development of 
the meaning and uses of words and language; (2) The 
exploitation of the connotations and ambiguities in words. 
Solipsism: A metaphysical view that the self (the 
individual) is the only knowable, or the only existent 
thing. 
Structuralism: A view which attempts to establish basic 
elements (concepts, actions, languages) and the rules or 
laws by which they are combined in the area of human 
activity. 
Structuration: After Anthony Giddens. The conditions 
whereby the role of human agency interacts with the 
continuity and/or transformation of structures, and 
thereby the extent to which human agency influences the 
reproduction of the systems themselves. 
Synchronicity: After Carl Jung. The simultaneous 
occurrence of two or more meaningfully but not causally 
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connected events. Also known as the Acasual Connecting 
Principle. 
Teleology: A doctrine of final causes which forwards the 
view that developments are due to the purpose or design 
that is served by them. The ends are a necessary means of 
understanding the cause. 
Totemism: A belief system in which natural objects are 
assumed to represent the ground of relationship within a 
social group. 
Vitalism: A doctrine associated with pre-scientific 
biology which asserts that life originates in a vital 
principle distinct from chemical or other physical forces. 
The origin of the concept has been equated with 
Aristotle's 'entelechy' - the vital function which 
transforms mere substance into a living organism and which 
simultaneously strives towards a state of perfection. 
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